AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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HC you make a very good point and believe me when I say things are and have changed. That is why the facilities now exist in Aberdeen, Malaysia, China and soon hopefully Brazil. The roll out for the EC175 should see an EC FFS in place in the absolute minimum time possible after AC certification.
DB
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 9th Sep 2013 at 09:43.
The same situation existed for the EC-155 too: we started operating in 2001 and the FFS came into service in 2004! Meantime, we trained about 30 pilots - most of whom came straight off the B212.....
I understood what the pasenger was asking, but my point was that in a properly operated environment these concepts are so basic and intrinsic that they should not require detailed discussion within the cockpit, but should be detailed comprehensively in the OMB/OMA and thereafter referred to as SOP. Variations from that SOP do need to be briefed in more detail - using knowledge gained in training - such as flying with a u/s collective trim and therefore a degraded coupled status. In fact, during simulator training, we would use a collective trim failure as a recognised malfunction, specifically to create this unfamiliar "mixed mode" situation.
212 and others. The point made by the passenger, The Learner, was specifically directed at the brief correlating in simple language who does what with the controls during an approach, such that both crew fully recognise beforehand how all three profiles, lateral, longitudinal and vertical, will be managed and modulated thought the approach.
Having left the NS 3 yrs ago my knowledge of SOPs and briefs is a little out of date.
However, in my time briefs would be said parrot fashion as it was generally obvious what type of approach was being done and how it would be flown.
I believe that briefs should reflect the conditions that are being flown in. If it is good VMC and the deck approach is simple the perhaps a call "standard brief - if we go around it will be to the L or R"
Should the conditions be marginal - as it seems to have been at Sumburgh then a very detailed brief should be given encompassing everything that needs to be done/monitored during the approach so a successful landing can be made.
I can see one problem that may happen is that companies want to standardise checklists/SOPs across the whole of their global operations. This may produce checklists/SOPs which are too broad and fail to take account of individual operational limits.
Have the autopilots become too complicated and not fully understood by crews who have had little training in all the quirks and dangers of the system. It seems that the 332L2 autopilot does have "gotchas" which EC obviously recognised and HC praises the 225 as being very capable and safe to use.
HF
However, in my time briefs would be said parrot fashion as it was generally obvious what type of approach was being done and how it would be flown.
I believe that briefs should reflect the conditions that are being flown in. If it is good VMC and the deck approach is simple the perhaps a call "standard brief - if we go around it will be to the L or R"
Should the conditions be marginal - as it seems to have been at Sumburgh then a very detailed brief should be given encompassing everything that needs to be done/monitored during the approach so a successful landing can be made.
I can see one problem that may happen is that companies want to standardise checklists/SOPs across the whole of their global operations. This may produce checklists/SOPs which are too broad and fail to take account of individual operational limits.
Have the autopilots become too complicated and not fully understood by crews who have had little training in all the quirks and dangers of the system. It seems that the 332L2 autopilot does have "gotchas" which EC obviously recognised and HC praises the 225 as being very capable and safe to use.
HF
Luck plays a big part in these things. In the early days Management aviation(Bond) had two full main gearbox failures on the 58T's. One just as the aircraft flared on to a helideck and the second just after the aircraft coasted in, resulting in an auto to a field in north Lincs. One minute earlier on each occasion would have resulted in a ditching.
I believe that with the exception of one (two?) helideck accidents Bond never had a fatality up to the point when they were bought out by HS. I believe there was only one ditching, 105 G-AZOM which ironically was a Bristow aircraft on lease.
This was in a period when BA, BIH and Bristow all had serious accidents.
However in the light of the comments on training a quote from I don't know where.
" The more I practice the luckier I get" (Golf related)
I believe that with the exception of one (two?) helideck accidents Bond never had a fatality up to the point when they were bought out by HS. I believe there was only one ditching, 105 G-AZOM which ironically was a Bristow aircraft on lease.
This was in a period when BA, BIH and Bristow all had serious accidents.
However in the light of the comments on training a quote from I don't know where.
" The more I practice the luckier I get" (Golf related)
Last edited by ericferret; 9th Sep 2013 at 11:37.
Contrary to this, on my side of the NS, not one UK Instructor has ever approached us for guidance or advice on operational issues such as DAFCS deplyoment and management despite the introduction of new and fantastic tools such as the Standard Groundspeed Mode. This is culture working against us. I am not criticising the individuals involved as I know well they fear that seeking such advice would be viewed poorly by their management and is probably sanctioned formally. This is poor culture. This has to change.
I saw great examples of that when teaching in the Sim when some British TRI's came through for training....with some predictable negative results in both Pilot Performance and Programmed Training for the Crews.
The attitude has got to be such that we can learn from anyone and everyone....being able to pick and choose what works best and produces the best outcome should be the goal.
I have always tried to learn from others even if it was "I shall never ever do that in that manner!".
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Mitcha,
thank you for the chronological correction. Still I think the point is valid, 3 x CFITs in 3 very different and disperse in capability helicopters in the UK sector.
I think this strongly implores us to look inward at our training, procedures, attitudes and culture. No stone left unturned.
A good start would be an emphasis on the appropriate use of automation and its associated procedures. Above all, 3 axis approaches in minimum weather in a 4 axis capable machine we should endeavour to rule out by OM prohibition.
DB
thank you for the chronological correction. Still I think the point is valid, 3 x CFITs in 3 very different and disperse in capability helicopters in the UK sector.
I think this strongly implores us to look inward at our training, procedures, attitudes and culture. No stone left unturned.
A good start would be an emphasis on the appropriate use of automation and its associated procedures. Above all, 3 axis approaches in minimum weather in a 4 axis capable machine we should endeavour to rule out by OM prohibition.
DB
Hand-flying an instrument approach isn't impossibly difficult; you can teach Squaddies to do it. Using the available technology to make life easier makes sense. I can see the argument for allowing the autopilot to do the work, but have we (ie you) allowed manual IF skills to be degraded enough to see another aircraft flown into the sea? What were our gallant aviators doing while the aircraft slowed and descended from the "recommended" profile?
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I am not criticising the individuals involved as I know well they fear that seeking such advice would be viewed poorly by their management and is probably sanctioned formally. This is poor culture. This has to change.
In the meantime, we, the crews have to do our level best to provide the service that our passengers deserve when they are our responsibility. With winter approaching, I hope we don't hear "well $%^& have just launched" or the like. We need to be a little more joined up and take the best from all the operators. We don't need to share commercial secrets, but flying and operating safely isn't a secret!
Used to be we sat on the ground until the first scheduled aircraft took off....jumping the queue was considered bad form...even when it was the other guys who were first up.
Are we saying those days of Pilots working with one another have passed on to competition in every aspect of the Operation?
Are we saying those days of Pilots working with one another have passed on to competition in every aspect of the Operation?
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I have worked in a EC subsidiary and a high priority from Marignane was that the subsidiaries must work closely with local industry in order for the factory to better understand, anticipate and help prevent incidents and improve the product. Problem is politics and self importance and mistrust often rightfully from the industry made this impossible and thus the experience and knowledge that could have been gained is lost-culture again? My interpretation only!
We have been evaluating all our SOP'S, manuals, checklist etc the last week using this thread as a different reference-ie suggestions, possible weaknesses listed, causes and prevention etc. Although approved and having passed many a OGP audit, we very quickly found big discrepencies in light of what is to learn here-unnecessary complexities, missing detail, incorrect references to our specific aircraft and systems and operation etc. Simple things but we had gaps that could have led to a incident. Enthusiastically we started cleaning up and removing big words that made no sense, changed briefings, shortened checklists, simplify multi crew ops etc. Handed in our suggested amendments with great pride as normally we dont like paperwork. Culture? We were told by Quality and Safety that our amendments does not comply with their laid down requirements they use for auditing
We have been evaluating all our SOP'S, manuals, checklist etc the last week using this thread as a different reference-ie suggestions, possible weaknesses listed, causes and prevention etc. Although approved and having passed many a OGP audit, we very quickly found big discrepencies in light of what is to learn here-unnecessary complexities, missing detail, incorrect references to our specific aircraft and systems and operation etc. Simple things but we had gaps that could have led to a incident. Enthusiastically we started cleaning up and removing big words that made no sense, changed briefings, shortened checklists, simplify multi crew ops etc. Handed in our suggested amendments with great pride as normally we dont like paperwork. Culture? We were told by Quality and Safety that our amendments does not comply with their laid down requirements they use for auditing
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Enthusiastically we started cleaning up and removing big words that made no sense, changed briefings, shortened checklists, simplify multi crew ops etc. Handed in our suggested amendments with great pride as normally we dont like paperwork. Culture? We were told by Quality and Safety that our amendments does not comply with their laid down requirements they use for auditing
I'll admit I haven't read the last few days posts so please excuse me if its a repost, but all of this talk of the ap/fd being the cause, I was sent this and it's worth watching even if not related to this accident.
Last edited by helimutt; 9th Sep 2013 at 18:06.
Well done helimutt - I couldn't remember where I had seen that clip - it is certainly very pertinent.
About 15 years ago, my parents' next door neighbour who was a recently retired senior training captain on 747s with BA, told me a number of his colleagues had taken to hiring light twins (no, not the cheeky girls) in their own time as they had so little hands on time in the 747, they were seriously concerned at their ability to hand fly the aircraft was waning quickly.
About 15 years ago, my parents' next door neighbour who was a recently retired senior training captain on 747s with BA, told me a number of his colleagues had taken to hiring light twins (no, not the cheeky girls) in their own time as they had so little hands on time in the 747, they were seriously concerned at their ability to hand fly the aircraft was waning quickly.
Originally Posted by Brom
At a push you could probably teach SLF to do it as well, given enough time.
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On the topic of CFIT style accidents. Apart from the development of our own SOPs and amending of checklists with the intention of making aircraft operation as safe as possible. I think the aircraft OEM’s have still much work left to do to help improve helicopter flight safety.
Should you be unlucky to still fly in an older machine the use of a RADALT bug might be the only system available to alert the crew of it’s proximity to either water or terrain and that’s not much of a safety net. I’m fortunate to operate a modern aircraft that provides far more S/A, largely thanks to it’s EGPWS, which is an improvement albeit with the odd spurious or unnecessary warnings from time to time, but I think we could do with more system improvements to aid S/A and safety.
Ultimately this accident occurred after the aircraft departed a desirable part of the flight envelope into the undesired for reasons yet to be determined. Should a crew not spot this development, why can’t the aircraft systems alert them? Or better why can’t they intervene? Or even better….do both?
During instrument approaches a programmable airspeed alert bug or/and vertical speed alert bug with ability to temporarily suspend the warning could be introduced to help alert a crew of an aircrafts departure from a desired segment of the flight envelope thus improving S/A. I’m thinking of a setting for either low airspeed or high rate of descent, which in addition to the present EGPWS modes could be useful.
The ability to temporarily suspend the protection is useful to prevent unnecessary warnings that merely desensitise the crew to warnings. Personally I believe this desensitisation to warnings is hugely underrated. The key is to get the warning when you absolutely positively need it; a point lost on far to many pilots, operators and perhaps OEMs who seem all to happy to hear them……it really bugs me…..boom boom!
As an example of a potential design oversight, the aircraft I fly can be flown coupled through it’s alert bug for RAD ALT whilst in a coupled hover mode……I’d love to know why? I think the AFCS demanded reference should always stop at the alert “safety” bug as the pilot will have set the radalt alert bug with the intention to remain above it. Should the pilot need to go lower they can always take control manually and do so.
Extra automation could help. I’m sure this has probably been already considered by the OEMs, but why not have an auto go-around function? Many generic helicopters can’t presently “couple up” at low airspeeds. But the aircraft is able to perfectly record data all the way to its demise. Clearly there are parts of the flight envelope you do not want to be in whilst operating close to water or terrain. So why don’t the OEMs provide an option to equip aircraft with an automatic AFCS “get out of jail card” upon detection of its occupancy in the undesired bitty of the aircraft flight envelope. To costly?
Soz if already discussed, been occupied.
Pig
Should you be unlucky to still fly in an older machine the use of a RADALT bug might be the only system available to alert the crew of it’s proximity to either water or terrain and that’s not much of a safety net. I’m fortunate to operate a modern aircraft that provides far more S/A, largely thanks to it’s EGPWS, which is an improvement albeit with the odd spurious or unnecessary warnings from time to time, but I think we could do with more system improvements to aid S/A and safety.
Ultimately this accident occurred after the aircraft departed a desirable part of the flight envelope into the undesired for reasons yet to be determined. Should a crew not spot this development, why can’t the aircraft systems alert them? Or better why can’t they intervene? Or even better….do both?
During instrument approaches a programmable airspeed alert bug or/and vertical speed alert bug with ability to temporarily suspend the warning could be introduced to help alert a crew of an aircrafts departure from a desired segment of the flight envelope thus improving S/A. I’m thinking of a setting for either low airspeed or high rate of descent, which in addition to the present EGPWS modes could be useful.
The ability to temporarily suspend the protection is useful to prevent unnecessary warnings that merely desensitise the crew to warnings. Personally I believe this desensitisation to warnings is hugely underrated. The key is to get the warning when you absolutely positively need it; a point lost on far to many pilots, operators and perhaps OEMs who seem all to happy to hear them……it really bugs me…..boom boom!
As an example of a potential design oversight, the aircraft I fly can be flown coupled through it’s alert bug for RAD ALT whilst in a coupled hover mode……I’d love to know why? I think the AFCS demanded reference should always stop at the alert “safety” bug as the pilot will have set the radalt alert bug with the intention to remain above it. Should the pilot need to go lower they can always take control manually and do so.
Extra automation could help. I’m sure this has probably been already considered by the OEMs, but why not have an auto go-around function? Many generic helicopters can’t presently “couple up” at low airspeeds. But the aircraft is able to perfectly record data all the way to its demise. Clearly there are parts of the flight envelope you do not want to be in whilst operating close to water or terrain. So why don’t the OEMs provide an option to equip aircraft with an automatic AFCS “get out of jail card” upon detection of its occupancy in the undesired bitty of the aircraft flight envelope. To costly?
Soz if already discussed, been occupied.
Pig
Last edited by IFR Piglet; 9th Sep 2013 at 19:59.
Chief Bottle Washer
We have been evaluating all our SOP'S, manuals, checklist etc the last week using this thread as a different reference-ie suggestions, possible weaknesses listed, causes and prevention etc. Although approved and having passed many a OGP audit, we very quickly found big discrepencies in light of what is to learn here-unnecessary complexities, missing detail, incorrect references to our specific aircraft and systems and operation etc. Simple things but we had gaps that could have led to a incident. Enthusiastically we started cleaning up and removing big words that made no sense, changed briefings, shortened checklists, simplify multi crew ops etc. Handed in our suggested amendments with great pride as normally we dont like paperwork. Culture? We were told by Quality and Safety that our amendments does not comply with their laid down requirements they use for auditing
If anything is picked up from this thread by someone within management, it is this.
If anything is picked up from this thread by the passengers, it is this.
If anything is picked up from this thread by the CAA, it is this.
The very culture that has been railed against for 75 pages.
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Re: the video
I'll admit I haven't read the last few days posts so please excuse me if its a repost, but all of this talk of the ap/fd being the cause, I was sent this and it's worth watching even if not related to this accident.
And I always wondered what happened to Henry Winkler