Crash near Bude, Cornwall: 24th July 2011
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I must be missing something. Albeit I get the basis of AnFis post.
PPLs are taught to fly VFR/VMC referencing a visual horizon to a position on a windscreen. They start this exercise away from the ground and learn how it is harder (in the early stages) mastering this art nearer the ground whilst hovering. If the horizon disappears due to low cloud, then how is there anything inadvertent about the inevitable?
Why do sections of our community insist upon pressing on until tragedy? Many FIs and FEs go to great lengths to ensure their students are safe and responsible. Legislation aside, you're an FE aren't you AnFi? For the 20-30% you quote do they fail check rides?
IMHO the problems are far wider than the individual. So to add to the controvesy.
Because helicopter flying is fun, a ppl course may not point out they can't fly all of the time, or that as a PPL no flight is that urgent that it cannot wait until another time.
A mindset that failing to reach your planned destination is a shamefull failure. From one of the earliest posts on this thread - it's been suggested local weather was worse than forecast and after 3 failed attempts to make progress (to a site less than 20 miles away) a low ground route and a break in the weather allowed progress to be made. The forecast is but a planning aid, if you encounter worse then rework the plan. If I diverted or picked a field due to unexpected nasty low clag, then I'd need a significant sustained improvement to warrant an attempt to continue VFR/VMC. So why do we try multiple attempts in the hope of finding a lucky gap?
Some schools simply authorise SFH sorties taking little direct interest in exactly where and what a sortie will involve. Perhaps some places actually enforcing their SFH limits and taking some accountability would be another good starting point.
In a similar vein hands up all those pilots that know of industry peers that fly unstabilised single engined helicopters in cloud. (Or proclaim that in bad weather you simply go lower and slower and then lower and slower still.... so that some get so low and so slow, without landing in a field, that control in IMC becomes basically impossible) We all know that many feel that they have the required skills so why restrict flight in cloud to stabilised twins and IFR qualified pilots. Legality aside, these pilots may have the required ability, but lesser mortals that hear of their tales (because skud running and going into cloud and the subsequent recovery is so easy/so cool/so much fun and therefore warrants boastful group discussion) and attempt similar may/clearly don't. I've overheard stories like this from ppls, and cpls and am as guility as all the other listeners for sometimes staying quiet and not saying publicly to their face that they are idiots. Instead we do it quietly. Perhaps as a community we should all take an interest in trying to stop these type of crashes before legislation cripples us?
The SIM IMC training I felt was included to show it was different to looking out the window. I dont think it was ever intended to be a panacea for surviving if going IMC at low level and/or low speed when stress levels are already through the roof. Every CFI on the planet has the ability to ensure their FIs make it clear that SIM IMC is nothing like the real thing and that failing to heed that warning will probably prove very costly.
Re the FNPT suggestion. This was an idea I discussed with another probably two years ago. Our slant was to suggest that insurers offered a lower premium to operators/owners whom only used pilots that had voluntarily attended a course on poor weather flying run at an FNPT. We came up with a basic course suggestion run over 1-2 days (depending on numbers) in conjunction with an FNPT operator and even had discussion with a major UK insurer..... but some how the idea just fizzled out
PPLs are taught to fly VFR/VMC referencing a visual horizon to a position on a windscreen. They start this exercise away from the ground and learn how it is harder (in the early stages) mastering this art nearer the ground whilst hovering. If the horizon disappears due to low cloud, then how is there anything inadvertent about the inevitable?
Why do sections of our community insist upon pressing on until tragedy? Many FIs and FEs go to great lengths to ensure their students are safe and responsible. Legislation aside, you're an FE aren't you AnFi? For the 20-30% you quote do they fail check rides?
IMHO the problems are far wider than the individual. So to add to the controvesy.
Because helicopter flying is fun, a ppl course may not point out they can't fly all of the time, or that as a PPL no flight is that urgent that it cannot wait until another time.
A mindset that failing to reach your planned destination is a shamefull failure. From one of the earliest posts on this thread - it's been suggested local weather was worse than forecast and after 3 failed attempts to make progress (to a site less than 20 miles away) a low ground route and a break in the weather allowed progress to be made. The forecast is but a planning aid, if you encounter worse then rework the plan. If I diverted or picked a field due to unexpected nasty low clag, then I'd need a significant sustained improvement to warrant an attempt to continue VFR/VMC. So why do we try multiple attempts in the hope of finding a lucky gap?
Some schools simply authorise SFH sorties taking little direct interest in exactly where and what a sortie will involve. Perhaps some places actually enforcing their SFH limits and taking some accountability would be another good starting point.
In a similar vein hands up all those pilots that know of industry peers that fly unstabilised single engined helicopters in cloud. (Or proclaim that in bad weather you simply go lower and slower and then lower and slower still.... so that some get so low and so slow, without landing in a field, that control in IMC becomes basically impossible) We all know that many feel that they have the required skills so why restrict flight in cloud to stabilised twins and IFR qualified pilots. Legality aside, these pilots may have the required ability, but lesser mortals that hear of their tales (because skud running and going into cloud and the subsequent recovery is so easy/so cool/so much fun and therefore warrants boastful group discussion) and attempt similar may/clearly don't. I've overheard stories like this from ppls, and cpls and am as guility as all the other listeners for sometimes staying quiet and not saying publicly to their face that they are idiots. Instead we do it quietly. Perhaps as a community we should all take an interest in trying to stop these type of crashes before legislation cripples us?
The SIM IMC training I felt was included to show it was different to looking out the window. I dont think it was ever intended to be a panacea for surviving if going IMC at low level and/or low speed when stress levels are already through the roof. Every CFI on the planet has the ability to ensure their FIs make it clear that SIM IMC is nothing like the real thing and that failing to heed that warning will probably prove very costly.
Re the FNPT suggestion. This was an idea I discussed with another probably two years ago. Our slant was to suggest that insurers offered a lower premium to operators/owners whom only used pilots that had voluntarily attended a course on poor weather flying run at an FNPT. We came up with a basic course suggestion run over 1-2 days (depending on numbers) in conjunction with an FNPT operator and even had discussion with a major UK insurer..... but some how the idea just fizzled out
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Meteorology may also play a part.
This accident happened near the Cornish coast and the film of the crash site clearly showed IMC weather conditions.
But, I was speaking to a non-pilot, who surfs around Cornwall, and he said that, at times, the sea mist can roll in very quickly and unexpectedly catching out sailors, surfers and even people on the beach, who lose site of their kids - one minute it's bright and sunny, the next it's grey and gloomy.
What are the tell tale signs to look out for?
This accident happened near the Cornish coast and the film of the crash site clearly showed IMC weather conditions.
But, I was speaking to a non-pilot, who surfs around Cornwall, and he said that, at times, the sea mist can roll in very quickly and unexpectedly catching out sailors, surfers and even people on the beach, who lose site of their kids - one minute it's bright and sunny, the next it's grey and gloomy.
What are the tell tale signs to look out for?
My son has just passed his driving test. Occasionally when I sit with him while he drives, I often squirm at his inexperience and I have to say to myself, he has passed his test and he has proven he is competent to drive.
As we all know in the Uk, this does not include skid training, night driving, heavy rain, heavy motorway traffic moving at speed, etc etc.
We all hope and pray that our young ones will survive those precious months/years where they gain that experience and where they can put more and more distance between themselves and that awful day when/if they do crash.
It's called LIFE and us humans court risk just getting out of bed. It's what controls the gene pool!
This unfortunate character didn't have the luxury of putting that distance between passing his PPL(H) and his day of reckoning. He becomes another statistic and frankly, I don't think anyone on this planet could have prevented his demise....least of all himself. No-one to blame - just a roll of the dice - wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong tools.
Very very sad, he must have been absolutely frozen with fear.
As we all know in the Uk, this does not include skid training, night driving, heavy rain, heavy motorway traffic moving at speed, etc etc.
We all hope and pray that our young ones will survive those precious months/years where they gain that experience and where they can put more and more distance between themselves and that awful day when/if they do crash.
It's called LIFE and us humans court risk just getting out of bed. It's what controls the gene pool!
This unfortunate character didn't have the luxury of putting that distance between passing his PPL(H) and his day of reckoning. He becomes another statistic and frankly, I don't think anyone on this planet could have prevented his demise....least of all himself. No-one to blame - just a roll of the dice - wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong tools.
Very very sad, he must have been absolutely frozen with fear.
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Of course, change is now unlikely to be possible within a generation (in Europe). The great EASA monolith has been created with all its inertia: committees of non-aviators completely obsessed with bureaucracy and airlines, checking the checkers and auditing almost everything to death. Who cares if a few tens of GA hele pilots get killed? Are the IHST and similar people going to be able to make changes? I would not bet my modest pension on it.
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Hi Flingwings, you said:
I must be missing something. Precisely my point! Albeit I get the basis of AnFis post. Thanks
PPLs are taught to fly VFR/VMC referencing a visual horizon to a position on a windscreen. They start this exercise away from the ground and learn how it is harder (in the early stages) mastering this art nearer the ground whilst hovering. If the horizon disappears due to low cloud, then how is there anything inadvertent about the inevitable? Yes - they can't see the cues you (and I , and most people here) just find blindingly obvious ... try it with in-experienced pilots - I am sure you will be surprised. Yes that is what I am saying - the I is Inevitable not Inadvertant
(and it's not as simple as the horizon disappearing due to low cloud ... it depends on combinations of poor vis and low cloud - if the vis is 40km when the horizon dissapears due to cloud it is because the guy has flown into it already ... if the furthest point in your world is 4k away with varying visibility then avoiding flying into a cloud which you have not detected because it has no contrast against the poor vis requires some skills not yet formally identified - these skills are required when the vis is 100km over featureless conditions etc etc etc too many variables to do justice to it here...)
Why do sections of our community insist upon pressing on until tragedy? Sometimes they just don't know they are Many FIs and FEs go to great lengths to ensure their students are safe and responsible. Legislation aside, you're an FE aren't you AnFi? For the 20-30% you quote do they fail check rides? The flight tests do not require the specific tests required to reveal whether pilots have this skill set - it should ... personally I do my best to make sure pilots are equipped - if the issue is not recognised then it is unlikely that others will know of this issue.
Skill tests are most often not performed under conditions requiring skills which the pilot becomes licensed to exercise. A conscious effort by the examiner to place the candidate in a position (under appropriate conditions) where he must make these judgments is not as far as I am aware a common feature of the testing process....
When the vis is 8km in haze, in a low-cue environment and the visual world stops ahead as the cloud and hills meet - almost everybody here would recognise the dead-end nature of that flight path ... some do not. I don't believe that basic skill is tested in general...
HIHOVER of the 1000 LSTs you have performed on how many candidates have you performed this in challenging conditions (even 6k 1200ft) and deliberately loaded the candidate with a task whilst placing him in a scenario where he must take action to avoid IMC?
I suspect if you did you might be surprised at the result ...
(1000 tests is not 1000 pilots - maybe 300, of which 20% were 'babies' 10% in poor conditions perhaps, gives 6 pilots 20% of those displaying questionable ability to maintain Visual References leaves about 1.2 pilots who you might have encountered were not good at maintaining VR - have you notice 1.2 pilots like that ?) - Just a thought - worth considering - no?
... it is rather surprising that there is a skill set SO BASIC that you (and I and others) don't even realise that it is a skill set, and can't imagine there are people who don't have it. Look with an open mind and you might be surprised.
I know a thoroughly excellent (now) instructor (of 7 yrs) who whilst a PPL of 5yrs I overheard saying something which made me believe he was not processing the visual field correctly - I took him immediately flying and found that it was indeed the case that he was mis-interpreting what he saw ... showed it to him it was obvious to him and he was cured, and very good. It made me attuned to the issue.
Only trying to help....
... of course I might be wrong and the world is really full of adults with five year old children who are just so irresponsible and suicidal that they happily arrogantly and confidently launch into conditions requiring skills they don't posses - knowingly because they are mad and should be hit with a bigger stick...
... dead pilots can't speak ... those left have a duty to consider their case with absolute fairness, and not just brand them as idiots (although that may still be the case)
Good analogy TC - and 'wrong tools' includes teaching... Experience is only experience if you don't kill yourself getting it...
(obviously there is a mix of reasons and scenarios in reality - I am just saying that one factor is the surprising inability of some to interpret what they see and how to maintain their visual references - I'll get my coat then....)
I must be missing something. Precisely my point! Albeit I get the basis of AnFis post. Thanks
PPLs are taught to fly VFR/VMC referencing a visual horizon to a position on a windscreen. They start this exercise away from the ground and learn how it is harder (in the early stages) mastering this art nearer the ground whilst hovering. If the horizon disappears due to low cloud, then how is there anything inadvertent about the inevitable? Yes - they can't see the cues you (and I , and most people here) just find blindingly obvious ... try it with in-experienced pilots - I am sure you will be surprised. Yes that is what I am saying - the I is Inevitable not Inadvertant
(and it's not as simple as the horizon disappearing due to low cloud ... it depends on combinations of poor vis and low cloud - if the vis is 40km when the horizon dissapears due to cloud it is because the guy has flown into it already ... if the furthest point in your world is 4k away with varying visibility then avoiding flying into a cloud which you have not detected because it has no contrast against the poor vis requires some skills not yet formally identified - these skills are required when the vis is 100km over featureless conditions etc etc etc too many variables to do justice to it here...)
Why do sections of our community insist upon pressing on until tragedy? Sometimes they just don't know they are Many FIs and FEs go to great lengths to ensure their students are safe and responsible. Legislation aside, you're an FE aren't you AnFi? For the 20-30% you quote do they fail check rides? The flight tests do not require the specific tests required to reveal whether pilots have this skill set - it should ... personally I do my best to make sure pilots are equipped - if the issue is not recognised then it is unlikely that others will know of this issue.
Skill tests are most often not performed under conditions requiring skills which the pilot becomes licensed to exercise. A conscious effort by the examiner to place the candidate in a position (under appropriate conditions) where he must make these judgments is not as far as I am aware a common feature of the testing process....
When the vis is 8km in haze, in a low-cue environment and the visual world stops ahead as the cloud and hills meet - almost everybody here would recognise the dead-end nature of that flight path ... some do not. I don't believe that basic skill is tested in general...
HIHOVER of the 1000 LSTs you have performed on how many candidates have you performed this in challenging conditions (even 6k 1200ft) and deliberately loaded the candidate with a task whilst placing him in a scenario where he must take action to avoid IMC?
I suspect if you did you might be surprised at the result ...
(1000 tests is not 1000 pilots - maybe 300, of which 20% were 'babies' 10% in poor conditions perhaps, gives 6 pilots 20% of those displaying questionable ability to maintain Visual References leaves about 1.2 pilots who you might have encountered were not good at maintaining VR - have you notice 1.2 pilots like that ?) - Just a thought - worth considering - no?
... it is rather surprising that there is a skill set SO BASIC that you (and I and others) don't even realise that it is a skill set, and can't imagine there are people who don't have it. Look with an open mind and you might be surprised.
I know a thoroughly excellent (now) instructor (of 7 yrs) who whilst a PPL of 5yrs I overheard saying something which made me believe he was not processing the visual field correctly - I took him immediately flying and found that it was indeed the case that he was mis-interpreting what he saw ... showed it to him it was obvious to him and he was cured, and very good. It made me attuned to the issue.
Only trying to help....
... of course I might be wrong and the world is really full of adults with five year old children who are just so irresponsible and suicidal that they happily arrogantly and confidently launch into conditions requiring skills they don't posses - knowingly because they are mad and should be hit with a bigger stick...
... dead pilots can't speak ... those left have a duty to consider their case with absolute fairness, and not just brand them as idiots (although that may still be the case)
Good analogy TC - and 'wrong tools' includes teaching... Experience is only experience if you don't kill yourself getting it...
(obviously there is a mix of reasons and scenarios in reality - I am just saying that one factor is the surprising inability of some to interpret what they see and how to maintain their visual references - I'll get my coat then....)
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FLY 7, I can concur with your source of information. I happened to be not far from the accident site (fortunately surfing rather than flying) and the cloud did seem to just descent in a very short period of time. One minute there was good vis, the next you could not see the hill tops and the next you could hardly see across the car park. A grim day for many reasons.
As for the debate around the 5hrs of PPL IR 'training'. I can admit to having been foolish shortly after passing my test and found myself with heavily reduced vis (again by the coast but more from going into a wall of clag rather than it coming down on me from above) but managed to remember enough to execute a smart 180 and popped straight out again. It scared the cr@p out of me but things would have been far worse if I had not had that training.
Did the training give me a false sense of ability ? - yes
Would I rather not have had it ? - no
Should simulated precautionary land-outs be taught ? - yes (but how does this fit into the UK restriction regarding training at licensed airfields only and does every training establishment have a friendly farmer nearby ?)
TB
As for the debate around the 5hrs of PPL IR 'training'. I can admit to having been foolish shortly after passing my test and found myself with heavily reduced vis (again by the coast but more from going into a wall of clag rather than it coming down on me from above) but managed to remember enough to execute a smart 180 and popped straight out again. It scared the cr@p out of me but things would have been far worse if I had not had that training.
Did the training give me a false sense of ability ? - yes
Would I rather not have had it ? - no
Should simulated precautionary land-outs be taught ? - yes (but how does this fit into the UK restriction regarding training at licensed airfields only and does every training establishment have a friendly farmer nearby ?)
TB
HTC
In my days of instruction, I did this about 7 times in 8 years. Those who did my CFI course over the years have heard me talk about the "guitar talk".....
The crunch is - how many schools/CFIs will throw away $/£k's income and tell a student that they are dangerous and should take up flower arranging/etc. Even if they have a conscience and do will the (wannabe) pilot of the attitude I can do it because...take any notice and give up or will they just move to a school that isn't as ethical in trying to stop the 'wrong' type of people learning to fly?
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This thread seems to focus on errors in aeronautical decision making committed by "PPL's." One only need read a reasonable number of accident reports to observe that those with CPL and ATPL are having difficulties with ADM, not only with respect to IIMC, but many other issues as well (but hopefully to a lesser degree). At risk of being acused of thread creep (and possibly other serious transgressions), here is a link to a recent NTSB investigation which drives this home in a compelling way. This is a plank accident but, highly relevant when we are trying to better understand failures in ADM. The report is long and somewhat repetitive, but an education and then some. For those not inclined to read it, a brief summary:
1. the pilot held an ATP certificate, was ex-military and ex-airline, and had 2000+ hours in make/model (Pilatus PC-12). He had recent recurrent make/model training and an otherwise unblemished flying record over about 40 years.
2. He made a choice to operate the accident aircraft with 14 people on board (certified for a maximum of 11, and in this case, equipped with 10 seats/seat belts), at almost 600 lbs above max gross weight, and did not add fuel anti icing agent (FSII) as required by the AFM. Furthermore, the accident flight was not the first time he made these choices.
He killed himself an 13 others as a result of these decisions. I would agree with others here that pilots with limited experience often dont know what they dont know. This was not a case of not knowing better. Why did he choose the course of action that he did?
NTSB report here: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/AAR1105.pdf
1. the pilot held an ATP certificate, was ex-military and ex-airline, and had 2000+ hours in make/model (Pilatus PC-12). He had recent recurrent make/model training and an otherwise unblemished flying record over about 40 years.
2. He made a choice to operate the accident aircraft with 14 people on board (certified for a maximum of 11, and in this case, equipped with 10 seats/seat belts), at almost 600 lbs above max gross weight, and did not add fuel anti icing agent (FSII) as required by the AFM. Furthermore, the accident flight was not the first time he made these choices.
He killed himself an 13 others as a result of these decisions. I would agree with others here that pilots with limited experience often dont know what they dont know. This was not a case of not knowing better. Why did he choose the course of action that he did?
NTSB report here: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/AAR1105.pdf
Last edited by EN48; 28th Jul 2011 at 17:07.
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EN48, you just beat me to it. Yes there is a tendency in this discussion towards pointing fingers at PPLs....and that should not be the case because this is an issue that is industry-wide. IIMC occurs occasionally at all levels in the industry, professional pilots, military pilots, instructors, examiners.....no group seems to be exempt.
Tam
Tam
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Here's what I think should happen
- Ditch the 5 hour IF PPL training, its a complete waste of time and money, and it hasn't reduced the accident numbers
- Introduce a 3-5 hour FNTP training session to cover flight in reduced viz, 180 degree turn, etc - this not to teach people to fly IFR, but more to teach the how hard/dangerous IMC is and how the workload increases quickly
- Change the PPL syllabus so it doesn't end up with instructors concentrating on auto rotations ("engines hardly fail - people do")
- Introduce some method that PPL students and PPL holders are forced to regularly read accident reports and learn about decision making - maybe some sort of computer based training/online course or attendance at a safety seminar(s)?
- Introduce some sort of "land immediately" lesson in the PPL syllabus - it should have just as much importance as PFLs/Autos do now
At the moment instructors are scared of teaching people to land in fields because of daft regulations and scare stories about Rule 5 etc.
The PPL syllabus and LPC testing/training MUST be changed to include decision making, weather avoidance, and landing in a field. At the moment the average LPC is a couple of circuits, and couple of autos, maybe a running landing and that is it. It's a joke.
- Ditch the 5 hour IF PPL training, its a complete waste of time and money, and it hasn't reduced the accident numbers
- Introduce a 3-5 hour FNTP training session to cover flight in reduced viz, 180 degree turn, etc - this not to teach people to fly IFR, but more to teach the how hard/dangerous IMC is and how the workload increases quickly
- Change the PPL syllabus so it doesn't end up with instructors concentrating on auto rotations ("engines hardly fail - people do")
- Introduce some method that PPL students and PPL holders are forced to regularly read accident reports and learn about decision making - maybe some sort of computer based training/online course or attendance at a safety seminar(s)?
- Introduce some sort of "land immediately" lesson in the PPL syllabus - it should have just as much importance as PFLs/Autos do now
At the moment instructors are scared of teaching people to land in fields because of daft regulations and scare stories about Rule 5 etc.
The PPL syllabus and LPC testing/training MUST be changed to include decision making, weather avoidance, and landing in a field. At the moment the average LPC is a couple of circuits, and couple of autos, maybe a running landing and that is it. It's a joke.
Last edited by hands_on123; 28th Jul 2011 at 16:50.
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"Land Immediately" or Off-Field landings due to weather are an absolute last-ditch fix for the basic problem which seems to be poor decision making, poor airmanship or non-existant captaincy. Practice at landing in a field would almost be a waste of effort, any helicopter pilot can do that, it is the lead-up to that point where I believe we need to focus.
Not being there is the first place is what I would like to see pilots aim for. If a pilot has to land in a field because he was "pressing-on" then he has missed several stages of correction and is in need of re-education.
Tam
Not being there is the first place is what I would like to see pilots aim for. If a pilot has to land in a field because he was "pressing-on" then he has missed several stages of correction and is in need of re-education.
Tam
If IIMC accidents were primarily confined to PPLs, then I would believe that poor decision making/captaincy was a primary underlying cause. However, it seems that IIMC misadventures are well distributed across the experience range. It also seems just too frequent to blame on poor decision making.
Maybe weather conditions in many flying areas are just normally unpredictable enough that flying un-stabilized, un-autopiloted helicopters is just inherently dangerous.
Maybe weather conditions in many flying areas are just normally unpredictable enough that flying un-stabilized, un-autopiloted helicopters is just inherently dangerous.
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If you want to teach PPL's what entry into IMC is like get them to wear foggles when facing out to sea on a grey day, that's the closest they'll get beyond actually going into cloud.
Removes the visual references and they may then appreciate how bad it can be.
Also the training relating to "if you inadvertantly enter cloud turn 180..." is far from how most people will end up in this state.
For my sins, I've been in solid cloud at an unusual attitude and it's not fun, I was flying fast between cloud on top and fog below and decided to grab a map from the back, in the short time it took to root around and find the right map in the bag and with no peripheral vision I went from straight and level at 120kt to decreasing airspeed, almost 1000ft/min climb, pitched over at least 20 degrees and in solid cloud. Not fun, with all the best will in the world it took a lot not to panic and to rely on the instruments and not the feeling in the pants. The final outcome probably dictated more by luck than skill or judgement.
I'll put that one in the accumulated luck bag........
Removes the visual references and they may then appreciate how bad it can be.
Also the training relating to "if you inadvertantly enter cloud turn 180..." is far from how most people will end up in this state.
For my sins, I've been in solid cloud at an unusual attitude and it's not fun, I was flying fast between cloud on top and fog below and decided to grab a map from the back, in the short time it took to root around and find the right map in the bag and with no peripheral vision I went from straight and level at 120kt to decreasing airspeed, almost 1000ft/min climb, pitched over at least 20 degrees and in solid cloud. Not fun, with all the best will in the world it took a lot not to panic and to rely on the instruments and not the feeling in the pants. The final outcome probably dictated more by luck than skill or judgement.
I'll put that one in the accumulated luck bag........
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Hmmm, perhaps the outfits that owned the expensive simulators could give one hour to PPL's ffor free, then us ordinary chaps could experiance bad could and vis without tripping accross it for real... costs nothing in real terms, and what better PR.
I'll get my coat.
Kev...
I'll get my coat.
Kev...
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maybe...
If you are a pilot in doubt you could 'book in' with a very experienced local instructor to go out in weather requiring judgment and learn survival/coping strategies... perhaps it will fill some gaps? Might save your life.... Striving for constant improvement is the best way forward...
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Some details of the pilot are printed in the Bristol Evening Post:
This is Bristol | Helicopter victim a top businessman
This is Bristol | Helicopter victim a top businessman
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IMC/VMC
5 hours of IMC training is a waste of time.
It may actually give the inexperienced or unwary a false sense of reality. In that they might actually believe they can instrument fly out of an IMC condition so they believe it's not really a drama if they go IMC.
Flying well 'on the clocks' takes constant practise and is not to be taken lightly. IF is a hard skill to master and 5 hours will get you absolutely nowhere. It will just make you dangerous to yourself and others.
The decision making processes to keep yourself out of the worst sort of trouble are relatively simple.
1. Unless you are flying a fully IFR capable aircraft with a CIR and you are IF current do not go near or in cloud.....EVER.
2. If the vis is getting worse or is even forecast to deteriorate to the point where you can't really see whats coming up then either land immediately in a safe place or turn around and go back to where the weather was good.
Flogging around unqualified and uncurrent in a VFR helicopter when the weather is crap WILL end in disaster sooner or later.
Most, if not all of those minimums and rules found in various forms of legislation around the world are written as a direct result of the last poor guy to push his luck.
One of the harder decisions to learn as a pilot is the decision to land or turn back before it all goes pear shaped. Being in command of an aircraft either VFR or IFR is a big responsibility and with that goes the ability to make the hard decisions. If anything that is the skill that needs to be instilled in training?
Pressonitis....will kill you....one day.
It may actually give the inexperienced or unwary a false sense of reality. In that they might actually believe they can instrument fly out of an IMC condition so they believe it's not really a drama if they go IMC.
Flying well 'on the clocks' takes constant practise and is not to be taken lightly. IF is a hard skill to master and 5 hours will get you absolutely nowhere. It will just make you dangerous to yourself and others.
The decision making processes to keep yourself out of the worst sort of trouble are relatively simple.
1. Unless you are flying a fully IFR capable aircraft with a CIR and you are IF current do not go near or in cloud.....EVER.
2. If the vis is getting worse or is even forecast to deteriorate to the point where you can't really see whats coming up then either land immediately in a safe place or turn around and go back to where the weather was good.
Flogging around unqualified and uncurrent in a VFR helicopter when the weather is crap WILL end in disaster sooner or later.
Most, if not all of those minimums and rules found in various forms of legislation around the world are written as a direct result of the last poor guy to push his luck.
One of the harder decisions to learn as a pilot is the decision to land or turn back before it all goes pear shaped. Being in command of an aircraft either VFR or IFR is a big responsibility and with that goes the ability to make the hard decisions. If anything that is the skill that needs to be instilled in training?
Pressonitis....will kill you....one day.
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From one of the earliest posts on this thread - it's been suggested local weather was worse than forecast and after 3 failed attempts to make progress (to a site less than 20 miles away) a low ground route and a break in the weather allowed progress to be made. The forecast is but a planning aid, if you encounter worse then rework the plan. If I diverted or picked a field due to unexpected nasty low clag, then I'd need a significant sustained improvement to warrant an attempt to continue VFR/VMC. So why do we try multiple attempts in the hope of finding a lucky gap?
Every situation is unique, but what is important is to have a plan with options and to use the options at the right time, not just press on into deteriorating conditions with no 'out'. That's judgement.
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This sort of accident is certainly not the preserve of low hours pilots. As you gain a bit of experience, you distinguish (in your head) yourself from those who have less experience. Inexperienced pilots are less well prepared but it is of course a mistake to think that these things do not happen to those with more time.
Over the years, I can recall several accidents involving CPLs/ATPLs who I had worked with and even checked-out and considered to be "good pilots". They seem to have made what would at first glance be inexplicably poor decisions. The AAIB are very good at what they do, but can only go so far at digging into the motivations of the pilots. But these motivations are, or can be very important. A number of the accidents I am thinking of the pilot had a particular reason to want to complete the flight. In some cases it was because the pax was a "very important" client and the pilot may have felt he needed to ensure the flight was completed as planned. In other cases, there was a rather personal reason for the pilot getting to his destination.
It seems to me that almost any pilot will make really poor decisions, given the right pressures. Not so much a bad pilot as a pilot making poor decisions on a particular occasion. We all need to guard against those pressures, whoever we are.
I have had the (generally) pleasure of doing a fair bit of safety pilot flying over the years. Often this is for the PPL non-IR owners of IFR twin helicopters: they or the operator to whom the aircraft are leased have the good sense to spend a bit of money on a second pair of hands and a bit of a brain. On a number of occasions, I have seen these pilots continuing on in deteriorating conditions. I can see things getting worse, but it would appear that the handling pilot cannot, or does nothing if he does see it. By talking to him/her you can then get him to start to see the clues and to take control of the helicopter. I think it needs more than to tell students/new pilots not to fly in poor conditions: I think that you need to show them what it looks like and what to do about it. I am not sure that the simple simulators do this very well - the real thing is different.
FIs and FEs cannot be blamed for doing what the syllabus includes and no more. It is possible to get a little continuation training done with some private pilots, but you will never get the opportunity to work with the pilots who need it most, when the aviation authorities do not even recommend it.
LH2 had a go at me for suggesting that EASA made any changes to solve this problem more difficult. I was just pointing out that we are an extremely low priority on their hit list. Much of their regulation for helicopters is simply a cut and paste job from the fixed wing world. Even though these IIMC accidents are a major risk for the light helicopter world, it won't figure on their radar. Since, in Europe, they make the rules I think my point was valid.
Over the years, I can recall several accidents involving CPLs/ATPLs who I had worked with and even checked-out and considered to be "good pilots". They seem to have made what would at first glance be inexplicably poor decisions. The AAIB are very good at what they do, but can only go so far at digging into the motivations of the pilots. But these motivations are, or can be very important. A number of the accidents I am thinking of the pilot had a particular reason to want to complete the flight. In some cases it was because the pax was a "very important" client and the pilot may have felt he needed to ensure the flight was completed as planned. In other cases, there was a rather personal reason for the pilot getting to his destination.
It seems to me that almost any pilot will make really poor decisions, given the right pressures. Not so much a bad pilot as a pilot making poor decisions on a particular occasion. We all need to guard against those pressures, whoever we are.
I have had the (generally) pleasure of doing a fair bit of safety pilot flying over the years. Often this is for the PPL non-IR owners of IFR twin helicopters: they or the operator to whom the aircraft are leased have the good sense to spend a bit of money on a second pair of hands and a bit of a brain. On a number of occasions, I have seen these pilots continuing on in deteriorating conditions. I can see things getting worse, but it would appear that the handling pilot cannot, or does nothing if he does see it. By talking to him/her you can then get him to start to see the clues and to take control of the helicopter. I think it needs more than to tell students/new pilots not to fly in poor conditions: I think that you need to show them what it looks like and what to do about it. I am not sure that the simple simulators do this very well - the real thing is different.
FIs and FEs cannot be blamed for doing what the syllabus includes and no more. It is possible to get a little continuation training done with some private pilots, but you will never get the opportunity to work with the pilots who need it most, when the aviation authorities do not even recommend it.
LH2 had a go at me for suggesting that EASA made any changes to solve this problem more difficult. I was just pointing out that we are an extremely low priority on their hit list. Much of their regulation for helicopters is simply a cut and paste job from the fixed wing world. Even though these IIMC accidents are a major risk for the light helicopter world, it won't figure on their radar. Since, in Europe, they make the rules I think my point was valid.
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At least one person agrees ...
Helinut said:
On a number of occasions, I have seen these pilots continuing on in deteriorating conditions. I can see things getting worse, but it would appear that the handling pilot cannot, or does nothing if he does see it. By talking to him/her you can then get him to start to see the clues and to take control of the helicopter. I think it needs more than to tell students/new pilots not to fly in poor conditions: I think that you need to show them what it looks like and what to do about it. I am not sure that the simple simulators do this very well - the real thing is different.
Quite right - some just cannot see it until shown - simulators don't do it...
....it's called VRF
On a number of occasions, I have seen these pilots continuing on in deteriorating conditions. I can see things getting worse, but it would appear that the handling pilot cannot, or does nothing if he does see it. By talking to him/her you can then get him to start to see the clues and to take control of the helicopter. I think it needs more than to tell students/new pilots not to fly in poor conditions: I think that you need to show them what it looks like and what to do about it. I am not sure that the simple simulators do this very well - the real thing is different.
Quite right - some just cannot see it until shown - simulators don't do it...
....it's called VRF