Crash near Bude, Cornwall: 24th July 2011
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I was nearby today too (in a Super Cub) and having trouble with the weather. I may have seen him go past.
May not be relevant, but... I saw an R22 (poss 44) heading West just before I departed Stoodleigh farm strip North of Tiverton for the third time at about 3pm this afternoon - need to check the GPS - as I tried to get back to Eggesford from Leicester. There was a lot of horrible, low drifting clag about with drizzle and the situation was rapidly changing. I eventually got back by heading over the low ground South to Tiverton and Crediton, which coincided with a short break in the weather, but West and North of Eggs it was not nice at all. I know there was quite a lot of clag on the coasts too.
The interesting thing about today in North Devon and North Cornwall was that the TAFs and METARs gave no indication whatsoever of the actual situation.
May not be relevant, but... I saw an R22 (poss 44) heading West just before I departed Stoodleigh farm strip North of Tiverton for the third time at about 3pm this afternoon - need to check the GPS - as I tried to get back to Eggesford from Leicester. There was a lot of horrible, low drifting clag about with drizzle and the situation was rapidly changing. I eventually got back by heading over the low ground South to Tiverton and Crediton, which coincided with a short break in the weather, but West and North of Eggs it was not nice at all. I know there was quite a lot of clag on the coasts too.
The interesting thing about today in North Devon and North Cornwall was that the TAFs and METARs gave no indication whatsoever of the actual situation.
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The pilot reported being 'in cloud, climbing' to ATC and kept his PTT depressed throughout this tragic accident. This was yet another case of VMC into IMC misadventure in a light helicopter.
What a tragic loss of life... RIP
What a tragic loss of life... RIP
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Tragic news, my condolences to his family and friends.
I have thought what I would do in same situation, and maybe for the benefit of others/investigators I would, if I had the presence of mind, keep my transmission open?
RIP
I have thought what I would do in same situation, and maybe for the benefit of others/investigators I would, if I had the presence of mind, keep my transmission open?
RIP
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Tragic for the family of the pilot.
Same old story and I sometimes wonder why the training does not include these
conditions.
All the theory in the world does not prepare some people for get there itis
Same old story and I sometimes wonder why the training does not include these
conditions.
All the theory in the world does not prepare some people for get there itis
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My condolences to the pilot's family and friends. RIP.
I should say that I know nothing about this tragic accident, but from what others say it seems to be almost exactly the same as so, so many others.
Talking in general, these VFR into IMC accidents in light helicopters are just awful, but oh so avoidable. It is nothing to do with what we spend time training students about (i.e. how to control the aircraft) but it is about quite awful decision making.
VFR helicoptering over open countryside, if you don't like what you see, land in a big field. I have done it many times, as I am sure have others. But I did have to learn this the hard way. No one really lead me through it, I learnt by experience. The more you do it, the easier it is to (mentally) do again. The mental barrier is broken.
Our training of pilots is seriously deficient because these sort of decision-making processes are not part of "the syllabus". Of course, we also tend not to train in these poor conditions. As training gets more and more regulated/restricted it is less and less likely that we will find ourselves out in these sort of conditions, where an experienced pilot/instructor can pass on his "wisdom".
If you think about it, there is not much clever about this. A certain amount of pole twiddling - keep clear of cloud, slowdown to be able to stop within your visibility; look critically at what is ahead of you. But mainly it is a question of recognising the land-out option and not being afraid/embarrassed/feeling it is a failure to land-out.
Oh and we should immediately stop that pointless and dangerous "instrument flying" that is part of the standard syllabus. It says exactly the wrong thing to the student. And it simply does not equip them to go IMC, whilst pretending to them that it is possible. In practice, in a small unstabilised light helicopter almost no one will survive a real inadvertent IMC incident.
Of course, change is now unlikely to be possible within a generation (in Europe). The great EASA monolith has been created with all its inertia: committees of non-aviators completely obsessed with bureaucracy and airlines, checking the checkers and auditing almost everything to death. Who cares if a few tens of GA hele pilots get killed? Are the IHST and similar people going to be able to make changes? I would not bet my modest pension on it.
Very sadly.
I should say that I know nothing about this tragic accident, but from what others say it seems to be almost exactly the same as so, so many others.
Talking in general, these VFR into IMC accidents in light helicopters are just awful, but oh so avoidable. It is nothing to do with what we spend time training students about (i.e. how to control the aircraft) but it is about quite awful decision making.
VFR helicoptering over open countryside, if you don't like what you see, land in a big field. I have done it many times, as I am sure have others. But I did have to learn this the hard way. No one really lead me through it, I learnt by experience. The more you do it, the easier it is to (mentally) do again. The mental barrier is broken.
Our training of pilots is seriously deficient because these sort of decision-making processes are not part of "the syllabus". Of course, we also tend not to train in these poor conditions. As training gets more and more regulated/restricted it is less and less likely that we will find ourselves out in these sort of conditions, where an experienced pilot/instructor can pass on his "wisdom".
If you think about it, there is not much clever about this. A certain amount of pole twiddling - keep clear of cloud, slowdown to be able to stop within your visibility; look critically at what is ahead of you. But mainly it is a question of recognising the land-out option and not being afraid/embarrassed/feeling it is a failure to land-out.
Oh and we should immediately stop that pointless and dangerous "instrument flying" that is part of the standard syllabus. It says exactly the wrong thing to the student. And it simply does not equip them to go IMC, whilst pretending to them that it is possible. In practice, in a small unstabilised light helicopter almost no one will survive a real inadvertent IMC incident.
Of course, change is now unlikely to be possible within a generation (in Europe). The great EASA monolith has been created with all its inertia: committees of non-aviators completely obsessed with bureaucracy and airlines, checking the checkers and auditing almost everything to death. Who cares if a few tens of GA hele pilots get killed? Are the IHST and similar people going to be able to make changes? I would not bet my modest pension on it.
Very sadly.
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Same old story and I sometimes wonder why the training does not include these conditions
I dont have the stats but it seems to me that accidents of these type have continued to occur at a similar rate since this training was introduced.
it could be that:
1) instrument training does not replicate very well the actual conditions of going into cloud as depending on the way external references are removed by hoods or foggles that often some external references are still available and therefore it is much easier than flying in real cloud which is also more turbulent and disorientating
2) more emphasis should be placed on avoiding cloud in the first place, as the training and LPC may give the pilot the idea that they have the skills to recover the situation when actually Instrument flying is a perishable skill and actually quite hard in an unstabilised A/C like a 22/44 even if you are current.
maybe time for a rethink about whether IF is taught at all in unstabilsed helicopters as was the situation before 2000.
just my thoughts CF
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maybe time for a rethink about whether IF is taught at all in unstabilised helicopters as was the situation before 2000.
During my CPL course I remember flying with both foggles and makeshift screens. I was managing just fine. I was quite certain I could see nothing outside. Then suddenly, I got a severe case of 'the leans'. I felt as though I was in a very steep right hand turn, and I got so nauseous I told my instructor we might have to stop. He later told me that the time of my disorientation exactly corresponded to us flying through a tiny cloud!
Now, imagine if that had happened if I'd been on my own, as a low hours pilot, in a twitchy little R22, and had had to try to do a 180 and get out. Would I have managed it? I doubt it.
OTOH, I never remember doing even one simulated bad weather landout. Why not? These things are easier if you've tried them first.
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I suspect the problem is less with the 5 hours training and more with what attitude students come out of the course with. I suspect some people will find a way to kill themselves regardless of what they're taught or told, no matter how many times they're told that turns out of cloud are an emergency procedure, just like autos etc.
I think the 'instrument appreciation' time can be useful, if done right. For me, when I did my PPL, I came out absolutely damn sure I didn't want to fly into cloud, because I was scared silly by what I expected the outcome to be. Much later, doing an IR, even having prepared and spent hours in a sim, the first time I took a Bolkow into cloud for more than the time it took to pop above the layer was interesting, and I'm really, really glad I had an instructor in the other seat to catch the initial wobbles. IFR flying requires training, practice, and recency, and PPLs should be made absolutely aware of their deficiencies in this respect as part of the training (or at least, as much as possible).
Having said all that, I'm not an instructor, so I've only been on the receiving end. I believe the 5 hrs in the PPL are useful if done right, as evidenced by my instructor(s) along the way.
I think the 'instrument appreciation' time can be useful, if done right. For me, when I did my PPL, I came out absolutely damn sure I didn't want to fly into cloud, because I was scared silly by what I expected the outcome to be. Much later, doing an IR, even having prepared and spent hours in a sim, the first time I took a Bolkow into cloud for more than the time it took to pop above the layer was interesting, and I'm really, really glad I had an instructor in the other seat to catch the initial wobbles. IFR flying requires training, practice, and recency, and PPLs should be made absolutely aware of their deficiencies in this respect as part of the training (or at least, as much as possible).
Having said all that, I'm not an instructor, so I've only been on the receiving end. I believe the 5 hrs in the PPL are useful if done right, as evidenced by my instructor(s) along the way.
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CF&Helinut - agree with you both also, irrespective of the current 'introduction' to IF flight, there is insufficient' or non existent instruction on the correct planning processes involved to cater for a potential inadvertent IMC whilst en-route - and what to do after that circumstance has been entered into. I prefer to think of the current situation as a familiarisation to enable the pilot to learn how the instruments work and how they are used in such conditions only. Not a means to get you out of the muck when you fly into it. The simple essential fact in all situations where there is an inadvertent IMC is that the pilot failed to make a correct command decision in time and either divert whilst still VMC, or in the worst case land. Unfortunately, not all pilots who hold a license have sufficient quality in command ability.
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Is the R22/R44 not particularly hazardous in IMC conditions?
I'm thinking of several incidents in recent years where an inexperienced pilot has gone into IMC and the resulting consequences have led to the aircraft breaking up in the air.
I'm thinking of several incidents in recent years where an inexperienced pilot has gone into IMC and the resulting consequences have led to the aircraft breaking up in the air.
I don't recall any recent midair breakups due to loss of control in IMC, in helicopters in the UK, at least. In most cases the breakup appears to be the result of hitting the ground (this recent accident, Steve Hislop, et al.).
ANY unstabilised helicopter, single or twin, is likely to cause even the experienced pilot issues in IMC or at night with poor cultural lighting (Mike Goss in an AS355 in 1996).
Perhaps R22 and R44, being the most prevalent light helicopters, are the most likely to feature in the accident reports ?
ANY unstabilised helicopter, single or twin, is likely to cause even the experienced pilot issues in IMC or at night with poor cultural lighting (Mike Goss in an AS355 in 1996).
Perhaps R22 and R44, being the most prevalent light helicopters, are the most likely to feature in the accident reports ?
