Crash near Bude, Cornwall: 24th July 2011
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Poor decisions, poor captaincy and poor airmanship are the problems.
"The least experienced press on while the more experienced turn back, to meet the most experienced who never took off in the first place."
Not always true, but you get the idea!
Was there 2 x 206 from same Co that crashed 2 one going to rescue 1 one in Alaska a few years ago cause no\ poor horizon I think.
AnFi,
The research that Crab took part in at Bedford did indeed find its way into the CAA Paper 2007/03 - Helicopter Flight in Degraded Visual Conditions:
CAA Paper 2007/03: Helicopter Flight in Degraded Visual Conditions | Publications | CAA
It makes interesting reading because of the emphasis on the inversely proportional link between flight in a reduced visual cue environment and handling qualities.
I'm not sure I would like to add anything to Crab's post except to say that birds use the 'tau' strategy to avoid trees and branches, and land so well; and they know nothing about the science of flying.
The nub of this is that you need to have sufficient visual cues in order to be able to fly with visual reference. As Crab has also said, the less stabilised the platform the more visual cues that are required. If there is a secret it is in knowing when the deterioration in the visual cue environment starts to effect your performance; however, that is a function that is heavily influence by the machine, the pilot and the pilot's experience (and personality).
As most have tried to say, it is 'personal limits' that are important; setting them, knowing them and not going beyond them.
Jim
The research that Crab took part in at Bedford did indeed find its way into the CAA Paper 2007/03 - Helicopter Flight in Degraded Visual Conditions:
CAA Paper 2007/03: Helicopter Flight in Degraded Visual Conditions | Publications | CAA
It makes interesting reading because of the emphasis on the inversely proportional link between flight in a reduced visual cue environment and handling qualities.
I'm not sure I would like to add anything to Crab's post except to say that birds use the 'tau' strategy to avoid trees and branches, and land so well; and they know nothing about the science of flying.
The nub of this is that you need to have sufficient visual cues in order to be able to fly with visual reference. As Crab has also said, the less stabilised the platform the more visual cues that are required. If there is a secret it is in knowing when the deterioration in the visual cue environment starts to effect your performance; however, that is a function that is heavily influence by the machine, the pilot and the pilot's experience (and personality).
As most have tried to say, it is 'personal limits' that are important; setting them, knowing them and not going beyond them.
Jim
Thanks for that link Jim but the trial I took part in was earlier than 2002/3 but followed an almost identical format. Neither of us were test pilots but both experienced A2 QHIs.
The results and terminology are the same though and speak for themselves.
Other trials have used the DVE acronym for Desktop Virtual Environment with regard to electronic representation of the outside world - the CAA one uses DVE for Degraded Visual Environment - too many TLAs!!!!
AnFI seems to have gone rather quiet
The results and terminology are the same though and speak for themselves.
Other trials have used the DVE acronym for Desktop Virtual Environment with regard to electronic representation of the outside world - the CAA one uses DVE for Degraded Visual Environment - too many TLAs!!!!
AnFI seems to have gone rather quiet
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another go.... (time and wifi difficult here)
Jim
Thanks for your level headed approach and helping Crab out by correcting him on the correct study.
I am not sure why he feels he needs to make a display of his experience and prowess – with stories of daring do in recirculating snow at night using NVG’s, and how he was once used as a guinea pig in an experiment to establish what level of enhancement is required to actually perform in poor cue extremes. Neither do I understand why he is being so unconstructive in attempting to trash a well considered view?
His experience is inappropriate and it leads to him drawing a very common and dangerously incorrect (IMHO) conclusion.
CRAB
: I say again:
There are techniques you use which you do not realise you use - some people do not have those techniques.... think about it - please (put in some 'substance' .... at least try and define them!)
As you say the bird didn't have to read about 'Tau' to use it ... and most birds use it instinctively - the ones which didn't, evolved out ... your approach of allowing people to evolve out is unacceptable and disrespectful...
if you saw someone failing to 'see' cues which you take as obvious I am really sure you would be amazed... they are not just being 'stupid' - your 'personal approach' stifles free discussion - and I am asking you (again) to try and analyse what qualities of the view out of your window you actually use to maintain your visual references - the bird can use 'Tau' without having to explain it ... since you presumably have evolved to the extent that you could explain it why don't you just try?
You might find that what you say puts a light on in someones head and saves (another) life ... nothing to loose , so why not try? ... please put your ego away and give it a fresh look.
JimL
I think I can possibly have one more go at trying to say what I believe is not being understood – using your clear appraisal:
Yes, but it is more than that really you don't just need to "have" sufficient cues - you need to actively maintain them - even in weather which is not particularly bad. (there are many permutations).
Because you must have them, then merely recogninising when the weather is deteriorating is nothing like good enough. (it might not actually be deteriorating at all….). Like the Forrest Gump reference I was trying to make "life is like a box of chocolates" - it is an insufficiently commanding mindset...
Whilst that is partially true, I really think this points at what I think is a flawed method (in the DVE study ...) (also the conditions in the experiment were homogeneous whereas reality ain't like that... same in 'your' study Crab?)
.... In it they fly a defined sortie(s) in worstening conditions and eventually discover that they cannot control if the pilots do not have sufficient visual cues. (as Crab says
This is Forrest Gump flying... where 'inexplicable' stuff just happens to you...
So Jim the subtle but important difference is (IMHO):
You say:
It is about recognising when your performance is being degraded
I say:
It is about 'how' to not allow it to be degraded at all.
(although they are not mutually exclusive)
The HOW part is missing!
I have spoken to at least 5 pilots (and studied others) who have somehow gone Inadvertently IMC ... in my attempt to understand it more.
In several of those the vis was in excess of 10km (other than actually inside the cloud they found themselves in). – Generally it is a failure to actively guard visual references.
The onset is often not gradual but sudden and unexpected … creating a difficult situation of a sudden change of references being changed from Visual References to Instrument References – often unsuccessfully.
I have spent my life in the sky and around these people - insulting them is not the answer (nor justified) - they want to live, but inappropriate advice from apparently authoritative sources can cause problems ... they do need to know how to not loose their visual referencestelling them to chose days when the prInt-out from the met-office claims it will be ok is an example of FATAL ADVICE
It might be educational for all if people here were able to freely give their accounts of Inadvertent entry to IMC - if they have one - without feeling that Crab might judge you using his superior military experience of NVGs in Blizzards( hypocritically "off piste" now Crab?)
[... and another thing!
It is most definately NOT a 'PPL only' problem: Police EC135, Harding AS355, other 'Chelsea' AS355, S61 NorthSea ... (and countless military cases and others) Encountering 'unforcast' weather is not a good enough excuse to lose your visual references .... forcasts are not reliable enough to avoid IMC with sufficient certainty - you have to be able to do it yourself....]
ShyTorque 's open and frank example of his IIMC (post 6Aug 00:49) is refreshing
- we could use more of that...
Would you say it was because of:
a) failure to recognise deteriorating conditions
b) failure to maintain visual references
c) a failure of the weather report
d) excess confidence in weather report
e) excessive cockpit lighting - poor external awareness
f) Life is like a box of chocolates - this can happen to anyone and being ready prepared and practiced at reverting to instruments is a vital skill.
(what's your answer?)
Thanks for your level headed approach and helping Crab out by correcting him on the correct study.
I am not sure why he feels he needs to make a display of his experience and prowess – with stories of daring do in recirculating snow at night using NVG’s, and how he was once used as a guinea pig in an experiment to establish what level of enhancement is required to actually perform in poor cue extremes. Neither do I understand why he is being so unconstructive in attempting to trash a well considered view?
His experience is inappropriate and it leads to him drawing a very common and dangerously incorrect (IMHO) conclusion.
CRAB
: I say again:There are techniques you use which you do not realise you use - some people do not have those techniques.... think about it - please (put in some 'substance' .... at least try and define them!)
As you say the bird didn't have to read about 'Tau' to use it ... and most birds use it instinctively - the ones which didn't, evolved out ... your approach of allowing people to evolve out is unacceptable and disrespectful...
if you saw someone failing to 'see' cues which you take as obvious I am really sure you would be amazed... they are not just being 'stupid' - your 'personal approach' stifles free discussion - and I am asking you (again) to try and analyse what qualities of the view out of your window you actually use to maintain your visual references - the bird can use 'Tau' without having to explain it ... since you presumably have evolved to the extent that you could explain it why don't you just try?
You might find that what you say puts a light on in someones head and saves (another) life ... nothing to loose , so why not try? ... please put your ego away and give it a fresh look.
JimL
I think I can possibly have one more go at trying to say what I believe is not being understood – using your clear appraisal:
The nub of this is that you need to have sufficient visual cues in order to be able to fly with visual reference.
Because you must have them, then merely recogninising when the weather is deteriorating is nothing like good enough. (it might not actually be deteriorating at all….). Like the Forrest Gump reference I was trying to make "life is like a box of chocolates" - it is an insufficiently commanding mindset...
If there is a secret it is in knowing when the deterioration in the visual cue environment starts to effect your performance;
.... In it they fly a defined sortie(s) in worstening conditions and eventually discover that they cannot control if the pilots do not have sufficient visual cues. (as Crab says
- no sh*t sherlock!
This is Forrest Gump flying... where 'inexplicable' stuff just happens to you...So Jim the subtle but important difference is (IMHO):
You say:
It is about recognising when your performance is being degraded
I say:
It is about 'how' to not allow it to be degraded at all.
(although they are not mutually exclusive)
The HOW part is missing!
I have spoken to at least 5 pilots (and studied others) who have somehow gone Inadvertently IMC ... in my attempt to understand it more.
In several of those the vis was in excess of 10km (other than actually inside the cloud they found themselves in). – Generally it is a failure to actively guard visual references.
The onset is often not gradual but sudden and unexpected … creating a difficult situation of a sudden change of references being changed from Visual References to Instrument References – often unsuccessfully.
I have spent my life in the sky and around these people - insulting them is not the answer (nor justified) - they want to live, but inappropriate advice from apparently authoritative sources can cause problems ... they do need to know how to not loose their visual referencestelling them to chose days when the prInt-out from the met-office claims it will be ok is an example of FATAL ADVICE
It might be educational for all if people here were able to freely give their accounts of Inadvertent entry to IMC - if they have one - without feeling that Crab might judge you using his superior military experience of NVGs in Blizzards
( hypocritically "off piste" now Crab?)[... and another thing!
It is most definately NOT a 'PPL only' problem: Police EC135, Harding AS355, other 'Chelsea' AS355, S61 NorthSea ... (and countless military cases and others) Encountering 'unforcast' weather is not a good enough excuse to lose your visual references .... forcasts are not reliable enough to avoid IMC with sufficient certainty - you have to be able to do it yourself....]
ShyTorque 's open and frank example of his IIMC (post 6Aug 00:49) is refreshing
- we could use more of that... Would you say it was because of:
a) failure to recognise deteriorating conditions
b) failure to maintain visual references
c) a failure of the weather report
d) excess confidence in weather report
e) excessive cockpit lighting - poor external awareness
f) Life is like a box of chocolates - this can happen to anyone and being ready prepared and practiced at reverting to instruments is a vital skill.
(what's your answer?)
AnFI - you are clearly trying to wind people up on this thread which is a shame as there are lots of valuable lessons to be learned about pushing on in bad weather and myself and others have tried to get the message across.
If you are genuine - not only have you failed to give us any detail of your superior experience but you have just muddied the waters with the assertion that you know something special that the rest of us are just not seeing.
When you start needing special skills to keep visual references, you have already passed the point when you should have made the right decision and turned back.
Basic flying instruction is all about attitude - it is the visual attitude that you use to control the aircraft FW or RW - if you are VFR then you need to be able to see the horizon in order to do that accurately.
So - a rule of thumb for you - if you can't see the horizon then you probably aren't flying VFR and should descend/turn round to re-establish your horizon. One of the worst mistakes people make is to fly just beneath the cloudbase such that any lowering of the base or inadvertant climb will immediately reduce forward visibility and possibly lead to IIMC.
This isn't special technique - this is BASIC flying - any other ideas like scanning to the side for rate of movement are not means to fly VFR safely, they are means to get you out of the sh*t your poor decision making has led you into.
If you had flown on NVG you would understand that it is the perfect tool for teaching flight in a DVE - no depth perception, a monochromatic image with poor contrast and a need to scan rapidly due to limited field of view - but I guess you know better.
In any DVE the flight instruments are your saviour but we are dealing with VFR pilots who do not have an IR and are not properly trained (nor equipped in the aircraft) to do pure IF let alone manage a visual/instrument balance.
So either put up or shut up - at best you are misguided (wow a whole 5 pilots you have talked to about IIMC) at worst you are feeding confusing and inaccurate messages to GA pilots who read these threads.
If you are genuine - not only have you failed to give us any detail of your superior experience but you have just muddied the waters with the assertion that you know something special that the rest of us are just not seeing.
When you start needing special skills to keep visual references, you have already passed the point when you should have made the right decision and turned back.
Basic flying instruction is all about attitude - it is the visual attitude that you use to control the aircraft FW or RW - if you are VFR then you need to be able to see the horizon in order to do that accurately.
So - a rule of thumb for you - if you can't see the horizon then you probably aren't flying VFR and should descend/turn round to re-establish your horizon. One of the worst mistakes people make is to fly just beneath the cloudbase such that any lowering of the base or inadvertant climb will immediately reduce forward visibility and possibly lead to IIMC.
This isn't special technique - this is BASIC flying - any other ideas like scanning to the side for rate of movement are not means to fly VFR safely, they are means to get you out of the sh*t your poor decision making has led you into.
If you had flown on NVG you would understand that it is the perfect tool for teaching flight in a DVE - no depth perception, a monochromatic image with poor contrast and a need to scan rapidly due to limited field of view - but I guess you know better.
In any DVE the flight instruments are your saviour but we are dealing with VFR pilots who do not have an IR and are not properly trained (nor equipped in the aircraft) to do pure IF let alone manage a visual/instrument balance.
So either put up or shut up - at best you are misguided (wow a whole 5 pilots you have talked to about IIMC) at worst you are feeding confusing and inaccurate messages to GA pilots who read these threads.
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Crab. I totally agree with your response on this thread. I have read through these threads from the start and common sense and self preservation must come to mind each time.
No point in repeating what has been said, however the common sense views that have been mentioned are key points for VFR pilots to use.
No point in repeating what has been said, however the common sense views that have been mentioned are key points for VFR pilots to use.
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Crab, you're absolutely right. PPLs (I'm one of them) only need the skill in decision making to avoid IMC, not the skill to exit it. This discussion has been tortuous due to AnFI's ramblings and potentially confusing to PPLs' reading it. It's no more complicated than I've just said.
AnFI - your profile says your location is N/A - I beg to differ - can you tell us where you fly please? I need to avoid the same piece of sky (in any weather).
AnFI - your profile says your location is N/A - I beg to differ - can you tell us where you fly please? I need to avoid the same piece of sky (in any weather).
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Crab... are you serious?
So you don't think maintaining Visual References is important - amazing!
You don't need to guard Visual References at all ... and if you do it's because you have already gone too far - is that really what you are saying?
No slowing down either?
So life is like a box of chocolates then?:
So you should switch to your instruments:
which you can't do because you are not an instrument pilot... 
("In any DVE" - surely not...)
So you think they deserve to die - Darwin right? Marvelous!
You are misrepresenting what I have said quite clearly:
The skills and techniques which people use to Maintain Sufficient Visual References are NOT particularly "special skills" - they are none-the-less skills and there are some people who cannot / do not see the same cues as you (most people) use subconsciously ... you would be surprised if you saw it... (no point in you answering that either)
... infact you have misrepresented much of what I have said - so much that I cannot respond to it all, one example:
I said:
You:
trying to belittle me - not a very constructive approach.
do you know a lot of VFR Pilots who have INADVERTENTLY gone IMC ?
CRAB: you didn't answer any of my questions.
Please answer just one question for me:
In the ShyTorque multichoice which answer do you most closely agree with?
apart from that I think its all been said ...... 
....
( I am sure if you needed a pilot to calculate, whilst hand flying on instruments, a 'time on target' 300nm out in an 80kt blizzard at night ... you'd be 'the man'. Demonstrating handling in an R22 - probably not.... wouldn't you agree?
)
You don't need to guard Visual References at all ... and if you do it's because you have already gone too far - is that really what you are saying?
No slowing down either?
So life is like a box of chocolates then?:
if you can't see the horizon then you probably aren't flying VFR and should descend/turn round to re-establish your horizon.
In any DVE the flight instruments are your saviour but we are dealing with VFR pilots who do not have an IR and are not properly trained (nor equipped in the aircraft) to do pure IF let alone manage a visual/instrument balance.
("In any DVE" - surely not...
)
When you start needing special skills to keep visual references, you have already passed the point when you should have made the right decision and turned back.
You are misrepresenting what I have said quite clearly:
The skills and techniques which people use to Maintain Sufficient Visual References are NOT particularly "special skills" - they are none-the-less skills and there are some people who cannot / do not see the same cues as you (most people) use subconsciously ... you would be surprised if you saw it... (no point in you answering that either)
... infact you have misrepresented much of what I have said - so much that I cannot respond to it all, one example:
I said:
I have spoken to at least 5 pilots (and studied others) who have somehow gone Inadvertently IMC
You:
(wow a whole 5 pilots you have talked to about IIMC)
do you know a lot of VFR Pilots who have INADVERTENTLY gone IMC ?
CRAB: you didn't answer any of my questions.
Please answer just one question for me:
In the ShyTorque multichoice which answer do you most closely agree with?
apart from that I think its all been said ......
....( I am sure if you needed a pilot to calculate, whilst hand flying on instruments, a 'time on target' 300nm out in an 80kt blizzard at night ... you'd be 'the man'. Demonstrating handling in an R22 - probably not.... wouldn't you agree?
)
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Having lurked for many years before joining PPRuNe, and with 40 years of varied professional helicopter flying (military and civil) behind me, there have been many of Crab's posts that I have silently disagreed with. However on this thread I totally agree with him, especially his third paragraph of post #141. KISS. AnFi - give it up mate, you are complicating everything and adding nothing to the discussion.
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Yes - I agree with para 3 also.
You only need ordinary skills to avoid IMC
... and as I say again 20% do not posses those ordinary skills.
(..... so ordinary infact that you don't even realise you use them - wake up!)
B47
You don't just need the descision making skill - you need the ability to perceive - so that you can make that decision.
I'm not the one suggesting having the skill to exit it , Crab/mil/CAA is, I'm the one saying you shouldn't just amble into it aimlessly in the first place
chased out....
You only need ordinary skills to avoid IMC
... and as I say again 20% do not posses those ordinary skills.
(..... so ordinary infact that you don't even realise you use them - wake up!)
B47
only need the skill in decision making to avoid IMC, not the skill to exit it.
I'm not the one suggesting having the skill to exit it , Crab/mil/CAA is, I'm the one saying you shouldn't just amble into it aimlessly in the first place
chased out....
Not chased out just not listening and not explaining
I do understand (at last) what AnFI is trying to say. 80% of pilots sub-consciously assess the view through the plexi-glass to gauge the suitability of the world outside for VFR. 20% don't, or maybe they do, but either don’t realise it or still don't recognise things that do obscure the ground. If they do but don't, maybe they can be trained such that they do, even if they may not realise they don't. If they don’t but do, then they should be in the 80%. If they realise they do but don’t, and they don’t realise they don't then they should do. If they do realise they don't, they know they're doing it consciously, or if they don’t realise they do, they’re in the 80% who do do it sub-consciously; they may recognise the clues but still do nothing about it, either consciously or sub-consciously because they’re either skilled, or not. Whether in the 20% or the 80%, you may or may not sub-consciously or consciously think about turning back or landing, if you have the skills. Even the 80% that do sub-conciously or consciously recognise the signs, or the 20% that don’t recognise it and do have the skills or do recognise it and don't have the skills and haven't or can't be trained to understand their situation and do something about it, will end up in the do do. And that's it. If you don't and they do and they’re in the 20%, then they do it anyway (sub-consciously), don't they?
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CRYSTAL !!! more ......... or less....
very funny .... Ha Ha ... hahaha
.... but there is a serious point in there..... somewhere......
IM(most)HO
I'd just add:
If you are in the 80% who do, and you don't know it, you think the 20% are stupid when they may well not be.
If you are in the 80% but get yourself in the do do any way - then you probably are 'being stupid'...
If you are dead already - there's an 80% chance you were a member of the 20% and you had no idea that you were in the 20% until you found yourself screaming in terror for your mother on the transmit button .... utterly bewildered as to how this 'happened to' you ... you were probably in class 4 (below)
... the training world probably let you down
... if you've been in that situation and luckily missed the ground when you fell out of the sky please share the experience - so that perhaps others are saved by it....
There are clearly different views on how to solve this problem:
1 All helicopters should be stabilised and pilots should hold some type of IMC proficiency. (CAA/DVE study?)
2 Pilots should ensure they stay VMC (me) (5hrs IRF is good for your flying but not a solution to this problem)
3 IIMC is just a fact of life and 5 hours training in IRF should ensure that pilots can make a 180 on instruments (CAA/mil?)
4 Pilot should choose conditions where it is less probable that they encounter IIMC (Crab?)
... is that fair?
.... but there is a serious point in there..... somewhere......
IM(most)HO
I'd just add:
If you are in the 80% who do, and you don't know it, you think the 20% are stupid when they may well not be.
If you are in the 80% but get yourself in the do do any way - then you probably are 'being stupid'...
If you are dead already - there's an 80% chance you were a member of the 20% and you had no idea that you were in the 20% until you found yourself screaming in terror for your mother on the transmit button .... utterly bewildered as to how this 'happened to' you ... you were probably in class 4 (below)
... the training world probably let you down
... if you've been in that situation and luckily missed the ground when you fell out of the sky please share the experience - so that perhaps others are saved by it....
There are clearly different views on how to solve this problem:
1 All helicopters should be stabilised and pilots should hold some type of IMC proficiency. (CAA/DVE study?)
2 Pilots should ensure they stay VMC (me) (5hrs IRF is good for your flying but not a solution to this problem)
3 IIMC is just a fact of life and 5 hours training in IRF should ensure that pilots can make a 180 on instruments (CAA/mil?)
4 Pilot should choose conditions where it is less probable that they encounter IIMC (Crab?)
... is that fair?
AnFI just 2 and 4.
The eye to hand co-ordination required to fly a helicopter well enough to get a licence is not that difficult to achieve - the ability to make sensible decisions (often under pressure) is a function of personality, intellect and temperament and means that not everyone is suited to be a pilot - they may be your 20%
TTB
The eye to hand co-ordination required to fly a helicopter well enough to get a licence is not that difficult to achieve - the ability to make sensible decisions (often under pressure) is a function of personality, intellect and temperament and means that not everyone is suited to be a pilot - they may be your 20%
TTB
Yep - only 2 and 4 work for me.
In my experience (of reading incidents such as Mark Weir's (TBC), Steve Hislop's and now seemingly, Chris Watts), the problem is ego, which is a product of attitude and personality. I know some excellent pilots, mature and professional, safe and sensible, but they could never claim to be intellectual and some have a rather short fuse. Some are really nice people and some a nasty pieces of work, but the significant thing is that either consciously or sub-consciously, whether trained for IIMC or not, they won't let their ego interfere with their decision making - unlike the successful entrepreneurs above and no doubt, countless others in the future 
Crab: the ability to make sensible decisions (often under pressure) is a function of personality, intellect and temperament and means that not everyone is suited to be a pilot
Very valid point TTB but whether it is control of ego or professionalism (maybe the same thing) that stops you making crap decisions is a subject for discussion. What is clear however, is that some will make the right decisions and some won't - students of the human condition please discuss.
It's not a surprise that many commercial operations use psychometric analysis to determine the suitability of candidates for flying posts - much like the military do - stable extroverts anyone???
It's not a surprise that many commercial operations use psychometric analysis to determine the suitability of candidates for flying posts - much like the military do - stable extroverts anyone???
I re-iterate: it's a catch 22 for PPL's: they have to stay alive long enough to experience and learn from those things that stop them from living long enough!!!!
If the PPL won't/can't go on to dedicated IMC training for various reasons, they have to fall back onto their "self preservation" gene. And for some individuals that gene has been replaced by the "self destruct" gene
When you tell / invite/advise certain people that flying into inadvertent IMC is a no go / inadvisable / stupid / dangerous ....you can bet your bottom dollar its the same as waving a red rag at a bull.
[For some, the national highway speed limit is a target not a limit - the same can be said for flying conditions].
If the PPL won't/can't go on to dedicated IMC training for various reasons, they have to fall back onto their "self preservation" gene. And for some individuals that gene has been replaced by the "self destruct" gene
When you tell / invite/advise certain people that flying into inadvertent IMC is a no go / inadvisable / stupid / dangerous ....you can bet your bottom dollar its the same as waving a red rag at a bull.
[For some, the national highway speed limit is a target not a limit - the same can be said for flying conditions].
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Decision Making
To me this all comes back to decision making. I think there are many people out there backing themselves into corners they have no business being in. They don't have a plan and run out of (good) options. Personally, in poor weather I am always thinking about alternate destinations, fuel locations, places with good food.
I try to keep at least a couple of alternates in mind at all times. I'm sitting here wondering how much fuel this poor chap left himself with. Did he just have enough for his destination? Was he past a point of no return? Did he have so little fuel that shutting down in a field might have left him short to get to a fuel stop?
I can't understand what could have been so important that he felt the need to continue in such changeable conditions.
Do people that end up in these situations not realise how quickly you can go from 1 mile vis in mist to in the cloud at 60 knots? By the time you notice the visibility dropping below your 1,500 metres you may not have time to execute a 180.
My thoughts go out to the family.
I try to keep at least a couple of alternates in mind at all times. I'm sitting here wondering how much fuel this poor chap left himself with. Did he just have enough for his destination? Was he past a point of no return? Did he have so little fuel that shutting down in a field might have left him short to get to a fuel stop?
I can't understand what could have been so important that he felt the need to continue in such changeable conditions.
Do people that end up in these situations not realise how quickly you can go from 1 mile vis in mist to in the cloud at 60 knots? By the time you notice the visibility dropping below your 1,500 metres you may not have time to execute a 180.
My thoughts go out to the family.