Super Puma down central North Sea Feb 2009
DB,
Sounds reasonable to me...but just one question.
Now what if we put one of the antique 76's next to a brand spanking new one with all the toys.....why is the new limited to VFR without the coupler and the Antique is not?
Are you suggesting only coupled machines should be out there in the dark?
As anyone knows....there is a lot of black in front of the wind screen between take off and CTB....no matter whether you are in a coupled or non-coupled machine.
Think back to the North Scottish guys doing this single pilot in BO-105's and Bristow doing it with S-58T's and 212's without autopilots using the old style Decca. It can be done.....but it does produce a lot of white hair!
You notice a nearly universal appreciation for what the Bond crew was facing that night and those that have walked in their shoes are very supportive and to the person state they have had very similar experiences shy of hitting the water! I for one stand in their corner on this one and know except for a train load of luck it did not happen to me while doing such work.
Sounds reasonable to me...but just one question.
For those aicraft fitted with couplers, the use of the coupler during this procedure should be mandatory (forget the argument for when it is broken the MEL says VFR only).
Are you suggesting only coupled machines should be out there in the dark?
As anyone knows....there is a lot of black in front of the wind screen between take off and CTB....no matter whether you are in a coupled or non-coupled machine.
Think back to the North Scottish guys doing this single pilot in BO-105's and Bristow doing it with S-58T's and 212's without autopilots using the old style Decca. It can be done.....but it does produce a lot of white hair!
You notice a nearly universal appreciation for what the Bond crew was facing that night and those that have walked in their shoes are very supportive and to the person state they have had very similar experiences shy of hitting the water! I for one stand in their corner on this one and know except for a train load of luck it did not happen to me while doing such work.
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Dropping in the 'oggin'
The sequence of events described sounds depressingly like the string of similar accidents we had in the RN when Wasps and later Lynxs dropped into the oggin at half a mile on a ship controlled approach or SCA.
The investigators diagnosed a syndrome that highlighted the problems associated with transferring from instruments to visual at night. The SCA required the radar controller to say at half a mile "Look up for sight". the pilot then came off the dials and tried to pick out the gyro-stabilised landing aid which should be showing green. When he saw the green he called "On sight". He then descended from the 200 feet approach height and simultaneously decellerated from the approach speed to the hover alongside the ship. The problem was that it took a few second to understand what you were looking at when you first looked outside. The over-riding feeling when you did aquire enough cues was that you were going too fast and/or you were closer than you thought. Natural reaction was to lower the lever and a few seconds later ...... plop, you're in the drink. Happened so often it was getting boring.... not to say expensive.
G.
The investigators diagnosed a syndrome that highlighted the problems associated with transferring from instruments to visual at night. The SCA required the radar controller to say at half a mile "Look up for sight". the pilot then came off the dials and tried to pick out the gyro-stabilised landing aid which should be showing green. When he saw the green he called "On sight". He then descended from the 200 feet approach height and simultaneously decellerated from the approach speed to the hover alongside the ship. The problem was that it took a few second to understand what you were looking at when you first looked outside. The over-riding feeling when you did aquire enough cues was that you were going too fast and/or you were closer than you thought. Natural reaction was to lower the lever and a few seconds later ...... plop, you're in the drink. Happened so often it was getting boring.... not to say expensive.
G.
DB has not gone quiet....he was thinking.
Just a couple of points:
1) as far as I know they were not coming in off an ARA, they made an en-route descent (or at least not a normal ARA), so your points about the ARA minima, whilst maybe valid, are not relevant to this accident.
2) We in BHL have something like your gate in with specified parameters, to run in at until we see the helideck ovality indicating the correct site picture. It certainly empowers PNF to intervene early if you go off the parameters.
3) Be careful not to specify too high a minimum height for the level sector. In an automated aircraft, its all fine and dandy whilst you are running in coupled, the trouble starts when you decouple and fly manually. The higher you are, the further out you are and so the smaller the installation is. At 400' going into a ship with a 50' deck, that's getting on to being too high IMHO. In a 225 its better to be lower and slower coupled, that way when you decouple, the helideck is getting fairly big and visual references are better. I would prefer deck height + 200 for all approaches - keeps the scary bit where its being flown manually to a minimum!
4) If you make me say "call the ball" I shall stop liking you
HC
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HELCOMPARITER
I know they wer not on an ARA and that is not the point of my procedure. The point is, by flying a pre-defined, stabilised approach, VMC or otherwise, they key change that needs to be made is moved the CTB further back and higher, so that a stable airspeed can be mainatined until FULL visual refrences are obtained, these being, the fully developed rugby ball.
To illustrate the point, drwa a line at approx 7- -9 degrees up and away from the helideck. (The angle that the rugby ball is present)
Now draw the flight path intesections at 50 foot above the deck and 200 feet above the deck.
Now decide at what airpseed you need to be at to make a stable final descent to the deck.
I would suggest that at 50 feet ADH (which isless than 1/2 the LDP of 130 feet/35 knots groundspeed, for a CAT A Helipad, (AS332L2) - try to imagine what your airspeed might be, especially in benign goldfish bowl conditions we all know exist with slack winds and no moonlight. It is airspeed (of lack it) that leads to instability.
As regards boats, yes there may need to be some work done but ideally we want a procedure that is simple and fits all cases, if that can be achieved.
400 feet above the sea for a boat is what I currently teach line pilots to do and it works fine.
Also why not "Call the Ball" it says exactly what it means. (We can abbreviate if to "CTB" if you like).
KEY COMPONENTS ARE:
DEFINED FLIGHT PROFILE leading to:
DEFINED INTERVENTION PARAMETERS providing:
STABLE AIRSPEED UNTIL FULLY VISUAL REFERENCES ARE IN PLACE (CTB) provinding:
A SAFE FLIGHT REGIME and a:
CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE.
Thanks for your input.
DB
I know they wer not on an ARA and that is not the point of my procedure. The point is, by flying a pre-defined, stabilised approach, VMC or otherwise, they key change that needs to be made is moved the CTB further back and higher, so that a stable airspeed can be mainatined until FULL visual refrences are obtained, these being, the fully developed rugby ball.
To illustrate the point, drwa a line at approx 7- -9 degrees up and away from the helideck. (The angle that the rugby ball is present)
Now draw the flight path intesections at 50 foot above the deck and 200 feet above the deck.
Now decide at what airpseed you need to be at to make a stable final descent to the deck.
I would suggest that at 50 feet ADH (which isless than 1/2 the LDP of 130 feet/35 knots groundspeed, for a CAT A Helipad, (AS332L2) - try to imagine what your airspeed might be, especially in benign goldfish bowl conditions we all know exist with slack winds and no moonlight. It is airspeed (of lack it) that leads to instability.
As regards boats, yes there may need to be some work done but ideally we want a procedure that is simple and fits all cases, if that can be achieved.
400 feet above the sea for a boat is what I currently teach line pilots to do and it works fine.
Also why not "Call the Ball" it says exactly what it means. (We can abbreviate if to "CTB" if you like).
KEY COMPONENTS ARE:
DEFINED FLIGHT PROFILE leading to:
DEFINED INTERVENTION PARAMETERS providing:
STABLE AIRSPEED UNTIL FULLY VISUAL REFERENCES ARE IN PLACE (CTB) provinding:
A SAFE FLIGHT REGIME and a:
CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE.
Thanks for your input.
DB
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SASLESS, the reason is that without the regulators adopting a punitive policy expressed in the alleviations afforded by MMELs the safety advantage afforded to the CAT PAX is lost in translation.
The AS332L2 is a bitch to fly with AP out and even if offered one with degraded coupler functions, for a night flight, I would refuse to take it as is our right as Commander.
In the NS we do not have a problem getting the AC fixed in relatively double quick time thanks to the quality of our engineers and the availability of spares.
Older machines may have older concepts within their MMELs as that was the standard at the time.
I hope this helps.
The AS332L2 is a bitch to fly with AP out and even if offered one with degraded coupler functions, for a night flight, I would refuse to take it as is our right as Commander.
In the NS we do not have a problem getting the AC fixed in relatively double quick time thanks to the quality of our engineers and the availability of spares.
Older machines may have older concepts within their MMELs as that was the standard at the time.
I hope this helps.
I was suggesting the older aircraft without the AP fell more into the category of the new ones without the AP being fully functional....meaning it should be time to retire or modify those aircraft to embrace the advent of modern avionics and the increased safety they provide.
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HELICOMPARITER
Having read your post again re "ARA Minima are not valid in this case"....
What I am proposing is that "MDH" is valid in ALL CASES VMC or IMC (ARA)
It is the complete lack of minima applicable once VMC has been gained that leads to these and other incidents.
Forget the ARA......I am not aware of any incidents like this one happening during an ARA...WHY....becasue the ARA provides an intrinstcly stable approach, albeit to (what is my opinion) in extremis at night (Ie at absolute minima)......an MDH that is far too low to GUARENTEE a safe final descent from the CTB.
Think about the ILS 200 DH and then try to justify to yourself why you should only have effectivley a 50 foot DH when approaching a deck, bearing in mind there are no lead in lights, no horizon and a **** load of sodiums producing utter confusion right up to the point where you reach the CTB (less than 100m from the deck).
This was a visual flight and two trained and checked crew, with a very experienced and competent P1 hit the sea. It is the procedures that were wrong, not them!!!
Having read your post again re "ARA Minima are not valid in this case"....
What I am proposing is that "MDH" is valid in ALL CASES VMC or IMC (ARA)
It is the complete lack of minima applicable once VMC has been gained that leads to these and other incidents.
Forget the ARA......I am not aware of any incidents like this one happening during an ARA...WHY....becasue the ARA provides an intrinstcly stable approach, albeit to (what is my opinion) in extremis at night (Ie at absolute minima)......an MDH that is far too low to GUARENTEE a safe final descent from the CTB.
Think about the ILS 200 DH and then try to justify to yourself why you should only have effectivley a 50 foot DH when approaching a deck, bearing in mind there are no lead in lights, no horizon and a **** load of sodiums producing utter confusion right up to the point where you reach the CTB (less than 100m from the deck).
This was a visual flight and two trained and checked crew, with a very experienced and competent P1 hit the sea. It is the procedures that were wrong, not them!!!
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SASLESS that gets my vote 100%
BOND, BHL and CHC have all made massive progress with new AC over the last few years.
I would suggest that is has been us, the crews, that have probably failed to recognise the true value of the safety these machines provide, and make procedures to exploit these safety features to the max.
It is not a Senior Management issue......it is much closer to home. We are the Line Pilots, we know how its done and so we know would needs to be done.
You can see from some of the resistance to change....posted on this website in the past few days, exactly where the true problems lie.
For any driver of 332L2, 225, S92 & 139 who still thinks that they want to fly manually, at night, their PAX and their families have my sympathy.
Shape up or ship out. The winds of change are blowing!!!!!
BOND, BHL and CHC have all made massive progress with new AC over the last few years.
I would suggest that is has been us, the crews, that have probably failed to recognise the true value of the safety these machines provide, and make procedures to exploit these safety features to the max.
It is not a Senior Management issue......it is much closer to home. We are the Line Pilots, we know how its done and so we know would needs to be done.
You can see from some of the resistance to change....posted on this website in the past few days, exactly where the true problems lie.
For any driver of 332L2, 225, S92 & 139 who still thinks that they want to fly manually, at night, their PAX and their families have my sympathy.
Shape up or ship out. The winds of change are blowing!!!!!
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DB
I for one am all for an improved/safer profile for night flying, we do not do enough of it on a regular basis in Aberdeen (i know Scatsta and SNS do alot more and are therefore better trained for it).
Points.
1."It is also clear in the CAA Offshore sector, that once a descent has commenced VMC, there are no further rules to prevent the crew from descending as low as they like."
It is my understanding that decending VMC day or night does have not below limits, certainly does in our OM and in the event that enroute you cannot becom VMC at these limits then an ARA must be conducted.
2."Finally we need to control the entry speeds for such a procedure. There are plenty of options but how about "Established at MDH, into wind @ 1.5Nm @Vy" as an absolute minimum."
Take Vy in 332L 70Kts against a 45 Kt headwind on finalls which is not unusual on the North Sea. Your ground speed would be 25Kts. I have found that there is more chance of people becoming disorientated with low ground speed trucking in from a long distance because your visual cues and depth perseption are not as good at night.....would suggest a ground speed equivilant to Vy that way you always have the same rate of closure and each approach would be similar instead of the possability of varying closing speeds in diffferent wind conditions.
My simple solution IMHO would be 1 nm 500' 70 Kts ground speed/ Vy until you have the sight picture , Ball, What ever you want to call it. From there a controlled and monitored approach to the deck Any large changes in Speed Height ROD should immediatley be called by NHP. If this procedure was followed day or night then you would have the same sight picture every time. It would not be the most expeditious approach but certainly safer.
Coming of an ARA.... then change the minima of the ARA to 1nm 500' followed by a visual approach following the above. (or if not visual a turn 45 degrees away and climb to MESA) Instead of offsetting 10 degrees at 1.5 nm and having the rig offest by 15 degrees the rig should appear at 1 nm right in front therefore no need for a turn at .75 nm to get you back on the correct sight picture.
Same procedure day or night..... means easier to teach, easy to follow and, yes it might mean a bit more time in the air for the Oil companies and the odd lost/ adhoc flight ( lets face it they can afford it!!)but would lead to a safer environment.
thoughts?
T4
I for one am all for an improved/safer profile for night flying, we do not do enough of it on a regular basis in Aberdeen (i know Scatsta and SNS do alot more and are therefore better trained for it).
Points.
1."It is also clear in the CAA Offshore sector, that once a descent has commenced VMC, there are no further rules to prevent the crew from descending as low as they like."
It is my understanding that decending VMC day or night does have not below limits, certainly does in our OM and in the event that enroute you cannot becom VMC at these limits then an ARA must be conducted.
2."Finally we need to control the entry speeds for such a procedure. There are plenty of options but how about "Established at MDH, into wind @ 1.5Nm @Vy" as an absolute minimum."
Take Vy in 332L 70Kts against a 45 Kt headwind on finalls which is not unusual on the North Sea. Your ground speed would be 25Kts. I have found that there is more chance of people becoming disorientated with low ground speed trucking in from a long distance because your visual cues and depth perseption are not as good at night.....would suggest a ground speed equivilant to Vy that way you always have the same rate of closure and each approach would be similar instead of the possability of varying closing speeds in diffferent wind conditions.
My simple solution IMHO would be 1 nm 500' 70 Kts ground speed/ Vy until you have the sight picture , Ball, What ever you want to call it. From there a controlled and monitored approach to the deck Any large changes in Speed Height ROD should immediatley be called by NHP. If this procedure was followed day or night then you would have the same sight picture every time. It would not be the most expeditious approach but certainly safer.
Coming of an ARA.... then change the minima of the ARA to 1nm 500' followed by a visual approach following the above. (or if not visual a turn 45 degrees away and climb to MESA) Instead of offsetting 10 degrees at 1.5 nm and having the rig offest by 15 degrees the rig should appear at 1 nm right in front therefore no need for a turn at .75 nm to get you back on the correct sight picture.
Same procedure day or night..... means easier to teach, easy to follow and, yes it might mean a bit more time in the air for the Oil companies and the odd lost/ adhoc flight ( lets face it they can afford it!!)but would lead to a safer environment.
thoughts?
T4
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T4, you have missed the point somewhat.
Once your are VMC....how low can you then fly.....get the picture. Nothing in our OM and Rule 5 does not apply ...as we are landing!!.
Thanks for your input...like I said we all have our own ideas...what we need is a mandatory profile...aligned to INTERVENTION policy.
Try to forget the ARA issue....or if you like...add the ARA to the top of the "GATE...you are dead right...one procedure for all conditions..... easy to teach, remember and fly.
KISS (not you of course.
Once your are VMC....how low can you then fly.....get the picture. Nothing in our OM and Rule 5 does not apply ...as we are landing!!.
Thanks for your input...like I said we all have our own ideas...what we need is a mandatory profile...aligned to INTERVENTION policy.
Try to forget the ARA issue....or if you like...add the ARA to the top of the "GATE...you are dead right...one procedure for all conditions..... easy to teach, remember and fly.
KISS (not you of course.
T4,
I sent DB a PM and recounted a procedure you laid out and noted I have flown for an operator that did just what you say except we used a constant airspeed vice increasing it for wind as you suggest.
It was a boring practice.....and repetitive almost to an extreme when shuttling but I would suggest that is what we are seeking....BOREDOM on every flight.
From a safety standpoint....it works.
From a training standpoint....it works.
From a standardization standpoint....it works.
Add in the use of what technology is available for determining height, distance to run, flight track, rate of closure, obstacle clearance and then let the Autopilot do its thing until the very last......and we shall see a real decrease in soiled undies and lost aircraft.
We used a 1.5nm/300 foot height for our gate and maintained Vy until we intercepted the desired glide path angle then decreased speed to Vtoss until committed to landing and then LDP was called. NFP called distance to run, height, and airspeed and monitored the guy flying. The "Call the Ball....I got the deck....starting down" call was confirmed by the monitoring pilot.
You and DB have sound ideas and should be given a fair hearing when you propose them to your boss fellahs.
I just hope the Training and Standards Mafia will open their minds to outside ideas and not respond with the typical "NIH" reaction....that being "Not Invented Here!".
Even a very old French Pilot I knew in the Dark Ages used the Sperry Helipilot system to good advantage as he wished not to drop lower than he should on takeoff and elected to trim a slight nose up attitude prior to rotation for takeoff....and that was clear back in the old days when the Helipilot (less Flight Director) was considered Star Wars kit!
Hand flying is just way over rated by some.....punching buttons and twisting knobs is the way to Salvation now days!
I sent DB a PM and recounted a procedure you laid out and noted I have flown for an operator that did just what you say except we used a constant airspeed vice increasing it for wind as you suggest.
It was a boring practice.....and repetitive almost to an extreme when shuttling but I would suggest that is what we are seeking....BOREDOM on every flight.
From a safety standpoint....it works.
From a training standpoint....it works.
From a standardization standpoint....it works.
Add in the use of what technology is available for determining height, distance to run, flight track, rate of closure, obstacle clearance and then let the Autopilot do its thing until the very last......and we shall see a real decrease in soiled undies and lost aircraft.
We used a 1.5nm/300 foot height for our gate and maintained Vy until we intercepted the desired glide path angle then decreased speed to Vtoss until committed to landing and then LDP was called. NFP called distance to run, height, and airspeed and monitored the guy flying. The "Call the Ball....I got the deck....starting down" call was confirmed by the monitoring pilot.
You and DB have sound ideas and should be given a fair hearing when you propose them to your boss fellahs.
I just hope the Training and Standards Mafia will open their minds to outside ideas and not respond with the typical "NIH" reaction....that being "Not Invented Here!".
Even a very old French Pilot I knew in the Dark Ages used the Sperry Helipilot system to good advantage as he wished not to drop lower than he should on takeoff and elected to trim a slight nose up attitude prior to rotation for takeoff....and that was clear back in the old days when the Helipilot (less Flight Director) was considered Star Wars kit!
Hand flying is just way over rated by some.....punching buttons and twisting knobs is the way to Salvation now days!
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TORQUES STRIPE,
You point is very valid, "even if you are at 500 feet you can set yourself up again",
The issue here is to get these parameters, whatever the end up being, mandated, so the NHP can monitor the HPs performance against the parameters and apply a properly formulated intervention policy when things go wrong, which as you say, when at 500 feet, should result in a safe and benign recovery, as apposed to being very close to the sea and a very high state of arousal when jobby hits the fan.
The principles of the way we fly ARA, one flying, one formally monitoring, dramatically increases the potential for intervention, as apposed to "flying vissually" giving th NHP the impression that the HP is OK, until.....splash.
I wish the term "VMC at night" when over the sea was erased from all out text books. In my view, VMC conditions do not exist until the "Ball is Called" (the CTB).
This would re-inforce the concept that full IFR monitoring procedures are in place until the CTB (and possibly for a good while after).
Thanks for input.
You point is very valid, "even if you are at 500 feet you can set yourself up again",
The issue here is to get these parameters, whatever the end up being, mandated, so the NHP can monitor the HPs performance against the parameters and apply a properly formulated intervention policy when things go wrong, which as you say, when at 500 feet, should result in a safe and benign recovery, as apposed to being very close to the sea and a very high state of arousal when jobby hits the fan.
The principles of the way we fly ARA, one flying, one formally monitoring, dramatically increases the potential for intervention, as apposed to "flying vissually" giving th NHP the impression that the HP is OK, until.....splash.
I wish the term "VMC at night" when over the sea was erased from all out text books. In my view, VMC conditions do not exist until the "Ball is Called" (the CTB).
This would re-inforce the concept that full IFR monitoring procedures are in place until the CTB (and possibly for a good while after).
Thanks for input.
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IMHO it should also be not just a company procedure, but set in stone for all operators in that area, Then there can be no Commercial advantage to any operator and if you swap companies the SOP's are identical. As an aside, if there are several of you in the same area, you know the wind direction you can build up your own mental picture of exactly where everybody is and what they will be doing, instead of one crew making a split ##se turn on to a short final and another setting them selves up in one of the afore mentioned approaches.
T4
T4
All good views and along the right lines I'm sure. It may only be a 332 Super Puma, but I still tend to fly that at night on 'automatics'. Not as reliable as a 225 or 92 I'm sure, but once level at 300ft, you can still couple it up in altitude and heading hold. Whilst I wouldn't take my eyes off the instruments for a moment, it does a pretty good job.
My concern is that no matter what you are flying, the landing still has to be done manually. Sometimes not too difficult with a well lit deck and lots of background to look at - other times, looking out into the blackness with your landing light trying to pick out the texture on the deck surface, even basic hovering can feel different. Whilst I agree that a well set up, stable and controlled approach is the key to a good safe landing at the end, even the best approach can still go horribly untidy and scary as you try to manouver visually to land.
I also find it concerning that given that we may have 18 passengers in the back, a landing at night in difficult conditions, can be the entire responsibility of one pilot, perhaps with very limited experience. The non-handling pilot can be demoted to just another passenger. OK, slightly harsh, but I would say I have had landings at night as NHP where I try to provide all the assistance I can, but in reality I cannot see the surface, obstacles, approach path or landing area. All I can do is call out rates of descent and speeds etc, and rely on that data to build up a picture that the approach is controlled and stable. If it started to go wrong, I really can't be certain whether I would pick it up in time, and I suppose we can see from Morecambe Bay how that can turn out.
As we have said so many times - Is that a satisfactory method for what is supposed to be Public Air Transport ?? Not with my wife and kids on board !
My concern is that no matter what you are flying, the landing still has to be done manually. Sometimes not too difficult with a well lit deck and lots of background to look at - other times, looking out into the blackness with your landing light trying to pick out the texture on the deck surface, even basic hovering can feel different. Whilst I agree that a well set up, stable and controlled approach is the key to a good safe landing at the end, even the best approach can still go horribly untidy and scary as you try to manouver visually to land.
I also find it concerning that given that we may have 18 passengers in the back, a landing at night in difficult conditions, can be the entire responsibility of one pilot, perhaps with very limited experience. The non-handling pilot can be demoted to just another passenger. OK, slightly harsh, but I would say I have had landings at night as NHP where I try to provide all the assistance I can, but in reality I cannot see the surface, obstacles, approach path or landing area. All I can do is call out rates of descent and speeds etc, and rely on that data to build up a picture that the approach is controlled and stable. If it started to go wrong, I really can't be certain whether I would pick it up in time, and I suppose we can see from Morecambe Bay how that can turn out.
As we have said so many times - Is that a satisfactory method for what is supposed to be Public Air Transport ?? Not with my wife and kids on board !
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night flying
Having previously dismissed anyone's input which didn't nicely agree with your own views DB, it's good to see you coming up with a slightly more balanced post 
I think that your ideas are interesting, and worth thinking about, but i also think the issue of training for night offshore flying should be looked at in general. I'm not sure how others feel, but i feel that the night time offshore approach is the most challenging aspect of North Sea flying. If that is a general held view, i find it astounding that we have the same amount of time being checked/trained for our night time offshore approaches, as we do flying a hold - 1 per year. When was the last time anyone flew a hold in anger?
i think the problem with the night offshore approach is 3 fold:
1. it's the only aspect of any type of flying that i know of, which is neither visual nor instrument, but an ill-defined mix of the two.
2. the infrequency and irregularity of the times that this approach is flown - both due to the months when extended daylight make night-time flying practicaly non-existant, and also over the winter months when shift patterns and wind direction mean that weeks go by sometimes without night landings for individual pilots.
3. The bias of the training flights being for onshore procedures. This leads to us all (i think) feeling comfortable and capable for bad weather instrument appraoches onshore, but we are short-changed in the area of training for night offshore landings. I'm not advocating lessening the onshore training, but would suggest it appropriate to introduce more night offshore training, and a review of the procedures.
Andy
I think that your ideas are interesting, and worth thinking about, but i also think the issue of training for night offshore flying should be looked at in general. I'm not sure how others feel, but i feel that the night time offshore approach is the most challenging aspect of North Sea flying. If that is a general held view, i find it astounding that we have the same amount of time being checked/trained for our night time offshore approaches, as we do flying a hold - 1 per year. When was the last time anyone flew a hold in anger?
i think the problem with the night offshore approach is 3 fold:
1. it's the only aspect of any type of flying that i know of, which is neither visual nor instrument, but an ill-defined mix of the two.
2. the infrequency and irregularity of the times that this approach is flown - both due to the months when extended daylight make night-time flying practicaly non-existant, and also over the winter months when shift patterns and wind direction mean that weeks go by sometimes without night landings for individual pilots.
3. The bias of the training flights being for onshore procedures. This leads to us all (i think) feeling comfortable and capable for bad weather instrument appraoches onshore, but we are short-changed in the area of training for night offshore landings. I'm not advocating lessening the onshore training, but would suggest it appropriate to introduce more night offshore training, and a review of the procedures.
Andy
Unlike some I have not yet seen the narrative of this accident however I feel obliged to comment on the thread and the appearance of a lack of awareness of existing limits from, what appear to be, experience flight crew. Let's deal with the ARA first:
The geometry of the procedure is such that even with a 3 degree slope, the 0.75nm point will be at 238ft plus the height of the helideck; this almost inevitably ensures that there will be a level segment before visual manoeuvring to the deck occurs (unless the procedure is not flown as published). The geometry of the procedure was provided to ensure that there was an adequate time to transition from instruments to visual flying. Even so, normal crew procedures should ensure that at least one of the crew is monitoring the key instruments - even during visual manoeuvring (at night).
Any procedure must take account of the fact that there might not be complete visual contact with the perimeter lights if the deck is on the upwind side of the platform.
There is no freedom to fly below the VFR limits. The transition from IFR to VRF must be conducted either as an en-route descent with the VFR limits or as an ARA - in accordance with the published procedure.
The 'shiny arsed committee members' who were involved in the provision of the ARA did so at the behest of IFALPA and under the auspices of ICAO - they were all current offshore practitioners. The offshore VFR limits were also produced by a group of experienced pilots who understood very well the dangers of offshore flying both by day and by night (Northern and Southern North Sea, Norway and Holland).
I would suggest a toning down of the rhetoric as well as a period of reflection on both the accident (when details become clearer) and current requirements (as reflected in the Operations Manuals (OM)). It might also be useful to recognise that the Operator writes and owns the OM - not a faceless committee in Europe.
Any new SOPs must take due cognisance of the fact that not all fleets have the capability of the EC225 - the additional dangers of the human factors element of complex automation should also be part of any consideration.
Finally, with any point in space procedure there will be a visual manoeuvring element - not to understand that will lead the unwary into danger. There will always be the need for competent handling skills in helicopters unless you wish to operate only to airfields. Then what would be the point?
Jim
Absolute limits are 300ft/night and 200ft/day with an additional proviso that the MDH cannot be lower than deck height plus 50ft (to provide a small cushion below the cloud base).
With an ARA to a circling manoeuvre, the limits are 300ft by day and 500ft by night. The MaPt is 0.75nm at which point, if the destination has not been acquired, a go-around must be flown (a reduced MaPt can be accepted if it provides equivalent safety).
The procedure with the OIP at 1.5nm 'should' provide some lateral clearance from the target even if the 'turning missed approach' procedure is initiated late. The segment from the OIP to the MaPt should be flown level.
If not on an ARA the cloud break procedure (en-route descent to VFR) by night requires a visibility of 5km and a minimum cloud base of 1,200ft and by day 1,500m and 600ft.The geometry of the procedure is such that even with a 3 degree slope, the 0.75nm point will be at 238ft plus the height of the helideck; this almost inevitably ensures that there will be a level segment before visual manoeuvring to the deck occurs (unless the procedure is not flown as published). The geometry of the procedure was provided to ensure that there was an adequate time to transition from instruments to visual flying. Even so, normal crew procedures should ensure that at least one of the crew is monitoring the key instruments - even during visual manoeuvring (at night).
Any procedure must take account of the fact that there might not be complete visual contact with the perimeter lights if the deck is on the upwind side of the platform.
There is no freedom to fly below the VFR limits. The transition from IFR to VRF must be conducted either as an en-route descent with the VFR limits or as an ARA - in accordance with the published procedure.
The 'shiny arsed committee members' who were involved in the provision of the ARA did so at the behest of IFALPA and under the auspices of ICAO - they were all current offshore practitioners. The offshore VFR limits were also produced by a group of experienced pilots who understood very well the dangers of offshore flying both by day and by night (Northern and Southern North Sea, Norway and Holland).
I would suggest a toning down of the rhetoric as well as a period of reflection on both the accident (when details become clearer) and current requirements (as reflected in the Operations Manuals (OM)). It might also be useful to recognise that the Operator writes and owns the OM - not a faceless committee in Europe.
Any new SOPs must take due cognisance of the fact that not all fleets have the capability of the EC225 - the additional dangers of the human factors element of complex automation should also be part of any consideration.
Finally, with any point in space procedure there will be a visual manoeuvring element - not to understand that will lead the unwary into danger. There will always be the need for competent handling skills in helicopters unless you wish to operate only to airfields. Then what would be the point?
Jim