Super Puma down central North Sea Feb 2009

[Geoffersincornwall]

Simulation to the rescue

Q, How do you keep the skills essential to handling the transition from IMC to VMC, from coupled to uncoupled flight, sharp?
A. I wish I could say that a good level D sim is the answer but regretably we are not quite there yet but we are working on getting the visuals right so that this becomes a valuable tool in these circumstances. We CAN provide a very useable environment in which to polish your protocols and SOPs but that last little bit, after the aquisition of the target in marginal vis is going to be tough to get right.

In the absence of 'real' night conditions we can offer something at least. When we introduced the Limited Vis Approach to Aberdeen arrivals in the early 80s we had a 28 day shelf-life for the LVA qualification. You had to requal in the sim every 28 days. Maybe that pathway offers a partial solution.

It has been my experience that most training I received in the sim focussed on either the 'visual at DA' scenario or the 'not visual, go-around at DA' scenario and passed over the opportunity to test me in the tricky 'visual but am I visual enough' scenario. It had a profound effect on my thinking as I now include that in my lessons. It has presented some very interesting Human Factors moments - I can recommend it.

G.

[P2bleed]

As it has now been defined as a human factors accident some of the drift has developed with an automatics to non automatics discussion and the merits of both.

As one that operates both types perhaps we should wait to determine whether it was an automatics settings problem or issues following the disengagement that has caused the accident.

Can’t possibly imagine how the crew must feel following this accident with such interest from all parties. I am sure most of us over the years, that are not behind desks, realise that we all have been very fortunate at times not to have been in a similar situation and its only training, standards and practice that will keep it that way.

[HeliComparator]

we should wait to determine whether it was an automatics settings problem or issues following the disengagement that has caused the accident

We now know that the aircraft struck the water, after disengaging the automatics and after turning onto finals from a base leg in poor weather. This does sound quite like the way to operate that some are advocating, but whilst it might have training benefit, it is higher risk IMHO.

BHL pilots will find a notice on the board when they next go into work, I expect ditto for CHC and Bond, but I am not going to be the one who posts its contents here - the gutter press are watching!

HC

[Brom]

One of the reasons CHC stopped dual rating on the L2/225 was due to the similarities and differences in the automatics of the two types. Being dual rated, for example on the 365 and S76, is not that big a problem because the differences are apparent and pilots are unlikely to confuse the two. The L2 and 225 automatics are very similar in some respects, but very different in operation, and could cause confusion.

[flyer43]

Being dual rated, for example on the 365 and S76, is not that big a problem because the differences are apparent and pilots are unlikely to confuse the two.

That might depend on how often you fly each of the different types. If you spend most of your time flying the 365 then jump into the S76 for a quick trip, it is highly probable that 365 "mindset" will lead to confusion.

[Brom]

flyer43,
Agreed, having been there I know the problem all too well.
CHC also had a problem with that, keeping pilots 'up to speed', as it were, on both types was going to be a big problem.

[Special 25]

Thought it might be appropriate to have a quick thought for everything that went right in this recent accident, and how the developments generated by previous North Sea incidents probably accounted for the fact that no lives were lost ........


AFDS - Floats deployed just as expected - And remained inflated until the aircraft was recovered. Their automatic deployment almost certainly ensured that the aircraft remained upright without which I think the outcome could have been very different.


Wet Dinghy Drills - I personally appreciate every opportunity to go to Nutec every three years, whilst I know some may consider it a chore. Whilst it is a nice warm pool in good light, I'm sure the experience as far as it goes, assisted with the text-book evacuation of the aircraft at night in the North Sea. Well done to crew and pax on completing this difficult task without injury given such a sudden and extraordinary situation.


JIGSAW - The investment in Jigsaw has proven its worth within the first five years. The combined efforts of the helicopter and particularly the Fast Response boat (ARCC) I think proved the concept that I know took a lot of effort to get off the ground. Had the surface vessel picked up casualties, the advantage of having the helicopter on scene within minutes (rather than over an hour away) would have proved itself further.

And I dare say, many, many more !!


I'm sure we will be focusing a lot on what went wrong over the coming months, and that is right and correct and we'll all hopefully learn something from it. But its important to remember that following the uncertain series of events last wednesday, a lot went right, and we need to be thankful to those in the industry that brought together these safety systems that contributed to the successful outcome.

[HeliComparator]

Jigsaw

Special

Yes, but more so the surface vessel and less so the helicopter. Whilst it might seem like a nice idea to be picked up by a helicopter, you try being in a dinghy on a hitherto nice calm night with an L2 hovering at 40' directly above you. Apparently the dinghies were getting blown towards the platform legs by the downwash. After the first 3 winched off, it was decided to stand the heli down and wait for the surface vessel, which was not far behind. But I heard through the grapevine that it took nearly an hour before the heli arrived - that must have seemed a long time when the platform was only 500m away.

Jigsaw seems a good idea but it does mean fewer resources, and probably those resources further away from you when you ditch near a platform. By contrast, when there was a standby boat for each installation, it would have been on site within a few minutes.

If its true that it was nearly an hour, and had these guys ended up in the water, there would have been hypothermia at the least.

Helis are better when its wild or you are in the water, boats are better when its calm and you're in the dinghy.

HC

[smudge07]

Helicoparator, No I am not a training captain in Aberdeen but was a line training captain on Dauphins before for PDG. I do understand your point about the difficulty in getting non rev. helidecks however if all the companies agree to it the oil company would have no choice especially in light of this accident. I would have thought right now was a perfect opportunity for training captains to push through new procedures. I also wonder as suggested that more frequent sim approaches and go arounds could count towards recency.
Just to clarify my point about 50/50 handling and automation. I totally agree when the weather is sh**y use what every automation you have got however when practicing practice both, I really believe if you do both your monitoring when the weather is bad is much better and will help if things go wrong. If I was flying a modern 737 to a beautifully lit runway I would use automatics all the time however, I feel the offshore world requires a high level of competance in both areas.
The other option if a better level of recency is not possible due to cost or difficulty would be do not fly at night especially as it accounts for such a small amount of flight or have specific crews that do as it would be easier to keep a smaller number of people current.

[Special 25]

I haven't heard much response on how the rescue took place, and would be interested if anyone knows the timescale of the rescue.

I was of the (seemingly incorrect) impression that the Surface Vessel had been onsite within minutes (being that it is based at the Etap) and done the lions share of the rescue. The helicopter I guess would take 10 minutes to scramble and 20 minutes to reach the scene. Nimrod about 45 minutes (not that it will be able to do much other than observe, film and co-ordinate) and SAR assets such as Lossie and Sumburgh were enroute, but I'm assuming about 1hr 40 to get to the scene.

Any accurate info would be appreciated.

[whoateallthepies]

We have had a full account of incident published to us. As it is in thepublic domain I do not want to "splurge" it acroiss this page,

As a 225 pilot, I'm very keen to know what happened? Can you provide a link to where it is published?

Thanks

[sox6]

I heard the first ARRC arrived after about 60 minutes, and that the three worst case survivors had been hoisted at that point.

And why so bashful DB now the data is in the 'public domain'? The leopard does seem to change his spots.

[coalface]

The initial account is not "in the public domain". It has been released internally within Bond and also to other Aberdeen based EC225 operators and, no doubt, their customers. Nothing has been released by the AAIB.

[sox6]

Coalface

I should have put 'public domain' in inverted commas because it was a qoute from above.

HC's 'gutter press' could read this notice as being 225 specific based on the limited circulation. Is there any relavence to other types, the 155 in particular?

I would like to know more on what was meant above by the comment:

I really hope the CAA tear into the culture that currently exists, in spite of operational crew, on the NS.

What culture is this?

[coalface]

sox6,

Although there will no doubt be some type specific elements in the final report, this accident is not type specific. I think it could happen in any offshore helicopter. There have been a number of accidents over the years when helicopters pilots have lost vertical situational awareness for various reasons and descended into the water.

The task will be to produce improved procedures and techniques to prevent it happening.

[sox6]

'Number of accidents...' Of that I am well aware. Hoping for a public domain AAIB bulletin in the next few days then.

[Bomber ARIS]

Chevrons?

Referring to the photo above (from post 201), I wondered where were the belly chevrons, much in vogue during my North Sea days.

Believed it was a NS standard, to facilitate location at night should an aircraft invert, post-ditching. Is this no longer the done thing?

Ta

[SASless]

Reckon them bright yellow float bags might clash with the chevrons?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Initial Report

The intial statement issued to us as operational pilots on NS is that nothing was wrong with the helicopter before it hit the sea.

The Commander has given his account of what happened and the crux of the incident is as follows:

The crew were attempting to approach the ETAP in marginal conditions, having descended to 300 feet.

They turned onto a final whereupon they became surprised that the platform was much closer than they thought. At this point the HP pitched the nose up (presumably to reduce speed). and the next thing they both knew was they had hit the water.

The impact seemingly does not seem to have been that great. However, the report goes on to say that the tail rotor, on contact with the sea, stopped almost instantly causing the TRDS to shear close to the transport joint. The driven end of which then flailed in the housing and all but severed the tailboom.

It is clear from some of the postings on this site that some people still believe it is a good idea to fly at night, without using automatics, relying instead on the superior flying skills to remain safe.

It is also clear that some NS pilots, flying older variants and types do not have the benefit of automatics at all.

It is also clear in the CAA Offshore sector, that once a descent has commenced VMC, there are no further rules to prevent the crew from descending as low as they like.

It is also clear that in many AOC Organisations OM procedures there is scant regard for the mandating the use of automatics at night.

It is also clear that on the ILS, the absolute minimum DH for a helicopter is 200 feet, this been the limit, stabilised, with full lead in lights, and the machine flying at a sensible, but more than adequate speed to maintain a stable vertical profile.

The absolute limit for an approach at night (MDH) is "Deck height +50 feet".

Here in lies the crux of the problem.

At the end of an ARA conducted in marginal conditions the crew, theoretically, have 50 feet of cloud free air in which to operate. This means that the point in space, where full visual references are available, ie "The fully formed rugby ball" is very very close to the helideck.

This means that to make a stable descent from this point the Groundspeed and therefore the airspeed has to be very low......OR the crew reaction, as seems to have been in this case, is to desperatly shed that speed, way to late, resulting in instability and loss of control and visual cues.

A SIMPLE BUT EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE

In my view....if we accept that the only point in space, where full visual flight can begin, is the "Rugby Ball", (Lets call this point "Calling the Ball" or CTB) the current regulations of "Helideck +50 feet" is way too low.

In my view, to gaurentee a stable final approach, this figure should be "Helideck + 200 feet" - and absolute minimum of 400 feet.

If, we accept this for a moment, we now have the makings of a sipmple, effective and safe procedure that would, if flown within parameters, ensure a stable final descent.

The piece of airspace underneath the MDH (Helideck + 200 feet or 400 feet), leading up to the CTB should not be available to the crew, ie no descent below that imaginary line drawn horizontally from MDH to the CTB should ever take place.

Finally we need to control the entry speeds for such a procedure. There are plenty of options but how about "Established at MDH, into wind @ 1.5Nm @Vy" as an absolute minimum.

Further reduction in KIAS, (to provide a sensible G/S) shall only be permitted in level flight at MDH, and to an absolute minimum of 50 KIAS at the CTB.

In summary, what I am proposing is to move the point in space where the rugby ball is fully developed, higher and further away, so that a stable airspeed can be maintained until the true transition to visual flight can take place..at the CTB.

Finally, and this is the most important point of all...INTERVENTION. By specifying this procedure and mandating the minima, both MDH and airspeeds at the Gate and CTB, the NHP now FOR THE VERY FIRST TIME will have a defintive intervention policy when the HP is not confroming to the profile, (ie descends below MDH before the CTB, or the airspeed drops below 50 kias between the Gate and the CTB).

USE OF AUTOMATICS OR OTHERWISE

For those aicraft fitted with couplers, the use of the coupler during this procedure should be mandatory (forget the argument for when it is broken the MEL says VFR only).

For those without couplers adherence to the profile and the intervention policy in provides the NHP puts them in a much better place than we all are right now.

What I have suggested above, before you rip into me, is safer, easier and simple.

It is not the full ARA procedure and would be suitable for shuttling. For the shuttle, for those fitted with it, the Alt Aquire prior to take off is set to the MDH for the next platform and once at that MDH, after take-off, the airspace beneath it, leading right up to the next CTB is not avaiable to the crew.

It may mean we do not fly some of the flights that we currently accept, but it will not be many and quite frankly we should welcome not having to push the to the current limits.

ANSWER THIS QUESTION

For those of you who still wish to fly a fully capable helicopter, manually, at night, during an offshore approach because you feel your skills might deteriote, I pose you the simple connudrum below:

FLIGHT ONE

Crew Operates the AC (IAW Double Bogies profile), making full use of the automatics. the NHP has a clearly defined intervention parameters and policy, and the crew follow the procedures, monitoring all parameters until the HP "Calls the Ball" whereupon they de-couple, gently reduce speed (couple of beeps back) lower the lever slightly and descend fully stable with a nice fat rugby ball to guide the HP to the deck.
If at any time the helicopter descends below MDH, or the speed drops below 50 KIAS, before the CTB, the new co-pilot (trained and breifed) knows exactly what to say, and in extermis what to do.
Up to the CTB, the crew rely on the £1m set of instruments displays and automatics to ensure that the helicopter follows the pre-designated profile, Both pilots effectively monitor the machine doing it work.

FLIGHT TWO

Crew, despite operating a fully capable helicopter, elect at 600 feet to de-couple and fly manually to the platform. The HP descends to 300 feet, the WX is marginal but the platform is vsiual and they begin to manouvre to try and find the helideck. The deck is 245 feet off the sea. They have to be within 200 metres of the deck before CTB is available. To get there, and still make a landing the airspeed has to be around 30 KIAS (Think of the LDP speed for a CAT helipad landing).
From the point they elected to de-couple, the crew and the pax they carry rely on the physical flying skills of the crew and the optical illusions that flying over the sea at night provide. The NHP has no intervention parameters (apart form his common sense) and there is no intervention policy in place.


Now........which of the above flights would like your Wife and Kids to be on.....

DB has not gone quiet....he was thinking.

P.S> All I have written above is fag packet stuff, intended to give food for thought,. I do not have a very large brain so any proposal like my suggestion needs careful consideration to ensure that Type specific issues are addressed, shuttling is not overly compromised and all the other bits and bobs like RADALT bug policys, resolving QFF over sea and so forth need overlaying.

However, at face value, it is unbelieveable that none of what I have described above exists today other than out own perosnal ideas and procedures that we have developed over the sea at night. Most of which being the result of giving ourselves a good scare.

I have over 8000 hours of offshore flight experience of which neary 1500 has been conducted at night. I have flown S61, L and L2 pumas. I am convinced that the development and adoptionsof procedures such as I have described above is the key to preventing incidents from happening like that poor BOND crew have suffered.

I am sure right now they are sat in their houses feeling really bad about what happened and maybe some guilt. In my veiw they are completely blameless as all that happened to them is the very last hole in the swiss cheese lined up, all the other cheese holes, (lack of procedures, non-mandated automatics, lack of intervention policy, MDH way too low, culture of manually flying) had already lined up!!!!!!!!

DB

[DeltaNg]

Hooray

Well said that man........should have been done years ago,
and one of the reasons I left the NS do go and do a lovely Day Vfr job