Qualities of a Good Training Captain
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....you know absolutely nothing about good teaching.
OTOH, the companies that I have worked for, seemed to like my style, which in the end is the only item that matters.
All the latest psycho-babble instructing methods are simply not cost effective in my, nor my companies opinion.
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and naturally your opinion doesn't count, because, you don't pay my big bucks salary.
OTOH, the companies that I have worked for, seemed to like my style, which in the end is the only item that matters.
All the latest psycho-babble instructing methods are simply not cost effective in my, nor my companies opinion.
What worries me about the 'teach them by rote and tell them to STFU' is that the student doesn't understand the reasons behind the methods. You may say 'well who cares as long as they do what I say'. The problem comes 10-20 years down the road when you've retired and your ex-students are now calling the shots. They'll say 'old 411A always used to say XYZ but he didn't really have a good reason for it, he was just an opinionated old arse. We know better, we're not going to do that any more'.
IMHO that is what is happening to this industry; in the rush to cut training time and costs the lessons of the past are simply not being passed on to the younger generations.
pb
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We know he flies for an airline that operates some of the last remaining Tristars in civilian service...
... has seen some of their fleet recently grounded for having expired LLPs (life limited parts)
Looks to me that ASFKAP is the 'pub bore' unable to separate fact from fiction.
This possibly is to be expected, as...he could never get TriStar aircraft to perform as advertised, whereas others definitely could...and can.
Now, in regard to this...
IMHO that is what is happening to this industry; in the rush to cut training time and costs the lessons of the past are simply not being passed on to the younger generations.
This is why I consider my training methods correct....as there is simply not enough time availabe to make everyone have all those warm and fuzzy feelings.
During line training, I subscribe to the 'do it my way, or else' agenda...and it works, no doubt about it.
Once a pilot is out on the line, he can accept/reject all the various odd ways of doing things from the Commanders he flies with.
During line training...sorry, no sale.
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I'd bet you learned all that in the marines. Didn't ya?
However, I was at SQ in the early days, flying (in Command) the B707 airplane, and I watched, first hand, these methods applied, with very good success.
Brand new First Officers taught by quite experienced (no nonsense) training Captains, in exactly the methods I have outlined.
And, what's more, it certainly worked for them, as SQ have had only one fatal accident in the intervening years, to date...in spite of a huge increase in their fleet, flying to far more international destinations than what many 'new guys' here could ever contemplate, never mind attain.
The B707 (advanced cowl, and older designs) were far more difficult to fly accuately) , than new(er) types.
B737 and A320...kiddie cars by comparasion.
When I received a brand new First Officer, on the line, just out of training at SQ, they could fly the airplane very well indeed, normally without my saying a word.
This was due, in large part, to Capt SK (Charlie) Chan's insistance on...training to proficiency, without exception.
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I know your going to harp on about "thats how we did it in the good 'ole days" or some other paltry excuse for ignorance or arrogance but you would definitely fall in the 'how not to do something' category of person from which to learn.
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were far more difficult to fly accuately)
Come on you guys grow up! If any of you guys really are airline pilots, I hope I never find myself sitting behind you! This was an extremely good and useful thread, with some excellent thoughts, until the children came out to play!!
Helen
Helen
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This was an extremely good and useful thread, with some excellent thoughts, until the children came out to play!!
Take ASFKAP, as an example...the guy is a mechanic, not a pilot, therefore wouldn't know the first thing about pilot training, especially in a company that he has no association with.
Par for the course.
the lunatic fringe
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Training a brand new "cadet" with 250 hours is a different task to training a hairy old 55 year old captain. The trainer needs to understand where the trainee has come from and adapt according to the trainees background experience and personality. One size does not fit all.
A good training captain, or indeed, a training FO needs to be adaptable amongst a host of other skills. Each trainee will learn differently. the trainer needs to adapt and understand to the trainees needs. In the olden days, trainers had just one way of teaching. Normally "monkey see, monkey do." If that did not work, then .. clearly the student was not good enough. Now a good trainer tries to understand how the student is learning, and adapts to that. For instance I tend to learn visually. Others need numbers and routines. Others are a mixture. Everyone is different.
So a brand new 20 hour cadet will need instruction. You talk, he listens. As the cadet begins to improve the instruction reduces, and you need to support him, and encourage him in improving his skills. More coaching than instruction. Towards the end of his training course the Cadet, should be able to get on and do is job with little or no input from the trainer.
With a grumpy old Captain on a conversion course it is a different matter. You show him the type specific stuff, how the seat moves, where to keep his glasses and pen. The best place to put the coffee cup. Impart a few words of wisdom about the new type. He does his thing and you mostly are mute in the right hand seat.
Bad trainers: Talk too much. Wave their ego in your face. Are inconsistent. Inflexible. Rigid. Never listen. Can't teach.
Too often trainers are doing the job for the money, and status, and not because they want to teach and impart wisdom and knowledge.
There is nothing more rewarding than watching a check ride in the simulator, watching a mediocre performance begin to unfold, and then with small input, settle the situation and tease out of the crew a good check ride. They learn something, and I always get to learn something. A bad trainer loves to unsettle a crew, and secretly delights in a bad performance. His ego gets fluffed up, and the trainee has his confidence rattled, and goes away learning nothing other than the training captain is an @rse.
All IMHO.
A good training captain, or indeed, a training FO needs to be adaptable amongst a host of other skills. Each trainee will learn differently. the trainer needs to adapt and understand to the trainees needs. In the olden days, trainers had just one way of teaching. Normally "monkey see, monkey do." If that did not work, then .. clearly the student was not good enough. Now a good trainer tries to understand how the student is learning, and adapts to that. For instance I tend to learn visually. Others need numbers and routines. Others are a mixture. Everyone is different.
So a brand new 20 hour cadet will need instruction. You talk, he listens. As the cadet begins to improve the instruction reduces, and you need to support him, and encourage him in improving his skills. More coaching than instruction. Towards the end of his training course the Cadet, should be able to get on and do is job with little or no input from the trainer.
With a grumpy old Captain on a conversion course it is a different matter. You show him the type specific stuff, how the seat moves, where to keep his glasses and pen. The best place to put the coffee cup. Impart a few words of wisdom about the new type. He does his thing and you mostly are mute in the right hand seat.
Bad trainers: Talk too much. Wave their ego in your face. Are inconsistent. Inflexible. Rigid. Never listen. Can't teach.
Too often trainers are doing the job for the money, and status, and not because they want to teach and impart wisdom and knowledge.
There is nothing more rewarding than watching a check ride in the simulator, watching a mediocre performance begin to unfold, and then with small input, settle the situation and tease out of the crew a good check ride. They learn something, and I always get to learn something. A bad trainer loves to unsettle a crew, and secretly delights in a bad performance. His ego gets fluffed up, and the trainee has his confidence rattled, and goes away learning nothing other than the training captain is an @rse.
All IMHO.
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...and the trainee has his confidence rattled, and goes away learning nothing other than the training captain is an @rse.
I will grant extra training, if need be, however...when some guys say...'well, it wasn't this way on the (insert type here, example, Boeing), make no mistake, the screws get turned...big time.
Why?
Because...these few folks are waisting my time, and that I will not allow.
Ever.
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411A - I have often been a fan of your postings, but your contribution to this debate is positively embarrassing. I am an Airbus Training Captain and in my foolishness believed that the attitudes displayed in your posts towards your fellow professionals were long-since gone. This is nothing to do with changing society for the sake of it and losing respect for elders - it is all to do with safety, safety and safety. When I train a new 200 hour pilot, the last thing I tell him is that regardless of our relative experience levels, I am totally capable of making a major error and if he sees something that alarms him he should shout out. The reason the attitude you display is so unacceptable is that it is dangerous and makes you a crash waiting to happen. It completely leaves the other pilot out the loop and removes one of the key components of a safe flight deck - a First Officer who will question what he does not feel comfortable with. It is the very reason that aviation outside the western world has such safety issues - a paternalistic approach to the guy next to the captain which guarantees he does not speak up when he needs to. You are breeding into your First Officers from Day One an unwise respect for authority that assumes the Captain is always right.
Back here in the western world where ever-increasing safety is a goal of all credible airlines, no stone has been left unturned in investigating why crashes occur and what can be done to avoid them. Much is wrong with the western world, and no one laments it more than me. Nonetheless, when it comes to aviation we have a lot right. One of those things that is right is making First Officers feel they have a voice in the process of flying. Sure, there are risks in that strategy and occasionally some guys misunderstand their place in the system. Overall, however, I am delighted to encourage First Officers to shout out when something wierd or uncomfortable is happening.
I note you quoting the wonders of SQ (Singapore Airlines). Perhaps you have forgotten the case of SQ006 which was a scheduled flight from Singapore Changi Airport to Los Angeles International Airport via Chiang Kai-Shek Airport (now Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport) in Taiwan. On 31 October 2000, at 15:17 UTC, 23:17 Taipei local time, a Boeing 747-400 on the route attempted to take off from the wrong runway in Taipei during a typhoon, destroying the aircraft and killing 83 of the 179 occupants. There were 2 First Officers on board who neither questioned the decision to take-off in a typhoon or to use the wrong runway. No doubt these redoubtable individuals were a product of the faultless SQ training system you espouse. The simple fact is that these FOs were unquestioning, overly-loyal individuals brought up on a diet of 'the Captain is always right' and a sense of their own low place in the hierarchy or eastern society. The result was catastrophe.
You will rightly point to a number of accidents in the western world over the years in similar circumstances. The one that comes to mind is that of Captain Stanley Key - an aggressive and much-disliked British European Airways (now British Airways) Trident Captain who was the commander of BE548 on 18th June 1972 out of Heathrow. The aircraft stalled on take-off and there is significant evidence to suggest that the very inexperienced co-pilot failed to act due to fear of being shouted down. That accident is well-known and within the UK was the beginning of a long and painful journey into what is now called CRM (Crew Resource Management). The airline industry in the west was forced to recognise, through this, and other terrible accidents, that overly-dominant Captains with young, inexperienced First Officers is a recipe for disaster. Since then enormous effort has been made to change the cockpit culture so that the FO can, and indeed should, shout out when something is going wrong. The world you still cling to 411A is yesterday's world that that is rightly being attacked in the interests of flight safety. The change in western flight deck practices has brought enormous safety benefits, but those benefits have yet to work their way to all airlines in the Far East and beyond. There is none so blind as those that will not see, and I do not expect you to embrace my view - such is the nature of denial. Nonetheless, I hope that many reading this will recognise the enormous benefits of encouraging all First Officers from day one to question the Captain if they do not like what they see. That is not an invitation to insubordination - it is an invitation to follow the best practices we know save lives.
Back here in the western world where ever-increasing safety is a goal of all credible airlines, no stone has been left unturned in investigating why crashes occur and what can be done to avoid them. Much is wrong with the western world, and no one laments it more than me. Nonetheless, when it comes to aviation we have a lot right. One of those things that is right is making First Officers feel they have a voice in the process of flying. Sure, there are risks in that strategy and occasionally some guys misunderstand their place in the system. Overall, however, I am delighted to encourage First Officers to shout out when something wierd or uncomfortable is happening.
I note you quoting the wonders of SQ (Singapore Airlines). Perhaps you have forgotten the case of SQ006 which was a scheduled flight from Singapore Changi Airport to Los Angeles International Airport via Chiang Kai-Shek Airport (now Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport) in Taiwan. On 31 October 2000, at 15:17 UTC, 23:17 Taipei local time, a Boeing 747-400 on the route attempted to take off from the wrong runway in Taipei during a typhoon, destroying the aircraft and killing 83 of the 179 occupants. There were 2 First Officers on board who neither questioned the decision to take-off in a typhoon or to use the wrong runway. No doubt these redoubtable individuals were a product of the faultless SQ training system you espouse. The simple fact is that these FOs were unquestioning, overly-loyal individuals brought up on a diet of 'the Captain is always right' and a sense of their own low place in the hierarchy or eastern society. The result was catastrophe.
You will rightly point to a number of accidents in the western world over the years in similar circumstances. The one that comes to mind is that of Captain Stanley Key - an aggressive and much-disliked British European Airways (now British Airways) Trident Captain who was the commander of BE548 on 18th June 1972 out of Heathrow. The aircraft stalled on take-off and there is significant evidence to suggest that the very inexperienced co-pilot failed to act due to fear of being shouted down. That accident is well-known and within the UK was the beginning of a long and painful journey into what is now called CRM (Crew Resource Management). The airline industry in the west was forced to recognise, through this, and other terrible accidents, that overly-dominant Captains with young, inexperienced First Officers is a recipe for disaster. Since then enormous effort has been made to change the cockpit culture so that the FO can, and indeed should, shout out when something is going wrong. The world you still cling to 411A is yesterday's world that that is rightly being attacked in the interests of flight safety. The change in western flight deck practices has brought enormous safety benefits, but those benefits have yet to work their way to all airlines in the Far East and beyond. There is none so blind as those that will not see, and I do not expect you to embrace my view - such is the nature of denial. Nonetheless, I hope that many reading this will recognise the enormous benefits of encouraging all First Officers from day one to question the Captain if they do not like what they see. That is not an invitation to insubordination - it is an invitation to follow the best practices we know save lives.
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Perhaps you have forgotten the case of SQ006...
Brand new First Officers taught by quite experienced (no nonsense) training Captains, in exactly the methods I have outlined.
And, what's more, it certainly worked for them, as SQ have had only one fatal accident in the intervening years, to date...in spite of a huge increase in their fleet, flying to far more international destinations than what many 'new guys' here could ever contemplate, never mind attain.
And, what's more, it certainly worked for them, as SQ have had only one fatal accident in the intervening years, to date...in spite of a huge increase in their fleet, flying to far more international destinations than what many 'new guys' here could ever contemplate, never mind attain.
Now, as for the rest of your comments, I would say the following...
airline budgets today are tight, and this extends to the training department as well, make no mistake.
Therefore, for the trainee to get the most out of these limited budgets and instructor time, it will be necessary for these '200 hour wonders' to listen carefully to their instructor pilots, and follow the plot to the letter, simply because...these referenced junior guys would have had no previous jet transport airline flying experience, therefore...they would, at the start of training, have zero knowledge of line operations, despite what they might read here on PPRuNe, to the contrary.
Once they know the basics, then they can start to 'question'...and not before.
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I suggest you go back and read the comments from other more reasonable Training Captains who have posted here. And take good notes.
1. Why have you not actually addressed the point NSF made about how the Far Eastern culture led to that accident, rather than simply highlighting that you had already mentioned it? Address the issue.
It is up to the specific airline company and their flight standards/safety department to set the policy, not the individual instructor.
The individual instructor simply follows the relevant company training syllabus, and should not go off on some tangent, trying to change 'culture'.
Otherwise...the 'CRM' department might well be out of a job.
To answer the original question I would reply, as many have done so already, that patience is probably the most important quality for a trainer to have. That and a genuine desire to teach another human being a new skill.
As to the "man and boy "concept where the trainer is a God-like entity who must not be questioned it would be all well and good except it doesn't/didn't work. NSF highlighted the Staines crash as a good example where it is believed that an aggressive over bearing Capt might have made an under confident FO unlikely to speak up when he needed to.
It's quite possible that a brand new FO, even during line training, will spot something wrong and should have the confidence to speak up. A good trainer will use that as an example of why it's a 2(3) crew aircraft and reinforce the message that one should never keep silent if something appears amiss.
As to the "man and boy "concept where the trainer is a God-like entity who must not be questioned it would be all well and good except it doesn't/didn't work. NSF highlighted the Staines crash as a good example where it is believed that an aggressive over bearing Capt might have made an under confident FO unlikely to speak up when he needed to.
It's quite possible that a brand new FO, even during line training, will spot something wrong and should have the confidence to speak up. A good trainer will use that as an example of why it's a 2(3) crew aircraft and reinforce the message that one should never keep silent if something appears amiss.
I wouldn't jump on the east too much about run way line ups
Regarding SQ 006, what about Lexington and the near miss, a farce worthy of Gilbert and Sullivan, that BA recently had in St Kitts?. Both happened in good weather with Western operators with overall good records long after SQ 006 was done and supposedly "learned" by our superior CRM based training?
"Once they know the basics, then they can start to 'question'...and not before."
Sounds like good advice to me. What exactly is wrong with that?
FITW - I'd have no problems flying with SQ or with 411A. Reading what I did, yes I read the entire report, about St Kitts I was stunned at the layers of "laissez faire" attitude at BA. I wasn't just the pilots. Why are BA operating large jets out of an airport(s) with known safety issues and doing nothing about it worries me a lot more than having a make nice trainer.
Edited - changed island
411A deliberately writes to stir the pot, but I have found a lot very good advice in there. Many here seem to never read the posts and just start foaming at the keyboard when they see his tag.
20driver
"Once they know the basics, then they can start to 'question'...and not before."
Sounds like good advice to me. What exactly is wrong with that?
FITW - I'd have no problems flying with SQ or with 411A. Reading what I did, yes I read the entire report, about St Kitts I was stunned at the layers of "laissez faire" attitude at BA. I wasn't just the pilots. Why are BA operating large jets out of an airport(s) with known safety issues and doing nothing about it worries me a lot more than having a make nice trainer.
Edited - changed island
411A deliberately writes to stir the pot, but I have found a lot very good advice in there. Many here seem to never read the posts and just start foaming at the keyboard when they see his tag.
20driver
Last edited by 20driver; 23rd Sep 2010 at 19:39.
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It is up to the specific airline company and their flight standards/safety department to set the policy, not the individual instructor.
The individual instructor simply follows the relevant company training syllabus, and should not go off on some tangent, trying to change 'culture'.
Otherwise...the 'CRM' department might well be out of a job.
The individual instructor simply follows the relevant company training syllabus, and should not go off on some tangent, trying to change 'culture'.
Otherwise...the 'CRM' department might well be out of a job.
20driver
I presume your attention to detail on your flight deck is better than your attention to detail in your recollection of the report .... I presume you refer to St Kitts
20driver
A question for you. Which of the following crews would be more likely to line up at the wrong intersection. A crew where the Trg Capt has established that despite the FO's inexperience he/she can feel free to question something that worries them or one where the Trainer has made it very clear that HE is in charge and the trainee should "shut up" and only do what they are told.
Of course the first crew could still make the same error but I would suggest it is less likely and that is what most airline professionals strive for.
A question for you. Which of the following crews would be more likely to line up at the wrong intersection. A crew where the Trg Capt has established that despite the FO's inexperience he/she can feel free to question something that worries them or one where the Trainer has made it very clear that HE is in charge and the trainee should "shut up" and only do what they are told.
Of course the first crew could still make the same error but I would suggest it is less likely and that is what most airline professionals strive for.
BBK -you might be right
You are suggesting, do you have any data?
What I am saying is lining up incorrectly is not a problem unique to SQ nor is it an "eastern" problem. It seems people here who don't like 411a feel they have to dump on SQ, and by extension "eastern culture" to discredit him as he thought they run, or ran, a good training department.
Anyone from SQ care to comment?
20driver
What I am saying is lining up incorrectly is not a problem unique to SQ nor is it an "eastern" problem. It seems people here who don't like 411a feel they have to dump on SQ, and by extension "eastern culture" to discredit him as he thought they run, or ran, a good training department.
Anyone from SQ care to comment?
20driver