Qualities of a Good Training Captain
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So the failings you clearly exhibit are not as a result of your own personality flaws but rather a reflection of the poor safety culture that exists within your company.....?
And you are, no doubt, "merely following orders" as they said in Nuremburg......
And you are, no doubt, "merely following orders" as they said in Nuremburg......
Hello pot, kettle calling...
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SQ006 took off from the unfamiliar side of the runway.Normally SQ at that time used only Eastern runway. Plus the deficienct taxiway marking, all pilots in the cockpit could miss the active runway.(They took off using the decommissioned parallel runway which was very close to the active runway).I think there is nothing involve CRM.
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As someone who spent twenty years with SQ as a Check & Training Captain on three different fleets including the B747 I feel that I need to add a few comments to this discussion.
In the early years – mid seventies – SQ were expanding at a phenomenal rate and suffered much of the same growing problems of any similar company. The main problem being a shortage of experienced pilots.
Captains were being hired from all around the globe; its aircrew was becoming a regular United Nations. Much of the flight operations culture had been inherited from British Airways who had played a role in this capacity.
Becoming an instructor or check pilot was considered a promotion and based on normal promotion criteria – not necessarily an ideal situation.
Whilst there were relatively few national commanders most of the co-pilots were either nationals of either Singapore or Malaysia with a few expats making up the numbers. As 411A have previously mentioned the policy at the time was, train hard and produce results.
As expansion continued the company realized that to meet its future pilot requirements a different approach was required, and in the course of time a complete in-house training organization was set up to take suitable candidates and put them through a structured training program from day one.
A multi million dollar training center was built near Changi Airport, flight schools were established at Seletar for basic flight training, Jandakot for multi-engine and I.F. and subsequently Maroochydore for advanced jet training.
Likewise the selection of instructors to meet the above requirements was also up-dated with more emphasis on initial selection, aircraft and operational knowledge, personal flying ability, instructional technique along with human factors were all taken in to consideration.
Each instructor or check pilot received additional training and subsequent performance monitoring, along with feedback from various students. The company also held regular instructor meetings to iron out any problems and establish subsequent training policy.
I can say with confidence that by the time a company trained pilot reached the rank of First Officer and occupied the right seat unsupervised he was fully qualified and competent. He would have completed a minimum of two years training. One year from basic to advanced jet, followed by Type Rating endorsement and Line Training. He would also have received training in Human Factors, CRM and other company associated courses and would certainly NOT be reluctant to challenge any actions by a Captain who was operating outside the Companies SOPs, or placing the safety of the aircraft in question.
The regrettable Taipei accident was a result of human factors. Whilst the T/OFF visibility was above limits it was severely reduced in rain. There was no question in the minds of the crew that they were lined up on the correct runway.
The runway lights were “ON” - they should not have been. There were NO white crosses on the threshold to indicate that the runway was “Closed” – there should have been.
Yes a fatal mistake was made, but it was not due to any uncertainty or reluctance of the two F/Os to challenge the captain’s decision.
In my mind and first hand experience SQs training and operational standards are equal to, and probably better than most, of its competitors and am proud to have been part of it.
In the early years – mid seventies – SQ were expanding at a phenomenal rate and suffered much of the same growing problems of any similar company. The main problem being a shortage of experienced pilots.
Captains were being hired from all around the globe; its aircrew was becoming a regular United Nations. Much of the flight operations culture had been inherited from British Airways who had played a role in this capacity.
Becoming an instructor or check pilot was considered a promotion and based on normal promotion criteria – not necessarily an ideal situation.
Whilst there were relatively few national commanders most of the co-pilots were either nationals of either Singapore or Malaysia with a few expats making up the numbers. As 411A have previously mentioned the policy at the time was, train hard and produce results.
As expansion continued the company realized that to meet its future pilot requirements a different approach was required, and in the course of time a complete in-house training organization was set up to take suitable candidates and put them through a structured training program from day one.
A multi million dollar training center was built near Changi Airport, flight schools were established at Seletar for basic flight training, Jandakot for multi-engine and I.F. and subsequently Maroochydore for advanced jet training.
Likewise the selection of instructors to meet the above requirements was also up-dated with more emphasis on initial selection, aircraft and operational knowledge, personal flying ability, instructional technique along with human factors were all taken in to consideration.
Each instructor or check pilot received additional training and subsequent performance monitoring, along with feedback from various students. The company also held regular instructor meetings to iron out any problems and establish subsequent training policy.
I can say with confidence that by the time a company trained pilot reached the rank of First Officer and occupied the right seat unsupervised he was fully qualified and competent. He would have completed a minimum of two years training. One year from basic to advanced jet, followed by Type Rating endorsement and Line Training. He would also have received training in Human Factors, CRM and other company associated courses and would certainly NOT be reluctant to challenge any actions by a Captain who was operating outside the Companies SOPs, or placing the safety of the aircraft in question.
Anyone from SQ care to comment?
The runway lights were “ON” - they should not have been. There were NO white crosses on the threshold to indicate that the runway was “Closed” – there should have been.
Yes a fatal mistake was made, but it was not due to any uncertainty or reluctance of the two F/Os to challenge the captain’s decision.
In my mind and first hand experience SQs training and operational standards are equal to, and probably better than most, of its competitors and am proud to have been part of it.
Last edited by Exaviator; 24th Sep 2010 at 07:25.
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In my mind and first hand experience SQs training and operational standards are equal to, and probably better than most, of its competitors and am proud to have been part of it.
Many 'western' pilots like to point fingers and say...those in the 'east' have a significant problem with their 'culture'.
This may well be true with some east asian air carriers, but....not SQ.
Captain SK (Charlie) Chan, the original Dir Flt Ops (and yes, I personally knew him quite well) wanted the screws turned, with training, and would accept nothing less than...trained to proficiency, period.
Each and every B707 new local First Officer received no less than thirty (30) circuits in the traffic pattern, and needed to accomplish the following...
a four engine ILS, to a landing
a four engine ILS to minimums, and a go-around,
an engine out ILS, to a landing,
an engine out ILS, with a go-around,
and (outboard) engine failure at rotation, followed by an ILS to a three engine landing,
and...
a non-precision approach (all engines) to a landing.
Only then, were these guys transferred to line ops, for line training.
Capt Chan's idea...train to proficiency and it will serve you well.
And, so it has...with SQ.
When I joined SQ, I was asked if I had instructor qualifications.
My reply was in the affirmative, provided by PanAmerican, recently.
I was put to work within one year, on a line training assignment, and continued for three more years with the company.
SQ had a first class training organisation...then (long ago), and now.
Second...to NONE, in my considered opinion.
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This thread seems to have drifted to SQ's training standards, and opinion sought from SQ pilots associated with the training programme.
I was hired as a Direct Entry Instructor 20 years ago, and have been close to the heart of SQ's attitudes towards proficiency. I've also been privelaged to have been an integral part of it's development. An example - In bygone times SQ pilots, were, to put it mildly NOT very Performance "savvy". They are now, and I'm pleased to have played a large part in this role.
The tragic SQ006 accident has raised it's ugly head. I will deliberately have little to comment upon this, but, by chance, all 3 of the operating crew were, at some time or other students of mine, albeit for a few flights only. In no respect did I find any of them "wanting". The tragic Taipei accident was the end result of the lining up of a lot of the proverbial holes in the Swiss cheese.
I'm in my last year of service before I reach my "use by" date, and have opted to drop training for the last year of my career to enjoy pure line flying after 30 years of instruction with SQ and another reputable airline. Thus, I am now flying with a lot of "new boys" with low time, fresh out of the training system. ON THE LINE I CANNOT TELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM AND MORE EXPERIENCED F/Os - Charlie Chan's legacy lives on - TRAIN TO STANDARD!
The acid test is, would you put your wife and family on board an aircraft with these new guys flying? My answer is a very positive YES!
Best Regards,
Old Smokey
I was hired as a Direct Entry Instructor 20 years ago, and have been close to the heart of SQ's attitudes towards proficiency. I've also been privelaged to have been an integral part of it's development. An example - In bygone times SQ pilots, were, to put it mildly NOT very Performance "savvy". They are now, and I'm pleased to have played a large part in this role.
The tragic SQ006 accident has raised it's ugly head. I will deliberately have little to comment upon this, but, by chance, all 3 of the operating crew were, at some time or other students of mine, albeit for a few flights only. In no respect did I find any of them "wanting". The tragic Taipei accident was the end result of the lining up of a lot of the proverbial holes in the Swiss cheese.
I'm in my last year of service before I reach my "use by" date, and have opted to drop training for the last year of my career to enjoy pure line flying after 30 years of instruction with SQ and another reputable airline. Thus, I am now flying with a lot of "new boys" with low time, fresh out of the training system. ON THE LINE I CANNOT TELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM AND MORE EXPERIENCED F/Os - Charlie Chan's legacy lives on - TRAIN TO STANDARD!
The acid test is, would you put your wife and family on board an aircraft with these new guys flying? My answer is a very positive YES!
Best Regards,
Old Smokey
Bungfai: I seem to remember that the accident report made much of the fact that although SQ trained for Low Visibility landings there was no training given to training for poor visibility take-offs. For example, some airlines use the departure runway localiser signal to confirm that the correct runway and centreline has been achieved. Did not SQ also have paravisual displays fitted to their aircraft which also would have helped prevent this accident? The typhoon conditions on the day with very heavy rainfall would have made taxying very challenging indeed.
