Aircraft down in Canley Vale
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IF, IF, IF...
Here is a HYPOTHETICAL situation... IF you had an engine failure and the remaining engine was operating normally initially and there was a runway close by with an ILS but with fog and practically zero vis, below landing minima for your class of aircraft and operation, and a few miles further on is another runway that is CAVOK, how many pilots would choose to land on the nearer runway - seriously?
This question doesn't have to be answered, but if this situation was real... And if the pilot chose the second airport and the remaining engine starts acting up on the way there - one could end up in a sticky situation...
I don't wish to argue further on this. Just presenting some food for thought.
Here is a HYPOTHETICAL situation... IF you had an engine failure and the remaining engine was operating normally initially and there was a runway close by with an ILS but with fog and practically zero vis, below landing minima for your class of aircraft and operation, and a few miles further on is another runway that is CAVOK, how many pilots would choose to land on the nearer runway - seriously?
This question doesn't have to be answered, but if this situation was real... And if the pilot chose the second airport and the remaining engine starts acting up on the way there - one could end up in a sticky situation...
I don't wish to argue further on this. Just presenting some food for thought.
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I think the reason some can't see why remoak is so far off track, is that without knowing Andrew you wouldn't know how far off the generalisations directed towards him are....
I guess I too am blinded by a few things. But the culture you present is not apparent with him or the group of guys he associated himself with. The fact is also that this wasn't his first emergency... Or abnormal situation.... Wouldn't have been the first time he shacked up at an airport refusing to budge -if he did go to Richmond...
He wasn't as inexperienced as you are trying to imply, and furthermore I guess why Dave would be reeling, his training wasn't lacking.
I am sure he would of made some mistakes contained in the event. I just don't see his refusal to go to Richmond as being it... Nor do I see it as the root cause of his eventual accident.
Remoak why can you not identify also with what people are saying. The automet says what says. It has been verified that there was low cloud and fog in the area... Is it just that this doesn't agree with your model.
As I have previously said... Unless you have all the facts, and look on with a completely unbiased view - Ga or not. Then better we wait for a report. The contents of which I'm sure will interest many... Too many variables and subjective opinions right now...
I guess I too am blinded by a few things. But the culture you present is not apparent with him or the group of guys he associated himself with. The fact is also that this wasn't his first emergency... Or abnormal situation.... Wouldn't have been the first time he shacked up at an airport refusing to budge -if he did go to Richmond...
He wasn't as inexperienced as you are trying to imply, and furthermore I guess why Dave would be reeling, his training wasn't lacking.
I am sure he would of made some mistakes contained in the event. I just don't see his refusal to go to Richmond as being it... Nor do I see it as the root cause of his eventual accident.
Remoak why can you not identify also with what people are saying. The automet says what says. It has been verified that there was low cloud and fog in the area... Is it just that this doesn't agree with your model.
As I have previously said... Unless you have all the facts, and look on with a completely unbiased view - Ga or not. Then better we wait for a report. The contents of which I'm sure will interest many... Too many variables and subjective opinions right now...
Conflict alert said
mate you can't be serious? Spoken like a true wanna bee Pilot.
A 10,000 Pilot has a lot more "head space" available to deal with any emergency thrown at him. They are more able to see the big picture and prioritise their actions without forgetting basic flying skills forgotten in the heat of battle during an emergency when one's mind tends to become easily overloaded or focused on one thing. The experienced Pilot will have a good base of "automatic skills " with which to automatically use.
On the other hand most 500 hr wannabees would be fully occupied to the max just handling a hard day of normal ops let alone a full blown emergency situation and they might just become focused on just one element of the operation.( and that is by no means a slur against them. )
There is no substitute for experience and training, full bloody stop.
surely a 10000 hour pilot who has never experienced a major inflight emergency is no more experienced than a 500 hour pilot with the same emergency??
A 10,000 Pilot has a lot more "head space" available to deal with any emergency thrown at him. They are more able to see the big picture and prioritise their actions without forgetting basic flying skills forgotten in the heat of battle during an emergency when one's mind tends to become easily overloaded or focused on one thing. The experienced Pilot will have a good base of "automatic skills " with which to automatically use.
On the other hand most 500 hr wannabees would be fully occupied to the max just handling a hard day of normal ops let alone a full blown emergency situation and they might just become focused on just one element of the operation.( and that is by no means a slur against them. )
There is no substitute for experience and training, full bloody stop.
Can anyone tell me if ATC would (or legally could) offer RI if it were not open and available weather wise?Surely they wouldn't offer it as an option if it were IMC?(excuse the ignorance-Im still a lowly VFR pilot)
There is obviously a lot of feeling on this thread, and I have to say that for the most part it has been impressive the amount of restraint used by all with a few inevitable whack's and jibes here and there.
To any that were close to the pilot and pax and are feeling grief I do feel for you, but it may be that a bit of time is needed before being active on this thread for your own mental and emotional state.I personally would have a lot of trouble reading all of this if I were racked with grief and too close to it as I doubt I would be able to keep my feelings out of it, but as someone not personally involved I can say that this has been remarkably civil and respectful compared to many other threads Ive seen here.
Im someone trying to learn all I can from this incident and I have found much of the speculation, conversation and ponderings on this thread invaluable, and this incident will shape how I hope to respond to any future incidents I may face in my flying career.This is not through judgements on what decisions were or were not made by AW, but more by reading through the valuable information on this thread by the pilots posting here with more knowledge and experience than I(most of them probably).
I hope that I have the instinct and intelligence to know what information to leave behind and what to take with me.
There is obviously a lot of feeling on this thread, and I have to say that for the most part it has been impressive the amount of restraint used by all with a few inevitable whack's and jibes here and there.
To any that were close to the pilot and pax and are feeling grief I do feel for you, but it may be that a bit of time is needed before being active on this thread for your own mental and emotional state.I personally would have a lot of trouble reading all of this if I were racked with grief and too close to it as I doubt I would be able to keep my feelings out of it, but as someone not personally involved I can say that this has been remarkably civil and respectful compared to many other threads Ive seen here.
Im someone trying to learn all I can from this incident and I have found much of the speculation, conversation and ponderings on this thread invaluable, and this incident will shape how I hope to respond to any future incidents I may face in my flying career.This is not through judgements on what decisions were or were not made by AW, but more by reading through the valuable information on this thread by the pilots posting here with more knowledge and experience than I(most of them probably).
I hope that I have the instinct and intelligence to know what information to leave behind and what to take with me.
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Which is another way of saying that the standards and culture in GA are well known to feature certain common traits, no matter what part of the world you might happen to be in. One of those traits is a preoccupation with saving money at all costs, and a significant amount of pressure on young, inexperienced pilots to "do the right thing" and always think primarily of the company when making operational decisions. Not all GA companies are like that, but the majority definitely are. Most of them will never spell out their operational preferences directly, but all GA pilots understand what is expected of them and all, to some extent, "play the game".
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Xcel
Look, I don't know how many times I am going to have to say this before you get it.
I don't have a theory. I don't have a model. I have nothing whatsoever to say about the character, training, skill, or professionalism of the pilot. Not even the somewhat abusive character that trained him.
All I have is a question. That's it. It's very simple: why would you leave a perfectly good, very long, superbly equipped runway to head off for another, some 20-odd miles away, with a major failure?
There is possibly a second question, which would be, why, when a second problem became apparent, or it became clear that there was going to be a problem reaching Bankstown, was a decision to make a forced landing not made while there was sufficient height to get it done successfully?
And that's all I'm asking.
Now to answer your points:
By who? Everyone who has commented on the weather at Richmond has said there were no issues (posts 122, 130, 173 and 181). I don't know who is right and who is wrong, but I do know that I tend to prefer human observation to automated weather reports. It is perfectly possible for an automated station to report low vis at the surface that would in no way preclude a safe landing.
The report will tell you precisely nothing about the real causes of this accident - they are lost forever.
Look, I don't know how many times I am going to have to say this before you get it.
I don't have a theory. I don't have a model. I have nothing whatsoever to say about the character, training, skill, or professionalism of the pilot. Not even the somewhat abusive character that trained him.
All I have is a question. That's it. It's very simple: why would you leave a perfectly good, very long, superbly equipped runway to head off for another, some 20-odd miles away, with a major failure?
There is possibly a second question, which would be, why, when a second problem became apparent, or it became clear that there was going to be a problem reaching Bankstown, was a decision to make a forced landing not made while there was sufficient height to get it done successfully?
And that's all I'm asking.
Now to answer your points:
It has been verified that there was low cloud and fog in the area
Then better we wait for a report. The contents of which I'm sure will interest many...
This still bothers me:
7:54 - Center - Descend to 2500
7:54 - PGW - 2500
All indications of time and distance that I can calculate indicate that the aircraft was losing height at around 500 fpm, from 3 minutes north of YSRI. At 12 miles to run the aircraft should have been at 2200' or better, but reported 1500'. Nine miles later, or 3-4 minutes, it had lost the 1500'.
It seems quite possible to me that the pilot may have reacted to the ATC call by stepping down at some point below the best descent angle, possibly due to an innate compliance with the normal requirements of the airspace as he was dealing with the mechanical problems.
These are only quick calculations I've made and I would be happy for someone knowledgeable to refute my hypothesis.
7:54 - Center - Descend to 2500
7:54 - PGW - 2500
All indications of time and distance that I can calculate indicate that the aircraft was losing height at around 500 fpm, from 3 minutes north of YSRI. At 12 miles to run the aircraft should have been at 2200' or better, but reported 1500'. Nine miles later, or 3-4 minutes, it had lost the 1500'.
It seems quite possible to me that the pilot may have reacted to the ATC call by stepping down at some point below the best descent angle, possibly due to an innate compliance with the normal requirements of the airspace as he was dealing with the mechanical problems.
These are only quick calculations I've made and I would be happy for someone knowledgeable to refute my hypothesis.
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Nojwod,
Without pulling out the BK/SY charts, I would suggest that ATC where acting as required,ie descent not below control steps etc, in keeping with the PAN situation.
As it was only a PAN situation, I can only assume that the PIC had the situation in hand at the time and had assessed his available options and that BK was his best option. Whether or not a MAYDAY would have given more scope to the PIC remains to be seen, but the fact that when he was given options, albeit when obviously the initial plan had gone pear shaped and could not see them, due haze, it was too late.
Without pulling out the BK/SY charts, I would suggest that ATC where acting as required,ie descent not below control steps etc, in keeping with the PAN situation.
As it was only a PAN situation, I can only assume that the PIC had the situation in hand at the time and had assessed his available options and that BK was his best option. Whether or not a MAYDAY would have given more scope to the PIC remains to be seen, but the fact that when he was given options, albeit when obviously the initial plan had gone pear shaped and could not see them, due haze, it was too late.
Does anyone know the state of the Hoxton Park runway. Its seems is track took him within 1.6nm of a safe haven, ie the Hoxton Park runway.
As a ME Instuructor, I have done over 100 inflight shutdowns on twins during endorsement training, 20m from BK at 4000, and have had to convert 4 of them to full featherd landings due to the engine not able to be restarted. 7000ft at 35nm. I too would have headed baack for YSBK.
It will be interesting to see the radar plots, was the descent a continuous one right to the ground, or was there a level segment at any time.
A couple of years ago I had a partial power loss at night over Point Cook at 4000. ATC were magnificent and literally parted the waters for me in regards to traffic. I dont know if I declared a Pan or a Mayday, I was too busy keeping the engine running.......sortof. I headed back to EN, I should have gone straight to Tulla, which was much closer, but the overwhelming drive is to go back to either your point of departure, or a field that you are familiar with.
What is concerning however, is the number of failures in 6 cylinder piston engines above 300Hp. Particularly turbo charged models. Worldwide, the statistics are shocking.
As a ME Instuructor, I have done over 100 inflight shutdowns on twins during endorsement training, 20m from BK at 4000, and have had to convert 4 of them to full featherd landings due to the engine not able to be restarted. 7000ft at 35nm. I too would have headed baack for YSBK.
It will be interesting to see the radar plots, was the descent a continuous one right to the ground, or was there a level segment at any time.
A couple of years ago I had a partial power loss at night over Point Cook at 4000. ATC were magnificent and literally parted the waters for me in regards to traffic. I dont know if I declared a Pan or a Mayday, I was too busy keeping the engine running.......sortof. I headed back to EN, I should have gone straight to Tulla, which was much closer, but the overwhelming drive is to go back to either your point of departure, or a field that you are familiar with.
What is concerning however, is the number of failures in 6 cylinder piston engines above 300Hp. Particularly turbo charged models. Worldwide, the statistics are shocking.
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The answers sought
May I suggest that some of the heat in this discussion has been due to the perceived questioning of Andrew's decision(s).
We dont have all the facts, some of them will be available to the investigators.
I will reiterate a common theme, HINDSIGHT. We can't turn back the hands of time. Easy to say now that YSRI might have been a better option.
Some thoughts out aloud:
-From above, the general area at the point of failure might have been covered with 8/8 cloud/fog, (note the transmission "visual on top"). Do I take an IMC approach and the possibility of a go-around assymetric, or continue on one.
-I would expect the aircraft to perform assymetric in cool conditions from altitude, with a profile that even with negative climb, would give me substantial range. I have ample fuel for crossfeeding (because I was fueled for a much longer sector)
- I am prioritising, controlling the aircraft, addressing the problem at hand, diagnosing, can I restore power to the troubled engine before I shut it down? (perhaps not a clear cut full power loss with pronounced yaw). Time and distance passes. Bankstown is getting closer.
The questions I'd like answered, and that we might learn from, (some of which probably wont be answered):
-What else transpired that resulted in lack of assymetric performance?
-What symptoms were available, and what diagnostics can we look for in the future that would indicate there might be further failure impending? There is no direct relationship between the two engines except electrical (no obvious factor) and fuel (I'm not going to venture down that path). Two independent powerplants, one fails to some unknown extent, what happened to the other one!!? Many aircraft have proceeded on one, with the expectation and result of assymetric performance, without loss.
To say that YSRI was the obvious choice, black and white, is to make a judgement as a time traveller, knowing the outcome, before the decision.
Hypothetical scenario, aircaft proceedes to YSRI, comes unstuck due poor vis, conditions below minima for piston engine aircraft, no coupled FD/AP, hand flying in an emergency situation with conditions below prescribed, similar outcome. I can hear the cries of why didnt it proceed to YSBK in VMC on one engine (staying VMC is a factor in the decision process), familiar destination.
I've tried to be as objective as possible under the circumstances.
I don't feel we have enough FACTS to say YSRI was the obvious and only choice, carte blanche under the circumstances.
I'm a GA pilot with some experience, by no means anywhere near an expert. Saddened by the loss of someone I knew and have personally flown with, and would also like some good to come out of this tragedy in the form of something we learn that will help others, whether it be human factors training, an engineering factor etc.
Safe flying to us all.
We dont have all the facts, some of them will be available to the investigators.
I will reiterate a common theme, HINDSIGHT. We can't turn back the hands of time. Easy to say now that YSRI might have been a better option.
Some thoughts out aloud:
-From above, the general area at the point of failure might have been covered with 8/8 cloud/fog, (note the transmission "visual on top"). Do I take an IMC approach and the possibility of a go-around assymetric, or continue on one.
-I would expect the aircraft to perform assymetric in cool conditions from altitude, with a profile that even with negative climb, would give me substantial range. I have ample fuel for crossfeeding (because I was fueled for a much longer sector)
- I am prioritising, controlling the aircraft, addressing the problem at hand, diagnosing, can I restore power to the troubled engine before I shut it down? (perhaps not a clear cut full power loss with pronounced yaw). Time and distance passes. Bankstown is getting closer.
The questions I'd like answered, and that we might learn from, (some of which probably wont be answered):
-What else transpired that resulted in lack of assymetric performance?
-What symptoms were available, and what diagnostics can we look for in the future that would indicate there might be further failure impending? There is no direct relationship between the two engines except electrical (no obvious factor) and fuel (I'm not going to venture down that path). Two independent powerplants, one fails to some unknown extent, what happened to the other one!!? Many aircraft have proceeded on one, with the expectation and result of assymetric performance, without loss.
To say that YSRI was the obvious choice, black and white, is to make a judgement as a time traveller, knowing the outcome, before the decision.
Hypothetical scenario, aircaft proceedes to YSRI, comes unstuck due poor vis, conditions below minima for piston engine aircraft, no coupled FD/AP, hand flying in an emergency situation with conditions below prescribed, similar outcome. I can hear the cries of why didnt it proceed to YSBK in VMC on one engine (staying VMC is a factor in the decision process), familiar destination.
I've tried to be as objective as possible under the circumstances.
I don't feel we have enough FACTS to say YSRI was the obvious and only choice, carte blanche under the circumstances.
I'm a GA pilot with some experience, by no means anywhere near an expert. Saddened by the loss of someone I knew and have personally flown with, and would also like some good to come out of this tragedy in the form of something we learn that will help others, whether it be human factors training, an engineering factor etc.
Safe flying to us all.
Shouldn't everyone first take a deep breath and conclusively determine whether YSRI was in fact available and free of low cloud/fog?
There seems little point debating the merits of any decision without first establishing this.
There have been a number of posts with conflicting reports of the viz at YSRI and I am surprised noone has simply picked up the phone and asked someone in ATC at YSRI about the day in question. Its possible to fly an ILS at Richmond in VMC right down till about 500' then you're in the gloop.
If you could see that the field is fogged in. Simple.
That may or may not be so, however in absence of information to the contrary, if the station reports viz below 2KM for the hours 1800-2300Z it would reasonable to assume it was not an option. (The temps and dewpoints tend to indicate fog.)
There seems little point debating the merits of any decision without first establishing this.
There have been a number of posts with conflicting reports of the viz at YSRI and I am surprised noone has simply picked up the phone and asked someone in ATC at YSRI about the day in question. Its possible to fly an ILS at Richmond in VMC right down till about 500' then you're in the gloop.
All I have is a question. That's it. It's very simple: why would you leave a perfectly good, very long, superbly equipped runway to head off for another, some 20-odd miles away, with a major failure?
It is perfectly possible for an automated station to report low vis at the surface that would in no way preclude a safe landing.
@ remoak
However, despite the training you gave him, the end result was tragic and from what I can tell, probably did not need to be.
I guess my point is that safe flying is all about judgement, a skill that is learned, and unfortunately a skill that can also be subverted. No trainer can be held, or hold themselves, responsible for the decisions an ex-trainee makes.
Last edited by Chronic Snoozer; 19th Jun 2010 at 19:27.
The report will tell you precisely nothing about the real causes of this accident - they are lost forever.
All I have is a question. That's it. It's very simple: why would you leave a perfectly good, very long, superbly equipped runway to head off for another, some 20-odd miles away, with a major failure?
There is possibly a second question, which would be, why, when a second problem became apparent, or it became clear that there was going to be a problem reaching Bankstown, was a decision to make a forced landing not made while there was sufficient height to get it done successfully?
There is possibly a second question, which would be, why, when a second problem became apparent, or it became clear that there was going to be a problem reaching Bankstown, was a decision to make a forced landing not made while there was sufficient height to get it done successfully?
You say yourself we'll never know the answer to those questions, yet you persist with it. I think the people here feel more that you're simply making an attack on his character.
Just to put some clarity into the argument, no-one here at any time has anyone brought this pilots skills, knowledge, culture or training into question, in fact the exact opposite is true from what I have read about this unfortunate young man.
Everyone appears to be looking for the cause of the accident and that is already known, the cause of the accident is that the aircraft failed to maintain altitude, following an inflight engine shutdown.
Everything else is contributing factors, but not the cause. The investigation will seek to determine what those contributing factors where.
Everyone appears to be looking for the cause of the accident and that is already known, the cause of the accident is that the aircraft failed to maintain altitude, following an inflight engine shutdown.
Everything else is contributing factors, but not the cause. The investigation will seek to determine what those contributing factors where.
Richmond weather is a big factor. Did anyone else note it seems he asked or implied to bk tower to ask/advise if he was closer to bk or ric after he had called bk tower. He did note he was vis ontop a few mins after centre told him he was 2nm to S of ric
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Richmond
Even if itwas IMC down to the minima I think approach could could have given him vectors to final at either end. Even better if the controller at Richmond was rated for GCA.
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Yeah, and it can work just as easily the other way too Owen Stanley as I think we all know that auto weather is measured from one spot on the aerodrome and one cone of sky above the cloud detector.... I've had auto weathers work both for me and against me.
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From my experience, normally when nearby Richmond tracking for Bankstown, the usual need in normal circumstances is to get the aircraft down (i.e normal descent).
A normal basic descent point (without considering other factors) would be approx 30nm BK from 5000ft or 42nm from 7000 ft (5oofpm/180 kts). So, if you made the decision to return to Bankstown, for whatever reason, previous experiences would try to convince you that you need to start getting the aircraft down, and also that Bankstown should be easily reached with one engine out (and one functioning normally) if you are located on what would normally be a descent path.
I do note that if you were back at say 120 kts (or 107) with an engine out, the descent profile would be steeper at the same rate of descent 500fpm.
What I'm getting at is, under the pressure and workload of handling the failure, your gut instinct would tell you you need to start descending to make an efficient return to Bankstown. It seems in this case the decision to return to BK was made early, and a descent initiated fairly quickly. (Obviously, the most appropriate thing to do with an engine out is to keep as much height up your sleeve as possible and descend overhead, unless its on fire).
Note that if you are descending for most part, you won't have much indication of whether the aircraft can maintain height (closer to sea level)on one. (ATC asked whether the aircraft could maintain height but the reply couldn't clarify this as he was "on descent at this time"
Even though the instruction from ATC cleared to aircraft to 2500 (rather than instructed it to descend) it MAY have subtly reinforced in the pilot's mind that the aircraft should continue descent. (Note ATC tried to clarify as to whether the aircraft could maintain height just after this).
For whatever reason, the aircraft ended up at 1500 ft still at 12 miles out, requiring a LONG level segment, which the aircraft/pilot in the end could not achieve.
So to summarise my point, there would be a strong tendency to want to descend the aircraft, under the assumption the aircraft will hold level when needed) rather than maintain as much height up your sleeve as possible.
Our decisions are shaped, amongst other things, from past experience and knowledge of the environment we are working in. Having flown in and out of the area in question many times in PA31 aircraft (as I'm sure many of you have), my perceptions of the factors influencing the pilot's decision making will be different to those who have not, so I just wanted to add my contribution. People who haven't flown in this particular environment will have a more neutral/external perspective, but just as much to contribute to the discussion.
A normal basic descent point (without considering other factors) would be approx 30nm BK from 5000ft or 42nm from 7000 ft (5oofpm/180 kts). So, if you made the decision to return to Bankstown, for whatever reason, previous experiences would try to convince you that you need to start getting the aircraft down, and also that Bankstown should be easily reached with one engine out (and one functioning normally) if you are located on what would normally be a descent path.
I do note that if you were back at say 120 kts (or 107) with an engine out, the descent profile would be steeper at the same rate of descent 500fpm.
What I'm getting at is, under the pressure and workload of handling the failure, your gut instinct would tell you you need to start descending to make an efficient return to Bankstown. It seems in this case the decision to return to BK was made early, and a descent initiated fairly quickly. (Obviously, the most appropriate thing to do with an engine out is to keep as much height up your sleeve as possible and descend overhead, unless its on fire).
Note that if you are descending for most part, you won't have much indication of whether the aircraft can maintain height (closer to sea level)on one. (ATC asked whether the aircraft could maintain height but the reply couldn't clarify this as he was "on descent at this time"
Even though the instruction from ATC cleared to aircraft to 2500 (rather than instructed it to descend) it MAY have subtly reinforced in the pilot's mind that the aircraft should continue descent. (Note ATC tried to clarify as to whether the aircraft could maintain height just after this).
For whatever reason, the aircraft ended up at 1500 ft still at 12 miles out, requiring a LONG level segment, which the aircraft/pilot in the end could not achieve.
So to summarise my point, there would be a strong tendency to want to descend the aircraft, under the assumption the aircraft will hold level when needed) rather than maintain as much height up your sleeve as possible.
Our decisions are shaped, amongst other things, from past experience and knowledge of the environment we are working in. Having flown in and out of the area in question many times in PA31 aircraft (as I'm sure many of you have), my perceptions of the factors influencing the pilot's decision making will be different to those who have not, so I just wanted to add my contribution. People who haven't flown in this particular environment will have a more neutral/external perspective, but just as much to contribute to the discussion.
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My observation from operating in the area a little earlier that morning was that there was light ground fog around the Hawkesbury River and to the north and west towards the mountains.
There were residual patches of ground mist on the fields between Richmond and Windsor, but the mist had cleared over most built-up areas and around the airport.
There were residual patches of ground mist on the fields between Richmond and Windsor, but the mist had cleared over most built-up areas and around the airport.
Conflict Alert. I seriously doubt that you passed the wanna bee stage mate.
Any Pilot with experience in the real world knows what i'm talking about and only a new guy would think a 500 hr Pilot would handle an Emergency with the same skill as a 10,000 Pilot. Anyone with 10,000 hrs has seen a lot, normal and abnormal.
Anyway good luck to you.........
Any Pilot with experience in the real world knows what i'm talking about and only a new guy would think a 500 hr Pilot would handle an Emergency with the same skill as a 10,000 Pilot. Anyone with 10,000 hrs has seen a lot, normal and abnormal.
Anyway good luck to you.........