Aircraft down in Canley Vale
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Ditto. I've had an in flight emergency of quite a serious nature but never called 'Mayday'. There was an almost (now) comical moment when I broke out of cloud at YSRI (coincidently) after being vectored to final and saw a bunch of emergency services vehicles in front of me on the ground with lights flashing etc.
I was by myself in a small twin.
"Oh wow... something big must be going on here" I thought. A few moments passed, now locked on short final... "oh crap... they're here for me".
Yep, it's the last thing on your mind.
YSRI was my nearest. I didn't even consider going anywhere else.
I was by myself in a small twin.
"Oh wow... something big must be going on here" I thought. A few moments passed, now locked on short final... "oh crap... they're here for me".
Yep, it's the last thing on your mind.
YSRI was my nearest. I didn't even consider going anywhere else.
Aviate, Navigate, Communicate
This PA31 crash is truly sad, but I believe that there is much more to this than meets the eye. Perhaps a PAN call was made. Why did he land on the road, when the open space of the school oval was next to the road? Let's wait for the ATSB investigation.
When doing my multi-eng training, for EFATO I was taught, fly the a/c, get it to the blue line, the phase one actions (mixture up, pitch up, power up, gear up, flap up, dead-leg, dead engine, confirm with throttle, fix or feather-FEATHER, raise the dead), to check performance, look for fire, if able to declare emergency.
I was flying a BE76 Duchess from Parafield to Kingscote many years ago, day private VFR (ca. 1998). I was over the Gulf of St. Vincent in controlled airspace before the halfway point of the trip. I had the alternator on the left engine fail, engine still going OK. I went through all the trouble shooting but couldn't get it back online. I first of all aviated, navigated then communicated.
Call me conservative, I called a PAN to Adelaide Approach and returned to Parafield, for many reasons, I didn't know if was something more seriously wrong with the left engine about to happen (i.e. the alternator going might have just been the start) also, I wanted to reduce electrical load, so I turned off all but one radio and the transponder, plus I wanted to have enough electricity to get the gear down and operate the flaps. Obviously, I was in controlled airspace and wanted to change the direction I was going too (thought I had better let them know..).
The ATC guys were great, they asked if I was able to maintain altitude and I was cleared to track back to YPPF via PAL, they asked me to report crossing the coast. And when I was ready to descend.
Handed over to YPPF tower no worries and given a straight in approach.
Subsequently found that the voltage regulator had blown.
When doing my multi-eng training, for EFATO I was taught, fly the a/c, get it to the blue line, the phase one actions (mixture up, pitch up, power up, gear up, flap up, dead-leg, dead engine, confirm with throttle, fix or feather-FEATHER, raise the dead), to check performance, look for fire, if able to declare emergency.
I was flying a BE76 Duchess from Parafield to Kingscote many years ago, day private VFR (ca. 1998). I was over the Gulf of St. Vincent in controlled airspace before the halfway point of the trip. I had the alternator on the left engine fail, engine still going OK. I went through all the trouble shooting but couldn't get it back online. I first of all aviated, navigated then communicated.
Call me conservative, I called a PAN to Adelaide Approach and returned to Parafield, for many reasons, I didn't know if was something more seriously wrong with the left engine about to happen (i.e. the alternator going might have just been the start) also, I wanted to reduce electrical load, so I turned off all but one radio and the transponder, plus I wanted to have enough electricity to get the gear down and operate the flaps. Obviously, I was in controlled airspace and wanted to change the direction I was going too (thought I had better let them know..).
The ATC guys were great, they asked if I was able to maintain altitude and I was cleared to track back to YPPF via PAL, they asked me to report crossing the coast. And when I was ready to descend.
Handed over to YPPF tower no worries and given a straight in approach.
Subsequently found that the voltage regulator had blown.
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Just to clarify a couple of things that have been said earlier:
In an emergency the pilot in command may act as necessary to ensure the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. There is no requirement to actually declare an emergency before you act to save the aircraft, even if you are in controlled airspace and have to break the rules to do so. (CAR 100, et al)
CAR 20.6 Section 3.2 specifically allows the pilot in command of an aircraft with an engine shut down, to proceed to an aerodrome of their choice rather than the nearest suitable aerodrome, if they deem it safe and operationally acceptable.
In an emergency the pilot in command may act as necessary to ensure the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. There is no requirement to actually declare an emergency before you act to save the aircraft, even if you are in controlled airspace and have to break the rules to do so. (CAR 100, et al)
CAR 20.6 Section 3.2 specifically allows the pilot in command of an aircraft with an engine shut down, to proceed to an aerodrome of their choice rather than the nearest suitable aerodrome, if they deem it safe and operationally acceptable.
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Hi all,
In case I can be of any help I was PIC of the Mojave mentioned in "assymetric's" post. I was at FL170 somewhere south west of Young and, as it happens, Kathy was my flight nurse, we also had a patient on board.
It was a catostrophic failure of the left engine. After carrying out my engine out drills I informed ATC of my predicament (I think I declared a pan), requested a descent to 10,000' and told them I'd get back to them when I'd decided what to do. When the failure occured I applied some rudder and put the AP in VS mode to maintain airspeed and drifted down to 10,000', the auto pilot didn't even disconnect. By the way I had decided on ten thousand because I wasn't sure if I could remain pressurised on one engine. I found that slightly increasing the power on the good engine was adequate to maintain 10,000' so I opted to fly to bankstown. I requested a track direct to bankstown, airspace and traffic were never an issue I tracked and decended as I needed merely informing ATC of my intentions. Of course I passed many adequate airfields along the way but the aircraft performed well and I never had a doubt that we wouldn't make BK.
You may ask why go all the way to BK? Why not? This, as far as I was concerned, was a non normal situation and not an emergency.
I was asked a number of times by ATC if I required the services on standby at BK fro my arrival, I said no until the last time because on consideration I thought I may do something dumb trying to taxi the Mojave on one donk, if anyone hase ever tried you would understand. The rest of the flight was uneventful and no I couldnt' taxi on one donk, they had to bring a tug to the runway.
All of this time I comunicated with Kathy keeping her informed of my intentions and she continued her job unquestioningly caring for her patient.
I have tried to remain factual I my post so apologies if I have waffled on in places but this incident has affected me, firstly because Kathy was a good friend and like many of you she has flown with me on numerous occasions. Kathy was a wonderful lady commited to her Job and her family. She will be missed. I did not know the pilot, however, from reading some of the above posts he sounds like a professional young man trying to do his job in difficult circumstances.
My deepest condolances to both families.
In case I can be of any help I was PIC of the Mojave mentioned in "assymetric's" post. I was at FL170 somewhere south west of Young and, as it happens, Kathy was my flight nurse, we also had a patient on board.
It was a catostrophic failure of the left engine. After carrying out my engine out drills I informed ATC of my predicament (I think I declared a pan), requested a descent to 10,000' and told them I'd get back to them when I'd decided what to do. When the failure occured I applied some rudder and put the AP in VS mode to maintain airspeed and drifted down to 10,000', the auto pilot didn't even disconnect. By the way I had decided on ten thousand because I wasn't sure if I could remain pressurised on one engine. I found that slightly increasing the power on the good engine was adequate to maintain 10,000' so I opted to fly to bankstown. I requested a track direct to bankstown, airspace and traffic were never an issue I tracked and decended as I needed merely informing ATC of my intentions. Of course I passed many adequate airfields along the way but the aircraft performed well and I never had a doubt that we wouldn't make BK.
You may ask why go all the way to BK? Why not? This, as far as I was concerned, was a non normal situation and not an emergency.
I was asked a number of times by ATC if I required the services on standby at BK fro my arrival, I said no until the last time because on consideration I thought I may do something dumb trying to taxi the Mojave on one donk, if anyone hase ever tried you would understand. The rest of the flight was uneventful and no I couldnt' taxi on one donk, they had to bring a tug to the runway.
All of this time I comunicated with Kathy keeping her informed of my intentions and she continued her job unquestioningly caring for her patient.
I have tried to remain factual I my post so apologies if I have waffled on in places but this incident has affected me, firstly because Kathy was a good friend and like many of you she has flown with me on numerous occasions. Kathy was a wonderful lady commited to her Job and her family. She will be missed. I did not know the pilot, however, from reading some of the above posts he sounds like a professional young man trying to do his job in difficult circumstances.
My deepest condolances to both families.
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I will await the ATSB report with interest....but there is something way wrong that this aircraft couldn't maintain height on one engine.
At two nm per thousand feet of altitude it should nearly be able to GLIDE that distance (15nm/7000") with BOTH shut down.
Can anyone clarify the nature of this operation? I thought the RFDS had the NSW Ambulance aeromed contract. Was this a private air ambulance thing?
At two nm per thousand feet of altitude it should nearly be able to GLIDE that distance (15nm/7000") with BOTH shut down.Can anyone clarify the nature of this operation? I thought the RFDS had the NSW Ambulance aeromed contract. Was this a private air ambulance thing?
Last edited by Jamair; 17th Jun 2010 at 12:05.
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In an emergency the pilot in command may act as necessary to ensure the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. There is no requirement to actually declare an emergency before you act to save the aircraft, even if you are in controlled airspace and have to break the rules to do so. (CAR 100, et al)
CAR 20.6 Section 3.2 specifically allows the pilot in command of an aircraft with an engine shut down, to proceed to an aerodrome of their choice rather than the nearest suitable aerodrome, if they deem it safe and operationally acceptable.
CAR 20.6 Section 3.2 specifically allows the pilot in command of an aircraft with an engine shut down, to proceed to an aerodrome of their choice rather than the nearest suitable aerodrome, if they deem it safe and operationally acceptable.
I still quite clearly remember having a certain Instructor with the initials TK informing me of the above on numerous occasions during my CPL and MEIFR training. Generally amidst a fairly thick smoke haze and high volume setting!
His point was that you were to get the aircraft back on the ground, as safely and quickly as possible using your own discretion, and argue about any regulation or disregard thereof afterwards, generally over a beer or three.
Sometimes however, it does not have a happy ending. That, regrettably, is something that is of occasion part of aviation.
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Gentlemen to say I am appalled is an understatement.
Some of the posts I have read are honest attempts to seek the truth, which I applaud, where perhaps all of us may learn something from this tragic incident, but there seems to be developing a preponderance of " legends in their own minds" pontificating on this tragedy.
Mods. I do apologise but I think this has gone far enough.
Andrew turned up on my door step around three years ago, a green young kid from the NT. My wife and I took him in and over time he became our adopted son in Sydney.
I was involved in a lot of Andrews initial training on multi aircraft. Did he receive proper and complete asymmetric training?...damned right he did..and not just the old power up clean up..an awful lot of scenario based training with the "what if question" thrown in, he was practiced and he was PROFICIENT.and well aware of the limitations of normal category airplanes.
I can honestly say I have never struck a more professional safety concious young pilot in the 45 odd years I've been in aviation.
During his first year or so in Sydney I had many calls from him out in the "Bush" asking for advise on what he should do or should not do, with a little leading he always came to the right conclusion, he never compromised safety, which made him somewhat unpopular with a few of the operations people, but the flight nurses all preferred to fly with him.
If any of you self appointed experts imagine for a moment that over the past few days and sleepless nights I havnt gone over and over in my mind if there anything I missed, was there anything I should have imparted to him then your deluding yourselves, I have, and probably will for a long time.
To you pontificating buffoons from the airline Fraternity...Yeah I agree Airline training is great for training monkeys..I spent twenty odd years in long haul airlines,all over the world. How dare you critisise GA and how dare you speculate on Andrews handling of this incident, you were not there, Andrew was, and he called it as he saw it.
My wife is a flight nurse, she flew with Andrew many times, would I allow her to fly with him again if he was here...damned right I would..long before I'd let her on an airline with some of you lot
Some of the posts I have read are honest attempts to seek the truth, which I applaud, where perhaps all of us may learn something from this tragic incident, but there seems to be developing a preponderance of " legends in their own minds" pontificating on this tragedy.
Mods. I do apologise but I think this has gone far enough.
Andrew turned up on my door step around three years ago, a green young kid from the NT. My wife and I took him in and over time he became our adopted son in Sydney.
I was involved in a lot of Andrews initial training on multi aircraft. Did he receive proper and complete asymmetric training?...damned right he did..and not just the old power up clean up..an awful lot of scenario based training with the "what if question" thrown in, he was practiced and he was PROFICIENT.and well aware of the limitations of normal category airplanes.
I can honestly say I have never struck a more professional safety concious young pilot in the 45 odd years I've been in aviation.
During his first year or so in Sydney I had many calls from him out in the "Bush" asking for advise on what he should do or should not do, with a little leading he always came to the right conclusion, he never compromised safety, which made him somewhat unpopular with a few of the operations people, but the flight nurses all preferred to fly with him.
If any of you self appointed experts imagine for a moment that over the past few days and sleepless nights I havnt gone over and over in my mind if there anything I missed, was there anything I should have imparted to him then your deluding yourselves, I have, and probably will for a long time.
To you pontificating buffoons from the airline Fraternity...Yeah I agree Airline training is great for training monkeys..I spent twenty odd years in long haul airlines,all over the world. How dare you critisise GA and how dare you speculate on Andrews handling of this incident, you were not there, Andrew was, and he called it as he saw it.
My wife is a flight nurse, she flew with Andrew many times, would I allow her to fly with him again if he was here...damned right I would..long before I'd let her on an airline with some of you lot
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There are literally dozen of aeromedical flights daily by private contractors, not unlike those National Patient Transport non-emergency ambulances you seendriving around for example. They are not required to meet the same standards as RFDS operations in terms of procedures and aircraft type because they are not the same thing.
The frustrating thing is that with no engines it possibly would have made it however you don't always assume it's not going to fly on one on the way back.
The frustrating thing is that with no engines it possibly would have made it however you don't always assume it's not going to fly on one on the way back.
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don't know the pilot or the operator. By the looks of things he had no options but to put it down. It's a **** part of town for a forced landing plus the haze equals not good.
Why did the engine ( or engines ) fail is what i really want to find out. I'm not an expert but fuel contamination is all i can think of
bless there souls
Why did the engine ( or engines ) fail is what i really want to find out. I'm not an expert but fuel contamination is all i can think of
bless there souls
My condolences to family and friends affected by this tragedy.
A few years ago (ok, around 16) I had to be specifically endorsed to fly the Mojave. The type endorsement was designated PA31L and I had to do it in spite of considerable PA31-350, PA31-310 and pressurised turbo-prop experience.
And frankly, it made sense once I read the AFM and flew the aircraft. The Mojave was, in my opinion, and that of the regulator, of sufficient differences to require specific training.
Suddenly, around 7 or 8 years ago (?), that requirement disappeared and subsequently, PA31L disappeared from my licence. It was deemed that a PA31 endorsement and a pressurisation endorsement, possibly on an entirely different aircraft, entitled you to hop in and fly this aircraft. With no additional training.
I'd like to ask, what risk assessment was done on this decision?
What do other pilots, who have flown both types, think?
I have always thought it was a little laissez-faire of CASA to remove the requirement for specific training. It was a different aircraft in many ways.
This is open speculation, but what has happened could indeed have its roots in training deficiencies arising from poor regulation and poor risk management.
Whatever this young man's rationale was for not accepting YSRI when offered cannot be known (mens era?) but the reality is that he called on the sum total of his knowledge and made a decision. That the decision can subsequently be shown to be flawed is not stupidity, it is tragedy.
We should look for every possible reason as to why he made this decision. Would other pilots of similar experience, training and operating within the same corporate culture, have made the same decision?
And I don"t believe the answer comes down to any single individual who trained him. We work within a system.
Someone wrote, "Human error does not occur within a vacuum, but within systems that either foster it, or resist it...."
The worst part is, that for those who are left behind, this'll never go away.
and for that, I'm truly sorry.
A few years ago (ok, around 16) I had to be specifically endorsed to fly the Mojave. The type endorsement was designated PA31L and I had to do it in spite of considerable PA31-350, PA31-310 and pressurised turbo-prop experience.
And frankly, it made sense once I read the AFM and flew the aircraft. The Mojave was, in my opinion, and that of the regulator, of sufficient differences to require specific training.
Suddenly, around 7 or 8 years ago (?), that requirement disappeared and subsequently, PA31L disappeared from my licence. It was deemed that a PA31 endorsement and a pressurisation endorsement, possibly on an entirely different aircraft, entitled you to hop in and fly this aircraft. With no additional training.
I'd like to ask, what risk assessment was done on this decision?
What do other pilots, who have flown both types, think?
I have always thought it was a little laissez-faire of CASA to remove the requirement for specific training. It was a different aircraft in many ways.
This is open speculation, but what has happened could indeed have its roots in training deficiencies arising from poor regulation and poor risk management.
Whatever this young man's rationale was for not accepting YSRI when offered cannot be known (mens era?) but the reality is that he called on the sum total of his knowledge and made a decision. That the decision can subsequently be shown to be flawed is not stupidity, it is tragedy.
We should look for every possible reason as to why he made this decision. Would other pilots of similar experience, training and operating within the same corporate culture, have made the same decision?
And I don"t believe the answer comes down to any single individual who trained him. We work within a system.
Someone wrote, "Human error does not occur within a vacuum, but within systems that either foster it, or resist it...."
The worst part is, that for those who are left behind, this'll never go away.
and for that, I'm truly sorry.
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There's no doubt that someone had convinced Andrew (somewhere in his training or checks) that he could get the thing back to YSBK, going down the steps.
Turns out that was bad advice.
There's little doubt that he had heard some company stories that indicated that you could bring in a Mojave with an engine down from FL17 with 140 to run
So. If you've lost an engine with 140 to run, and you think you know why you've lost the donk, and if you're damn sure that whatever cost you one engine won't cost you the other, and you're passing a string of ideal landing spots, and you think you're fine to cruise for another 45 (or so) minutes, risking your own life and those on board, then God Bless You.
BTW - Was this the incident with VH-IGW?
Turns out that was bad advice.
There's little doubt that he had heard some company stories that indicated that you could bring in a Mojave with an engine down from FL17 with 140 to run
So. If you've lost an engine with 140 to run, and you think you know why you've lost the donk, and if you're damn sure that whatever cost you one engine won't cost you the other, and you're passing a string of ideal landing spots, and you think you're fine to cruise for another 45 (or so) minutes, risking your own life and those on board, then God Bless You.
BTW - Was this the incident with VH-IGW?
Last edited by Rojer Wilco; 18th Jun 2010 at 05:22.
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Guys,
Enough is enough.
If we were standing in a bar, with David and others who knew Andrew and Kath within earshot, would these conversations be occuring? More than likely not.
Tactless, uninformed and at times moronic statements of imagined fact that are now in the public domain. Not as vicious as the crud Dom James (Norfolk Island ditching) had to put up with but then again, Andrew and Kath didn't have a previous media profile... and thank God for that! The vultures here would be into them big time and a whole lot earlier if that were the case.
To say Dave is an experienced and ethical operator is an understatment. Nice fella and a gentleman to boot.
There is some good info here... but not a lot.
The press has again started quoting posts from this website as fact. Didn't see that one coming did we kiddies!?
Again... how about a little respect and tact people?
Regards,
Pissed off Drivr.
PS. Mods...thoughts?
Enough is enough.
If we were standing in a bar, with David and others who knew Andrew and Kath within earshot, would these conversations be occuring? More than likely not.
Tactless, uninformed and at times moronic statements of imagined fact that are now in the public domain. Not as vicious as the crud Dom James (Norfolk Island ditching) had to put up with but then again, Andrew and Kath didn't have a previous media profile... and thank God for that! The vultures here would be into them big time and a whole lot earlier if that were the case.
To say Dave is an experienced and ethical operator is an understatment. Nice fella and a gentleman to boot.
There is some good info here... but not a lot.
The press has again started quoting posts from this website as fact. Didn't see that one coming did we kiddies!?
Again... how about a little respect and tact people?
Regards,
Pissed off Drivr.
PS. Mods...thoughts?
Last edited by GADRIVR; 17th Jun 2010 at 13:44.
BN Centre Comms
Someone mentioned in an earlier post that there seemed to be sounds of a surging engine in the background on the centre recording. There certainly is a similar sound but it seems a little regular to be a surging engine; maybe some sort of alarm? Is it recognisable to anyone familar with a Mojave?
On a broader note, I have to admit that having operated out of BK for almost 20 years, my greatest fear has been losing the donk over suburbia. The only choices are ****ty ones. In this case, if you headed back to BK thinking you had one you could rely on (and this is a reasonable assumption), then when number 2 went over the 'burbs you would have very few options left. It is very easy to be wise in hindsight, but he would have been in a very lonely position right then. That he maintained his professionalism and dignity is truly incredible.
Having said all that, Andrew and Kathy obviously had a lot of friends here and to them and their families, my sincerest condolences.
On a broader note, I have to admit that having operated out of BK for almost 20 years, my greatest fear has been losing the donk over suburbia. The only choices are ****ty ones. In this case, if you headed back to BK thinking you had one you could rely on (and this is a reasonable assumption), then when number 2 went over the 'burbs you would have very few options left. It is very easy to be wise in hindsight, but he would have been in a very lonely position right then. That he maintained his professionalism and dignity is truly incredible.
Having said all that, Andrew and Kathy obviously had a lot of friends here and to them and their families, my sincerest condolences.
Jamair,
My knowledge of the way patient transfers in NSW is limited, but what I do know is it's nothing short of incompetence on the behalf of the NSW Government and NSW Health.
Unlike in QLD and many other states where if a patient is transferred by air, it comes out of the state budget, NSW Health takes it out of the budget of the Health District where the patient is being flown from.
So, why get an expensive RFDS/Air Ambulance flight for a non-urgent (and their definition of 'non-urgent' is sometimes to be questioned too), when they can just contract a much cheaper charter company to do it for them? As a result, you have numerous charter companies running around in these old Chieftain's/Baron's/Mohave's and whatever else they can conjur up, doing patient transfers.
I have no doubt the level of professionalism this gentlemen possessed and displayed, was nothing short of exemplary. But I think the NSW Government and NSW Health need to look at how they go about doing and funding these patient transfers, in light of this accident.
It's sad that it may take this tragic accident, for the powers that be, to ponder whether it's such a good idea doing things the way they do, when it's quite clear there are better ways right from the outset.
morno
My knowledge of the way patient transfers in NSW is limited, but what I do know is it's nothing short of incompetence on the behalf of the NSW Government and NSW Health.
Unlike in QLD and many other states where if a patient is transferred by air, it comes out of the state budget, NSW Health takes it out of the budget of the Health District where the patient is being flown from.
So, why get an expensive RFDS/Air Ambulance flight for a non-urgent (and their definition of 'non-urgent' is sometimes to be questioned too), when they can just contract a much cheaper charter company to do it for them? As a result, you have numerous charter companies running around in these old Chieftain's/Baron's/Mohave's and whatever else they can conjur up, doing patient transfers.
I have no doubt the level of professionalism this gentlemen possessed and displayed, was nothing short of exemplary. But I think the NSW Government and NSW Health need to look at how they go about doing and funding these patient transfers, in light of this accident.
It's sad that it may take this tragic accident, for the powers that be, to ponder whether it's such a good idea doing things the way they do, when it's quite clear there are better ways right from the outset.
morno
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It amazes me that people are still questioning andrews training and how he handled the situation when as stated before nobody here was on the aircraft.
I think people are forgetting that two people died in this accident, whoever rated this thread five star is a f*%&ing moron
I think people are forgetting that two people died in this accident, whoever rated this thread five star is a f*%&ing moron
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Certain posts have been removed (for various reasons). The aim is to try and keep this thread reasonable and keep personalities out of it.
I'd take this opportunity to remind you that the PM function is there for a reason. Please don't clog the thread with questions or statements which could otherwise be directed between yourselves personally (and privately).
Thanks, TID.
I'd take this opportunity to remind you that the PM function is there for a reason. Please don't clog the thread with questions or statements which could otherwise be directed between yourselves personally (and privately).
Thanks, TID.
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davidgrant - Boo sir, boo
I'm sure it is just grief speaking, but you comments are well wide of the mark and can't go unchallenged.
I have been involved in airline training for many years, and we do not train monkeys.
Mostly, what we do is take GA pilots, strip out all the bad habits and dodgy practices, and teach them how to operate as part of a team, to a high professional standard. One of the qualities we instill is the ability to know when to say "no".
How dare we criticise GA? More like, how dare you NOT criticise GA, for that is where the worst side of aviation is most frequently seen, where the most accidents happen, and where the most pressure is applied to young pilots to do silly things.
In this case, I'd be the first to say that Andrew (who I do not know in any way) did his very best in a difficult situation. However, despite the training you gave him, the end result was tragic and from what I can tell, probably did not need to be.
And to imply that because an airline pilot might be less than effusive in his praise of this young man, he is therefore dangerous, is a step way to far.
Hopefully it only the grief talking... but if not... you should be ashamed.
I'm sure it is just grief speaking, but you comments are well wide of the mark and can't go unchallenged.
I have been involved in airline training for many years, and we do not train monkeys.
Mostly, what we do is take GA pilots, strip out all the bad habits and dodgy practices, and teach them how to operate as part of a team, to a high professional standard. One of the qualities we instill is the ability to know when to say "no".
How dare we criticise GA? More like, how dare you NOT criticise GA, for that is where the worst side of aviation is most frequently seen, where the most accidents happen, and where the most pressure is applied to young pilots to do silly things.
In this case, I'd be the first to say that Andrew (who I do not know in any way) did his very best in a difficult situation. However, despite the training you gave him, the end result was tragic and from what I can tell, probably did not need to be.
And to imply that because an airline pilot might be less than effusive in his praise of this young man, he is therefore dangerous, is a step way to far.
Hopefully it only the grief talking... but if not... you should be ashamed.