Aircraft down in Canley Vale
Maybe there is a reason you are still stuckin GA after 34 years Conflict..
And if it is, so what. A lot of people have made and carried on long careers in GA.
Makes you look a bit snobby liveillusion.
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All I was saying was that he or she seems to think of themselves like some major airline investigator or some crap thats all. And yes they are in GA its pretty damn easy to see that. PS there is nothing wrong with GA if thats what you are going for,its just not my cup of tea. I think if you are still stuck in it after 34 years maybe they should move on and find something they are better at. Yeah it probably does make me sound snobby but I like to aim high. 
Hello Scott,
I wonder if you may be able to elaborate on 'the left engine sounded unfeathered slightly' description?
Are you suggesting that the operating left engine was not 'at full power'?
And were you able to 'confirm' that the right engine was 'feathered' OK?
Thanks for your post and I hope you are able to provide some 'qualified' comment to ATSB.
I wonder if you may be able to elaborate on 'the left engine sounded unfeathered slightly' description?
Are you suggesting that the operating left engine was not 'at full power'?
And were you able to 'confirm' that the right engine was 'feathered' OK?
Thanks for your post and I hope you are able to provide some 'qualified' comment to ATSB.
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ScottCD
Do you perhaps mean that no flaps were extended? ie flaps were up?
What exactly made you think that the left engine was "unfeathered slightly"? Was the noise from the engine uneven or hunting, or did it sound as though it was "missing", like a car running on three cylinders for example?
The ATSB will almost certainly ask you those questions, but the answers could help us here on the forum build a more accurate picture of what was happening.
Wings level and no flaps retracted.
What exactly made you think that the left engine was "unfeathered slightly"? Was the noise from the engine uneven or hunting, or did it sound as though it was "missing", like a car running on three cylinders for example?
The ATSB will almost certainly ask you those questions, but the answers could help us here on the forum build a more accurate picture of what was happening.
Ref Post #324 Aerodink
"7000' @ RIC
1500' @ 12nm BK
0' @ 3nm BK
The first 5500' to 6000' took the aircraft around 12 - 13 nm and the last 1500' approx 9 nm."
My reading of the ATC log is that the aircraft was as much as 9 miles north
(3 minutes) of YSRI when the aircraft was turned around. That's around 33 miles from YSBK according to a quick check on Google Earth.
At three miles per minute the aircraft would have been descending at around 800fpm to get to 1500' at 12 miles from YSRI, 7 minutes later. The ATC log indicates that the 12 mile call was made at 8 minutes. That translates to a descent rate of around 700fpm.
After that the descent rate slows to around 500fpm if you still allow 3 miles per minute, but more like 375 fpm if airspeed fell to 2 and a bit miles per minute.
Initially I thought there was a case for an assumption that the aircraft may have been 'stepped down' somewhere in the initial 21 miles, however I believe there is an equally valid assumption that the aircraft could have lost the altitude at the best available configuration. I'm sure there are engineering types out there who could advise on the rate of descent from 7000' to 1500' vs 1500' to 0'. I wouldn't be surprised if in fact it was double early on where the air is markedly thinner.
It seems more likely that the rate of descent of around 700 fpm (which would be a fairly normal rate to comply with the steps) was selected under the assumption that the aircraft had reserve power to hold altitude at 2500' - 2000' until the normal final descent to 11C, but when the power was asked for it just wasn't there.
"7000' @ RIC
1500' @ 12nm BK
0' @ 3nm BK
The first 5500' to 6000' took the aircraft around 12 - 13 nm and the last 1500' approx 9 nm."
My reading of the ATC log is that the aircraft was as much as 9 miles north
(3 minutes) of YSRI when the aircraft was turned around. That's around 33 miles from YSBK according to a quick check on Google Earth.
At three miles per minute the aircraft would have been descending at around 800fpm to get to 1500' at 12 miles from YSRI, 7 minutes later. The ATC log indicates that the 12 mile call was made at 8 minutes. That translates to a descent rate of around 700fpm.
After that the descent rate slows to around 500fpm if you still allow 3 miles per minute, but more like 375 fpm if airspeed fell to 2 and a bit miles per minute.
Initially I thought there was a case for an assumption that the aircraft may have been 'stepped down' somewhere in the initial 21 miles, however I believe there is an equally valid assumption that the aircraft could have lost the altitude at the best available configuration. I'm sure there are engineering types out there who could advise on the rate of descent from 7000' to 1500' vs 1500' to 0'. I wouldn't be surprised if in fact it was double early on where the air is markedly thinner.
It seems more likely that the rate of descent of around 700 fpm (which would be a fairly normal rate to comply with the steps) was selected under the assumption that the aircraft had reserve power to hold altitude at 2500' - 2000' until the normal final descent to 11C, but when the power was asked for it just wasn't there.
Nojwod, quite correct, It doesnt necessarily follow that the initial descent was deliberate. Human Factors play a huge role in this accident, before he even turns around his mindset is, track direct to bankstown and descend to circuit height, initially even if he was at optimum climb configuration, the aircraft is doing exactly as his mindset expects. Situational awareness doesn't come until there's a mismatch, probably at some point before reaching 2.500'ft. Certainly he is fully aware by 1500ft, because we hear disbelief in his voice.
ScotCD
You Sir are an important witness, because you are one of the few that saw the aircraft in it's last seconds of the en-route phase, beyong this point he is landing. We all have lots of questions for you, the ones I would ask have already been asked by Remoak and Griffo
ScotCD
You Sir are an important witness, because you are one of the few that saw the aircraft in it's last seconds of the en-route phase, beyong this point he is landing. We all have lots of questions for you, the ones I would ask have already been asked by Remoak and Griffo
It might be appropriate to point out the certification requirement of a normal catergory aircraft.
The PA-31 is a normal category aircraft and is certificated as such, it is only required to demonstrate that it can maintain 5000ft in the standard atmosphere in the optimum climb performance configuration with one engine inoperative, at the time of certification of a new aircraft. it does not follow that it will remain so for the duration of the aircrafts life (read ageing aircraft).
The manufacturer may well provide performance data that suggests the aircraft will perform better than that and that's all well and good, however it is not required to be demonstrated and may well be theoretical expectations.
Engine out performance data is not guaranteed.
Having said that purely for academic purposes, I concede that with all other factors being normal, it should have been a doddle from that altitude over that distance.
The PA-31 is a normal category aircraft and is certificated as such, it is only required to demonstrate that it can maintain 5000ft in the standard atmosphere in the optimum climb performance configuration with one engine inoperative, at the time of certification of a new aircraft. it does not follow that it will remain so for the duration of the aircrafts life (read ageing aircraft).
The manufacturer may well provide performance data that suggests the aircraft will perform better than that and that's all well and good, however it is not required to be demonstrated and may well be theoretical expectations.
Engine out performance data is not guaranteed.
Having said that purely for academic purposes, I concede that with all other factors being normal, it should have been a doddle from that altitude over that distance.
Last edited by Xeptu; 22nd Jun 2010 at 02:07.
Grandpa Aerotart
I wouldn't be surprised if in fact it was double early on where the air is markedly thinner.
The worst performing (on one engine) piston twin I ever flew, the Twin Comanche, would **** it in from 7000'/25 odd nm if the only issue was 1 engine shutdown.
He wasn't much above 'training' weight with two up and Brisbane fuel. Name me a piston twin in commercial usage in 2010 that won't fly level below 5000' on a winters day at training weights?
There isn't one. Most piston twins could fly around at 7000' on one engine all day lightly loaded in winter - even if that was not feasible the resultant drift down rate with one set at MCP and one feathered would be in the order of several hundred feet/minute, tops, until reaching an altitude it could maintain - unless you ran a tank dry in the process.
I dare say the ATSB will start with fuel - did he take off with the selectors on partially filled aux tanks and when the first stopped was he so preoccupied with getting back to YSBK he never checked/changed tanks and subsequently ran the second dry a few minutes later?
That sort of scenario has been repeated down through the decades so many times you really wonder at peoples inability to learn from history.
The chances of BOTH engines developing a mechanical fault within minutes of one another is vanishingly small. Either he was faced with another 'Spencer Gulf' type scenario (I would be gobsmacked if it turns out to be so) or he cocked something up.
It will be interesting to read the report when it comes out but I suspect it will hold only a reminder of basic good airmanship rather than a re run of Spencer Gulf. Even that young man managed better than 25 nm before succumbing to fate.
I dare say the ATSB will start with fuel - did he take off with the selectors on partially filled aux tanks and when the first stopped was he so preoccupied with getting back to YSBK he never checked/changed tanks and subsequently ran the second dry a few minutes later?
DF.
Chimbu chuckles
I think you misread my point which was: if the aircraft was only capable of staying in the air at MSL at a descent rate of 375 fpm, at 7,000' the rate of descent would be higher, perhaps double initially. Unlikely I admit, my best guess is 25-50% higher rate of descent at thatf altitude, but I would defer to anyone who has the knowledge to provide a knowledgeable estimate.
I think you misread my point which was: if the aircraft was only capable of staying in the air at MSL at a descent rate of 375 fpm, at 7,000' the rate of descent would be higher, perhaps double initially. Unlikely I admit, my best guess is 25-50% higher rate of descent at thatf altitude, but I would defer to anyone who has the knowledge to provide a knowledgeable estimate.
There are 'rumours' there was a phone call made from the aircraft to Airtex when the situation started to go belly-up. Let us hope this will provide an insight as to what went wrong.
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Ohhhh Dear
Someone (many) said about commercial pressures, can you imagine the call going like ....get it back here so we can look at it!
One hopes not, but you can imagin it
Someone (many) said about commercial pressures, can you imagine the call going like ....get it back here so we can look at it!
One hopes not, but you can imagin it
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Well done Scott CD.
At last! Someone that actually saw the aircraft!!
Good on you for sharing that with us Scott
. I checked the map...that could've easily been your street..thanks to all however for the many informative posts into yet another tragedy..
At the end of the day, regardless of the circumstances, at least you all cared enough to post.
Stiky
At last! Someone that actually saw the aircraft!!
Good on you for sharing that with us Scott
. I checked the map...that could've easily been your street..thanks to all however for the many informative posts into yet another tragedy.. At the end of the day, regardless of the circumstances, at least you all cared enough to post.Stiky
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Jabba, believe me, some operators (possibly most) have their maintenance facility at home base and once a twin has been put down on a strip remote from the home base, for engine problems, it is usually a very expensive excersize to get it back. I had been "advised' on many occasions to "bring it home".
Once again it is up to the PIC to make that decision, irrespective of commercial pressures.
To tell tales out of school, I (CFI) was ostracised once by a senior FOI for advising a pilot to put an aircraft down in a good padock should he have continuing engine troubles (single, extreme rough running, surging, loss of altitude). This guy said to me "Can you imagine the costs involved and the logistics to retrieve that aircraft from there!!!! Tell him to nurse it home". I advised the pilot that there were many considerations HE must consider and that he must use his own judgement in making HIS own decision. Commercial pressures......you better believe it mate.
Once again it is up to the PIC to make that decision, irrespective of commercial pressures.
To tell tales out of school, I (CFI) was ostracised once by a senior FOI for advising a pilot to put an aircraft down in a good padock should he have continuing engine troubles (single, extreme rough running, surging, loss of altitude). This guy said to me "Can you imagine the costs involved and the logistics to retrieve that aircraft from there!!!! Tell him to nurse it home". I advised the pilot that there were many considerations HE must consider and that he must use his own judgement in making HIS own decision. Commercial pressures......you better believe it mate.
Off Immediately!
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Quote -
"Jabawocky Ohhhh Dear
Someone (many) said about commercial pressures, can you imagine the call going like ....get it back here so we can look at it!
One hopes not, but you can imagin it"
Speaking from personal experience, (about the company in question) having had cause to land somewhere other than BK for an aircraft issue, (signifigantly LESS serious than the incident in question) not an ounce of "commercial pressure" was placed on me by any member of staff for choosing the course of action I undertook. Not so much as a raised eyebrow was cast in my direction when I reported what happened and why I did what I did. The issue was corrected promptly and to my satisfaction, I continued the flight and that was that.
I have been following this thread very closely, and have been examining what my own course of action would have been on that day, and if I was 100% honest with myself, (with what little information I posses about the incident in question) I would have more than likely elected to return to BK as well...
I look forward to the release of the report from the ATSB, to shed some more light on this extremly unfortunate incident, so that a more complete picture may be formed. With a complete analysis of all available information (Wx/Aircraft performance/Radio tapes/Radar tapes/Human factors/Aircraft system failures) it may be able to enlighten us all with a clearer idea of what happened, and maybe just stop me, or anyone else following in such tragic footsteps.
Fly safe.
"Jabawocky Ohhhh Dear
Someone (many) said about commercial pressures, can you imagine the call going like ....get it back here so we can look at it!
One hopes not, but you can imagin it"
Speaking from personal experience, (about the company in question) having had cause to land somewhere other than BK for an aircraft issue, (signifigantly LESS serious than the incident in question) not an ounce of "commercial pressure" was placed on me by any member of staff for choosing the course of action I undertook. Not so much as a raised eyebrow was cast in my direction when I reported what happened and why I did what I did. The issue was corrected promptly and to my satisfaction, I continued the flight and that was that.
I have been following this thread very closely, and have been examining what my own course of action would have been on that day, and if I was 100% honest with myself, (with what little information I posses about the incident in question) I would have more than likely elected to return to BK as well...
I look forward to the release of the report from the ATSB, to shed some more light on this extremly unfortunate incident, so that a more complete picture may be formed. With a complete analysis of all available information (Wx/Aircraft performance/Radio tapes/Radar tapes/Human factors/Aircraft system failures) it may be able to enlighten us all with a clearer idea of what happened, and maybe just stop me, or anyone else following in such tragic footsteps.
Fly safe.
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I had been "advised' on many occasions to "bring it home".
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One thing I feel may have been missed here, our young collegue made a decision, to his credit he stuck to that decision. Many more aviators have changed their mind after making the initial decision to their peril. This young bloke believed he made the right decision and remained true to that.