Aircraft down in Canley Vale

[remoak]

but it is just downright wrong to throw stones

Nobody here is throwing stones.

In this instance I firmly believe that he would of made the correct ones. Doing everything he could, with what he was given.

How do you know?

We do know he was in control of the situation upto the landing.

He was in control of the situation until he realised he wasn't going to make Bankstown. After that, he was reacting to changing circumstances.

Personal attacks and questions of integrity of this fine young aviator however shouldn't come into question.

There are no personal attacks here. There are no questions regarding his integrity here either. If you think that, you have utterly mis-read most of the thread.

I'm sure he was a great guy and respected and well trained and conscientious, and quite probably the sort of guy I would have employed when I was doing that stuff for airlines. None of that is in question.

The ONLY question that I have in all this, is why, from 7000 feet more or less over Richmond, he ended up where he did.

The refusal of some folk to recognise that as a valid question is quite depressing.

[Xcel]

Dont add tone or temper to this post as it is a genuine response...

Nobody here is throwing stones

reread your post to Dave and GA. Not pissing match just genuine concerns.

How do you know?

I don't. Hence the statement provided was my belief in his ability, as I believe was stated.

After that, he was reacting to changing circumstances.

The whole event was continually changing circumstances... from 7000' to 0'.
If it was clear cut we probably wouldnt be on here discussing it.

If you think that, you have utterly mis-read most of the thread.

perhaps.

The ONLY question that I have in all this, is why, from 7000 feet more or less over Richmond, he ended up where he did.

The refusal of some folk to recognise that as a valid question is quite depressing.

Granted a fair question. We know from the radio that he went from 7000' somewhere near richmond to 1500' at 3nm, in a descent that could only be described as controlled (no radio transmissions - no help required). To then requiring immediate help and not being able to maintain height from 3nm and to attempt to land on a road. The problem as I see it may have manifested itself after Richmond was outside of the decision making process.

why the event ended as it did

Would it have ended the same if he circled Richmond to lose the 7000' in a controlled manner. Only for perhaps the same event to occur in which the aircraft became unable to maintain height and crashed in a street in Richmond instead of Canley Vale.

Would he have even been able to understand the true magnitude of the problem he was facing? Until the cause of the failure/s and event/s that followed is established then everything is speculation and every question you ask will only open more doors. Even for one as straightforward as yours...

Perhaps i'm being naive but i don't think any of this helps until the simple parts of the equation can be put together.

cheers,
Rob

[Deaf]

For the benefit of the journo's a factor (one the holes in the swiss cheese) is this

7:54 - Center - Descend to 2500
7:54 - PGW - 2500

Pilot In Command means just that, Center is not in command. A response of
"ABC will maintain 5000" is the decision of the PIC and Center/ATC's job is to clear the path.

3 useless things Fuel in bowser, runway behind you and altitude above you.

[Dangly Bits]

Quick question folks.

Was Richmond fogged in?

Someone may have answered this already but I can't find it.

Thanks
DB

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Try post no. 122.....

[remoak]

reread your post to Dave and GA. Not pissing match just genuine concerns.

I say again - nobody is (or has been) throwing stones. Perhaps you could enlighten me if you think that is the case. You seem to have entirely missed the slur on airline pilots that I was responding to.

I don't. Hence the statement provided was my belief in his ability, as I believe was stated.

OK then WHY do you BELIEVE that? Genuine question.

The whole event was continually changing circumstances... from 7000' to 0'.
If it was clear cut we probably wouldnt be on here discussing it.

Not really. If he had elected to go into Richmond, there is little doubt that he would have made it easily, as previously suggested. It was the attempt to get to Bankstown that turned a drama into a crisis - quite possibly as a result of a further failure, and again nobody is laying blame. Something clearly went very wrong in the final stages of the flight as from what I can tell, he should have easily made it to Bankstown. Those are the changing circumstances I am referring to. Have a look at that road in Google Earth - it isn't very wide and I doubt I could manage to miss all the power poles and cables that he faced. it was clearly a last desperate attempt to get down safely.

Would it have ended the same if he circled Richmond to lose the 7000' in a controlled manner. Only for perhaps the same event to occur in which the aircraft became unable to maintain height and crashed in a street in Richmond instead of Canley Vale.

Personally, no I don't think so. It's a long runway and there is no need to stray far from it during the descent. Even a second engine failure with a failure to feather shouldn't be too much of an issue in that situation.

Perhaps i'm being naive but i don't think any of this helps until the simple parts of the equation can be put together

It helps because irrespective of what the failure might have been, it highlights the decision-making process and possibly a whole raft of cultural issues. It may possibly make some young GA pilot think to himself "right, if that ever happens to me, I'm not leaving a perfectly good runway in favour of a distant one for whatever reason - I'm getting myself and my passengers on the ground in the safest possible way" - and who knows, that might save lives. To me, that is worthwhile.

[aditya104]

7:30 AM 1034 hPa 1.9 kilometers
8am 0.5km vis

source History : Weather Underground

I wish there was a separate thread for the investigators(speculators) friends of the pilot Andrew are still in disbelief =(

[Wally Mk2]

This thread is getting quite messy but I guess we are talking about two peoples lives here (mainly Andrews) & the reason/s as to why it ended hence emotions are 'running' this thread..
Essentially we ALL have a little bit of "Andrew" in us meaning commercial pressure even a small amount is ever present in the back of our minds & not just with pilots either. Truckies for Eg make some really poor decisions (IE speeding) to get the job done, I'm sure if truckies had NO commercial pressure on them then they would be sitting in the L/H lane doing 20 clicks listening to C&W!,we've all done that,sped that is.
Whether we make the correct decision in such cases as this is wholly dependent on how reactionary you are & yr ability to think under pressure. I would say that Andrew on the day made his decision in good faith to continue based purely on being presented with a situation that few ever experience, an in flight engine malfunction. Whether it was the right decision is why we are here debating about it. Unlike a Sim you can't just 'freeze' time & think about yr situation for a while using some level of hindsight to end up with the best outcome Andrew's 'clock' was 'ticking' regardless of his decision/s & there in lies the biggest challenge for ALL of us, to make a decision based ONLY on safety not allowing any other external forces no matter how big they are to 'divert' you from that main focus.
Humans will go on doing this just like Andrew did for ever & day & there's nothing we can do to stop it all together!

Wmk2, forever learns from others.

[wasathangi]

Tojan....Feel good about yourself in putting this post up, first thing in the A.M of the accident?

Then to top it off, "ALL" of you that replied had to dig in and spill your own ego's, lack of knowledge and cold remarks to a very sad situation.....

Pull your heads in. Wait for the ATSB report through official channels not PPRUNE......

MODERATORS...

REQUEST YOU SHUT DOWN THIS THREAD.

WASA.

,

[bluesky300]

Like most of the others who have contributed to this thread I am focused on learning about the decision making process that took the aeroplane from overhead richmond to a forced landing in a street. I am looking for the weakness in my own decisions that could and might put me in the same position if I am in the same situation. That's all. Remoak's post was unfortunate, but many of his are in that category.

And I hereby grant complete and unrestricted approval to all of you out there to discuss, criticise, tear apart and generally pontificate about me in the event that I ever become a hole in the ground in the hope that you might save the next guy.

[VH-XXX]

This thread should NOT be shut down. Some of us are learning from it and it could save lives in the future.

[mmhbtower]

xcel

7000 at 11m north of YSRI and 0 at 3.1m YSBK

if you are going to present info as fact then get them right!

[Jabawocky]

Deaf

For the benefit of the journo's a factor (one the holes in the swiss cheese) is this

Quote:
7:54 - Center - Descend to 2500
7:54 - PGW - 2500
Pilot In Command means just that, Center is not in command. A response of
"ABC will maintain 5000" is the decision of the PIC and Center/ATC's job is to clear the path.

3 useless things Fuel in bowser, runway behind you and altitude above you.

I hope you are not trying to aportion blame on the ATC by selectively using some truths. Facts in Isolation can do that, just like the AGW brigade.

Lets look at the whole transcript, and you will see that ATC were not advised of a PAN, MAYDAY or even the words DECLARING AN EMERGENCY, no matter which way you say it. So he gets cleared to A025.....so what...he can used all the airspace from initial height to 2500....there was no height/time or distance requirement. The pilot elected to create minimal fuss, even when ATC prompted him, as it turns out the CEN guy spoke to the BK TWR guy and effectively declared it an emergency....becuase he could sense it really was one.

Syd Center
7:52 - PGW - We're just turning round sir, we've got a few problems here
7:52 - Center - Everything OK?
7:52 - PGW - Not at the moment, we're just turning round to Bankstown thankyou
7:52 - Center - Roger maintain 5000ft, Richmond available if emergency conditions exist
7:52 - PGW - Standby
7:53 - PGW - We've got an engine issue, we've shut one down and returning to Bankstown
7:53 - Center - Roger, track back to Bankstown
7:54 - Center - Will you require any services on your arrival ?
7:54 - PGW - Not sure at the moment, just dealing with it
7:54 - Center - Descend to 2500
7:54 - PGW - 2500
7:55 - Center - Are you able to maintain height, if not Richmond 2 miles south of you at this time
7:55 - PGW - Ah, we're just on descent at this time… (difficult to make out exactly)
7:56 - Center - Bankstown advise services will be in attendance for your arrival
7:56 - PGW - Wondering if we can confirm 11C available?
7:56 - Center - Track Direct for 11C final, 11C available with two knots downwind
7:57 - PGW - Thanks do you have a heading for us?
7:57 - Center - It's a left turn by 10 or 12 degrees
7:57 - PGW - Left 10-12 degrees
7:58 - Center - Continue descent as required, confirm visual
7:58 - PGW - We have visual at the moment
7:58 - Center - Roger, continue descent as required

BSK Tower
8:00 - PGW - 12 miles to run, 1500

[sagan]

I hope that controller is on if I ever have a major problem in flight.

[Xeptu]

Human factors are complex and widely varied. Human behaviour varies by the same exposure to various situations or events. Training and particularly experience modifys that behaviour in a more expected way.

In all likelihood this was his very first real life engine failure. there is an element of disbelief or uncertainty in his transmissions, however he overcomes this and does what he was trained to do, I'll speculate a little and say he elected an engine shut down because it was running rough as opposed to a catastrophic failure where he would was compelled to.

This creates a different mind set, "have I done the right thing" mentality and it stays with you for the rest of the event, its not an easy thing the first time to make a decision and execute that decision in full confidence.

At this point the engine is secure and a decent is initiated to bankstown, fair and reasonable decision "if" you are certain you still have one good engine and why wouldn't it be. reduced power running normally until you get to
1500' and apply power to maintain altitude when you discover that ones not performing either. What goes through your head, not two dodgy engines but oh my god I have shut down the wrong engine and thrown all my altitude away already. Doubt has set in and confidence is rapidly deminishing, then the realisation "I'm out of options, all rationale is lost at this point and the error chain just gets longer. This is where simulators, if for nothing else, train that human behaviour, but you have to be allowed to do it and make those mistakes before you can learn from them and ultimately train that behaviour, experience and exposure will provide for enough brain space to deal with more complex variables.

[puff]

Another subtle issue to consider was another PA31 that lost an engine out of port macquarie whereby when he secured the engine the a/c wouldn't perform on one -(after losing the engine in IMC and descending thru LSALT on descent IMC), they were lucky to have a nearby runway, after they landed they discovered that the flaps at 0 weren't fully retracted, thus creating enough drag that it wouldn't perform. There was an article about this in flight safety magazine, and the a/c was flown by a highly experienced pilot.

Agreed sagan - if they are readers thumbs up to both the centre controller and BK tower - in what is the 'worst' day scenario for a controller as well you 2 both conducted yourself with total professionalism and provided a fantastic support to the pilot. I've got friends in BK that when hearing the recording commented that the centre controller is always a top operator.

[DickyPearse]

I hope you are not trying to aportion blame on the ATC by selectively using some truths.

I didn't read the post that way.

A question has previously been raised as to whether the pilot made the concious decision to descend in order to avoid the steps and reach the standard reporting height for BK or whether the rate of decent was dictated by the damaged equipment. With hindsight, the first choice would be YSRI, the second would be to maintain all height available on the return to YSBK and then descend to land.

The exact decision making process will never be known but it is important to discuss for the benefit of the next pilot placed in similar circumstances - as hard as it may be for the friends of the unlucky pilot to witness.

[VH-XXX]

The ATSB report will say at the very end something like:

"It is unknown why the pilot elected to fly to Bankstown when Richmond was available."

1 line item. 2 needless fatalities.

[davidgrant]

Mr Remoak, or perhaps you would prefer " Captain" as your Title.
I congratulate you, it would appear you are the "Oracle" of all that is aviation.
An old and revered aviator once said to me.
" when you THINK you know it all....give it up and do something else"
Hmmm.
From your lofty position of " Knowledge" You cast dispertions on the standards, professional ethics and judgement of a fellow aviator... based on...??? err...fact??, Its almost as if you were there.
Fact.
Met reports from Ysri... at the time indicated that vis may...and I dont know because I wasnt there....may have been down to as low as 0.5 Kilometers... A GA pilot would maybe consider not exactly ideal conditions to conduct an approach even with both engines running, maybe an airline pilot annointed by their superior training and sound judgement would have had no problem with that at all.
Fact
From the AAFM for the PA-31P... "In flight shutdown of an inoperative engine".. at the completion of the checklists states "Land as soon as Practical" which sort of implies to a pilot that it might be a good idea to have a good think about just where I'm going to put this thing.... But I wasnt there, I wasnt looking out the window trying to make judgements about what the weather acually was, someone else was, and he made his judgement based on what he saw, but then unfortunately GA pilots are not blessed with the instincts of an airline pilot to see into the future
Fact
Andrew had not long left Bankstown, he knew the conditions were Cavok there, and it was just a short distance away, his machine was under control and performing as it should, so he made a judgement.
Funnily enough only a short while ago and airline pilot was faced with the same scenario in almost the same position. He diverted to KSA. Would you have been as critical of him if he had have experienced what Andrew did?

To be honest Sir, you sound like a pompous, arrogant, self opinionated Ass.

With regard to GA and airline, another great Philosopher once said
" Let he without sin cast the first stone".

I'd really appreciate it if you would keep your conjecture to yourself and let the experts discover the facts and let others get on with grieving for the loss of a fine young man, a skillful and concientious pilot, one thing you never could have taught him was how to say NO...that was intrinsic in his training.

[swh]

Originally Posted by Dangly Bits

Was Richmond fogged in?

The metars for YSRI are not conclusive, with a no temp/dew point split, and light wind, they may have had fog patches in the area.

Pretty hard to second guess a pilots decision, only they were there at the time, and would have made the best decision they could have with the information and time available.

He would have also had a right to expect, like we all do, that engine and prop failures “behave” themselves like we are trained to think when we do our training. However history is littered with cases where the expected turns out to be the unexpected.

Knowing what it takes to get a gig like flying a PA-31 out of BK, the guy must have had numerous people who have checked him out in the past, had good normal engine handling skills, and no doubt passed 5 or so instrument renewals and various twin ratings. He would have been on top of the pile waiting to get an airline gig.

He would have been a good operator, and knowing the sort of standard that GA aircraft are kept in Australia, this would not have been the first incident he would have had to deal with. I think it would interesting to see the previous MR entries, it may contain a smoking gun.

If anything, I think this pilot would represent an "above average" standard of handling skill on that aircraft compared to people less experienced in GA, or airline folks that are no longer used to single pilot IFR.

Until we know what he was up against, like many accidents a secondary problem may have been lurking and only showed its ugly head when he had few other options. What sounded like a gear warning horn in the background on several of his transmissions got me thinking ...

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