Global Aviation Magazine : 60 Years of the Hercules
AA62
Although Chris was on 47 at the time he can't remember the incident and was struggling to remember details of the rudder trim - all those hours asleep in the bunk as a Cathay pilot have dulled his brain 
.
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Brian,
thanks for trying. At least Null Orifice has confirmed the main thrust of my story. Probably less of a crew bunk problem for Chris than all that post flight champagne they used to get through !
thanks for trying. At least Null Orifice has confirmed the main thrust of my story. Probably less of a crew bunk problem for Chris than all that post flight champagne they used to get through !
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Colerne Accident
Brian,
My recollection of the accident was that the No 1 was shut down using the Condition Lever and, during the follow-up, the No 2 Fire Handle was pulled. Because the IAS was below Vmca2, applying full power to the other 2 engines led to the inevitable.
Mind you, your memory is probably better than mine.
My recollection of the accident was that the No 1 was shut down using the Condition Lever and, during the follow-up, the No 2 Fire Handle was pulled. Because the IAS was below Vmca2, applying full power to the other 2 engines led to the inevitable.
Mind you, your memory is probably better than mine.
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AA62 A very tasteful pic of the Bev (both of them).
At least the Bev had buckets of both character and charm - in the same way that a classic car that wont start and keeps breaking down has character!
Sad that there is only one in existance and the RAF Museum let their Bev fall apart.
At least the Bev had buckets of both character and charm - in the same way that a classic car that wont start and keeps breaking down has character!
Sad that there is only one in existance and the RAF Museum let their Bev fall apart.
Kilwhang,
I heard a similar story regarding a mix up with condition levers and T handles. At the time it happened I had just left Colerne to join you at AKR, so it was certainly a shock to hear of it happening. I certainly believe that by the time I became an Aircraft Ground Engineer in 1988 or so, that such things as a checker shutting an engine down had gone out of practice. Some things definitely improved over the years.
Smudge
I heard a similar story regarding a mix up with condition levers and T handles. At the time it happened I had just left Colerne to join you at AKR, so it was certainly a shock to hear of it happening. I certainly believe that by the time I became an Aircraft Ground Engineer in 1988 or so, that such things as a checker shutting an engine down had gone out of practice. Some things definitely improved over the years.
Smudge
Nimbev,
I thought you might approve of the pic. As a restorer and tinkerer of classic cars I think your analogy is most apt.
Pic is the HSP ready for loading into the a/c. Due to these loads exceeding the Condec limits (25000 lbs) we had to use the rather ungainly device shown above.
I thought you might approve of the pic. As a restorer and tinkerer of classic cars I think your analogy is most apt.
Pic is the HSP ready for loading into the a/c. Due to these loads exceeding the Condec limits (25000 lbs) we had to use the rather ungainly device shown above.
smudge
I have a few stories that some may find interesting, if only for their historical context. I shall post these in due course. They will cover my time at Colerne on Acceptance Checks and Base Servicing, a subsequent posting to the late, great, 48 at Changi, just in time for Bersatu Padu and the subsequent winding down East of Suez, and finally, on 'A' Line at Lyneham. I intend to keep these tales in an approximately chronological order (following the established trend) but reserve the right to deviate
as I see fit (brain fade permitting).
AA62
My memory confirms that yours is still quite good after all this time. The offending relays were visually identical, not that I, a mere engine man, would know if they weren't! Things that go 'click' and don't “hiss or p!$$” shouldn't be allowed! Once the required part had been identified, an electrical tradesman was roused from his pit to perform the necessary, while I filled out the necessary paperwork. Here endeth my involvement with Cutler Hammer relays.
I have a few stories that some may find interesting, if only for their historical context. I shall post these in due course. They will cover my time at Colerne on Acceptance Checks and Base Servicing, a subsequent posting to the late, great, 48 at Changi, just in time for Bersatu Padu and the subsequent winding down East of Suez, and finally, on 'A' Line at Lyneham. I intend to keep these tales in an approximately chronological order (following the established trend) but reserve the right to deviate
as I see fit (brain fade permitting).AA62
My memory confirms that yours is still quite good after all this time. The offending relays were visually identical, not that I, a mere engine man, would know if they weren't! Things that go 'click' and don't “hiss or p!$$” shouldn't be allowed! Once the required part had been identified, an electrical tradesman was roused from his pit to perform the necessary, while I filled out the necessary paperwork. Here endeth my involvement with Cutler Hammer relays.
Null Orfice,
as I recall there was no way before the incident that the suppliers or the engineers could have known about this relay problem. We had lots of problems. I think that apart from the usual reluctance to properly provision spare parts there was a mind set in MOD that this was a proven mature a/c. Indeed it was but we certainly turned our 66 into one offs by one means or another. The supplied servicing documentation was a mess and in some cases actually misleading. I may bore the readership with the ramp lock problems at a future date. Oh and bunting the a/c to get the cargo door to lock up on airdrop sorties.
It sounds as though we were on 48 at Changi at the same time.
as I recall there was no way before the incident that the suppliers or the engineers could have known about this relay problem. We had lots of problems. I think that apart from the usual reluctance to properly provision spare parts there was a mind set in MOD that this was a proven mature a/c. Indeed it was but we certainly turned our 66 into one offs by one means or another. The supplied servicing documentation was a mess and in some cases actually misleading. I may bore the readership with the ramp lock problems at a future date. Oh and bunting the a/c to get the cargo door to lock up on airdrop sorties.
It sounds as though we were on 48 at Changi at the same time.
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Bottling Engines
When the Herc arrived the Old Guard from Hastings and Bevs OCU took on the training on the new beast. Who could forget Dolly Grey and Jack Huntingdon. The snag was that the Herc was a quantum leap in performance and the habit of "bottling an engine" on take off took some time to be abandoned. The loss of a piston engine didn't change the poor performance of the other 3 much but the Allison produced as much as a whole Lancaster bomber all by itself and if the matching outboard on the other side wasn't hauled back then the remaining 3 turbines would take you straight to the scene of the accident.
Years back a Hastings instructor of welsh descent Taff J*** once bottled an engine in flight at night and in the ensuing panic reactions of the pilots and flt eng, who all had engine instruments managed to shut down the remaining engines. In the resulting dark silence with the only sound being the wind soughing over the wings a purposeful welsh voice was heard to say " Now will everybody put everything back where they found it!"
Years back a Hastings instructor of welsh descent Taff J*** once bottled an engine in flight at night and in the ensuing panic reactions of the pilots and flt eng, who all had engine instruments managed to shut down the remaining engines. In the resulting dark silence with the only sound being the wind soughing over the wings a purposeful welsh voice was heard to say " Now will everybody put everything back where they found it!"
AA62
You are right on the subject of the differences in the relays - and in the (incorrect) assumption by 'powers that be' that they were getting a proven aircraft; after all, it had been in service with the gum chewers for a good number of years before we acquired ours.
Part of the problem was in the support/training departments. While I can only speak on behalf of the ground personnel, there was a complete lack of appreciation of the quantum leap we were expected to make from the Hastings/Bev, etc.
Instructors on the ground school had no experience on the K, or any other C-130 for that matter. The manufacturers' reps (both Freds) were excellent fellows, and well versed in the build/overhaul of the aircraft and engines but, sadly, not at the operational line servicing/hangar maintenance levels.
Our request/suggestion of 'borrowing' some USAF guys from operational units - who had relevant experience on type, and who could have given us some useful gen, fell on deaf ears.
I was on 48 between May 70-October 71, so we may have seen each other at happy hour (or in the dinghy at the squadron repat party!).
You are right on the subject of the differences in the relays - and in the (incorrect) assumption by 'powers that be' that they were getting a proven aircraft; after all, it had been in service with the gum chewers for a good number of years before we acquired ours.
Part of the problem was in the support/training departments. While I can only speak on behalf of the ground personnel, there was a complete lack of appreciation of the quantum leap we were expected to make from the Hastings/Bev, etc.
Instructors on the ground school had no experience on the K, or any other C-130 for that matter. The manufacturers' reps (both Freds) were excellent fellows, and well versed in the build/overhaul of the aircraft and engines but, sadly, not at the operational line servicing/hangar maintenance levels.
Our request/suggestion of 'borrowing' some USAF guys from operational units - who had relevant experience on type, and who could have given us some useful gen, fell on deaf ears.
I was on 48 between May 70-October 71, so we may have seen each other at happy hour (or in the dinghy at the squadron repat party!).
Null Orifice,
With respect to training and experience on Albert in the early days, you are spot on. In some ways I was fortunate in being posted to Colerne directly from my apprentice course at Halton. I had no pre conceived ideas, in fact I had no idea, what to expect. Reading the books, and doing as I was told was the general rule on White team (Base 3) in 71-73, and followed when I was part if the Corrosion Control team (Tank Rats) before posting to Cyprus. As I recall, and as AA62 suggests, the use of NSN, FSN and Section and Reference numbers did little to help anyone find his way through the Vol3. But must surely be down to the insistence on using a blend of USA and British equipment? When I was there, Colerne's Lockheed Rep was a bit of a lad, wore a ten gallon hat and cowboy boots. He ensured company funds sponsored many of the drinks consumed at the team Christmas do, and even managed to present us all with a dark blue tie, with a single Albert on it. I still have mine, but like my course notes, photographs etc, seem to be temporarily misplaced in my old Nav bag.
I rather suspect that the "buggers muddle" that was the fleet "second line facility" at Colerne in the early 70s, would not be acceptable for say, the introduction of the A400M to the RAF today. But then, perhaps half the fun of engineering on Albert was the "journey in to the unknown.
Doug M,
Thanks for that insight on the loss of an Engine on Albert. It never occurred to me how much power the Allison was producing on take off, despite more than 5000 hours flying on them, years working on them, and lots and lots of ground running. It's never too late to learn I reckon.
Smudge
With respect to training and experience on Albert in the early days, you are spot on. In some ways I was fortunate in being posted to Colerne directly from my apprentice course at Halton. I had no pre conceived ideas, in fact I had no idea, what to expect. Reading the books, and doing as I was told was the general rule on White team (Base 3) in 71-73, and followed when I was part if the Corrosion Control team (Tank Rats) before posting to Cyprus. As I recall, and as AA62 suggests, the use of NSN, FSN and Section and Reference numbers did little to help anyone find his way through the Vol3. But must surely be down to the insistence on using a blend of USA and British equipment? When I was there, Colerne's Lockheed Rep was a bit of a lad, wore a ten gallon hat and cowboy boots. He ensured company funds sponsored many of the drinks consumed at the team Christmas do, and even managed to present us all with a dark blue tie, with a single Albert on it. I still have mine, but like my course notes, photographs etc, seem to be temporarily misplaced in my old Nav bag.
I rather suspect that the "buggers muddle" that was the fleet "second line facility" at Colerne in the early 70s, would not be acceptable for say, the introduction of the A400M to the RAF today. But then, perhaps half the fun of engineering on Albert was the "journey in to the unknown.
Doug M,
Thanks for that insight on the loss of an Engine on Albert. It never occurred to me how much power the Allison was producing on take off, despite more than 5000 hours flying on them, years working on them, and lots and lots of ground running. It's never too late to learn I reckon.
Smudge
Last edited by smujsmith; 8th Nov 2014 at 22:26.
Null,
we did actually 'borrow' some experienced USAF C130 chaps. We had the USAF exchange officer on 47, one Major J.J. Smith. A class act who arranged for some of the USAF Mildenhal Herc det to visit us at happy hours on the squadron.
They brought some of their groundcrew and we always invited ours. This ad hoc arrangement certainly helped us with 'translating' the very poor manuals and helped to solve a lot of problems we were beginning to have especially with the air con/pressurisation and the infamous ramp lock saga. Getting the system to acknowledge that the books might not be the paragons of perfection that they assumed was quite another matter.
we did actually 'borrow' some experienced USAF C130 chaps. We had the USAF exchange officer on 47, one Major J.J. Smith. A class act who arranged for some of the USAF Mildenhal Herc det to visit us at happy hours on the squadron.
They brought some of their groundcrew and we always invited ours. This ad hoc arrangement certainly helped us with 'translating' the very poor manuals and helped to solve a lot of problems we were beginning to have especially with the air con/pressurisation and the infamous ramp lock saga. Getting the system to acknowledge that the books might not be the paragons of perfection that they assumed was quite another matter.
Pic of the HSP safely installed. Not a lot of room as you can see. I wonder if this is the type of vehicle that DM refers to in his post on dropping the HSP. This may be the very last HSP I dropped.
Null,
forgot to mention that I was on 48 at the same time. We will have known each other but whether we would now is doubtful due to to old father time !
forgot to mention that I was on 48 at the same time. We will have known each other but whether we would now is doubtful due to to old father time !
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Originally Posted by Null Orifice
AA62
You are right on the subject of the differences in the relays - and in the (incorrect) assumption by 'powers that be' that they were getting a proven aircraft; after all, it had been in service with the gum chewers for a good number of years before we acquired ours.
Part of the problem was in the support/training departments. While I can only speak on behalf of the ground personnel, there was a complete lack of appreciation of the quantum leap we were expected to make from the Hastings/Bev, etc.
You are right on the subject of the differences in the relays - and in the (incorrect) assumption by 'powers that be' that they were getting a proven aircraft; after all, it had been in service with the gum chewers for a good number of years before we acquired ours.
Part of the problem was in the support/training departments. While I can only speak on behalf of the ground personnel, there was a complete lack of appreciation of the quantum leap we were expected to make from the Hastings/Bev, etc.
How does the failure of the British government and military in providing proper training and support for the C-130 when they decided to adopt it in any way mean that the C-130 was an "unproven aircraft"?
It was a very proven aircraft, with proven and successful training, maintenance, and supply requirements - with a proven and successful training, maintenance, and supply system in place in the USAF/USN/USMC - and the UK decided NOT to avail themselves of those when they adopted the aircraft itself.
That the UK, when the US offered to show them how to train for and maintain the C-130, said "no thanks, we'll do it our own way, as yours is obviously inferior*" only shows the flaws in the UK's decision process - it shows nothing about the aircraft itself.
* Perhaps they used the words "too expensive" here.
Yamagata Ken,
for training drops the jerry cans would ether be empty or contain water. For Exercise or Operations they would contain fuel for the vehicle. For a war load you would hardly see the vehicle for jerry cans and other stores !
Pic of the HSP fully rigged and the final checks being completed and signed for. Both the ALM and the army checker did their own independent checks and then signed the checklist.
You can clearly see the extractor parachute fitted to the bomb rack.
for training drops the jerry cans would ether be empty or contain water. For Exercise or Operations they would contain fuel for the vehicle. For a war load you would hardly see the vehicle for jerry cans and other stores !
Pic of the HSP fully rigged and the final checks being completed and signed for. Both the ALM and the army checker did their own independent checks and then signed the checklist.
You can clearly see the extractor parachute fitted to the bomb rack.
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Thanks aa62. When I saw them I thought: 'petrol, that looks like an accident (fireball) looking for somewhere to happen'. In my very brief time in boy's service (1969), everything was petrol engined. I believe its all diesel now? (Apologies if I'm off-topic).
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I tend to agree with GreenKnight121. The aircraft were bought through FMS and not directly from Lockheed. Full training would have been available had UK wanted it but, to be honest, I dont think there were too many problems with the training per se. Minor problems arose with changes to the aircraft eg removing part of the US nav fit and installing parts of a UK system, but perhaps one of the biggest problems was the decision not to use a fungal inhibitor, such that by mid 1969 we had major structural problems with the integral fuel tanks.
I remember that B cat crews were sent out on the Changi slip to bring back the aircraft. The airframe we recovered went straight into the hangar at Lyneham and had major structural rework to the wing. They wouldnt even authorise it for one more flight. I remember the crew being invited to go and have a look - having just flown it back from Changi we werent impressed! Mind you I never worked out why B cat crews were stipulated - pilots yes, maybe they were more likely to handle the aircraft more gently than a less experienced pilot - but for the nav? My undoubted navigation expertise wouldnt have helped a lot if the wing folded!!
From Hansard Dec 1969
I remember that B cat crews were sent out on the Changi slip to bring back the aircraft. The airframe we recovered went straight into the hangar at Lyneham and had major structural rework to the wing. They wouldnt even authorise it for one more flight. I remember the crew being invited to go and have a look - having just flown it back from Changi we werent impressed! Mind you I never worked out why B cat crews were stipulated - pilots yes, maybe they were more likely to handle the aircraft more gently than a less experienced pilot - but for the nav? My undoubted navigation expertise wouldnt have helped a lot if the wing folded!!
From Hansard Dec 1969
The fuel tanks of virtually all R.A.F. Hercules have suffered some degree of corrosion. The extent of the damage varies widely. In a few aircraft replacement of part of the wing structure is likely to be needed. All the aircraft affected will be repaired over the next year. To make good the loss of transport capacity while repairs are being carried out, some Argosies will continue in service longer than planned.
The Royal Air Force has for some time used a fuel additive as an icing inhibitor for aircraft liable to icing, and this additive inhibits fungal growth. In view of the special lining of the integral fuel tanks, it was not at first thought necessary to incur the cost of using this additive to check fungal growth in all Hercules aircraft.