Flt. Lt. Sean Cunningham inquest
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So they settled out of consideration for the family? That would be a first! The MOD is less concerned about liability (after all the pay-out is our money, not theirs). Their worry is that evidence should not emerge of any MOD negligence or incompetence. That is less likely to happen if the sequence is as in this case; settle, allow late sight of SI report to family only, ensure that their version of events is about all that is available to the Coroner, finally release SI report after Inquest
DV
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dragartist
Excellent. And unfortunately we've been there before too often.
MoD always look to the final act, but these defences in depth have been systematically weakened over many years. Yet they are money in the bank to both the designer and MoD.
To your list I'd add the Design Reviews (especially the Critical Design Review) and Installation Design Conference (the 555), when as many knowledgeable people you can spare from the squadrons are allowed to crawl all over every aspect of the design and installation.
In the 1990s building these defences became optional, and in the case of CDRs non-technical staff are now permitted to waive them, yet sign a declaration to the effect they have been held, successfully. That, of course, is a serious fraud; DE&S has expressed itself content, and Min(AF) and the Head of the Civil Service have accepted this advice and upheld the policy.
Given the MAA is part of this cowboy outfit, it is little wonder we're repeating ourselves yet again.
Excellent. And unfortunately we've been there before too often.
MoD always look to the final act, but these defences in depth have been systematically weakened over many years. Yet they are money in the bank to both the designer and MoD.
To your list I'd add the Design Reviews (especially the Critical Design Review) and Installation Design Conference (the 555), when as many knowledgeable people you can spare from the squadrons are allowed to crawl all over every aspect of the design and installation.
In the 1990s building these defences became optional, and in the case of CDRs non-technical staff are now permitted to waive them, yet sign a declaration to the effect they have been held, successfully. That, of course, is a serious fraud; DE&S has expressed itself content, and Min(AF) and the Head of the Civil Service have accepted this advice and upheld the policy.
Given the MAA is part of this cowboy outfit, it is little wonder we're repeating ourselves yet again.
The death of Flt Lt Cunningham was tragic, as is every other needless death that occurs as a consequence of an aircraft accident.
Those on here who know who I am, and remember my contribution to TELIC 1 may also remember the post TELIC 1 conference at Marham.
At the opening of that the staish gave a briefing which paraphrased said: “give me the tools…” (he meant the upgrades to the jet) “… and an appraisal of the safety… or not.. and let me determine the benefit vs risk …and choose to take or not take it into battle accordingly”
Now, for a variety of reasons which we all know, that brave but slightly cavalier (sorry Sir) attitude simply is neither feasible nor is it favourable in today’s world.
At the other end of the scale we have this emotive sentiment being rattled out which would apparently seek to find anyone involved in the design chain, at whatever level, and hang them out to dry if any tiny thing should go wrong . Ever!
Now if that’s the way you want to play the game then fine, so be it.
But just remember this: if you ‘phone me and ask me to drop everything in order to design, build, integrate and clear a UOR onto a fast jet in a matter of literally weeks, then guess what? I’ll tell you to get lost, I’m busy. I really don’t need the stress today, and I certainly don’t want it in ten years time when some-know-it-all uses the benefit of 20-20 hindsight to point out something that I missed, and that didn’t get spotted at PDR, CDR, TRR or any other R!
If flexibility really is the key to air power, then you have to understand that it works both ways. ‘He who never made a mistake never made anything’ as the saying goes, the corollary of which is that if you want something made, then as a consequence it must be accepted that sometimes mistakes will occur.
No one, me included, has not been shocked by what Haddon Cave has uncovered, and yes, there are areas where accountability is lacking. But please don’t tar everyone with the same brush.
After the H-C report was published I had conscientious hard-working young engineers come to me to ask whether they could end up in jail for making an honest mistake in the design process. The gist of what I told them was “no, you’ll not end up in jail if you…try hard… be honest…tell everyone the truth….and document everything…and you’ll be ok”.
Sadly, it sounds as though if some of you lot had their way that wouldn’t be the case.
Is that really what you want?
Zulu 10
Thanks for that. I fully agree that the people I describe, who caused so many deaths, are "myopic and self-serving".
I wasn't shocked. He didn't uncover any failure that wasn't already in the public domain; and certainly known by anyone in MoD with any knowledge of airworthiness. How many of these people met their legal and moral obligation to report, and escalate, these failings? What he did do was protect the myopic and self-serving, by naming and blaming the wrong people. We also agree that this should never be the case.
Thanks for that. I fully agree that the people I describe, who caused so many deaths, are "myopic and self-serving".
No one, me included, has not been shocked by what Haddon Cave has uncovered
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Zulu,
I came up though the design route to become the EA for some serious kit. I received commendations for my work on Granby and Jacana. The citations majored on my attention to detail and not compromising safety. I turned some jobs round very quickly to give the front line the tools you describe.
I recognised it was time to leave when my moans about the compromises being made were being shunned.
Let me give you just one example that may have some relevance to this thread. it would have been 2000 or 2001. A safety manager (C1 Grade CS) post was established in the team I can't recall the blokes name, he was insignificant. he was soon diverted to Business Management tasks. The IPTL at the time had is priorities wrong in my mind. I don't think I am alone in my view.
As Tuc has stated several times on several threads there has been a gradual watering down of the resources supporting efforts over the years.
Only following C H-C was money being thrown at Safety. Too little too late and too poorly focused. What I saw was it being contracted out to the likes of Q2, ERA etc. The in house expertise had gone never to be recovered.
I once worked for the military advisor to C H-C he taught me a fair bit. the most significant thing was to fully understand the kit I was responsible for.
Standing by to repel boarders.
I came up though the design route to become the EA for some serious kit. I received commendations for my work on Granby and Jacana. The citations majored on my attention to detail and not compromising safety. I turned some jobs round very quickly to give the front line the tools you describe.
I recognised it was time to leave when my moans about the compromises being made were being shunned.
Let me give you just one example that may have some relevance to this thread. it would have been 2000 or 2001. A safety manager (C1 Grade CS) post was established in the team I can't recall the blokes name, he was insignificant. he was soon diverted to Business Management tasks. The IPTL at the time had is priorities wrong in my mind. I don't think I am alone in my view.
As Tuc has stated several times on several threads there has been a gradual watering down of the resources supporting efforts over the years.
Only following C H-C was money being thrown at Safety. Too little too late and too poorly focused. What I saw was it being contracted out to the likes of Q2, ERA etc. The in house expertise had gone never to be recovered.
I once worked for the military advisor to C H-C he taught me a fair bit. the most significant thing was to fully understand the kit I was responsible for.
Standing by to repel boarders.
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Zulu,
I came up though the design route to become the EA for some serious kit. I received commendations for my work on Granby and Jacana. The citations majored on my attention to detail and not compromising safety. I turned some jobs round very quickly to give the front line the tools you describe.
I recognised it was time to leave when my moans about the compromises being made were being shunned.
Let me give you just one example that may have some relevance to this thread. it would have been 2000 or 2001. A safety manager (C1 Grade CS) post was established in the team I can't recall the blokes name, he was insignificant. he was soon diverted to Business Management tasks. The IPTL at the time had is priorities wrong in my mind. I don't think I am alone in my view.
As Tuc has stated several times on several threads there has been a gradual watering down of the resources supporting efforts over the years.
Only following C H-C was money being thrown at Safety. Too little too late and too poorly focused. What I saw was it being contracted out to the likes of Q2, ERA etc. The in house expertise had gone never to be recovered.
I once worked for the military advisor to C H-C he taught me a fair bit. the most significant thing was to fully understand the kit I was responsible for.
Standing by to repel boarders.
I came up though the design route to become the EA for some serious kit. I received commendations for my work on Granby and Jacana. The citations majored on my attention to detail and not compromising safety. I turned some jobs round very quickly to give the front line the tools you describe.
I recognised it was time to leave when my moans about the compromises being made were being shunned.
Let me give you just one example that may have some relevance to this thread. it would have been 2000 or 2001. A safety manager (C1 Grade CS) post was established in the team I can't recall the blokes name, he was insignificant. he was soon diverted to Business Management tasks. The IPTL at the time had is priorities wrong in my mind. I don't think I am alone in my view.
As Tuc has stated several times on several threads there has been a gradual watering down of the resources supporting efforts over the years.
Only following C H-C was money being thrown at Safety. Too little too late and too poorly focused. What I saw was it being contracted out to the likes of Q2, ERA etc. The in house expertise had gone never to be recovered.
I once worked for the military advisor to C H-C he taught me a fair bit. the most significant thing was to fully understand the kit I was responsible for.
Standing by to repel boarders.
The original designer may, and I emphasise "may" have failed to notice a flaw in his/her work, but that doesn't mean that they should be pilloried if subsequent reviews etc didn't spot it either.
If, as I think you are suggesting, the reviews are not carried out thoroughly and dilligently, and the recommendations followed, then we're in full agreement that heads should roll.
Where we seem to differ is in our view of whether the designer is responsible if the review/clearance 'system' fails in its duty.
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Team effort
Zulu, you are absolutely correct it is a team effort. I share the blame with the evaluators who are the designers safety net. Perhaps even the maintainers who could perhaps have raised a number of 760s and 765s. (Maybe they did and the Station or EA did not act on them) One point I tried to make was the erosion of all the formations who supported continued airworthiness. The Publications at Glasgow closed, CSDE closed. IPT assumed responsibilities but had their manning cut. My example of the Safety Manager is true. My team halved in two years, my PDS budget continuously salami sliced. my DERA then Q2 budget cut significantly. Just been reading the Aero Society mag on DE&S+ and listened to Hammond yesterday at Yeovil. The penny is starting to drop but it has taken Chinook computers, Herc ESF, Nimrod fuel and hot air ducts and bang seats. What's next.
Just saying it as I saw it.
Just saying it as I saw it.
Good post, Dragartist. The system can only work as a team, united in its earnest desire to ensure airworthy aircraft. We have to get back to such a system. There is a long way to go. About time we started out then.
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I meant to add that my comments were intended to be generic not directed specifically to the topic of this thread. I am sure my ex colleagues on the IPT are under enough pressure.
I figure we are all eagerly awaiting the publication of the SI. It was not on the MAA web site earlier this evening when I checked. I did note that some of the ASIMS forms I had a early hand in had developed nicely. Well done Mike.
I figure we are all eagerly awaiting the publication of the SI. It was not on the MAA web site earlier this evening when I checked. I did note that some of the ASIMS forms I had a early hand in had developed nicely. Well done Mike.
Zulu
Please explain.
I talked of Design Reviews, and the policy decision by CDP and his staff (especially DGAS2/XD1 - Nimrod, Chinook) that they may be waived by non-technical staff, and a false declaration made that they were held successfully, and full payment made. Like dragartist, I state a simple fact, and DE&S has on many occasions confirmed this practice is acceptable, most recently last month. I am quite comfortable repeating this. It was submitted in evidence to both Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip; and less than a week ago to the HofC Defence Committee. At no time has MoD sought to refute what I say.
In fact, DE&S has been extremely helpful in this matter, offering to provide the correspondence from CDP upholding these rulings. Think about that. DE&S has staff so utterly and completely barking, or supremely confident of the top cover from VSOs (probably both) that they offer to provide the written evidence that it is stated policy to discipline staffs who seek to implement mandated airworthiness regulations, and support to the hilt staffs who commit fraud.
And the MAA is FULLY aware of this, having been informed in the presence of a Minister and been party to the above DE&S correspondence. The record of proceedings is very clear! Neither took any action. That gets to the root of the problem. Those few staffs who met their legal obligation were castigated and disciplined for their impertinence, and despite the Nimrod Review and the changes it has brought about in MoD, they are still castigated, despite being proven 100% right. The official Ministerial line remains that there have been no systemic airworthiness failings. So why was the MAA formed?
Finally, how daft does it look sniping at someone who has consistently fought for aviation safety, yet in the same breath list a raft of things both you and I fully agree upon. It makes me think what is upsetting you/MoD is WHO revealed the failures and, more to the point, WHO ordered and perpetuated them while aircrew were dying in avoidable accidents. Please don't shoot the messenger.
Please explain.
which was echoed by Tecumseh's slight about "designers".
In fact, DE&S has been extremely helpful in this matter, offering to provide the correspondence from CDP upholding these rulings. Think about that. DE&S has staff so utterly and completely barking, or supremely confident of the top cover from VSOs (probably both) that they offer to provide the written evidence that it is stated policy to discipline staffs who seek to implement mandated airworthiness regulations, and support to the hilt staffs who commit fraud.
And the MAA is FULLY aware of this, having been informed in the presence of a Minister and been party to the above DE&S correspondence. The record of proceedings is very clear! Neither took any action. That gets to the root of the problem. Those few staffs who met their legal obligation were castigated and disciplined for their impertinence, and despite the Nimrod Review and the changes it has brought about in MoD, they are still castigated, despite being proven 100% right. The official Ministerial line remains that there have been no systemic airworthiness failings. So why was the MAA formed?
Finally, how daft does it look sniping at someone who has consistently fought for aviation safety, yet in the same breath list a raft of things both you and I fully agree upon. It makes me think what is upsetting you/MoD is WHO revealed the failures and, more to the point, WHO ordered and perpetuated them while aircrew were dying in avoidable accidents. Please don't shoot the messenger.
760s & 765s
DA
You said : "Perhaps even the maintainers who could perhaps have raised a number of 760s and 765s".
Perhaps they could/did - However....
In the Mid 80 - to early 90s, I recall the mantra that came out of (some) Eng Wg HQs I knew and loved was "Do you realise how much it costs to raise a F760?" ...this was often followed by a ripping sound emanating from handbrake house.
Later, and whilst in an EA post processing (amongst many other things) loads of 760s & 765s, We developed a very good working relationship with `Mr 765`(A Sqn Ldr M**dl*** IIRC) and all was well until the 765 cell disappeared in a puff of smoke amongst the headlong rush to MDGs or IPTs or whatever the latest yukspeak term was. A great shame, as the work load then fell onto a rapidly restructured IPT which had been reduced in size, reorganised (several times) relocated (several times) and largely civilianised... CSDE disappeared around this time as well...And if that wasn't enough, all this was happening in and around Gulf War 1.
Without a doubt, things got missed. It was (and is, I guess) a sad state of affairs.
You said : "Perhaps even the maintainers who could perhaps have raised a number of 760s and 765s".
Perhaps they could/did - However....
In the Mid 80 - to early 90s, I recall the mantra that came out of (some) Eng Wg HQs I knew and loved was "Do you realise how much it costs to raise a F760?" ...this was often followed by a ripping sound emanating from handbrake house.
Later, and whilst in an EA post processing (amongst many other things) loads of 760s & 765s, We developed a very good working relationship with `Mr 765`(A Sqn Ldr M**dl*** IIRC) and all was well until the 765 cell disappeared in a puff of smoke amongst the headlong rush to MDGs or IPTs or whatever the latest yukspeak term was. A great shame, as the work load then fell onto a rapidly restructured IPT which had been reduced in size, reorganised (several times) relocated (several times) and largely civilianised... CSDE disappeared around this time as well...And if that wasn't enough, all this was happening in and around Gulf War 1.
Without a doubt, things got missed. It was (and is, I guess) a sad state of affairs.
I'm no expert on the airworthiness saga, but I think I've picked up enough from tuc and Chug over the years to understand that the problems date from the late 80s / early 90s - correct? Therefore, since the Hawk entered service in the 1970s, I presume that a fully-functioning airworthiness organisation scrutinised the design of the ejection seat and found no problems with either the firing handle safety pin or the scissor shackle.
If MB's information regarding overtightening of the scissor shackle bolt was released in the 1990s then it conceivably might have got lost in the by-now-dysfunctional airworthiness organisation, in which case the MoD could rightly be blamed. However MB have not challenged the accusation that they failed to inform the MoD about the issue. To me it seems a bit churlish, in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, to assume that the MoD must have received and failed to act upon the information.
As for the seat handle and safety pin, if its design was approved by the fully-functioning airworthiness organisation of the 1970s, and there were no instances of handles being pulled to a hair trigger position until Sean's accident, then how exactly was anyone supposed to recognise and mitigate the risk? I think we know that a few pilots have inadvertantly pulled the handle a little way and then pushed it back in on various marks of seat; if these instances were never formally reported or acted upon then the failure was not so much in airworthiness funding as it was in aircrew reporting culture. And I think we all know how poor that was in the 1970s / 1980s!How, exactly, would airworthiness process have identified the hazard without an incident report?
It seems to me that the best opportunities to stop the accident were the visual checks of the seat safety pin. As I said in an earlier post, having seen mock-up photos, the clues were subtle but they were definitely there. Of the 19 opportunities to spot the condition, at least 4 would have belonged to Sean as he pinned the seat, got out, got back in, and unpinned the seat. Knowing a little of the Reds' way of doing business, the fact that the SI president testified about their unit culture at the inquest suggests to me that the report (which I have yet to see) will touch on self-imposed time pressures, which (if true) would further reduce the likelihood of spotting the condition of the seat handle.
This is not Nimrod or Patriot; there were opportunities for the Reds' management, the lineys and the pilot to identify weaknesses or faults and break the accident chain. There may well have been design and communication failings elsewhere but I do not believe that this accident was fundamentally the making of a dysfunctional or negligent airworthiness organisation. The payout is at least as likely to result from acknowledged failings within Air Command as it is within DE&S, in my view...
If MB's information regarding overtightening of the scissor shackle bolt was released in the 1990s then it conceivably might have got lost in the by-now-dysfunctional airworthiness organisation, in which case the MoD could rightly be blamed. However MB have not challenged the accusation that they failed to inform the MoD about the issue. To me it seems a bit churlish, in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, to assume that the MoD must have received and failed to act upon the information.
As for the seat handle and safety pin, if its design was approved by the fully-functioning airworthiness organisation of the 1970s, and there were no instances of handles being pulled to a hair trigger position until Sean's accident, then how exactly was anyone supposed to recognise and mitigate the risk? I think we know that a few pilots have inadvertantly pulled the handle a little way and then pushed it back in on various marks of seat; if these instances were never formally reported or acted upon then the failure was not so much in airworthiness funding as it was in aircrew reporting culture. And I think we all know how poor that was in the 1970s / 1980s!How, exactly, would airworthiness process have identified the hazard without an incident report?
It seems to me that the best opportunities to stop the accident were the visual checks of the seat safety pin. As I said in an earlier post, having seen mock-up photos, the clues were subtle but they were definitely there. Of the 19 opportunities to spot the condition, at least 4 would have belonged to Sean as he pinned the seat, got out, got back in, and unpinned the seat. Knowing a little of the Reds' way of doing business, the fact that the SI president testified about their unit culture at the inquest suggests to me that the report (which I have yet to see) will touch on self-imposed time pressures, which (if true) would further reduce the likelihood of spotting the condition of the seat handle.
This is not Nimrod or Patriot; there were opportunities for the Reds' management, the lineys and the pilot to identify weaknesses or faults and break the accident chain. There may well have been design and communication failings elsewhere but I do not believe that this accident was fundamentally the making of a dysfunctional or negligent airworthiness organisation. The payout is at least as likely to result from acknowledged failings within Air Command as it is within DE&S, in my view...
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This is not Nimrod or Patriot; there were opportunities for the Reds' management, the lineys and the pilot to identify weaknesses or faults and break the accident chain.
The CAA at airshows actually present a light aircraft with built in faults present, split pins in controls missing, screwdrivers in engine compartment, nuts missing off wheels etc then invite members of the public / engineers / private pilots/ commercial pilots etc to spot the faults...... Very very few actually find them all, indeed the majority do not even come close, and they know there are faults present.
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Zulu
Please explain.
I talked of Design Reviews, and the policy decision by CDP and his staff (especially DGAS2/XD1 - Nimrod, Chinook) that they may be waived by non-technical staff, and a false declaration made that they were held successfully, and full payment made. Like dragartist, I state a simple fact, and DE&S has on many occasions confirmed this practice is acceptable, most recently last month. I am quite comfortable repeating this.....
.... Finally, how daft does it look sniping at someone who has consistently fought for aviation safety, yet in the same breath list a raft of things both you and I fully agree upon. It makes me think what is upsetting you/MoD is WHO revealed the failures and, more to the point, WHO ordered and perpetuated them while aircrew were dying in avoidable accidents. Please don't shoot the messenger.
Please explain.
I talked of Design Reviews, and the policy decision by CDP and his staff (especially DGAS2/XD1 - Nimrod, Chinook) that they may be waived by non-technical staff, and a false declaration made that they were held successfully, and full payment made. Like dragartist, I state a simple fact, and DE&S has on many occasions confirmed this practice is acceptable, most recently last month. I am quite comfortable repeating this.....
.... Finally, how daft does it look sniping at someone who has consistently fought for aviation safety, yet in the same breath list a raft of things both you and I fully agree upon. It makes me think what is upsetting you/MoD is WHO revealed the failures and, more to the point, WHO ordered and perpetuated them while aircrew were dying in avoidable accidents. Please don't shoot the messenger.
What I do not agree with is your point in #299 that "MoD always look to the final act, but these defences in depth have been systematically weakened over many years. Yet they are money in the bank to both the designer and MoD."
Your post was supporting Drag Artist's post in which he had suggested taking responsibility for this dreadful accident all the way back to the application of ink to drafting film. i.e. to the designer.
My concern being your statement, also castigating the "designer". It is the position of the designer that I am attempting, but apparently failing, to defend. I am proud to say that I have never met a designer who would place money above safety.
Corporations and design organisations might, but designers? Never.
I'll agree not to shoot the messenger if you agree not to shoot the designer.
"Do you realise how much it costs to raise a F760?"
Briefly, this was a "saving at the expense of safety" (see Nimrod Review) thought necessary because in 1991 AMSO (the RAF Chief Engineer) had failed to correct the wasteful policy issued by his predecessors in June 1987 (formulation) and January 1988 (promulgation without discussion or warning).
All he had to do was rescind the policy, and was advised to do so by successive internal audits (e.g. EAC), but refused. Why? MoD won't say but the refusal protected his predecessors. The money had to be found from somewhere so he simply applied successive 28% cuts to direct airworthiness tasks, year on year. (Remember, Haddon-Cave criticised General Cowan for 4% cuts imposed upon him from above, but praised the instigator of 28% cuts). Don't take my word; it is noted in the August 1992 CHART report by Inspector of Flight Safety. That was withheld until obtained during the Mull of Kinttyre reveiw.
MF765s were stopped (which would be a confusing message to industry - MoD don't want tech pubs to be correct). EAs were under orders to save up MF760s, regardless of safety implications. Even if an EA broke the rules and submitted a 760A, funding had been entirely withdrawn for the investigation. This ethos extended across all 17 components of maintaining the build standard (of which MF65s is a small part of one). That maintained build standard is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case, and hence Release to Service.
Zulu 10: If flexibility really is the key to air power, then you have to understand that it works both ways. ‘He who never made a mistake never made anything’ as the saying goes, the corollary of which is that if you want something made, then as a consequence it must be accepted that sometimes mistakes will occur.
Is it a 'mistake' to not use a shouldered bolt (fitted up to and including Mk9 and Mk 12 seats) that cannot be over tightened and use one that can. If a mod does indeed come out that has a shouldered bolt I would be asking why not in the 1st place.
Is it a 'mistake' to not use a shouldered bolt (fitted up to and including Mk9 and Mk 12 seats) that cannot be over tightened and use one that can. If a mod does indeed come out that has a shouldered bolt I would be asking why not in the 1st place.
Zulu
Thank you.
I have never criticised designers and, indeed, have supported them consistently in my many posts. If I caused confusion, I apologise. No designer is perfect. Everyone makes mistakes. God knows I made a few howlers when I was one. But that is why the defences in depth (design reviews/configuration milestones) are mandated and I disagree with MoD's stated policy that they can be waived, at the whim of a non-engineer. It is a slightly different issue that he is also allowed to make a false declaration that they were held successfully, but I disagree with that as well. As always, I fully accept that many disagree with me, including the MAA and DE&S policy branch, but I'm glad you don't.
Edited to add; Sorry, I did openly criticise one company, who always put negative tolerances on their wiring/loom drawings; but as they had been awarded the major contract on a political direction, without bidding, I guess anyone would make the same criticism. Such a mistake, and refusal to correct, indicates zero subject knowledge. Perhaps worse, a non-engineer in MoD was allowed to arbitrate - he did not choose wisely. I suppose strictly speaking the original error wasn't made by a designer - loom drawings are apprentice jobs. But the designer made the mistake by signing them off.
Thank you.
I have never criticised designers and, indeed, have supported them consistently in my many posts. If I caused confusion, I apologise. No designer is perfect. Everyone makes mistakes. God knows I made a few howlers when I was one. But that is why the defences in depth (design reviews/configuration milestones) are mandated and I disagree with MoD's stated policy that they can be waived, at the whim of a non-engineer. It is a slightly different issue that he is also allowed to make a false declaration that they were held successfully, but I disagree with that as well. As always, I fully accept that many disagree with me, including the MAA and DE&S policy branch, but I'm glad you don't.
Edited to add; Sorry, I did openly criticise one company, who always put negative tolerances on their wiring/loom drawings; but as they had been awarded the major contract on a political direction, without bidding, I guess anyone would make the same criticism. Such a mistake, and refusal to correct, indicates zero subject knowledge. Perhaps worse, a non-engineer in MoD was allowed to arbitrate - he did not choose wisely. I suppose strictly speaking the original error wasn't made by a designer - loom drawings are apprentice jobs. But the designer made the mistake by signing them off.
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Zulu
Thank you.
I have never criticised designers and, indeed, have supported them consistently in my many posts. If I caused confusion, I apologise. No designer is perfect. Everyone makes mistakes. God knows I made a few howlers when I was one. But that is why the defences in depth (design reviews/configuration milestones) are mandated and I disagree with MoD's stated policy that they can be waived, at the whim of a non-engineer. It is a slightly different issue that he is also allowed to make a false declaration that they were held successfully, but I disagree with that as well. As always, I fully accept that many disagree with me, including the MAA and DE&S policy branch, but I'm glad you don't.
Thank you.
I have never criticised designers and, indeed, have supported them consistently in my many posts. If I caused confusion, I apologise. No designer is perfect. Everyone makes mistakes. God knows I made a few howlers when I was one. But that is why the defences in depth (design reviews/configuration milestones) are mandated and I disagree with MoD's stated policy that they can be waived, at the whim of a non-engineer. It is a slightly different issue that he is also allowed to make a false declaration that they were held successfully, but I disagree with that as well. As always, I fully accept that many disagree with me, including the MAA and DE&S policy branch, but I'm glad you don't.
The business of "review held successfully" is a murky one: a review can be held during which a number of issues arise, items are minuted and actions/problems raised. Been there, done that.
Technically though, in accordance with the letter of the wording, the milestone of 'holding the review' has been met and typically a milestone staged payment is duly claimed by the supplier/design organisation.
Sadly, the fact that there are multiple outstanding issues doesn't stand in the way, and unless there's a robust way to capture those outstanding issues and ensure resolution, then the rot sets in from that point onwards.
On a number of occasions, whilst drawing up fairly large yet detailed project plans/estimates, I have been told to alter my wording from "Design Review Carried Out Successfully" or "Design Review Completed", to "Design Review Carried Out".
The nuance is, from a commercial viewpoint, quite clear....
Esay Street
I think your excellent points are best answered or explained by the mandated regulation calling for continuous assessment (of safety). Also, the associated positive feedback loop, which eliminates the need to assume (in this case, receipt, or otherwise, of servicing bulletins).
How can we have continuous assessment if (a) funding is cut by 28% per year to conceal waste and, (b) posts are chopped as the cuts mean the staff cannot do their work and are sitting idle? (In January 1993, when we were told there would be no funding to maintain safety, we were advised to ship out and seek jobs elsewhere. 38 of us left, in my case returning to MoD(PE); only one stayed. That's a lot of experience to lose in one year, and have no means of replacing it. Not that the Chief Engineer wanted to).
Both Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip, plus every ART report I've read, mentions the failure to implement this policy in one way or another.
I think your excellent points are best answered or explained by the mandated regulation calling for continuous assessment (of safety). Also, the associated positive feedback loop, which eliminates the need to assume (in this case, receipt, or otherwise, of servicing bulletins).
How can we have continuous assessment if (a) funding is cut by 28% per year to conceal waste and, (b) posts are chopped as the cuts mean the staff cannot do their work and are sitting idle? (In January 1993, when we were told there would be no funding to maintain safety, we were advised to ship out and seek jobs elsewhere. 38 of us left, in my case returning to MoD(PE); only one stayed. That's a lot of experience to lose in one year, and have no means of replacing it. Not that the Chief Engineer wanted to).
Both Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip, plus every ART report I've read, mentions the failure to implement this policy in one way or another.
Zulu
I must admit I didn't think of myself as a "poor sod", I rather enjoyed the job! I had good teachers.
I agree with the issue of nuances. But when signing off the work (a delegation granted only to engineers, my complaint being non-engineers are now allowed to self-delegate) you are signing to say the work has been carried out in accordance with the contracted specification. The MoD engineer is, uniquely, allowed (required) to exercise engineering judgement and defer issues, but only in exceptional circumstances. A typical example would be interface parameters not yet established from a parallel development. But, the good book says;
A Critical Design Review (CDR) is defined as a review to determine if the detailed system design meets the performance and engineering requirements (including safety) of development specifications. During CDR, the MoD must ensure that all design areas are adequately examined, that design weaknesses are identified, and that solutions for design-related problems are available. The MoD must use the results of the CDR to assess the readiness of the system to progress to the next acquisition phase. The design reviews and associated testing of design features let the MoD review the complete system design and evaluate its capability to satisfy total mission requirements, safely. The CDR should be effective and not rely on later production efforts to resolve design deficiencies.
Ever so slightly ambiguous, but it needs to be to allow deferments. But what it doesn't allow is a false declaration that the design is safe, knowing it is not!
I must admit I didn't think of myself as a "poor sod", I rather enjoyed the job! I had good teachers.
I agree with the issue of nuances. But when signing off the work (a delegation granted only to engineers, my complaint being non-engineers are now allowed to self-delegate) you are signing to say the work has been carried out in accordance with the contracted specification. The MoD engineer is, uniquely, allowed (required) to exercise engineering judgement and defer issues, but only in exceptional circumstances. A typical example would be interface parameters not yet established from a parallel development. But, the good book says;
A Critical Design Review (CDR) is defined as a review to determine if the detailed system design meets the performance and engineering requirements (including safety) of development specifications. During CDR, the MoD must ensure that all design areas are adequately examined, that design weaknesses are identified, and that solutions for design-related problems are available. The MoD must use the results of the CDR to assess the readiness of the system to progress to the next acquisition phase. The design reviews and associated testing of design features let the MoD review the complete system design and evaluate its capability to satisfy total mission requirements, safely. The CDR should be effective and not rely on later production efforts to resolve design deficiencies.
Ever so slightly ambiguous, but it needs to be to allow deferments. But what it doesn't allow is a false declaration that the design is safe, knowing it is not!