"Do you realise how much it costs to raise a F760?"
Precisely. This very point, and supporting evidence, was submitted to both H-C and Lord Philip.
Briefly, this was a "saving at the expense of safety" (see Nimrod Review) thought necessary because in 1991 AMSO (the RAF Chief Engineer) had failed to correct the wasteful policy issued by his predecessors in June 1987 (formulation) and January 1988 (promulgation without discussion or warning).
All he had to do was rescind the policy, and was advised to do so by successive internal audits (e.g. EAC), but refused. Why? MoD won't say but the refusal protected his predecessors. The money had to be found from somewhere so he simply applied successive 28% cuts to direct airworthiness tasks, year on year. (Remember, Haddon-Cave criticised General Cowan for 4% cuts imposed upon him from above, but praised the instigator of 28% cuts). Don't take my word; it is noted in the August 1992 CHART report by Inspector of Flight Safety. That was withheld until obtained during the Mull of Kinttyre reveiw.
MF765s were stopped (which would be a confusing message to industry - MoD don't want tech pubs to be correct). EAs were under orders to save up MF760s, regardless of safety implications. Even if an EA broke the rules and submitted a 760A, funding had been entirely withdrawn for the investigation. This ethos extended across all 17 components of maintaining the build standard (of which MF65s is a small part of one). That maintained build standard is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case, and hence Release to Service.