Flt. Lt. Sean Cunningham inquest
What I do know is that the shackle link and the offending bolt are still present,
I can see where this is going! Has MoD claimed the two are unrelated as the seats are different?
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I can see where this is going! Has MoD claimed the two are unrelated as the seats are different?
The mod as a whole was advertised as improving low altitude performance
DV
DV,
I wasn't party to any of the work that underpinned this mod, but some interesting observations on platform out-of-service dates might go some way to explain how it came to be embodied on Tornado but not Hawk. The mod was introduced in the mid-2000s, so would have been staffed in the early 2000s, when Tornado OSD was still 2025. I don't know what the Hawk T1 OSD was meant to be back in the early 2000s, but I do know that it has been put back (I think as a combination of MFTS shenanigans, provision of international defence training, and undoubtedly with a nod towards RAFAT preservation) and now falls after Tornado OSD, which has been brought forward to 2019.
The following is all my postulation: perhaps the cost-benefit part of the ALARP calculation back in the early 2000s decided that the "long" remaining life of Tornado made it worthwhile to fit the mod, while there was insufficient benefit gained from the "short" remaining life of Hawk T1. And by the early 2010s, when the OSDs were changed, the Hawk still had insufficient life remaining to make embodiment worthwhile.
At any rate, that would be a procedurally-correct and justfiable reason for having 2 different mod states of seat. It's almost certain to be the case that, in reality, the Tornado and Hawk cap sponsors, PTs and operators were operating in totally separate 'pillars of excellence' and didn't notice what each other was doing...
I wasn't party to any of the work that underpinned this mod, but some interesting observations on platform out-of-service dates might go some way to explain how it came to be embodied on Tornado but not Hawk. The mod was introduced in the mid-2000s, so would have been staffed in the early 2000s, when Tornado OSD was still 2025. I don't know what the Hawk T1 OSD was meant to be back in the early 2000s, but I do know that it has been put back (I think as a combination of MFTS shenanigans, provision of international defence training, and undoubtedly with a nod towards RAFAT preservation) and now falls after Tornado OSD, which has been brought forward to 2019.
The following is all my postulation: perhaps the cost-benefit part of the ALARP calculation back in the early 2000s decided that the "long" remaining life of Tornado made it worthwhile to fit the mod, while there was insufficient benefit gained from the "short" remaining life of Hawk T1. And by the early 2010s, when the OSDs were changed, the Hawk still had insufficient life remaining to make embodiment worthwhile.
At any rate, that would be a procedurally-correct and justfiable reason for having 2 different mod states of seat. It's almost certain to be the case that, in reality, the Tornado and Hawk cap sponsors, PTs and operators were operating in totally separate 'pillars of excellence' and didn't notice what each other was doing...
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ES, I follow your logic re OSD of two platforms at the time the mod was proposed [The weight growth mod]. I may have missed something as I understood from the SI that a Safety Case [for the Hawk seat] did not exist. It is therefore a big assumption that anyone ever did any ALARP detriment calculations. I would wish to be wrong about this.
I am sure there will be an audit trail for the decisions recorded on the F714/715 Cost and brief Sheets we operated at the time.
I love the term "Pillars of Excellence" you introduced. unfortunately I saw all the pillars crumble and pleased to be away from it all these days!
I am sure there will be an audit trail for the decisions recorded on the F714/715 Cost and brief Sheets we operated at the time.
I love the term "Pillars of Excellence" you introduced. unfortunately I saw all the pillars crumble and pleased to be away from it all these days!
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" A modification that was embodied on Tornado seats only. Why?"
ISTR this was part of a package of several seat mods (known in some quarters as the "six pack") which were intended to address the problem of Tornado ejected mass growth over time. Part of the mass growth was due to hardware growth (including AEA) and part was due to aircrew mass growth – quite a few exceeded the 99%ile assumed during system design. The latter was partly managed by dietary means but not in all cases; some pilots were reassigned. A more modern 'chute was included to improve seat performance and the strops were strengthened. In the interim while the mods were cleared and embodied, a series of a/c speed limits were introduced to limit strop loads.
Its a long time ago so I couldn't guarantee all of the details.
Its a long time ago so I couldn't guarantee all of the details.
A big factor in the AEA mass growth was the persistent use of the Tornado on desert operations. At one point I think the standard load of water in the combat survival waistcoat grew to over 3 litres, with another 5 in the survival pack! Factor in pistol, ammo and PRC112 CSAR radio, and it's perhaps even clearer why Tornado would get a modified seat, but not the Hawk.
Even in peacetime, though, the AEA keeps getting heavier as redesigns increase the amount of fabric for fire-retardency purposes, because someone decided it would be a good idea to insist on RW and FJ crews all wearing similar kit (so the FJ kit has to meet RW fire escape criteria, even though this is not necessary with an ejection seat). Typhoon decided to ditch the UK standard flying kit a long time ago, and since then FJ AEA has not been done in a very integrated way... perhaps another symptom of the IPTs becoming PTs?
And a big factor in the aircrew mass growth was life at Bruggen. Especially on Fridays. Happy times...
Even in peacetime, though, the AEA keeps getting heavier as redesigns increase the amount of fabric for fire-retardency purposes, because someone decided it would be a good idea to insist on RW and FJ crews all wearing similar kit (so the FJ kit has to meet RW fire escape criteria, even though this is not necessary with an ejection seat). Typhoon decided to ditch the UK standard flying kit a long time ago, and since then FJ AEA has not been done in a very integrated way... perhaps another symptom of the IPTs becoming PTs?
And a big factor in the aircrew mass growth was life at Bruggen. Especially on Fridays. Happy times...
Last edited by Easy Street; 2nd Mar 2014 at 15:41.
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You can not get much lower than Flt Lt Cunningham's zero level ejection.
DV
DV
The Mk12 in the GR5/7 is an example:
Martin-Baker developed the Mk12 seat to provide a cost effective escape system with an improved low speed and adverse attitude recovery capability.
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Yes, but how is the gas shackle element of the modification programme related to the weight problem? This appears to be more about improving the release of the drogue chute from the seat, and deploying the main chute.
It is true, as Easy Street states, that the "offending" bolt and shackle remain and can be "wiggled", but they are no longer the point of release as they are with the scissor shackle. From the drawngs associated with SIL704 it seems that a lug is permanently attached to the drogue shackle by the bolt and the other end is attached to the gas piston assembly. This becomes the point of release.
On the face of it, it would appear that if Flt. Lt. Cunninghan's seat had been fiitted with a gas shackle, rather than a scissor shackle, he would have survived. Perhaps the SI team and the Coroner were encouraged to wear "Hawk" blinkers rather than the Mk10 modification programme as a whole.
DV
It is true, as Easy Street states, that the "offending" bolt and shackle remain and can be "wiggled", but they are no longer the point of release as they are with the scissor shackle. From the drawngs associated with SIL704 it seems that a lug is permanently attached to the drogue shackle by the bolt and the other end is attached to the gas piston assembly. This becomes the point of release.
On the face of it, it would appear that if Flt. Lt. Cunninghan's seat had been fiitted with a gas shackle, rather than a scissor shackle, he would have survived. Perhaps the SI team and the Coroner were encouraged to wear "Hawk" blinkers rather than the Mk10 modification programme as a whole.
DV
DV,
I don't think this is an RAF seat, but it looks similar enough to illustrate how the drogue shackle sits on a modified seat:
I see what you mean about the 'lug' not being affected by the tightness of the bolt - it doesn't appear to be a collar-type affair. I agree that it's difficult to see how the shackle might improve low altitude performance - about the best speculation I can offer is that it might have come as an essential part of the gas bladder improvement. Other than that, it would appear to be somewhat distinct from the boarding mass issue.
I don't think this is an RAF seat, but it looks similar enough to illustrate how the drogue shackle sits on a modified seat:
I see what you mean about the 'lug' not being affected by the tightness of the bolt - it doesn't appear to be a collar-type affair. I agree that it's difficult to see how the shackle might improve low altitude performance - about the best speculation I can offer is that it might have come as an essential part of the gas bladder improvement. Other than that, it would appear to be somewhat distinct from the boarding mass issue.
Last edited by Easy Street; 2nd Mar 2014 at 16:15.
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While the drogue is deployed, the drogue link carries its load, which is transmitted through the link into the plunger within the gas shackle, which is mounted to the seat structure.
DV
Am I alone in wondering if Distant Voice hasn't unearthed the real reason that the SPH triggering the inadvertent (but normal zero/zero) ejection was found to be the main cause of Sean Cunningham's death, rather than the drogue bolt jammed within the original scissor shackle jaws that actually sealed his fate?
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On 25th Feb, in a written answer to a question put by Angus Robertson, Mr Dunne stated;
This is a misleading statement and only applies to those Mk10 ejection seats fitted to Tornado aircraft. If all seats had been modified, which included the replacement of the scissor shackle with a gas shackle, then it is highly unlikely that Flt. Lt. Cunningham would have died. The "bolt" isssue is a red herring.
The real failure lies in MoD's inability to read across from one platform to another. I came across the same problem with hot air pipes in Nimrod. The same pipe "lagging" had caused a fire on a Tornado (ZA599, 17 May 02), but no one had told the Nimrod office; result 14 dead.
DV
the Mk10 ejection seat has been the subject of a mid-life upgrade programme, in the late 1990s, and an extensive modification programme from 2007 to 2010 that introduced many improvements. The Mk10 ejection seat in its current configuration is much improved as compared to 1996. As you are aware, further improvements are now being made as a result of the tragic accident to Flt Lt Sean Cunningham in November 2011.
The real failure lies in MoD's inability to read across from one platform to another. I came across the same problem with hot air pipes in Nimrod. The same pipe "lagging" had caused a fire on a Tornado (ZA599, 17 May 02), but no one had told the Nimrod office; result 14 dead.
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 3rd Mar 2014 at 09:53.
The real failure lies in MoD's inability to read across from one platform to another. I came across the same problem with hot air pipes in Nimrod. The same pipe "lagging" had caused a fire on a Tornado (ZA599, 17 May 02), but no one had told the Nimrod office; result 14 dead.
This systemic failure was notified within the Chief Engineer’s organisation (AMSO) in late 1992 when it was announced the necessary, mandated procedures would no longer be implemented, in order to save money. Shut down was in June 1993. No compensatory provision was made, and instead of a central authority existing to ensure such notifications were made, project offices were forcibly stove-piped.
In 1999 Director General Air Systems 2 was advised to order a fleet inspection of Tornado (in the first instance) because of this precise problem; this time on IFF. This was brought about by another project office and Boscombe Down discovering that the IFF office routinely failed to integrate warning systems, rendering aircraft vulnerable to friendly fire. They had stated “It works on the bench, so it’ll work in the aircraft”, thus at a stroke ignoring every principle of systems integration and functional safety. He (Fauset) refused, ruling it quite acceptable to knowingly deliver a functionally unsafe aircraft to the Services. The Chief of Defence Procurement (Walmsley) later upheld this ruling; which DE&S upheld no less than 3 times last year. In 2002 another 2 Star, XD5 (Porter), was similarly advised. He, too, refused.
In 2003 ZG710 was shot down, which the senior Reviewing Officer (Burridge) confirmed would have been avoided had the safety work been carried out. (It was actually cheaper to do it properly first time around. DGAS2 dug his heels in as to admit the aircraft was unsafe would have upset those who committed fraud).
All the above was presented to Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip.
We’ve been here before and the lessons are being ignored.
