RAF Rivet Joint
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: 180INS500
Posts: 137
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So how does this work then?
A number of USAF C-135B-04-BN, Boeing Model 717-166 were converted to RC-135M then RC-135W.
New build RC-135-01-BN, Boeing Model 739-445B subsequently became RC-135C, then RC-135V or U.
UK purchases KC-135A-27-BN, Boeing Model 717-148, subsequently converted to KC-135R, and now converted to RC-135W by L3.
For starters, how much does the difference in Boeing Model numbers contribute to lack of read-through evidence for UK certification? This is going to get interesting.....
SS
New build RC-135-01-BN, Boeing Model 739-445B subsequently became RC-135C, then RC-135V or U.
UK purchases KC-135A-27-BN, Boeing Model 717-148, subsequently converted to KC-135R, and now converted to RC-135W by L3.
For starters, how much does the difference in Boeing Model numbers contribute to lack of read-through evidence for UK certification? This is going to get interesting.....
SS
The picture I have in my head is of buying three custom build Cadillacs from GM ... except they were a prior model year.
Chug
CGB
This is the interesting bit of this thread. How do you explain "wriggle room" in regulations? Tuc already said it is a matter of engineering judgment and I know he's right. But if the MAA have to go to the secretary of state for Defence every time what does that mean? The Military Aviation Authority don't have the authority or don't have the judgment? Both?
The MAA? I suspect that they are about to realise just how peripheral they are in such matters...
CGB
It is my view that there has to be some 'wriggle room' within the airworthiness system.
This is the interesting bit of this thread. How do you explain "wriggle room" in regulations? Tuc already said it is a matter of engineering judgment and I know he's right. But if the MAA have to go to the secretary of state for Defence every time what does that mean? The Military Aviation Authority don't have the authority or don't have the judgment? Both?
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Hotel Gypsy
Posts: 2,821
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
dervish, to be honest I don't know. I do know that dogmatic application of overly restrictive regulation encourages people to find ways around regulation (Health & Safety, Tippex sniffing and sharp edges on sheets of A4 paper spring to mind). If the airworthiness rules, as they stand, are felt to be overly restrictive I can understand (not condone) people finding ways around them.
Of course, the problem arises in identifying things that do affect airworthiness against those that don't. I have come across engineers who have refused to sign-off aircraft because of the most minor divergence from the procedure (ie, seats have been recovered in the same leather as before but the audit trail is wrong). Clearly the only airworthiness issue here is that a specified paperwork process has not followed - there is nothing inherently unsafe in what has been done. Conversely, a poorly fitted fuel line which does not have an EASA Form 1 (or equivalent) is most definitely a very major issue.
I don't have an answer other than suggesting a root-and-branch review of airworthiness processes in line with guiding principles of ALARP and/or 'proportionate and risk based'. Perhaps a clearer or more expanded definition of the very word 'airworthiness' is a good starting point? We certainly cannot continue writing regulation and then flagrantly ignore it when we see fit.
Maybe Tuc is right with the 'engineering judgement' bit but this judgement has to be at the right level. Otherwise if every man with a spanner was allowed to exercise his engineering judgement we would quickly see divergence of standards and safety.
Of course, the problem arises in identifying things that do affect airworthiness against those that don't. I have come across engineers who have refused to sign-off aircraft because of the most minor divergence from the procedure (ie, seats have been recovered in the same leather as before but the audit trail is wrong). Clearly the only airworthiness issue here is that a specified paperwork process has not followed - there is nothing inherently unsafe in what has been done. Conversely, a poorly fitted fuel line which does not have an EASA Form 1 (or equivalent) is most definitely a very major issue.
I don't have an answer other than suggesting a root-and-branch review of airworthiness processes in line with guiding principles of ALARP and/or 'proportionate and risk based'. Perhaps a clearer or more expanded definition of the very word 'airworthiness' is a good starting point? We certainly cannot continue writing regulation and then flagrantly ignore it when we see fit.
Maybe Tuc is right with the 'engineering judgement' bit but this judgement has to be at the right level. Otherwise if every man with a spanner was allowed to exercise his engineering judgement we would quickly see divergence of standards and safety.
Last edited by Cows getting bigger; 29th Apr 2014 at 13:37.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: UK
Posts: 799
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
CGB and others,
I think that the point Tuc (and I) are making is that it's not the regulations, and it's not the 'processes'. They aren't great, but they are sufficient for the job of producing safe and airworthy combat aircraft.
The main problem is that the regulations and processes just aren't being followed. And not 'down in the weeds' (type of leather on seats), but right at the core of the system. Configuration control, management of modifications, maintaining proper records of decisions, requirements management, effective project management - you name it, I can guarantee that there are areas of the MoD that no longer even know how to carry out these basic tasks properly.
Why? Lots of reasons, in my view mainly dilution of technical expertise and over-reliance on project management as a substitute, coupled with an obsession at senior level with meeting schedules, not requirements.
Way forward? Rebuild a bit at a time. Give just one PT a chance to rebuild around a strong technical core with hand picked managers, watch them excel and then apply the lessons across the piece. Utopia, i know....
Best Regards
Engines
I think that the point Tuc (and I) are making is that it's not the regulations, and it's not the 'processes'. They aren't great, but they are sufficient for the job of producing safe and airworthy combat aircraft.
The main problem is that the regulations and processes just aren't being followed. And not 'down in the weeds' (type of leather on seats), but right at the core of the system. Configuration control, management of modifications, maintaining proper records of decisions, requirements management, effective project management - you name it, I can guarantee that there are areas of the MoD that no longer even know how to carry out these basic tasks properly.
Why? Lots of reasons, in my view mainly dilution of technical expertise and over-reliance on project management as a substitute, coupled with an obsession at senior level with meeting schedules, not requirements.
Way forward? Rebuild a bit at a time. Give just one PT a chance to rebuild around a strong technical core with hand picked managers, watch them excel and then apply the lessons across the piece. Utopia, i know....
Best Regards
Engines
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chugalog
You keep spouting off about airworthiness related fatal accidents.
I have knowledge of only one, the Seaking 7 crash.
I, and every single seaking pilot, will tell you that the HISLs did not cause or contribute to that accident, but you, and other non-pilots who frankly have no clue still use it to add to your statistics. That brings the rest into doubt for me.
We used to turn off the previous lights before HISLs were fitted because they also bounced distractingly off the water/clouds at low level.
It is in the very nature of light that it is bright and bounces off things.
What would you have them do?
Invent a light that does not light things up?
We are all trained to operate silent and dark anyway because in a real shooty war we would leave everything turned off fitted and airworthy or not!
It did not cause or contribute to that accident!!
You might as well say that an enormous 200ft thick bouncy shield would have stopped the fatalities so the aircraft was un-airworthy because they had not fitted it.
The 200ft bouncy shield does not exist and neither does the strobe which is not distracting at low level.
You keep spouting off about airworthiness related fatal accidents.
I have knowledge of only one, the Seaking 7 crash.
I, and every single seaking pilot, will tell you that the HISLs did not cause or contribute to that accident, but you, and other non-pilots who frankly have no clue still use it to add to your statistics. That brings the rest into doubt for me.
We used to turn off the previous lights before HISLs were fitted because they also bounced distractingly off the water/clouds at low level.
It is in the very nature of light that it is bright and bounces off things.
What would you have them do?
Invent a light that does not light things up?
We are all trained to operate silent and dark anyway because in a real shooty war we would leave everything turned off fitted and airworthy or not!
It did not cause or contribute to that accident!!
You might as well say that an enormous 200ft thick bouncy shield would have stopped the fatalities so the aircraft was un-airworthy because they had not fitted it.
The 200ft bouncy shield does not exist and neither does the strobe which is not distracting at low level.
Tourist, the point about the baggers HISLs is that they were not fitted IAW the Regulations (see engines post above about not following them) they were simply swapped for the anti-collision lights, without testing per the mandatory procedures. That automatically made the fit, and hence the aircraft, unairworthy. Surprise, surprise the forward ones were then found to cause excess glare under the conditions you describe and it became customary to switch them off. I am not saying whether that caused the mid-air between the i/b-o/b changeover, which seems to have been a classic Swiss Cheese affair anyway. Indeed the BoI carried out specific trials that discounted the HISLs as a possible cause.
What I do say is that it was an airworthiness related accident along with all the others listed. That is all we can say about them all, for they were all both regulated and investigated by the operator, ie the MOD and its subsidiary Services. That is the root problem here, if the regulation and the investigation were independent of the MOD and each other we would then know if the first had provided for an airworthy aircraft (it hadn't) and the second had revealed that (it didn't). We can all huff and puff about wriggle room and Service pride as much as we like. Quite frankly aviation doesn't give a damn and will kill given half a chance. Give it an unairworthy aircraft and its chances of doing so are then greatly increased.
What I do say is that it was an airworthiness related accident along with all the others listed. That is all we can say about them all, for they were all both regulated and investigated by the operator, ie the MOD and its subsidiary Services. That is the root problem here, if the regulation and the investigation were independent of the MOD and each other we would then know if the first had provided for an airworthy aircraft (it hadn't) and the second had revealed that (it didn't). We can all huff and puff about wriggle room and Service pride as much as we like. Quite frankly aviation doesn't give a damn and will kill given half a chance. Give it an unairworthy aircraft and its chances of doing so are then greatly increased.
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Hotel Gypsy
Posts: 2,821
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Engines, your post makes sense and you are obviously better placed to provide expert comment. For sure, rebuilding experience levels is a must but this will take a generation to achieve. I find myself asking why did the hierarchy choose to circumvent process? Were there operational/budgetary imperatives? Were the VSOs naive/ignorant? Had the rot already set in? This clearly takes us back to Haddon Cave who threw the pebble (or should I say hand grenade?) in the pond. Do we just ensure a return to compliance with the process(es) or also take the opportunity to ensure that the regulations are wholly fit for purpose?
Chug, we crossed posts. Take my favourite example of a Red Cross on a helicopter. By definition, that aircraft was unairworthy - we had implemented a modification without proper approval. Did that particular unairworthiness 'greatly increase' the chances of the aircraft killing me and some others?
Chug, we crossed posts. Take my favourite example of a Red Cross on a helicopter. By definition, that aircraft was unairworthy - we had implemented a modification without proper approval. Did that particular unairworthiness 'greatly increase' the chances of the aircraft killing me and some others?
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chugalug
"Surprise, surprise the forward ones were then found to cause excess glare under the conditions you describe "
No, you are not listening.
It had always been the case that we had turned off the previous flashing lights!
It was not a new phenomena!
The old flashing lights flashed and the new flashing lights flashed. Both were routinely switched off at low level.
To say that the crash was airworthiness related is totally misguided at best and dishonest at worst.
If one of the crew was wearing a t-shirt rather than an aircrew sweater, then that would also by your definition make it un-airworthy, but it does not make it crash.
Indeed as you say the BOI discounted it as a factor so stop citing it as an airworthiness related accident.
"Surprise, surprise the forward ones were then found to cause excess glare under the conditions you describe "
No, you are not listening.
It had always been the case that we had turned off the previous flashing lights!
It was not a new phenomena!
The old flashing lights flashed and the new flashing lights flashed. Both were routinely switched off at low level.
To say that the crash was airworthiness related is totally misguided at best and dishonest at worst.
If one of the crew was wearing a t-shirt rather than an aircrew sweater, then that would also by your definition make it un-airworthy, but it does not make it crash.
Indeed as you say the BOI discounted it as a factor so stop citing it as an airworthiness related accident.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: UK
Posts: 799
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Guys,
Perhaps I can help defuse the temperature a bit. Lion's den and all that, but I think it's worth a go.
Aircraft crash for all sorts of reasons. Fact. In almost all cases, there's what used to be called a 'chain of events' (these days it's the 'holes in the cheese lining up') that leas to the eventual accident/incident. In a lot of accidents, there's an airworthiness 'link' or 'hole' somewhere. It may, or may not, have been the 'primary' cause of the accident, or it may have been a 'contributory'. It might not have even been in the chain.
It's clearly over-egging the case to state that EVERY accident where an airworthiness angle was present was therefore an 'airworthiness related' event.
However, it's the job of us engineers to ensure that when a military aircraft enters the operational world (at the 700 desk) , it's as free as practicable (choosing my words carefully here) from potential airworthiness 'links'. Where the skill (and training, and experience) comes in is recognising potential airworthiness issues and using the proven systems to remove them.
But remember that engineers are military personnel as well, and should be committed to fighting the war as hard as they damn well can. That means making aircraft available to the aircrew to go and do the stuff. With my background, where the engineers and aircrew (and everyone else) was floating around on a large war canoe in harm's way, the engineers were accorded the same level of respect and regard that they accorded the aircrew. Lots, usually. I could never have done their job. They could never have done mine. Together, as a team, we kicked serious ass in the name of HM Queen. And all of our squadron came back, thank the Good Lord.
So, my job was, and remained for some time, to get aircrew into the air as often as possible, as safely as possible. That meant judgement calls all the time. Later on, the job remains the same but in the environs of the MoD. Your job as a project engineer is to focus like a killing laser on delivering military capability as safely as possible. Identify the big issues and hound them mercilessly until they fall at your feet screaming for mercy. Then kill them. Then find the next one and kill that. Sounds aggressive? Meant to be. Our aircrew deserve nothing less.
'Nit Picking' is usually the last refuge of the truly incompetent engineer who has too much experience (in one area) and not enough learning. They are best countered by strong and technically aware managers.
I suppose what I'm saying is that taking any argument to extremes usually leads in stalemate or worse, name calling. Even worse, it can obscure the issues. What guys like Tuc and Chug are flagging up is that the system in the UK MoD is failing to deliver the correct level of airworthiness (safety) to the aircrew. it's doing that by not observing its own systems and processes. (Example - Read the recent Hawk SI and see how the BoI had to admit that they couldn't find records of meetings at which airworthiness decisions were made). Why? Tons of reasons, main ones (I think) are lack of technical training and experience and application of 'schedule fear' forcing people into short cuts.
I hope this little rant helps - we are all trying to fight the same battle, I think.
Best Regards as ever to absolutely everyone
Engines
Perhaps I can help defuse the temperature a bit. Lion's den and all that, but I think it's worth a go.
Aircraft crash for all sorts of reasons. Fact. In almost all cases, there's what used to be called a 'chain of events' (these days it's the 'holes in the cheese lining up') that leas to the eventual accident/incident. In a lot of accidents, there's an airworthiness 'link' or 'hole' somewhere. It may, or may not, have been the 'primary' cause of the accident, or it may have been a 'contributory'. It might not have even been in the chain.
It's clearly over-egging the case to state that EVERY accident where an airworthiness angle was present was therefore an 'airworthiness related' event.
However, it's the job of us engineers to ensure that when a military aircraft enters the operational world (at the 700 desk) , it's as free as practicable (choosing my words carefully here) from potential airworthiness 'links'. Where the skill (and training, and experience) comes in is recognising potential airworthiness issues and using the proven systems to remove them.
But remember that engineers are military personnel as well, and should be committed to fighting the war as hard as they damn well can. That means making aircraft available to the aircrew to go and do the stuff. With my background, where the engineers and aircrew (and everyone else) was floating around on a large war canoe in harm's way, the engineers were accorded the same level of respect and regard that they accorded the aircrew. Lots, usually. I could never have done their job. They could never have done mine. Together, as a team, we kicked serious ass in the name of HM Queen. And all of our squadron came back, thank the Good Lord.
So, my job was, and remained for some time, to get aircrew into the air as often as possible, as safely as possible. That meant judgement calls all the time. Later on, the job remains the same but in the environs of the MoD. Your job as a project engineer is to focus like a killing laser on delivering military capability as safely as possible. Identify the big issues and hound them mercilessly until they fall at your feet screaming for mercy. Then kill them. Then find the next one and kill that. Sounds aggressive? Meant to be. Our aircrew deserve nothing less.
'Nit Picking' is usually the last refuge of the truly incompetent engineer who has too much experience (in one area) and not enough learning. They are best countered by strong and technically aware managers.
I suppose what I'm saying is that taking any argument to extremes usually leads in stalemate or worse, name calling. Even worse, it can obscure the issues. What guys like Tuc and Chug are flagging up is that the system in the UK MoD is failing to deliver the correct level of airworthiness (safety) to the aircrew. it's doing that by not observing its own systems and processes. (Example - Read the recent Hawk SI and see how the BoI had to admit that they couldn't find records of meetings at which airworthiness decisions were made). Why? Tons of reasons, main ones (I think) are lack of technical training and experience and application of 'schedule fear' forcing people into short cuts.
I hope this little rant helps - we are all trying to fight the same battle, I think.
Best Regards as ever to absolutely everyone
Engines
Tourist, what you did or didn't do with or without the 'previous flashing lights' (Anti-Collision ones?), which I have no reason to believe were not airworthy, is between you and your SOPs. I'm talking about the 'later Flashing Lights' (High Intensity Strobe Lights) which are far more intense, as their name implies. You can't simply swap them over like changing a light bulb, the new fit requires trials not only because of the potential for blinding the crew, which is obviously greatly enhanced, but also because of the internal potential to induce unwanted radiation interference with the electronics fit. That's not my idea, that is the mandated requirement of the Regulations, in order that the modification works safely. As this was a UK Military mod the Regulations were ignored of course and the aircraft was made unairworthy. That's not my idea, it is a direct result of the Regulations being thus suborned.
The problem is not with the Regulations, which as engines says are perfectly adequate for the job. The problem is people. People who give illegal orders to suborn the Regulations. People who discard the Regulations, lest they be quoted. People who cover up the suborning. People who subvert Accident Investigations so that the suborning remains covered up. People who hound qualified and experienced engineers out of the airworthiness posts and replace them with unqualified and inexperienced non-engineers so that the suborning continues. Those people shared one thing in common, they were all VSOs. They have now reduced UK Military Aviation to the point where it cannot go out and order a new aircraft without getting it spectacularly wrong, hence this thread.
As to not calling the Sea Kings mid-air Airworthiness Related, I'm afraid it was and I'll go on calling it that unless and until the BoI is recalled to consider new evidence (ie new evidence, not new evidence that the MOD says is not new). That BoI/SI should be convened by a truly independent MAAIB. Unacceptable? Then I go on calling it airworthiness related (not 'caused' though, until so found by the SI).
Ridiculing airworthiness says more about your mindset than mine, you can't pick and choose which Regs you will comply with and which not. Anyway, are aircrew sweaters subject to an airworthiness process? They may well be approved aircrew wear rather than non-approved t-shirts, but airworthy?
Cgb likewise, why is a Red Cross painted on the side of a helicopter a cause of unairworthiness? I'm afraid that playing the 'HSE' card, or having it played upon you, isn't what this is about. I'm not a jobsworth, I simply want UK Military Aircraft to be airworthy so that they can serve our purpose and not that of our enemies. That requires an independent military airworthiness authority, something that the Military Aviation Authority is not.
The problem is not with the Regulations, which as engines says are perfectly adequate for the job. The problem is people. People who give illegal orders to suborn the Regulations. People who discard the Regulations, lest they be quoted. People who cover up the suborning. People who subvert Accident Investigations so that the suborning remains covered up. People who hound qualified and experienced engineers out of the airworthiness posts and replace them with unqualified and inexperienced non-engineers so that the suborning continues. Those people shared one thing in common, they were all VSOs. They have now reduced UK Military Aviation to the point where it cannot go out and order a new aircraft without getting it spectacularly wrong, hence this thread.
As to not calling the Sea Kings mid-air Airworthiness Related, I'm afraid it was and I'll go on calling it that unless and until the BoI is recalled to consider new evidence (ie new evidence, not new evidence that the MOD says is not new). That BoI/SI should be convened by a truly independent MAAIB. Unacceptable? Then I go on calling it airworthiness related (not 'caused' though, until so found by the SI).
Ridiculing airworthiness says more about your mindset than mine, you can't pick and choose which Regs you will comply with and which not. Anyway, are aircrew sweaters subject to an airworthiness process? They may well be approved aircrew wear rather than non-approved t-shirts, but airworthy?
Cgb likewise, why is a Red Cross painted on the side of a helicopter a cause of unairworthiness? I'm afraid that playing the 'HSE' card, or having it played upon you, isn't what this is about. I'm not a jobsworth, I simply want UK Military Aircraft to be airworthy so that they can serve our purpose and not that of our enemies. That requires an independent military airworthiness authority, something that the Military Aviation Authority is not.
Deliverance, thank you for the encouragement. You are right, there never was a Golden Age (certainly Haddon Cave's Golden Period of airworthiness is utter bunk!) and there never will be. All I can promise is an independent MAA that will be resented, just as its civilian sister is, and an MAAIB that will be the subject of moaning for the time it takes to publish Accident Reports. It was ever thus and shall be evermore. What I can say is that, were they to be independent of the MOD and of each other, then we can expect UK Military Aviation to reclaim the airworthiness that it once possessed, together with unbiased , objective, and comprehensive Air Accident Investigations that will not be afraid to point the finger at the Airworthiness Authority should it be called for.
I know that many BoI Presidents have not flinched from that in the past (and a word of apology here to the ASaCs President, who did indeed find the aircraft to be unairworthy, mea culpa!), but on the whole the investigation of the operator by the operator is prone to error to say the least (Mull as always being the prime example).
Airworthiness is not a preoccupation at squadron level, it certainly wasn't at mine. It is enough to fill your mind with SOPs, FOBs, ASIs, Pilots Notes, Tech Pubs, F700s etc etc. You assume that airworthiness is a given, summed up by Anthony Alowishus Hancock as he cheerily transmits, "Going well, tell the designer chappie!". It is a terrible indictment of those who set out to destroy it, that they also destroyed that trust and confidence in the back-room boys (and girls!). All that has to be repaired and trust regained. It is going to be a long hard road to regain all that has been lost. Time is of the essence because it has cost too many lives already. Time to put things right by admitting the past, prosecuting the transgressors, and freeing the MAA and MAAIB from the MOD and from each other.
I know that many BoI Presidents have not flinched from that in the past (and a word of apology here to the ASaCs President, who did indeed find the aircraft to be unairworthy, mea culpa!), but on the whole the investigation of the operator by the operator is prone to error to say the least (Mull as always being the prime example).
Airworthiness is not a preoccupation at squadron level, it certainly wasn't at mine. It is enough to fill your mind with SOPs, FOBs, ASIs, Pilots Notes, Tech Pubs, F700s etc etc. You assume that airworthiness is a given, summed up by Anthony Alowishus Hancock as he cheerily transmits, "Going well, tell the designer chappie!". It is a terrible indictment of those who set out to destroy it, that they also destroyed that trust and confidence in the back-room boys (and girls!). All that has to be repaired and trust regained. It is going to be a long hard road to regain all that has been lost. Time is of the essence because it has cost too many lives already. Time to put things right by admitting the past, prosecuting the transgressors, and freeing the MAA and MAAIB from the MOD and from each other.
The question isn't about people who do their jobs properly and implement process, but those who don't. Managed properly, very few of us should be aware of this detailed stuff that goes on in the background. We should just get a safe aircraft without any fuss.
The Nimrod case exposed that this background stuff wasn't being done and brought it to the the fore. We should be worrying about those who think it is unnecessary.
The Nimrod case exposed that this background stuff wasn't being done and brought it to the the fore. We should be worrying about those who think it is unnecessary.
And I have no problem with any of this process, but the moment it is suggested that a fleet should be grounded, in toto, to allow the paperwork to catch up is the moment that airworthiness killed OC. Moreover, if the process demonstrates that an aircraft is not "airworthy", I still think it should be retained in service.
Alfred,
Airworthy is not a hard-edged condition. That's why the SofS defines airworthiness as a probability. Tuc has posted the full definition up thread. The existence of that probability is why Engines, Tuc, Chug and others all insist experience and technical knowledge is essential to make the judgement that the probability has been reduced sufficiently to meet the definition. Anyone with the competence to make the decision will want evidence as a basis.
BUT, until someone has ploughed through the paperwork trail the decision maker does no know what evidence there is to form the basis for a decision. If there is no evidence, or not enough evidence, the aircraft is not airworthy and should not be flying in peacetime. It's not just about OC or aircrew or engineers or other Service people's lives - it's about schools and hospitals and football crowds not receiving several tons of metal at high speed. It's also about integrity- being able to believe that the weapon system you are handed as safe actually is safe to go and practice with.
Retaining an aircraft in service with a known airworthiness problem can be done Sometimes, often even, the problem can be lived with, by adjustment of what the aircrew and engineers do with the aircraft so that the risk is acceptable. This has been done on many occasions, often as soon as an AAIB/RNAAIU investigation has revealed a potential problem.
Sometimes it can't . In the latter case grounding is the only option. The classic example was the Buccaneer. A spar failed. The airworthiness problem was that the spar design was not suited to the way the aircraft was being used and the ongoing test programme was based on the wrong things. The aircraft was grounded, the spars were fixed and the test programme was fixed.
N
Airworthy is not a hard-edged condition. That's why the SofS defines airworthiness as a probability. Tuc has posted the full definition up thread. The existence of that probability is why Engines, Tuc, Chug and others all insist experience and technical knowledge is essential to make the judgement that the probability has been reduced sufficiently to meet the definition. Anyone with the competence to make the decision will want evidence as a basis.
BUT, until someone has ploughed through the paperwork trail the decision maker does no know what evidence there is to form the basis for a decision. If there is no evidence, or not enough evidence, the aircraft is not airworthy and should not be flying in peacetime. It's not just about OC or aircrew or engineers or other Service people's lives - it's about schools and hospitals and football crowds not receiving several tons of metal at high speed. It's also about integrity- being able to believe that the weapon system you are handed as safe actually is safe to go and practice with.
Retaining an aircraft in service with a known airworthiness problem can be done Sometimes, often even, the problem can be lived with, by adjustment of what the aircrew and engineers do with the aircraft so that the risk is acceptable. This has been done on many occasions, often as soon as an AAIB/RNAAIU investigation has revealed a potential problem.
Sometimes it can't . In the latter case grounding is the only option. The classic example was the Buccaneer. A spar failed. The airworthiness problem was that the spar design was not suited to the way the aircraft was being used and the ongoing test programme was based on the wrong things. The aircraft was grounded, the spars were fixed and the test programme was fixed.
N
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Bengo
"Retaining an aircraft in service with a known airworthiness problem can be done Sometimes, often even, the problem can be lived with, by adjustment of what the aircrew and engineers do with the aircraft so that the risk is acceptable. This has been done on many occasions, often as soon as an AAIB/RNAAIU investigation has revealed a potential problem. "
That is the problem.
The adjustment causes a loss of capability, otherwise we would have been doing it in the first case!
How about we take a big picture look at the problem, and in some instances just say "the risk is large but the gain is worth it, carry on"
The problem is that though that is the right decision in some cases, the current system will send the officer who had the balls to sign it off to jail when the inevitable accident occurs, thus no sane man including me would sign it.
As an officer in the military it is not unacceptable to send men to their deaths in the interest of the bigger picture. ie winning the war.
99% of winning the war is done in peacetime training.
All Army officers know it. The projected losses of a Para assault or a feint etc are horrifying.
All Navy Officers know it. An engine compartment fire re-entry or damage control in the lower decks is not going to be pretty. For some reason it doesn't apply to aviation though.
"Retaining an aircraft in service with a known airworthiness problem can be done Sometimes, often even, the problem can be lived with, by adjustment of what the aircrew and engineers do with the aircraft so that the risk is acceptable. This has been done on many occasions, often as soon as an AAIB/RNAAIU investigation has revealed a potential problem. "
That is the problem.
The adjustment causes a loss of capability, otherwise we would have been doing it in the first case!
How about we take a big picture look at the problem, and in some instances just say "the risk is large but the gain is worth it, carry on"
The problem is that though that is the right decision in some cases, the current system will send the officer who had the balls to sign it off to jail when the inevitable accident occurs, thus no sane man including me would sign it.
As an officer in the military it is not unacceptable to send men to their deaths in the interest of the bigger picture. ie winning the war.
99% of winning the war is done in peacetime training.
All Army officers know it. The projected losses of a Para assault or a feint etc are horrifying.
All Navy Officers know it. An engine compartment fire re-entry or damage control in the lower decks is not going to be pretty. For some reason it doesn't apply to aviation though.
Indeed, the single skin of every warship places it in immense danger everytime it goes to sea. Hell, we conduct RAS at distances of 30ft for hours at a time between 30,000 tonnes of ships: that certainly wouldn't pass an airworthiness test. I am willing to bet my entire career that the steering systems involved don't have a safety chain that the aviation system seems to be demand.
Whilst this should not be a race to the bottom, there are distinctly different levels of "practicable" involved - one involves massive effort for the final 1 or 2%, the other is much more comfortable with the 20 - 80% solution. Unfortunately, the former has taken over as the default process, hence the horrific loads being carried by the infantry in HERRICK, which has probably contributed to the tactical loss on the ground.
Whilst this should not be a race to the bottom, there are distinctly different levels of "practicable" involved - one involves massive effort for the final 1 or 2%, the other is much more comfortable with the 20 - 80% solution. Unfortunately, the former has taken over as the default process, hence the horrific loads being carried by the infantry in HERRICK, which has probably contributed to the tactical loss on the ground.
Tourist,
The simple answer to why we do is it that our political masters demand it. They do that because the risk from military aviation is wider than just to the aircraft and those in it. Ministers don't want an accident which involves lots of civilians. Have one, and as a soon as the cause is attributed to airworthiness failure, then the aircraft fleet involved will at least be grounded.
If we were prepared to fly exclusively on isolated ranges with no-one else there and no risk of interaction with civilian air traffic then I expect the airworthiness bar would be a lot lower. The systems airworthiness requirements for RPAS/UAS/'drones' and the limits placed on their operation are an example of this.
In a RAS (and I've been there for several) it's a handful of warships and an RFA in the middle of the 'oggin practising an activity that has been provided for under the Colregs. When it all goes pear shaped, as it has several times, there is no-one involved apart from those doing it. Ships are required to be seaworthy and someone has to sign to say they are. The systems involved in ships are subject to a process similar, but not so stringent, as airworthiness in design, construction and upkeep. It's not so stringent because the risks to all involved are a lot lower. Sometimes this goes wrong too -Upholder anyone?
I agree that it is necessary sometimes to have people die in order to win the battles and the war, or even in peacetime to preserve the lives of the rest of the ship's company. It helps if you have not killed too many of them with faulty equipment beforehand. That's what airworthiness is about.
Albert,
RAS is not that much different from flying a couple of large a/c similar distances apart for flight re-fuelling. That was done regularly and at night too, albeit usually not with the towline above populated areas I expect. The RAF only stopped because the large aircraft with capability as receivers went out of service. I expect it was at least as safe as a RAS though the consequences of failure were probably greater for those involved
N
The simple answer to why we do is it that our political masters demand it. They do that because the risk from military aviation is wider than just to the aircraft and those in it. Ministers don't want an accident which involves lots of civilians. Have one, and as a soon as the cause is attributed to airworthiness failure, then the aircraft fleet involved will at least be grounded.
If we were prepared to fly exclusively on isolated ranges with no-one else there and no risk of interaction with civilian air traffic then I expect the airworthiness bar would be a lot lower. The systems airworthiness requirements for RPAS/UAS/'drones' and the limits placed on their operation are an example of this.
In a RAS (and I've been there for several) it's a handful of warships and an RFA in the middle of the 'oggin practising an activity that has been provided for under the Colregs. When it all goes pear shaped, as it has several times, there is no-one involved apart from those doing it. Ships are required to be seaworthy and someone has to sign to say they are. The systems involved in ships are subject to a process similar, but not so stringent, as airworthiness in design, construction and upkeep. It's not so stringent because the risks to all involved are a lot lower. Sometimes this goes wrong too -Upholder anyone?
I agree that it is necessary sometimes to have people die in order to win the battles and the war, or even in peacetime to preserve the lives of the rest of the ship's company. It helps if you have not killed too many of them with faulty equipment beforehand. That's what airworthiness is about.
Albert,
RAS is not that much different from flying a couple of large a/c similar distances apart for flight re-fuelling. That was done regularly and at night too, albeit usually not with the towline above populated areas I expect. The RAF only stopped because the large aircraft with capability as receivers went out of service. I expect it was at least as safe as a RAS though the consequences of failure were probably greater for those involved
N
hmm, if your RAS (at what 10knots or so?) goes wrong - 2 big ships collide in the middle of an empty bit of ocean (I would hope it is done in waters clear of other vessels..) However, 1 Typhoon AAR-ing with a tanker at a slightly faster speed 
- if that goes wrong - who knows where the wreckage will end up and who/what may be under it. Risk includes a look at the effects of an unwanted event...
edited to add - snap! with Bengo (wot he said!)
- if that goes wrong - who knows where the wreckage will end up and who/what may be under it. Risk includes a look at the effects of an unwanted event...edited to add - snap! with Bengo (wot he said!)