RAF Rivet Joint
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Harry you ask;
I believe that the safety case must include an a assessment of all known and potential hazards, all of which should be managed to ALARP. Potential hazards are identified through experience and brainstorming. Just because it hasn't happened does not mean it will not happen. A fire in Dry Bay No 7 of XV230 had not happened in 35 years of Nimrod flying but it did on 2nd Sept 2006. The coroner's verdict was that the aircraft had never been airworthy.
DV
Does the Safety Case have to examine every possible issue and put a risk on it??
And how do we risk the "known unknowns"??
And how do we risk the "known unknowns"??
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 22nd Apr 2014 at 17:53. Reason: Additional information
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I read C pants $3 book. The incidents he refers to were all in the 2000 era long after Rivet Amber.
I do have some sympathy for his plight but I don't think I would have gone about it that way.
I do not believe for one minute that the conditions he describes will prevail on our 3 aircraft.
the summary he makes at the end of his book, having been allowed back into the hangar, suggest that corrective actions are in place.
Keep raising the F765s, F760s and all the ASIMs (or what ever they call them now)
I do have some sympathy for his plight but I don't think I would have gone about it that way.
I do not believe for one minute that the conditions he describes will prevail on our 3 aircraft.
the summary he makes at the end of his book, having been allowed back into the hangar, suggest that corrective actions are in place.
Keep raising the F765s, F760s and all the ASIMs (or what ever they call them now)
The coroner's verdict was that the aircraft had never been airworthy.
Lonewolf
With over 2000 hrs on type and a friend on 230, so would I. 
Just for pedantry the MR1/MR2 combo made 40 years of service.
With 35 years of successful operations, I'd call that assessment risible on the basis of that one incident.
Just for pedantry the MR1/MR2 combo made 40 years of service.
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Lonewolf and RP
I am afraid you like many others confuse serviceability with airworthiness. On the day of XV230's accident the aircraft was serviceable, it just wasn't airworthy. Whilst MoD did not agree with the coroner's findings, initially, the aircraft was "prematurely" withdrawn from service less than two years later, despite an extensive replacement programme of fuel and hot air pipe couplings.
DV
I am afraid you like many others confuse serviceability with airworthiness. On the day of XV230's accident the aircraft was serviceable, it just wasn't airworthy. Whilst MoD did not agree with the coroner's findings, initially, the aircraft was "prematurely" withdrawn from service less than two years later, despite an extensive replacement programme of fuel and hot air pipe couplings.
DV
DV,
Agreed but I thought this was purely as a cost saving measure rather than any aircraft safety issues being a factor.
the aircraft was "prematurely" withdrawn from service
it just wasn't airworthy
The MR2 was taken early, as a savings measure, by the previous government. Most of the people I know who were flying the aircraft at the end were not concerned about the airworthiness and would have been happy to continue flying the jet.
RP:-
Were the events not 'foreseen' by the Airworthiness Regulations? Did they not forbid the passing of fuel lines joined by couplings through a dry bay that included a source of ignition? Wasn't that the situation with XV230? Wasn't it therefore unairworthy? So how was the coroner being disingenuous?
Pot calling kettle black?
A combination of unforseen events may, or may not, have caused the accident.
Pot calling kettle black?
Did they not forbid the passing of fuel lines joined by couplings through a dry bay that included a source of ignition?
You will have to forgive me but I do not have a copy of the accident report to hand, but my (somewhat faded) memory seems to remember the fuel came from elsewhere leaking into the dry bay not from any couplings within the dry bay. Am I wrong? I thought the fuel came from one of the centre tanks. Back to you.
As to airworthiness regulations, when were they written; before or after the aircraft was designed and built?
Last edited by Roland Pulfrew; 23rd Apr 2014 at 12:13. Reason: Edited to add: sorry for turning this topic into a Nimrod debate!
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"What was deemed safe engineering practice in the 1960s or even the 1980s might not be deemed safe today"
And getting back to the RJ isn't this the problem being faced today. Even ignoring all the excellent points being made about build standard, eng records, availability of documentation etc.
Is an aircraft designed tested and built to standards of the 60s/70s/80s (even if we assume that it was tested to, and fully met these standards) acceptably safe to bring into the inventory?
And getting back to the RJ isn't this the problem being faced today. Even ignoring all the excellent points being made about build standard, eng records, availability of documentation etc.
Is an aircraft designed tested and built to standards of the 60s/70s/80s (even if we assume that it was tested to, and fully met these standards) acceptably safe to bring into the inventory?
RP, I'm not arguing about what was the cause of the tragic loss of 230 and its 14 occupants. Like other UK Military Air Accidents it is compromised by being investigated to all intents and purposes by the operator. The freeing of the MAAIB from the MOD is as vital to UK Military Air Safety as is that of the MAA being similarly free, and just as important is that they be freed of each other.
The point about the dry bay plumbing is that it was contrary to the Airworthiness Regulations and known to be. As with similar 'anomalies', they were suborned by the UK Military Airworthiness Regulator, aka the MOD, aka the Operator. This Forum is littered with UK Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents where the cause of the accident is disputed. So be it, for they were all investigated by the operator anyway. The point is that whatever the causes they were all unairworthy, and an Air Force riddled with unairworthy aircraft faces a bleak future, especially if it has to go to war with one that has respected and sustained its airworthiness.
In this country it took a 700 year old institution to tell its Air Force, not yet 100 years old, that 'there is something wrong with its bloody aircraft'. High time it took note instead of sneering at such warnings.
The point about the dry bay plumbing is that it was contrary to the Airworthiness Regulations and known to be. As with similar 'anomalies', they were suborned by the UK Military Airworthiness Regulator, aka the MOD, aka the Operator. This Forum is littered with UK Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents where the cause of the accident is disputed. So be it, for they were all investigated by the operator anyway. The point is that whatever the causes they were all unairworthy, and an Air Force riddled with unairworthy aircraft faces a bleak future, especially if it has to go to war with one that has respected and sustained its airworthiness.
In this country it took a 700 year old institution to tell its Air Force, not yet 100 years old, that 'there is something wrong with its bloody aircraft'. High time it took note instead of sneering at such warnings.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 23rd Apr 2014 at 13:11.
Regardless of personal opinion, the irrefutable facts are;
1. MoD (specifically, Alcock, Graydon and Bagnall) were advised by the RAF's Inspector of Flight Safety that Nimrod (and other types) were not airworthy. The specific failings with regard to fuel systems were advised in 1996 by DRA. The systemic failings were first reported in detail in January 1988 by civilian staffs, and in general terms by RAF engineers in 1985. These notifications were supported in reports by Director Internal Audit, Equipment Accounting Centre, Man(S)Org and others; the DIA one submitted direct to PUS in June 1996.
2. All were ignored.
3. More detailed evidence, expanding upon all of the above, was submitted to both the XV230 Coroner and Haddon-Cave.
4. Both agreed with IFS and the later submissions (although neither was told about IFS's evidence in any great detail, as MoD withheld it. It was made available in detail to Lord Philip, who accepted it in full. Not that he had much choice!).
5. Government accepted the findings and established the Military Aviation Authority (not the Nimrod Aviation Authority, thereby accepting that the failings were systemic).
Much is made in the press of Rivet Joint not meeting "new" regulations. It doesn't meet the old ones either, an inconvenient fact bodyswerved by the MAA. It has NEVER been deemed safe for an aircraft not to be under configuration control and have an invalid safety case or safety argument. The press can be forgiven for not understanding this, but MoD/MAA are being highly disingenuous.
Like most, I eagerly await Philip Hammond's decision. Does he refuse to issue a waiver and face castigation because his department has made the same mistake yet again. Or does he sign, and drive a bus through Haddon-Cave and, effectively, negate the need for the MAA. Think about that last one. The MAA has, effectively, recommended to Hammond that they need not exist.
If he signs, he is sending out a powerful message. Mandated Airworthiness regulations are optional. That is, we're back to square one, as this is what his predecessors ruled so many times in the past, killing so many in the process.
1. MoD (specifically, Alcock, Graydon and Bagnall) were advised by the RAF's Inspector of Flight Safety that Nimrod (and other types) were not airworthy. The specific failings with regard to fuel systems were advised in 1996 by DRA. The systemic failings were first reported in detail in January 1988 by civilian staffs, and in general terms by RAF engineers in 1985. These notifications were supported in reports by Director Internal Audit, Equipment Accounting Centre, Man(S)Org and others; the DIA one submitted direct to PUS in June 1996.
2. All were ignored.
3. More detailed evidence, expanding upon all of the above, was submitted to both the XV230 Coroner and Haddon-Cave.
4. Both agreed with IFS and the later submissions (although neither was told about IFS's evidence in any great detail, as MoD withheld it. It was made available in detail to Lord Philip, who accepted it in full. Not that he had much choice!).
5. Government accepted the findings and established the Military Aviation Authority (not the Nimrod Aviation Authority, thereby accepting that the failings were systemic).
"What was deemed safe engineering practice in the 1960s or even the 1980s might not be deemed safe today"
Much is made in the press of Rivet Joint not meeting "new" regulations. It doesn't meet the old ones either, an inconvenient fact bodyswerved by the MAA. It has NEVER been deemed safe for an aircraft not to be under configuration control and have an invalid safety case or safety argument. The press can be forgiven for not understanding this, but MoD/MAA are being highly disingenuous.
Like most, I eagerly await Philip Hammond's decision. Does he refuse to issue a waiver and face castigation because his department has made the same mistake yet again. Or does he sign, and drive a bus through Haddon-Cave and, effectively, negate the need for the MAA. Think about that last one. The MAA has, effectively, recommended to Hammond that they need not exist.
If he signs, he is sending out a powerful message. Mandated Airworthiness regulations are optional. That is, we're back to square one, as this is what his predecessors ruled so many times in the past, killing so many in the process.
It doesn't meet the old ones either
Or does he sign, and drive a bus through Haddon-Cave and, effectively, negate the need for the MAA.
RP,
Indeed, Hammond personally will be accepting the risk and imposing it on the servicemen and women who have to fly in the aircraft. I wonder if he will be able to accurately quantify that risk for them? "Duty of Care" is the phrase that springs to mind.
If he does accept the risk he is also waiving his own requirement for the probability of a life endangering accident to be less than 1 in 10-6, which tucumseh quoted in detail above. If that level of safety is not required for RJ why is it different to the other a/c operated by the Services?
N
Indeed, Hammond personally will be accepting the risk and imposing it on the servicemen and women who have to fly in the aircraft. I wonder if he will be able to accurately quantify that risk for them? "Duty of Care" is the phrase that springs to mind.
If he does accept the risk he is also waiving his own requirement for the probability of a life endangering accident to be less than 1 in 10-6, which tucumseh quoted in detail above. If that level of safety is not required for RJ why is it different to the other a/c operated by the Services?
N
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he may of course take into account the risks of NOT having Rivet Joint in service and the losses to British servicemen and women and British interests that might thus occur......................
damned whatever he does I beleive
damned whatever he does I beleive
Surely this is what risk management is all about?
In this case, the basic risk (flat refusal to implement mandated regs) was identified, but neither mitigated nor recurrence prevented. So, it has happened again, and again. The same risks have recurred with monotonous regularity; the issue I have is that some have mitigated them with effortless competence, while others have ignored them or failed miserably to mitigate them. Yet MoD prefer to endorse the latter while vilifying the former.
If he accepts that we can never achieve the safety case that you, DV and Chug want
I infer from this that you do not see a need for a compliant Safety Case, so perhaps you could offer an alternative? I have said before, if he signs a waiver and a viable alternative means of assuring safety is agreed, then I'm fine with that. What worries me is that this programme is some years old now, the first aircraft was delivered last October (?), and here we are 6 months later asking for a waiver of supposedly mandated regulations. If MoD had identified all the risks (as they claim), and they could not be mitigated, why was the request for waiver not on Ainsworth's desk all those years ago? As I said before, no-one in MoD has the authority to proceed with expenditure under such circumstances. (Or, even if Bernard Gray has been granted such authority recently, then he'd be foolish to sign given the "novel and/or contentious" nature of the risk. And given his background, I wonder if he CAN be granted such delegation? Or if he even wants it!).
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Tuc
Gratifying though it is to have those like yourself trying to keep us safe, you seem to believe that the safety of the aircrew should be of paramount importance.
It shouldn't.
If you want safe then don't join the military.
Military is about operational capability.
People trying to make us safe have pretty much destroyed ours.
We now have vastly more capable aircraft than when I joined but a reduction in capability because we are not allowed to operate them to the limit or anywhere near the limit or even get them airborne because nobody can prove it's safe!
It never was safe!!
"safety" will make us lose the next war. Lets see how "safe" that is.
Gratifying though it is to have those like yourself trying to keep us safe, you seem to believe that the safety of the aircrew should be of paramount importance.
It shouldn't.
If you want safe then don't join the military.
Military is about operational capability.
People trying to make us safe have pretty much destroyed ours.
We now have vastly more capable aircraft than when I joined but a reduction in capability because we are not allowed to operate them to the limit or anywhere near the limit or even get them airborne because nobody can prove it's safe!
It never was safe!!
"safety" will make us lose the next war. Lets see how "safe" that is.
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Not just operators...
Tourist,
Whilst I applaud your 'can do regardless' attitude, airworthiness is not there just for you to agree to accept the risk - airworthiness is also there to protect third parties. Would YOU be willing to underwrite the liability if a Rivet Joint came down in the middle of Lincoln due to a risk that hadn't been mitigated and demonstrated to be ALARP?
Whilst I applaud your 'can do regardless' attitude, airworthiness is not there just for you to agree to accept the risk - airworthiness is also there to protect third parties. Would YOU be willing to underwrite the liability if a Rivet Joint came down in the middle of Lincoln due to a risk that hadn't been mitigated and demonstrated to be ALARP?
Tourist, we've threads here on the Reds 0/0 ejection (1), the Sea Kings' collision (7), the Tornado blue on blue (2), the Hercules in Iraq (10), the Nimrod in Afghanistan (14), and of course the Mull Chinook (29), and that's your conclusion?
Yes, the idea is to keep you alive and your aircraft intact, not for your ultimate survival, but so that you can do what we pay you for, to close with our enemies and to destroy them. If instead you are killed by your ejection seat, so blinded by your HISLs that you switch them off, cannot be seen and suffer a mid-air, unwarned of your IFF failure and hence shot down, destroyed by as little as a small arms round penetrating your tactical aircraft's fuel tanks, destroyed by your aircraft's AAR system, or simply ordered to fly a grossly unairworthy aircraft that kills you and all its occupants, then you are poor value for money and the enemy prevails. Is that the good operational capability of which you speak?
Yes, the idea is to keep you alive and your aircraft intact, not for your ultimate survival, but so that you can do what we pay you for, to close with our enemies and to destroy them. If instead you are killed by your ejection seat, so blinded by your HISLs that you switch them off, cannot be seen and suffer a mid-air, unwarned of your IFF failure and hence shot down, destroyed by as little as a small arms round penetrating your tactical aircraft's fuel tanks, destroyed by your aircraft's AAR system, or simply ordered to fly a grossly unairworthy aircraft that kills you and all its occupants, then you are poor value for money and the enemy prevails. Is that the good operational capability of which you speak?