RAF Rivet Joint
RC-135W Rivet Joint
I may be wrong but I'm pretty sure that when the procurement of Rivet Joint aircraft for the RAF was first announced, it included a statement that a "pooled fleet" of USAF/RAF RC-135Ws would be created. Presumably this means that when major upgrades take place throughout the life of the system, the RAF will get "issued" with a different airframe from the Depot (L-3) to maintain the size of the operational fleet (the alternative would be to only operate 2/3 at a time) as agreed by the Joint Program Office. Presumably, the way airworthiness is being handled currently, this will cause significant delays whenever the RAF gets back a different airframe to the one it gave back for upgrade, particularly when the earlier model it is based upon is different - as eluded to earlier in the thread (various previous RC-135 variants and KC-135Rs).
I also came across this:
UK May Waive Rivet Joint Certification Requirements | Defense News | defensenews.com
I also came across this:
UK May Waive Rivet Joint Certification Requirements | Defense News | defensenews.com
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Pooled Fleet
Pooled fleet means the RAF aircraft will enter the upgrade and maintenance PDM flow as part of the overall RJ fleet. The RAF will only be flying the three designated airframes, 664, 665, and 666. This means two aircraft will probably be available at any one time for ops, not three.
Although L-3 has tremendously improved the time required for PDM and Block upgrades, usually a third of the overall RJ fleet is in Greenville at a time. The flow chart of this looks like a cascading series of PDM periods with the individual RJ aircraft coming through about every three years. This has worked to keep the fleet upgraded with the latest aircraft operational and mission equipment since the 1970s, and should be good enough for the RAF.
Unless, of course, the whole certification disaster discussed in the previous 34 pages of comments screws the whole thing up. Biggest loser will then be the RAF, MOD and the UK---left without a premier airborne SIGINT platform.
Although L-3 has tremendously improved the time required for PDM and Block upgrades, usually a third of the overall RJ fleet is in Greenville at a time. The flow chart of this looks like a cascading series of PDM periods with the individual RJ aircraft coming through about every three years. This has worked to keep the fleet upgraded with the latest aircraft operational and mission equipment since the 1970s, and should be good enough for the RAF.
Unless, of course, the whole certification disaster discussed in the previous 34 pages of comments screws the whole thing up. Biggest loser will then be the RAF, MOD and the UK---left without a premier airborne SIGINT platform.
RC-135W Availability
NoNav,
Thanks - I didn't realize a third of the USAF fleet was at L-3 at any given time - makes perfect sense now. The UK often only had 2 out of 3 x Nimrod R1 available (and presumably less for a while after one was lost and had to be replaced by converting a MR2).
Thanks - I didn't realize a third of the USAF fleet was at L-3 at any given time - makes perfect sense now. The UK often only had 2 out of 3 x Nimrod R1 available (and presumably less for a while after one was lost and had to be replaced by converting a MR2).
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If the MoD is not yet satisfied with ZZ664 which remains parked at Waddington, why is it OK for 51 Sqn to continue to accumulate thousands of flying hours on the USAF fleet of very similar aircraft?
Couple of thoughts...
- The USAF have been operating RJs for years and, AFAIK, they don't fall out of the sky on a regular basis
- The USAF operates RJs out of the UK on a daily basis - often with UK crews. Somebody must have authorised this and "taken the risk"
) I am not sure that particular point was directly addressed. From a pure airworthiness point of view then the current failure to progress to RTS does not stack up. Surely if there was a known issue with RJs that meant they were more likely to suffer a catastrophic failure then UK MoD would not allow them to continue to operate over the UK and/or with UK crews. I fully realise these RJs are operated under US jurisdiction but not sure that would wash very well with Joe Public in Newmarket if one landed on his house and it was proven to be airworthiness related (and even worse if it were proven that UK SoS for Defence, Service Chiefs, etc knew about it!)
Hence my assertion in original post that any delays in Safety Case approval and RTS are NOT inherently related to lack of airworthiness but much more related to a collective unwillingness to accept the risk of an incomplete audit trail. Might be a slightly easier decision for someone to make if the basic design of the thing didn't pre-date the Ark!
As others have alluded to all of this was well known at time of procurement but some bright spark decided to accept that particular risk - can only assume he's NOT the same individual now involved in sign-off.
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One point that has been brought up a couple of times already, but does not seem to have registered, is that the RAF RJs are unique aircraft, not merely more USAF RJs with different roundels.
All the USAF RJs were originally built as EC135B, and have served their 40+ year careers in the relatively benign environment of communications platforms or intelligence gathering.
The RAF RJs are converted from surplus KC135A (latterly KC135R) which will have led a very different operational career. I am sure that L3 and Boeing have taken the different stresses involved in AAR into consideration, as well as the complications or removing the boom and associated plumbing.
These changes will surely have generated a mountain of unique paperwork which will presumably have to be (or have been) checked and verified by the UK authorities.
Summarizing: The RAF RJs are NOT merely more USAF RJs, so please don't use that argument.
All the USAF RJs were originally built as EC135B, and have served their 40+ year careers in the relatively benign environment of communications platforms or intelligence gathering.
The RAF RJs are converted from surplus KC135A (latterly KC135R) which will have led a very different operational career. I am sure that L3 and Boeing have taken the different stresses involved in AAR into consideration, as well as the complications or removing the boom and associated plumbing.
These changes will surely have generated a mountain of unique paperwork which will presumably have to be (or have been) checked and verified by the UK authorities.
Summarizing: The RAF RJs are NOT merely more USAF RJs, so please don't use that argument.
As to that mountain, and the point we discussed a few pages back on configuration control:
It appears that the obstacle to IOC is a due diligence action in the UK.
If they identify documentation either missing (part of the original order) or gaps that need to be filled ( a contract mod to get ahold of same documentation) then once again UK MoD due diligence function is on tap for that.
If the assertions that nobody is left in the MoD who can do such due diligence, where does one hire that specialized skill set?
PPRuNe Consulting Services?
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RJs from KC-135s
Sorry Iwasaspotter,
That argument does not carry any water, except literally.
The impact of a career as a KC does not put any additional stress on a -135 airframe as service in any other of the many, many special missions the 135 fleet has performed.
Besides, the RCs did NOT come from EC-135s. Most of the current W fleet were modified from M-models which were originally converted from C-135Bs. Some additional aircraft were converted from Bs directly to Ws when the fleet increased (61-4125, 126, 130). The U and V models were purchased directly for the RC-135B role. Being in the last batch of KC-135As purchased, the three RAF aircraft are 19 years younger than the original KC-135A batch. Just ahead of the RC-135Bs, which were the last of the 135 production.
Since the airframes have all had the same wing re-skin, TCTOs and other general airframe work then the only additional modifications are the ones undertaken to convert them to the RC-W version.
There is no difference between the RAF conversions and the original existing RC-135Vs, except designation as a W. (Done recently for standardization as the original B models have electric flaps and the KC-135Rs, RC-135Vs have hydraulic.
Give it a rest! The modified aircraft are NOT different, except for the retention of water heaters for the required UK "brew-up" requirement.
That argument does not carry any water, except literally.
The impact of a career as a KC does not put any additional stress on a -135 airframe as service in any other of the many, many special missions the 135 fleet has performed.
Besides, the RCs did NOT come from EC-135s. Most of the current W fleet were modified from M-models which were originally converted from C-135Bs. Some additional aircraft were converted from Bs directly to Ws when the fleet increased (61-4125, 126, 130). The U and V models were purchased directly for the RC-135B role. Being in the last batch of KC-135As purchased, the three RAF aircraft are 19 years younger than the original KC-135A batch. Just ahead of the RC-135Bs, which were the last of the 135 production.
Since the airframes have all had the same wing re-skin, TCTOs and other general airframe work then the only additional modifications are the ones undertaken to convert them to the RC-W version.
There is no difference between the RAF conversions and the original existing RC-135Vs, except designation as a W. (Done recently for standardization as the original B models have electric flaps and the KC-135Rs, RC-135Vs have hydraulic.
Give it a rest! The modified aircraft are NOT different, except for the retention of water heaters for the required UK "brew-up" requirement.
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RJs from KC-135s
NoVANav
So what is the Boeing model number of the UK aircraft?
Are you saying that Boeing had 'rebuilt' the aircraft from the ground up to a different 'Model' standard?
SS
Give it a rest! The modified aircraft are NOT different, except for the retention of water heaters for the required UK "brew-up" requirement.
A number of USAF C-135B-04-BN, Boeing Model 717-166 were converted to RC-135M then RC-135W.
New build RC-135-01-BN, Boeing Model 739-445B subsequently became RC-135C, then RC-135V or U.
UK purchases KC-135A-27-BN, Boeing Model 717-148, subsequently converted to KC-135R, and now converted to RC-135W by L3.
New build RC-135-01-BN, Boeing Model 739-445B subsequently became RC-135C, then RC-135V or U.
UK purchases KC-135A-27-BN, Boeing Model 717-148, subsequently converted to KC-135R, and now converted to RC-135W by L3.
SS
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"How did it get to the UK"
An interesting question. From what I understand it was delivered several months ahead of 'schedule' the original date being Q1 '14 but BS promising the UK / DE & S Project Lead that all was well; thoroughly tested and the evidence trail fully available and substantiated hence the delivery advanced to Nov 13. Alas it appears that the US forgot one crucial piece of the jigsaw....please generate and provide the substantiating evidence to the UK so the certification process can proceed.
Having sat on the sidelines and reviewed the various posts on this forum with interest, it is reassuring to know that there are many educated colleagues who appear to know more about 664's certification criteria/ substantiation evidence available to the UK than the Procuring PT and those involved in trying to get this aircraft into the skies above the UK....I too sit here with interest, but am a realist, and the BS programme office are no more profficient at providing evidence than those departments within the UK community generating the plethora of UOR's to which no proven; auditable and certified modification exist.
Regrettably, many posts do not seem to be factually correct and, to be honest, there are many inaccurate posts starting to appear. Whilst in accordance with US processes the aircraft may be both Airworthy and Certifiable, the evidence available to the UK is not sufficiently robust to provide a comprehensive Safety Arguement to both the Duty Holder and MAA. It appears as simple as that!!!!!
Many flying hours does not make an aircraft safe....Concorde; Nimrod; Chinook.
Either a platform has sufficient evidence or it does not. The choice for those who decide to recommend and endorse the Safety Case is simple. Put your neck on the line and hope 'Hadden Cave 2' never occurs, or follow due diligence as defined and mandated by the MAA Regulations and seek sufficient; robust; ACCURATE and substantiated data, or bow to political pressure and hope that those 'politicians' and RAF Officers who have many fat stripes, but limited substance when it comes to holding a pen to the paper support you when the going gets tough.
I therefore pose one question......which may/ may not be true, but the the rumours abound.....why has the current Engineering Authority (EA) for the platform now declined/ rejected/ returned his Letter of Airworthiness Authority.
If the truth be known, and this proven to be accurate, then there is no smoke without fire and perhaps those who advocate a rapid clearance for the aircraft would like to accept his responsibility....I am sure there are those within the DE & S; DH; MAA; CAS community who would only too gladly provide you with both the pen and the noose should you wish to take up this offer.
Having sat on the sidelines and reviewed the various posts on this forum with interest, it is reassuring to know that there are many educated colleagues who appear to know more about 664's certification criteria/ substantiation evidence available to the UK than the Procuring PT and those involved in trying to get this aircraft into the skies above the UK....I too sit here with interest, but am a realist, and the BS programme office are no more profficient at providing evidence than those departments within the UK community generating the plethora of UOR's to which no proven; auditable and certified modification exist.
Regrettably, many posts do not seem to be factually correct and, to be honest, there are many inaccurate posts starting to appear. Whilst in accordance with US processes the aircraft may be both Airworthy and Certifiable, the evidence available to the UK is not sufficiently robust to provide a comprehensive Safety Arguement to both the Duty Holder and MAA. It appears as simple as that!!!!!
Many flying hours does not make an aircraft safe....Concorde; Nimrod; Chinook.
Either a platform has sufficient evidence or it does not. The choice for those who decide to recommend and endorse the Safety Case is simple. Put your neck on the line and hope 'Hadden Cave 2' never occurs, or follow due diligence as defined and mandated by the MAA Regulations and seek sufficient; robust; ACCURATE and substantiated data, or bow to political pressure and hope that those 'politicians' and RAF Officers who have many fat stripes, but limited substance when it comes to holding a pen to the paper support you when the going gets tough.
I therefore pose one question......which may/ may not be true, but the the rumours abound.....why has the current Engineering Authority (EA) for the platform now declined/ rejected/ returned his Letter of Airworthiness Authority.
If the truth be known, and this proven to be accurate, then there is no smoke without fire and perhaps those who advocate a rapid clearance for the aircraft would like to accept his responsibility....I am sure there are those within the DE & S; DH; MAA; CAS community who would only too gladly provide you with both the pen and the noose should you wish to take up this offer.
Nice post, Rivetman, but can you answer me this:
Was that paid for and required in the original contract/documents/agreements, or is this an over and above requirement now levied?
Who is "the US" in this case?
USAF?
State Department?
DoD?
L-3?
Boeing?
Thanks. Again, your post was well worth the read.
Alas it appears that the US forgot one crucial piece of the jigsaw....please generate and provide the substantiating evidence to the UK so the certification process can proceed.
Who is "the US" in this case?
USAF?
State Department?
DoD?
L-3?
Boeing?
Thanks. Again, your post was well worth the read.
In previous posts I’ve mention the importance of having a properly appointed Design Authority or Design Custodian (and explained the difference).
The main submission to Lord Phillip noted;
When was this “difficulty” removed? ( I don't know as I rather luckily avoided working with Boeing; if indeed anyone actually works "with" them). It is a fair question because if it still exists then that is a huge hole in any audit trail. And if it was removed, what action was taken to ensure previous records, which have no formal status as far as MoD are concerned, are accurate? That is a huge task. Chinook teams over the years had no proper means of managing this, and didn't, so what chance RJ?
Noting part of the MAA's remit will be to ensure the recommendations of these ARTs have been implemented (because they weren't before the MAA was formed).
Rivetman – Excellent.
The main submission to Lord Phillip noted;
This last (referring to the AAIB report in to ZA721 in 1987) .... aligns closely with the CHART criticism 5 years later highlighting the difficulties caused by Boeing never having been an MoD-appointed Design Authority. That is, the procedures for selecting and appointing Design Authorities had broken down.
When was this “difficulty” removed? ( I don't know as I rather luckily avoided working with Boeing; if indeed anyone actually works "with" them). It is a fair question because if it still exists then that is a huge hole in any audit trail. And if it was removed, what action was taken to ensure previous records, which have no formal status as far as MoD are concerned, are accurate? That is a huge task. Chinook teams over the years had no proper means of managing this, and didn't, so what chance RJ?
Noting part of the MAA's remit will be to ensure the recommendations of these ARTs have been implemented (because they weren't before the MAA was formed).
Rivetman – Excellent.
Can anyone in the room explain to me how Boeing is not a MoD appointed design authority?
It beggars belief that somehow, the UK MoD never got the memo that Boeing, one of the premier aircraft manufacturers on the planet Earth, who (with original producer Vertol) deliverd over 1200 Chinooks to date, is somehow not worthy of being appointed by someone in the MoD as capabile of fulfilling that role. Please forgive my across the pond exasperation here, but this sort of "difficulty" strikes me as having nothing to do with substance, and all to do with illusions of form, chauvinsim, and rice bowls.
This last (referring to the AAIB report in to ZA721 in 1987) .... aligns closely with the CHART criticism 5 years later highlighting the difficulties caused by Boeing never having been an MoD-appointed Design Authority.
(If anyone can answer the question I posed to Rivetman, much obliged. If some of that question falls into "not suitable for discussion on open forums," please advise.)
It beggars belief that somehow, the UK MoD never got the memo that Boeing, one of the premier aircraft manufacturers on the planet Earth, who (with original producer Vertol) deliverd over 1200 Chinooks to date, is somehow not worthy of being appointed by someone in the MoD as capabile of fulfilling that role. Please forgive my across the pond exasperation here, but this sort of "difficulty" strikes me as having nothing to do with substance, and all to do with illusions of form, chauvinsim, and rice bowls.
This last (referring to the AAIB report in to ZA721 in 1987) .... aligns closely with the CHART criticism 5 years later highlighting the difficulties caused by Boeing never having been an MoD-appointed Design Authority.
(If anyone can answer the question I posed to Rivetman, much obliged. If some of that question falls into "not suitable for discussion on open forums," please advise.)
Lonewolf
Can't answer I'm afraid, but I do remember when I asked (many many years ago) being told Boeing flatly refused to act as a sub-contractor to ANYONE on an MoD contract, and MoD (or more likely Government) permitted this. So it isn't necessarily a reflection of what MoD think, or thought, of the company.
Having said that, the context of the IFS comment was Chinook (lack of) airworthiness, and had roots in the cause of the ZA721 crash and the appalling lack of Quality Control and technical know how at Boeing on the device that had been improperly manufactured and assembled; and whose failure was widely accepted as the cause. (I've seen the photos that remain unreleased; they're pretty damning). This was raised in evidence at the ZD576 (MoK) Fatal Accident Inquiry by an RAF officer. That MoD/Government took no action speaks volumes about who has primacy here. Later, similar evidence about Chinook Mk2s was given during the campaign to clear the pilots, and again Ministers took no action.
MoD's Design Approved Organisation Scheme, a complementary process to that which appoints DA/DCs, permits one to take account of such historical failures and refusal or inability to fix them, so you never know, MoD may have finally flexed muscle. But I doubt it!
Can't answer I'm afraid, but I do remember when I asked (many many years ago) being told Boeing flatly refused to act as a sub-contractor to ANYONE on an MoD contract, and MoD (or more likely Government) permitted this. So it isn't necessarily a reflection of what MoD think, or thought, of the company.
Having said that, the context of the IFS comment was Chinook (lack of) airworthiness, and had roots in the cause of the ZA721 crash and the appalling lack of Quality Control and technical know how at Boeing on the device that had been improperly manufactured and assembled; and whose failure was widely accepted as the cause. (I've seen the photos that remain unreleased; they're pretty damning). This was raised in evidence at the ZD576 (MoK) Fatal Accident Inquiry by an RAF officer. That MoD/Government took no action speaks volumes about who has primacy here. Later, similar evidence about Chinook Mk2s was given during the campaign to clear the pilots, and again Ministers took no action.
MoD's Design Approved Organisation Scheme, a complementary process to that which appoints DA/DCs, permits one to take account of such historical failures and refusal or inability to fix them, so you never know, MoD may have finally flexed muscle. But I doubt it!
What is it you were pointing to? JFK airport is very much Stateside. Tuc, Rigga, thank you for the answers. In that light, it makes more sense.
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Guys,
Perhaps I can help. Boeing Helicopters in Philadelphia have been accredited under the DAOS scheme, for at least 18 months now.
To get this, they had to submit a 'DAOS Exposition' that set out their credentials and demonstrated that they met the MoD's criteria. That exposition was examined and 'signed off' by the MAA.
So everything's just fine then...
Best Regards
Engines
Perhaps I can help. Boeing Helicopters in Philadelphia have been accredited under the DAOS scheme, for at least 18 months now.
To get this, they had to submit a 'DAOS Exposition' that set out their credentials and demonstrated that they met the MoD's criteria. That exposition was examined and 'signed off' by the MAA.
So everything's just fine then...
Best Regards
Engines
So everything's just fine then...
Thanks Engines
Well done the MAA.
But it does make you wonder about the RAF Chief Engineer's statement that all such recommendations were fully implemented shortly after CHART was published (but only distributed to the CE and ACAS, and withheld from all inquiries).
Mind you, he does have form in this regard, having stated CHART has nothing to do with Chinook HC Mk2 and doesn't mention it. (Only 373 times!)
Perhaps he should have read the Team Leader's Terms of Reference. Oh, he wrote them.
MoD still have a long way to go and RJ is a major test of resolve.
Well done the MAA.
But it does make you wonder about the RAF Chief Engineer's statement that all such recommendations were fully implemented shortly after CHART was published (but only distributed to the CE and ACAS, and withheld from all inquiries).
Mind you, he does have form in this regard, having stated CHART has nothing to do with Chinook HC Mk2 and doesn't mention it. (Only 373 times!)
Perhaps he should have read the Team Leader's Terms of Reference. Oh, he wrote them.
MoD still have a long way to go and RJ is a major test of resolve.