RAF Rivet Joint
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Bengo
I think you are correct that this comes from politicians, but that does not make it ok.
The public would be upset about an aircraft piling through the roof, yes, but not half as upset as they will be if we end up speaking German/Russian/Swahili etc because we had an ego military that looks shiney in peacetime but can't do the business because we forgot how to live with risk.
Incidentally, in the bad old days before flight safety was invented and the skys were full of crashing aircraft, how many piled into cities causing mass loss of life?
When doing a risk assessment, one should take into account not just the consequences of something happening, but also the chances of it happening.
I think you are correct that this comes from politicians, but that does not make it ok.
The public would be upset about an aircraft piling through the roof, yes, but not half as upset as they will be if we end up speaking German/Russian/Swahili etc because we had an ego military that looks shiney in peacetime but can't do the business because we forgot how to live with risk.
Incidentally, in the bad old days before flight safety was invented and the skys were full of crashing aircraft, how many piled into cities causing mass loss of life?
When doing a risk assessment, one should take into account not just the consequences of something happening, but also the chances of it happening.
Bengo/Sandy Parts - if a RAS goes wrong you could lose upto 1000 people. I'm not aware of an aircraft crash that has killed that many people.
Hell, losing NOTTINGHAM would've lost upto 45 people in one go if it had happened slightly differently. ENDURANCE was an utter fluke to not be run onto shore during her flooding, and she had about 60 people on-board. Aviation is nothing special I'm afraid.
Hell, losing NOTTINGHAM would've lost upto 45 people in one go if it had happened slightly differently. ENDURANCE was an utter fluke to not be run onto shore during her flooding, and she had about 60 people on-board. Aviation is nothing special I'm afraid.
Tourist,
I disagree that because it comes from politicians it is not necessarily OK. Not always the best decision or for the best reasons, often, but always OK- it has to be unless it is clearly illegal. That's the basis on which the UK military runs. The logical extension of it not being OK is the ability to pick and choose which wars we fight or which Ministers we obey. That's a different debate to airworthiness.
In the bad old days before Flight Safety, the RN were losing so many men and aircraft in preventable accidents that something had to be done. It was done by a programme called 'We have a Problem' aimed at finding and fixing the various causes of accidents. Many were part of what we call the airworthiness process now. Not often in Design or Construction, but certainly in modifications, maintenance and operational practice.
Fortunately the FAA was operating at sea so, as you say, they were not spearing into civilians, but others (John Derry in the DH110 and others at different air displays) did.
I don't disagree with your premise that in wartime anything that should fly (and any aircrew who might be declared fit enough to fly it) are an asset we should get airborne if needed. I have signed off repairs to aircraft that should have gone to fourth line, but Fleetlands were not where the aircraft was and the aircraft was needed for operations. Similar authority to decide on the fitness to fly of an aircraft is (or was) vested in all RN AEO's. However, fitness to fly operationally is not airworthiness.
I also agree there are two elements of a risk assessment, but in assessing likelihood it is essential to remember that whether you have won millions on the lottery or not, the likelihood of winning them in this week's draw is just the same as it was last week and the same as it has been since the lottery started. Not having had an accident is just the same.
N
I disagree that because it comes from politicians it is not necessarily OK. Not always the best decision or for the best reasons, often, but always OK- it has to be unless it is clearly illegal. That's the basis on which the UK military runs. The logical extension of it not being OK is the ability to pick and choose which wars we fight or which Ministers we obey. That's a different debate to airworthiness.
In the bad old days before Flight Safety, the RN were losing so many men and aircraft in preventable accidents that something had to be done. It was done by a programme called 'We have a Problem' aimed at finding and fixing the various causes of accidents. Many were part of what we call the airworthiness process now. Not often in Design or Construction, but certainly in modifications, maintenance and operational practice.
Fortunately the FAA was operating at sea so, as you say, they were not spearing into civilians, but others (John Derry in the DH110 and others at different air displays) did.
I don't disagree with your premise that in wartime anything that should fly (and any aircrew who might be declared fit enough to fly it) are an asset we should get airborne if needed. I have signed off repairs to aircraft that should have gone to fourth line, but Fleetlands were not where the aircraft was and the aircraft was needed for operations. Similar authority to decide on the fitness to fly of an aircraft is (or was) vested in all RN AEO's. However, fitness to fly operationally is not airworthiness.
I also agree there are two elements of a risk assessment, but in assessing likelihood it is essential to remember that whether you have won millions on the lottery or not, the likelihood of winning them in this week's draw is just the same as it was last week and the same as it has been since the lottery started. Not having had an accident is just the same.
N
Tourist
It was the BoI that stated it was airworthiness related, quoting some of the regulations that were not met. Have you written to the BoI President (Cdre Hawkins) telling him he is misguided and dishonest? Didn't think so.
I'm the first to admit I know very little about how the RN operate that aircraft but I've read the BoI and RNFAISC reports. You have said in the past that both aircraft had serviceable and operating radar and that both aircraft were serviceable. The reports say otherwise and that the effect was to render the HISL their last line of defence, and it was switched off. Or the forward one was, and the aft was dim and obscured.
There are other things I don't entirely understand but seem to have been withheld from the BoI and RNFAISC. At least 4 LRUs in the avionics system that were the wrong type, directly related to the loss of situational awareness the BoI concluded was a likely cause. The only explanation for one of the faults was another LRU was missing entirely. Lots of seemingly minor holes in slices of cheese but put together didn't do the crews any favours.
I'm told (this is a rumour site after all) that all of the above would have been avoided had MoD not got shot of its corporate knowledge at a vital time. I don't like long posts so I'll stop there, at a point Engines, Tuc, Chug etc reached long ago. All I'll say is if you disagree with the BoI then argue with them, not people who quote the reports.
To say that the crash was airworthiness related is totally misguided at best and dishonest at worst.
I'm the first to admit I know very little about how the RN operate that aircraft but I've read the BoI and RNFAISC reports. You have said in the past that both aircraft had serviceable and operating radar and that both aircraft were serviceable. The reports say otherwise and that the effect was to render the HISL their last line of defence, and it was switched off. Or the forward one was, and the aft was dim and obscured.
There are other things I don't entirely understand but seem to have been withheld from the BoI and RNFAISC. At least 4 LRUs in the avionics system that were the wrong type, directly related to the loss of situational awareness the BoI concluded was a likely cause. The only explanation for one of the faults was another LRU was missing entirely. Lots of seemingly minor holes in slices of cheese but put together didn't do the crews any favours.
I'm told (this is a rumour site after all) that all of the above would have been avoided had MoD not got shot of its corporate knowledge at a vital time. I don't like long posts so I'll stop there, at a point Engines, Tuc, Chug etc reached long ago. All I'll say is if you disagree with the BoI then argue with them, not people who quote the reports.
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Bengo
If politicians decide, or through ignorance allow the British military to become a "look pretty and zoomy in peacetime but **** all use at war" vanity project military like so many other around the world, then that is not ok!!
We should obey the governments order as to who and when we fight, but we should not stand by and allow the destruction of our military.
It is a vicious circle.
The flight safety movement was started for the very good reason that our loss rate was affecting our OC, and initially had a very good definition, something like - "To increase operational capability by reducing our unnecessary loss rate"
This was a brilliant idea as these kind of loss rates are unsustainable.
This was very successful, but has slowly plot shifted to something like - "avoid all avoidable accidents at all costs and sod OC", and the returns are now not worth the effort.
The initial gains were spectacular, but the law of diminishing returns has flight safety firmly in its grasp.
Because of this, despite the fact that in all other realms of manufacturing things have got cheaper, aircraft have got more expensive!
Every new airworthiness requirement and test costs more money which makes the aircraft more valuable which makes the loss more damaging to the military so we buy less so they become more expensive per airframe to cover development cost which get more expensive as requirements are brought in to avoid more losses etc etc ad infinitum until eventually we have 3 Typhoons and a Merlin which nobody can afford to fly.
If politicians decide, or through ignorance allow the British military to become a "look pretty and zoomy in peacetime but **** all use at war" vanity project military like so many other around the world, then that is not ok!!
We should obey the governments order as to who and when we fight, but we should not stand by and allow the destruction of our military.
It is a vicious circle.
The flight safety movement was started for the very good reason that our loss rate was affecting our OC, and initially had a very good definition, something like - "To increase operational capability by reducing our unnecessary loss rate"
This was a brilliant idea as these kind of loss rates are unsustainable.
This was very successful, but has slowly plot shifted to something like - "avoid all avoidable accidents at all costs and sod OC", and the returns are now not worth the effort.
The initial gains were spectacular, but the law of diminishing returns has flight safety firmly in its grasp.
Because of this, despite the fact that in all other realms of manufacturing things have got cheaper, aircraft have got more expensive!
Every new airworthiness requirement and test costs more money which makes the aircraft more valuable which makes the loss more damaging to the military so we buy less so they become more expensive per airframe to cover development cost which get more expensive as requirements are brought in to avoid more losses etc etc ad infinitum until eventually we have 3 Typhoons and a Merlin which nobody can afford to fly.
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Dervish
This is what exasperates me.
You are talking about LRUs as if they had some effect on the accident.
If you had any, and I do mean any knowledge of how a bagger operates and it's capabilities you would know how much that does not matter in this incident.
If the aircraft had not been fitted with HISLs, it would still have switched of the forward anti col and thus been in exactly the same config at the moment of the crash.
Do you understand what I am saying?
The Anti cols would have been off if fitted.
The HISLs were off.
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE!!!
Have you ever found a single bagger to support your crusade?
Seriously?
Do you not think that that might be a bit of a pointer that the other baggers-friends of the deceased- have never come forward and said "OI! This aircraft was a unfit to fly and killed our mates!"?
Have you considered that it is because it is not the problem?
This is what exasperates me.
You are talking about LRUs as if they had some effect on the accident.
If you had any, and I do mean any knowledge of how a bagger operates and it's capabilities you would know how much that does not matter in this incident.
If the aircraft had not been fitted with HISLs, it would still have switched of the forward anti col and thus been in exactly the same config at the moment of the crash.
Do you understand what I am saying?
The Anti cols would have been off if fitted.
The HISLs were off.
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE!!!
Have you ever found a single bagger to support your crusade?
Seriously?
Do you not think that that might be a bit of a pointer that the other baggers-friends of the deceased- have never come forward and said "OI! This aircraft was a unfit to fly and killed our mates!"?
Have you considered that it is because it is not the problem?
Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy? 
Airframe?
Avionice?
Fire Suppression?
ENgines?
Fuel system?
Flight Control System?
Autopilot?
What is it that has somebody's back up?
IF NDA's do not permit this, I understand.
Airframe?
Avionice?
Fire Suppression?
ENgines?
Fuel system?
Flight Control System?
Autopilot?
What is it that has somebody's back up?
IF NDA's do not permit this, I understand.
Hi Lonewolf
I have seen a couple of specific issues mentioned, but without serious provenance.
If I've got this right, it's seems it's the UK Airworthiness process itself that's not particularly Airworthy. With very bad history over 30 odd years, the current setup has yet to prove itself. They stated publicly about two years ago (but without mentioning specifics) that RJ will not comply with current or previous UK regulations ! What they've been doing since then, heaven only knows. Polishing the administrative/political fudge probably, while the only delivered example apparently sits outside in the rain, when it should be in a nice warm hangar with all the experts getting to know every nut and bolt.
OTH in respect of "Known Unknowns" I wonder whether last year's Shell 77 accident and the current Boeing top down (or bottom up) review of all the tail-end smart stuff which might have contributed, might be something that would present a more practical problem for the UK authorities, until the review is complete in a year or so - precisely because the UK won't be able to anticipate or fudge the results of the review. Also, I have no idea whether UK Dutch Roll indoctrination/ simulator/ flight training for E-3 Sentry and RJ, has any of the shortcomings mentioned in the Shell 77 accident report.
LFH
Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy?
If I've got this right, it's seems it's the UK Airworthiness process itself that's not particularly Airworthy. With very bad history over 30 odd years, the current setup has yet to prove itself. They stated publicly about two years ago (but without mentioning specifics) that RJ will not comply with current or previous UK regulations ! What they've been doing since then, heaven only knows. Polishing the administrative/political fudge probably, while the only delivered example apparently sits outside in the rain, when it should be in a nice warm hangar with all the experts getting to know every nut and bolt.
OTH in respect of "Known Unknowns" I wonder whether last year's Shell 77 accident and the current Boeing top down (or bottom up) review of all the tail-end smart stuff which might have contributed, might be something that would present a more practical problem for the UK authorities, until the review is complete in a year or so - precisely because the UK won't be able to anticipate or fudge the results of the review. Also, I have no idea whether UK Dutch Roll indoctrination/ simulator/ flight training for E-3 Sentry and RJ, has any of the shortcomings mentioned in the Shell 77 accident report.
LFH
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Quote:
Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy?
I'm told the RAF 'variant' of Rivet Joint is identical to the American one - or that it is supposed to be
Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy?
I'm told the RAF 'variant' of Rivet Joint is identical to the American one - or that it is supposed to be
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FATTER GATOR
Gator,
See my post #591. Not even based on the same Boeing Model number.
SS
Quote:
Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy?
I'm told the RAF 'variant' of Rivet Joint is identical to the American one - or that it is supposed to be
Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy?
I'm told the RAF 'variant' of Rivet Joint is identical to the American one - or that it is supposed to be
Gator,
See my post #591. Not even based on the same Boeing Model number.
SS
Tourist:-
The aim of RAF Flight Safety has always been to try to avoid all avoidable accidents in order to maintain Operational Capability. Your imagined quote is utter nonsense, so no surprise there. Similarly with Air Safety, it is also utter nonsense to imply that Airworthiness is the enemy of Operational Capability, for that is the role of Unairworthiness.
This is where your proposition founders. The reason an elderly US aircraft (which has been miraculously zero lifed we are told) is standing forlorn and neglected in the rain at Waddington isn't because of MAA Airworthiness zealots, because there are none. The MAA doesn't do Airworthiness, it doesn't know how to, thanks to the deliberate destruction of UK Military Airworthiness Provision. That aircraft is the cost of that malevolence, as was MR2, as was MRA4, as was HC3. It isn't the cost of the aircraft that is the problem, but the cost of ineptness. The jobsworths that are often quoted as the unacceptable face of airworthiness are merely a sign of that endemic ineptness.
The whole MAA structure has to be rebuilt, outwith the MOD and under a civilian DG. Many of those who got us where we are now still inhabit the MAA and have to be got rid of. The old Regulations have to be regained and built upon to ensure a firm foundation upon which airworthiness provision can be reformed. The inevitable cost will not be because of airworthiness but because of the lack of it, so blame those who caused that, prosecute them and even bankrupt them in order to help pay for it. If airworthiness is not regained then OC will suffer, it certainly wont be enhanced!
In the meantime UK Military Airworthiness will remain heavily compromised, and the SoS will be kept busy signing off waiver after waiver. He is about to do so for RJ I expect, for it seems that the paperwork, that alfred so confidently expects to catch up with it, was eaten by the dog. I wouldn't advise the SoS to say so though when he makes his 'courageous' statement to the HoC, which will of course reveal the MAA to be the toothless dog that it really is (so it couldn't have been the one that ate it, could it?).
..."avoid all avoidable accidents at all costs and sod OC", and the returns are now not worth the effort.
This is where your proposition founders. The reason an elderly US aircraft (which has been miraculously zero lifed we are told) is standing forlorn and neglected in the rain at Waddington isn't because of MAA Airworthiness zealots, because there are none. The MAA doesn't do Airworthiness, it doesn't know how to, thanks to the deliberate destruction of UK Military Airworthiness Provision. That aircraft is the cost of that malevolence, as was MR2, as was MRA4, as was HC3. It isn't the cost of the aircraft that is the problem, but the cost of ineptness. The jobsworths that are often quoted as the unacceptable face of airworthiness are merely a sign of that endemic ineptness.
The whole MAA structure has to be rebuilt, outwith the MOD and under a civilian DG. Many of those who got us where we are now still inhabit the MAA and have to be got rid of. The old Regulations have to be regained and built upon to ensure a firm foundation upon which airworthiness provision can be reformed. The inevitable cost will not be because of airworthiness but because of the lack of it, so blame those who caused that, prosecute them and even bankrupt them in order to help pay for it. If airworthiness is not regained then OC will suffer, it certainly wont be enhanced!
In the meantime UK Military Airworthiness will remain heavily compromised, and the SoS will be kept busy signing off waiver after waiver. He is about to do so for RJ I expect, for it seems that the paperwork, that alfred so confidently expects to catch up with it, was eaten by the dog. I wouldn't advise the SoS to say so though when he makes his 'courageous' statement to the HoC, which will of course reveal the MAA to be the toothless dog that it really is (so it couldn't have been the one that ate it, could it?).
Last edited by Chugalug2; 30th Apr 2014 at 22:56.
Tourist
I'll take that as a NO, you haven't expressed your opinions to the BoI president.
It has been pointed out to me my post was lacking. The 4 wrong LRUs were two in each aircraft, not 4 in each. My phrasing was poor. I understand MoD admitted this under freedom of info but didn't realise it was an admission.
which might explain why it was withheld from the inquiries. But the bottom line was the aircraft were nowhere near the aircraft spec and that contributed to their problems. Is a BoI required to check things like that?
You may be right that poor situational awareness had little impact, but the BoI disagreed. In a head-on it's an obvious consideration. I know others here see the similarities between this and other accidents, and MoD making the same mistakes on RJ.
I'll take that as a NO, you haven't expressed your opinions to the BoI president.
It has been pointed out to me my post was lacking. The 4 wrong LRUs were two in each aircraft, not 4 in each. My phrasing was poor. I understand MoD admitted this under freedom of info but didn't realise it was an admission.
which might explain why it was withheld from the inquiries. But the bottom line was the aircraft were nowhere near the aircraft spec and that contributed to their problems. Is a BoI required to check things like that? You may be right that poor situational awareness had little impact, but the BoI disagreed. In a head-on it's an obvious consideration. I know others here see the similarities between this and other accidents, and MoD making the same mistakes on RJ.
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There you go making 2+2=5 again.
Of course situational awareness was the problem! They flew into each other!
What I'm saying is that the LRUs had no effect on their situational awareness or lack of re the other a/c.
What do you think the LRUs did?
I'll take that as a NO them. You have not got a single Bagger to support your crusade.
Of course situational awareness was the problem! They flew into each other!
What I'm saying is that the LRUs had no effect on their situational awareness or lack of re the other a/c.
What do you think the LRUs did?
I'll take that as a NO them. You have not got a single Bagger to support your crusade.
You have not got a single Bagger to support your crusade.
Don't shoot the messengers tourist. UK Military Aviation is riddled with unairworthiness. I cannot see how the MAA can point to any fleet or any system and declare it airworthy, for they do not know how to. As fatal air accident after fatal air accident occurs, as often as not it turns out to be Airworthiness Related. That may not be flagged up by the SI, it certainly wont be flagged up by the MOD as it settles with the family, nor with the Coroner, and certainly not with us, but turn out it often does. That is no way to run a whelk stall let alone an air force. Prevention is better than cure and a competent and independent authority is essential for that. That is where we have to start. It will be a long process because repair takes time, only destruction is instantaneous. We have to repair airworthiness before we go to war with an operationally capable air force, or we will not prevail IMHO.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 1st May 2014 at 13:19.
I remember the aftermath of one accident. When the BoI report was published, pinpointing an unairworthy system as a contributory factor;
1. DEC order a separate investigation into who approved the fit of the offending system and why.
2. IPT staff lie to the investigator, naming a civilian programme manager as the guilty party, claiming they know nothing of (a) the system fitted to their aircraft despite it being the subject of a Service Deviation in their RTS, or (b) the staff in their IPT who had approved its use without first testing or trailling it.
3. When written and photographic evidence clears the programme manager and proves the IPT staff have lied to an official investigation, the investigation is stopped on the grounds that the “guilty” party is too senior to be pursued. The staff who lied to or withheld evidence from the investigation are praised and advanced.
4. None of the above is revealed to the BoI or Coroner, except by the programme manager who is not called as a witness.
5. MoD continues to this day to name and blame the civilian programme manager in correspondence with families, denying the aircraft in the photographic evidence is the aircraft type in question. (Yes, really! Photographs taken from 50 feet away and tail number clearly visible).
6. At the inquest MoD witnesses lie and mislead, refusing to provide evidence to the Coroner. Their successors continue in this vein.
7. Subsequent questions in Parliament force the IPT to admit they knew of this system going back to the 1980s, yet the previous lies are still condoned and repeated.
8. When they ask for the BoI to be reconvened to hear the above, the BoI President offers to help families expose the truth. When told the truth, he withdraws; possibly because the evidence proves the RTS does not reflect the crashed aircraft, but a different, older Mark.
An example that will ring bells with those interested in, for example, the Chinook Mull of Kintyre crash, where MoD knowingly blamed the wrong people, withheld evidence and lied to inquiries. And the aircraft had an invalid RTS.
And still you say the above is acceptable behaviour ......... Follow the lies because that is where the truth can be found. Alone, the offending system may not have caused the accident, but a behavioural trend like this tells you something is making MoD very nervous. Why else do they lie?
RIP….
Lt Philip Green, RN
Lt Antony King, RN
Lt Marc Lawrence, RN
Lt Philip West, RN
Lt James Williams, RN
Lt Andrew Wilson, RN
Lt Thomas Adams, USN
Died 22nd March 2003
1. DEC order a separate investigation into who approved the fit of the offending system and why.
2. IPT staff lie to the investigator, naming a civilian programme manager as the guilty party, claiming they know nothing of (a) the system fitted to their aircraft despite it being the subject of a Service Deviation in their RTS, or (b) the staff in their IPT who had approved its use without first testing or trailling it.
3. When written and photographic evidence clears the programme manager and proves the IPT staff have lied to an official investigation, the investigation is stopped on the grounds that the “guilty” party is too senior to be pursued. The staff who lied to or withheld evidence from the investigation are praised and advanced.
4. None of the above is revealed to the BoI or Coroner, except by the programme manager who is not called as a witness.
5. MoD continues to this day to name and blame the civilian programme manager in correspondence with families, denying the aircraft in the photographic evidence is the aircraft type in question. (Yes, really! Photographs taken from 50 feet away and tail number clearly visible).
6. At the inquest MoD witnesses lie and mislead, refusing to provide evidence to the Coroner. Their successors continue in this vein.
7. Subsequent questions in Parliament force the IPT to admit they knew of this system going back to the 1980s, yet the previous lies are still condoned and repeated.
8. When they ask for the BoI to be reconvened to hear the above, the BoI President offers to help families expose the truth. When told the truth, he withdraws; possibly because the evidence proves the RTS does not reflect the crashed aircraft, but a different, older Mark.
An example that will ring bells with those interested in, for example, the Chinook Mull of Kintyre crash, where MoD knowingly blamed the wrong people, withheld evidence and lied to inquiries. And the aircraft had an invalid RTS.
And still you say the above is acceptable behaviour ......... Follow the lies because that is where the truth can be found. Alone, the offending system may not have caused the accident, but a behavioural trend like this tells you something is making MoD very nervous. Why else do they lie?
RIP….
Lt Philip Green, RN
Lt Antony King, RN
Lt Marc Lawrence, RN
Lt Philip West, RN
Lt James Williams, RN
Lt Andrew Wilson, RN
Lt Thomas Adams, USN
Died 22nd March 2003
Just read Tourist's last post.
Do you know what LRUs dervish is talking about? Or why they are designated LRUs in that aircraft? dervish, you are a naughty boy but absolutely right. I don't think the IPT would be able to answer that one either.
Where I'd agree with tourist is it was less critical in this case (as there was so much else that went wrong), but nevertheless a contributory factor and most definitely a situational awareness issue. Another similarity with Chinook Mk2 is the crash occurred just after a very immature variant entered service too quickly; but experience has hopefully ironed out these fatal wrinkles.
Do you know what LRUs dervish is talking about? Or why they are designated LRUs in that aircraft? dervish, you are a naughty boy but absolutely right. I don't think the IPT would be able to answer that one either.
Where I'd agree with tourist is it was less critical in this case (as there was so much else that went wrong), but nevertheless a contributory factor and most definitely a situational awareness issue. Another similarity with Chinook Mk2 is the crash occurred just after a very immature variant entered service too quickly; but experience has hopefully ironed out these fatal wrinkles.
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Go on.
Somebody explain to me in small words how these incorrect LRU's affected SA on that occasion?
Tuc
Your description of the Mk7
" a very immature variant entered service too quickly"
The entire aviation description of the Mk7
"The best bit of procurement in recent military history"
"And still you say the above is acceptable behaviour "
No, I don't.
I honestly don't give a flying **** about their behaviour as long as decent aircraft get to the front line. By decent I don't mean safe, though that is nice to have. By decent I mean capable.
Somebody explain to me in small words how these incorrect LRU's affected SA on that occasion?
Tuc
Your description of the Mk7
" a very immature variant entered service too quickly"
The entire aviation description of the Mk7
"The best bit of procurement in recent military history"
"And still you say the above is acceptable behaviour "
No, I don't.
I honestly don't give a flying **** about their behaviour as long as decent aircraft get to the front line. By decent I don't mean safe, though that is nice to have. By decent I mean capable.
Tourist, I think you do perfer safe, operable aircraft. What seems to be the point in question is how many places to the right of the decimal must be shown for reliability to render an aircraft safe/airworthy.
The Sea King collision reminds me of a similar collision off of the coast of California, VP-50, two P-3C's, back on March 21, 1991. That wasn't an airworthiness issue, it was two aircraft being to close to each other at the same altitude. Bad vis, of course. Won't comment further, as this seems to be a pet peeve for some folks.
The Sea King collision reminds me of a similar collision off of the coast of California, VP-50, two P-3C's, back on March 21, 1991. That wasn't an airworthiness issue, it was two aircraft being to close to each other at the same altitude. Bad vis, of course. Won't comment further, as this seems to be a pet peeve for some folks.
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Yes, Lone, you are correct.
When the whole flight safety thing was begun it was for very real reasons, but the pendulum has swung too far to the point that it is now driving the entire process and making a joke of our military.
When the whole flight safety thing was begun it was for very real reasons, but the pendulum has swung too far to the point that it is now driving the entire process and making a joke of our military.