Gulf Tornado/Patriot
LJ
Understand your point now. Yes your right, it was manual typing in the air, but IIRC the F3 had a psuedo HTS but range to tgt to get the accuracy made things spicy! I think the E3 was a great idea, esp with radar tweaks that were going on.
Chug
It wasn't the IFF aerieals it was the RHWR aerials.
Merry Xmas one and all, and RIP Kev and Ploppy
30 mRad
Understand your point now. Yes your right, it was manual typing in the air, but IIRC the F3 had a psuedo HTS but range to tgt to get the accuracy made things spicy! I think the E3 was a great idea, esp with radar tweaks that were going on.
Chug
It wasn't the IFF aerieals it was the RHWR aerials.
Merry Xmas one and all, and RIP Kev and Ploppy
30 mRad
30mrad
Thanks dude. The other way to take data was 3rd party from an ELINT platform via JTIDS/L16. Happy Xmas, mate.
All,
If we're being technically correct then they were interferometers in the wing nibs giving a far better angle of arrival and the F3 could triangulate between 2 jets via the data-link - very clever stuff amongst a whole host of other clever mods to make the EF-3. Heaps ahead of a lot of other aircraft then and now in this role with both SEAD and DEAD.
Does anyone know if an EF-3 made it into any of the museums?
LJ
Thanks dude. The other way to take data was 3rd party from an ELINT platform via JTIDS/L16. Happy Xmas, mate.
All,
If we're being technically correct then they were interferometers in the wing nibs giving a far better angle of arrival and the F3 could triangulate between 2 jets via the data-link - very clever stuff amongst a whole host of other clever mods to make the EF-3. Heaps ahead of a lot of other aircraft then and now in this role with both SEAD and DEAD.
Does anyone know if an EF-3 made it into any of the museums?
LJ
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Beadwindow
I understand that the responses so far are in response to a request for information after an incredibly tragic incident. Kev and I did our GR1 work-up together in Germany. He was a dedicated and loyal officer who would be shocked and disappointed at the depth of detail gone into on this thread. Guys, the truth shouldn't be hidden but most of these responses are so far outside the "Act" that they're almost meeting it coming back from the opposite direction. Please respect Kev, Dave and the OSA by taking care what you write. Remember what's written at the bottom of every PPrune page......
Last edited by tommee_hawk; 27th Dec 2011 at 19:45.
th, I do not say that you are wrong, for in truth I do not know if you are. All I do know is that a regular ingredient of these threads concerning Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents, be they concerning Sea King, Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, or indeed Tornado tragedies, are calls to inhibit or even to stop all posts, either on account of adding to the grief of the bereaved or, as in your case, on grounds of security. In each thread more and more facts emerged of the scandal of incompetence, deceit, and plain malevolence at the highest levels of the RAF Leadership. You will understand therefore, I hope, that your call is met with a certain amount of reserve. The words "Crying Wolf" come to mind, though of course one day it may well be called for. The pity of it is that the RAF Leadership, for which you may or may not speak, has lost all moral credibility in this scandal. Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation is not safe in its hands because of what it has done and has not done.
Self Regulation Does Not Work, and in Aviation it Kills!
Self Regulation Does Not Work, and in Aviation it Kills!
Chugs,
I agree with you, although I wouldn't necessarily accuse TH of crying wolf. Your case about military airworthiness is well made.
In TH's support, I would just say that we should all consider carefully the security implications of what we post. We're grown-ups and should know where the line is drawn.
As for upsetting the living, as long as no one attacks the relatives, passes undue judgement on the deceased or speaks inappropriately, considered opinion on the failings of the "system" and its masters is healthy.
As with everything, care and balance are called for.
I agree with you, although I wouldn't necessarily accuse TH of crying wolf. Your case about military airworthiness is well made.
In TH's support, I would just say that we should all consider carefully the security implications of what we post. We're grown-ups and should know where the line is drawn.
As for upsetting the living, as long as no one attacks the relatives, passes undue judgement on the deceased or speaks inappropriately, considered opinion on the failings of the "system" and its masters is healthy.
As with everything, care and balance are called for.
th
To repeat a previous post, the vast majority of what has been posted here is in the public domain. Certainly, in my case, when I say advance notice was given to 2 Stars in 1998 and 2002 of the systemic failing later identified (reiterated) in the BoI report (i.e. refusal to ensure functional safety), this is a simple matter of record and the subject of unclassified letters from MoD/Ministers to MPs (and hence, constituents). MoD and successive Governments have quite happily upheld the formal ruling that contracts may be signed off as complete and aircraft as safe, in the full knowledge they are not. MoD acknowledge this is a form of fraud, but openly condone it and protect those who commit it.
In this particular case, there would seem to be a number of contributory causes. The consensus is that if any one of these had not occurred, then the aircraft and aircrew would have had a very good chance of getting home safely. This can be said of most accidents discussed here. The key point and common denominator is that MoD disingeniously present their "findings" as a revelation and lesson to be learnt; when in fact the failures were predictable, predicted and ignored. That is, nothing in these BoI reports, or those of Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip, came as a surprise. Most are a simple collation of long known, and very public, facts. Whether or not this should have remained "classified" is another matter. MoD made that choice.
The final point I'd make is this. What makes anyone here think MoD are keen to correct matters? It is not they who have been proactive here. They did not hold their hands up and report systemic failures. They actively hid systemic failings that placed aircrew in grave danger when, as I have demonstrated so often, it would have been cheaper and quicker to do the job right in the first place. Properly integrated IFF failure warnings is a simple example. They were dragged screaming through numerous Coroners Courts and Inquiries until eventually some of the truth was reluctantly revealed and acknowledged. Senior staffs and politicians should be asking why these failings were concealed behind a tissue of lies for 20+ years. And ask why those responsible are routinely protected and advanced. And what, in God's name, makes these people suitable to manage amelioration.
To repeat a previous post, the vast majority of what has been posted here is in the public domain. Certainly, in my case, when I say advance notice was given to 2 Stars in 1998 and 2002 of the systemic failing later identified (reiterated) in the BoI report (i.e. refusal to ensure functional safety), this is a simple matter of record and the subject of unclassified letters from MoD/Ministers to MPs (and hence, constituents). MoD and successive Governments have quite happily upheld the formal ruling that contracts may be signed off as complete and aircraft as safe, in the full knowledge they are not. MoD acknowledge this is a form of fraud, but openly condone it and protect those who commit it.
In this particular case, there would seem to be a number of contributory causes. The consensus is that if any one of these had not occurred, then the aircraft and aircrew would have had a very good chance of getting home safely. This can be said of most accidents discussed here. The key point and common denominator is that MoD disingeniously present their "findings" as a revelation and lesson to be learnt; when in fact the failures were predictable, predicted and ignored. That is, nothing in these BoI reports, or those of Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip, came as a surprise. Most are a simple collation of long known, and very public, facts. Whether or not this should have remained "classified" is another matter. MoD made that choice.
The final point I'd make is this. What makes anyone here think MoD are keen to correct matters? It is not they who have been proactive here. They did not hold their hands up and report systemic failures. They actively hid systemic failings that placed aircrew in grave danger when, as I have demonstrated so often, it would have been cheaper and quicker to do the job right in the first place. Properly integrated IFF failure warnings is a simple example. They were dragged screaming through numerous Coroners Courts and Inquiries until eventually some of the truth was reluctantly revealed and acknowledged. Senior staffs and politicians should be asking why these failings were concealed behind a tissue of lies for 20+ years. And ask why those responsible are routinely protected and advanced. And what, in God's name, makes these people suitable to manage amelioration.
Originally Posted by Chugalug2
Self Regulation Does Not Work, and in Aviation it Kills!
In a word, jaj, yes. Let me ask you in turn, how could it be otherwise? Read tuc's resume above of the depth and extent of the MOD's, as UK Military Airworthiness Authority, Gross Negligence (to coin their own phrase), and dwell on the cynicism of then establishing a subsidiary body to assume that mantle which is described as "independent". Independent of the MOD? Independent of the cadre of VSO's that caused the problem in the first place and have been protected ever since by their successors? Independent of the ignorance and incompetence that now permeates UK Military Airworthiness as those who knew how have been got rid of because they would not be suborned, or those who were and are thus completely compromised?
Similarly independence is the key to effective and objective Military Air Accident Investigation, and the first body that it has to be independent of is the Military Airworthiness Authority itself, so that it may expose the airworthiness failures that relate to so many military air accidents.
So yes, I do consider the new setup to be fatally flawed, the word fatally being particularly and tragically apt.
Similarly independence is the key to effective and objective Military Air Accident Investigation, and the first body that it has to be independent of is the Military Airworthiness Authority itself, so that it may expose the airworthiness failures that relate to so many military air accidents.
So yes, I do consider the new setup to be fatally flawed, the word fatally being particularly and tragically apt.
Tuc,
I have keenly followed your postings over the years and am struck by the seemingly common thread that runs through each of them. While I am neither senior staff nor politician, may I ask the question you suggested?
It seems to me that there is plenty of material that Mr Haddon-Cave would have been made aware of - did it fall outside of his narrow Nimrod remit, or was he specifically steered away from it? Your specific mentions of orders to ignore regulations, disciplinary action for following regulations, and acknowledged commercial fraud are surely something you could take to the police on a personal basis? And if the can of worms is already all but open, why has not some maverick MP taken it on as a personal campaign (in the mould of Tom Watson vs News International)?
I have keenly followed your postings over the years and am struck by the seemingly common thread that runs through each of them. While I am neither senior staff nor politician, may I ask the question you suggested?
Senior staffs and politicians should be asking why these failings were concealed behind a tissue of lies for 20+ years. And ask why those responsible are routinely protected and advanced.
Easy Street
Excellent questions.
The easy answer is one I was given a few months ago when I asked the same of an MP on the All Party Armed Forces Committee. There is no difference between Ministers and their Departments. Convention has it that they speak with one voice. As very few MPs have the slightest clue about their Ministerial brief, their default position is that their officials MUST be right. Convention dictates that to contradict the officials is to admit you don’t have a clue and that you, yourself, are wrong. That is the way it was explained to me when I asked why no Ministers were interested. The honourable exception in all this is Sir Malcolm Rifkind who spoke out (after he left office) when he became aware he had been misled by omission and commission on Mull of Kintyre. I believe his evidence swayed Lord Philip. What was omitted? The fact the aircraft was not cleared to fly.
Haddon-Cave was given detailed facts and written supporting evidence demonstrating the systematic rundown of airworthiness from 1991-onwards. The main submission to Lord Philip included all those papers, and more; the passage of time had allowed research to reveal the evidence that pushed this rundown back to a June 1987 policy by AMSO. The weight of evidence probably swayed him in general terms, but the natural reaction of both was to concentrate on one key issue that underpinned their recommendations. The legal mind introducing sufficient doubt, perhaps. In both cases, it was reasonable of them to assume MoD would understand all the failures that led to the ultimately flawed Safety Cases. But, of course, they don’t. That is why the ARTs have been sought, because they reported the failings in excruciating detail to the RAF Chief Engineer, whose job it was to govern the process. He did nothing; evidenced when the 1996 Puma ART reported the same failures as its predecessor in 1992. 4 crucial years, with MoK right in the middle.
And therein lies the problem. The self healing nature of MoD, the culture that incompetence is acceptable and the malign influence of retired VSOs. But in the past 11 months (since this was reported to Minsters and, in turn, to MoD) I really do see a difference. Not as a result of Haddon-Cave – he made an a*** of his report and blamed the wrong people. I believe he was swayed. It wasn’t so much who he blamed, but those he praised, that is the giveaway. He accepted all the evidence against them, but blamed others. I always ask this – “Who is protected by this decision?” and adhere to the basic principle of “Follow the lies, because that is where you’ll find the truth.” For example, he attributed a 1991 airworthiness failing to General Cowan, who only took up post in 1999.
No, the catalyst will prove to be the Mull of Kintyre verdict. That has reasserted Ministerial governance of the Department. We all read the pompous rubbish from Graydon, Alcock etc in their letters to the press. Post-verdict, the telling question is “Why the silence?”. The answer lies in the detailed evidence to Lord Philip. He did not need to publish it publicly, but you can rest assured it has been thrust under the noses of senior officers and officials. That evidence explained in detail the comment by Haddon-Cave that savings had been made at the expense of safety. Haddon-Cave had not explored the root of the problem, despite being dragged there screaming. That the savings had been thought necessary by the wanton waste that had created a black hole in AMSO’s budget in 1990 (as a result of the above June 1987 policy). Ring bells? That black hole was filled, in part, by robbing the hitherto ring fenced airworthiness pot. One problem was hidden, but the bow wave built up. From a personal perspective, my concern is that all this was identified and notified in January 1988. Who was it that did nothing? See letters to the press (above). As I said, self healing.
I don’t like getting into politics, but the Coalition is doing good deeds here. Say what you like about the cutbacks, but their appointment of Bernard Gray is potentially a major step forward. At the moment (!) he is not toeing a party line; he seems his own man and is following through proposals he made while independent of Government. His biggest battle will not be political, but with the above VSOs and officials, because radical change will reveal their past shortcomings. Importantly, it will reveal they KNEW of these shortcomings and the adverse effect they had, and sat back and did nothing. While servicemen died. Did you listen to “Buying Defence” on Radio 4 on Tuesday evening? In 40 mins of regurgitation, Gray came out with the telling phrase “Co-ordinating Authority”. Where does that come from ? I’ll tell you. The only Defence Standard dedicated to maintaining airworthiness. Last amended in 1991 (when AMSO chopped funding and stopped most activities) and finally cancelled 3 years ago. But quoted extensively in evidence to both Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip. Every experienced project manager knows that Def Stan is not only the procedures for maintaining airworthiness, but the template for all procurement. Got a problem? The solution is in those 2 books. If you don’t know them off by heart, you’re years shy of being experienced enough to work in the MAA and even further away from being a project manager!
Excellent questions.
The easy answer is one I was given a few months ago when I asked the same of an MP on the All Party Armed Forces Committee. There is no difference between Ministers and their Departments. Convention has it that they speak with one voice. As very few MPs have the slightest clue about their Ministerial brief, their default position is that their officials MUST be right. Convention dictates that to contradict the officials is to admit you don’t have a clue and that you, yourself, are wrong. That is the way it was explained to me when I asked why no Ministers were interested. The honourable exception in all this is Sir Malcolm Rifkind who spoke out (after he left office) when he became aware he had been misled by omission and commission on Mull of Kintyre. I believe his evidence swayed Lord Philip. What was omitted? The fact the aircraft was not cleared to fly.
Haddon-Cave was given detailed facts and written supporting evidence demonstrating the systematic rundown of airworthiness from 1991-onwards. The main submission to Lord Philip included all those papers, and more; the passage of time had allowed research to reveal the evidence that pushed this rundown back to a June 1987 policy by AMSO. The weight of evidence probably swayed him in general terms, but the natural reaction of both was to concentrate on one key issue that underpinned their recommendations. The legal mind introducing sufficient doubt, perhaps. In both cases, it was reasonable of them to assume MoD would understand all the failures that led to the ultimately flawed Safety Cases. But, of course, they don’t. That is why the ARTs have been sought, because they reported the failings in excruciating detail to the RAF Chief Engineer, whose job it was to govern the process. He did nothing; evidenced when the 1996 Puma ART reported the same failures as its predecessor in 1992. 4 crucial years, with MoK right in the middle.
And therein lies the problem. The self healing nature of MoD, the culture that incompetence is acceptable and the malign influence of retired VSOs. But in the past 11 months (since this was reported to Minsters and, in turn, to MoD) I really do see a difference. Not as a result of Haddon-Cave – he made an a*** of his report and blamed the wrong people. I believe he was swayed. It wasn’t so much who he blamed, but those he praised, that is the giveaway. He accepted all the evidence against them, but blamed others. I always ask this – “Who is protected by this decision?” and adhere to the basic principle of “Follow the lies, because that is where you’ll find the truth.” For example, he attributed a 1991 airworthiness failing to General Cowan, who only took up post in 1999.
No, the catalyst will prove to be the Mull of Kintyre verdict. That has reasserted Ministerial governance of the Department. We all read the pompous rubbish from Graydon, Alcock etc in their letters to the press. Post-verdict, the telling question is “Why the silence?”. The answer lies in the detailed evidence to Lord Philip. He did not need to publish it publicly, but you can rest assured it has been thrust under the noses of senior officers and officials. That evidence explained in detail the comment by Haddon-Cave that savings had been made at the expense of safety. Haddon-Cave had not explored the root of the problem, despite being dragged there screaming. That the savings had been thought necessary by the wanton waste that had created a black hole in AMSO’s budget in 1990 (as a result of the above June 1987 policy). Ring bells? That black hole was filled, in part, by robbing the hitherto ring fenced airworthiness pot. One problem was hidden, but the bow wave built up. From a personal perspective, my concern is that all this was identified and notified in January 1988. Who was it that did nothing? See letters to the press (above). As I said, self healing.
I don’t like getting into politics, but the Coalition is doing good deeds here. Say what you like about the cutbacks, but their appointment of Bernard Gray is potentially a major step forward. At the moment (!) he is not toeing a party line; he seems his own man and is following through proposals he made while independent of Government. His biggest battle will not be political, but with the above VSOs and officials, because radical change will reveal their past shortcomings. Importantly, it will reveal they KNEW of these shortcomings and the adverse effect they had, and sat back and did nothing. While servicemen died. Did you listen to “Buying Defence” on Radio 4 on Tuesday evening? In 40 mins of regurgitation, Gray came out with the telling phrase “Co-ordinating Authority”. Where does that come from ? I’ll tell you. The only Defence Standard dedicated to maintaining airworthiness. Last amended in 1991 (when AMSO chopped funding and stopped most activities) and finally cancelled 3 years ago. But quoted extensively in evidence to both Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip. Every experienced project manager knows that Def Stan is not only the procedures for maintaining airworthiness, but the template for all procurement. Got a problem? The solution is in those 2 books. If you don’t know them off by heart, you’re years shy of being experienced enough to work in the MAA and even further away from being a project manager!
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It seems to me that there is plenty of material that Mr Haddon-Cave would have been made aware of
What I find difficult to understand is that H-C spends some 174 pages dealing with the Nimrod safety case, and how people like Baber and Eagles failed to recognise the fact that Dry Bay No.7 did not have fire detection and suppression, and yet the abuse of the STF procedure and in particular an important witness statement at the Inquest, gets no mention. In fact H-C has the impertinence to state, "The Inquest produced little factual evidence of value to the Review" The witness statement indicates a clear violation of the Nimrod safety case; unofficial amendments to RTS document, equipment installed on the galley table, circuit breakers being used as switches etc.
The abuse of the STF procedure features in nearly all the ARTs produced during the 1990s, but nothing was done to correct the problem by the CEs (RAF) of the time. As Tuc says, H-C goes out of his way to praise these people for creating the "golden period" of airwothiness. From comments made on this thread it would appear that IFF Mode 4 on the Tornado was installed by the STF procedure.
The following is a recent statement issued by MoD, which shows how determined they are to prevent the truth being exposed;
I am writing to advise you that your requests are being refused under Section 14(1) of the FOI Act as they are considered to be vexatious. Furthermore, the Department has
decided that all future requests made by you on the subject of Nimrod engineering and airworthiness will be regarded as a vexatious request under Section 14(1)
decided that all future requests made by you on the subject of Nimrod engineering and airworthiness will be regarded as a vexatious request under Section 14(1)
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 29th Dec 2011 at 09:53.
Was the IFF M4 on the ZG710 an UOR derived STF fit that was in the process of being fully integrated by the DA?
It is implied above that a UOR course of action may have been taken to avoid regs and save money (i.e. dubious reasons) - this view is perhaps a bit simplistic as the main reason is surely to save TIME (which can be shown to be a good reason). If you are offered a choice between UOR IFF in 6 months, or fully integrated by the DA in 3 years - it is surely obvious that both courses of action potentially have merit (albeit the early option carries greater risk to be balanced against the operational benefit). Even if you took such a decision to the MAA as implied above, they would not necessarily disagree, though ultimately they would just pass the buck to the relevant duty holder (who is of course the right person to make such a decision, if he has the right supporting facts, and is the right thing for the MAA to do).
It also seems from a quick skim that the Patriot battery and its actions were in effect 99% responsible - it is even dubious, given what actions the battery took, whether the crew being aware that the IFF was on the blink would have made any difference at all. Nearly all the (huge IMO) holes in the swiss cheese lie with the Patriot end of this sad event.
I'm not convinced at all that the IFF warning is the smoking gun some are implying - infact to do so is to distort true events which is a big no-no IMO when it comes to proper analysis of events leading to an incident.
The more and more the IFF warning is discussed as an issue, the more pressure you take off the surely more burning issue with the configuration and operation of the Patriot system - which should have us all far more worried from what I've read so far!
It is implied above that a UOR course of action may have been taken to avoid regs and save money (i.e. dubious reasons) - this view is perhaps a bit simplistic as the main reason is surely to save TIME (which can be shown to be a good reason). If you are offered a choice between UOR IFF in 6 months, or fully integrated by the DA in 3 years - it is surely obvious that both courses of action potentially have merit (albeit the early option carries greater risk to be balanced against the operational benefit). Even if you took such a decision to the MAA as implied above, they would not necessarily disagree, though ultimately they would just pass the buck to the relevant duty holder (who is of course the right person to make such a decision, if he has the right supporting facts, and is the right thing for the MAA to do).
It also seems from a quick skim that the Patriot battery and its actions were in effect 99% responsible - it is even dubious, given what actions the battery took, whether the crew being aware that the IFF was on the blink would have made any difference at all. Nearly all the (huge IMO) holes in the swiss cheese lie with the Patriot end of this sad event.
I'm not convinced at all that the IFF warning is the smoking gun some are implying - infact to do so is to distort true events which is a big no-no IMO when it comes to proper analysis of events leading to an incident.
The more and more the IFF warning is discussed as an issue, the more pressure you take off the surely more burning issue with the configuration and operation of the Patriot system - which should have us all far more worried from what I've read so far!
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JFZ,
Your points are well made. The only thing I would say is that (in my opinion) the failure warnings weren't being regarded here as the cause, just a significant factor and was one of the questions raised by DV way back at post #5. It was important to explore that aspect because it was a symptom of a rushed (very urgent) integration, but, as you say, it does not represent a smoking gun.
M2
Your points are well made. The only thing I would say is that (in my opinion) the failure warnings weren't being regarded here as the cause, just a significant factor and was one of the questions raised by DV way back at post #5. It was important to explore that aspect because it was a symptom of a rushed (very urgent) integration, but, as you say, it does not represent a smoking gun.
M2
Ah! The old smoking gun thing again, eh? If by smoking gun we mean a clear and unambiguous accident cause, then no, of course it wasn't. Likewise the infamous Chinook FADEC wasn't a smoking gun, nor the known phenomena of UFCM's, or control jams in one, two, or even all three axis. So we shall never why ZD576 slammed into a Scottish hillside taking all 29 lives with it. What we do know though is that it was Grossly Unairworthy, and was known to be so. That is what these accidents have in common. Both aircraft were in contravention of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations, and both suffered unsurvivable accidents costing 31 lives in total.
As an aside, are we to believe that there was no crew action that could be taken to ameliorate the danger of a blue on blue had they known that they had an IFF failure? I find that hard to believe, but there again I was never a roughty toughty type and await clarification from those who are, or were...
As an aside, are we to believe that there was no crew action that could be taken to ameliorate the danger of a blue on blue had they known that they had an IFF failure? I find that hard to believe, but there again I was never a roughty toughty type and await clarification from those who are, or were...
To answer you last point there, Chugs, I cannot create a full picture of the air control environment on the day, but generally there are a number of measures. I shall just give two GENERIC examples. Close up with a squawking aircraft and tell EVERYONE you can that you have no M4. Now, the battery in question was acting autonomously so I would guess that getting the word through to them to go weapons tight might have taken a while, but we don't know how long before the engagement the failure occured. It is normal for ACOs to have lame duck procedures.
I say again, my examples here are generic and not exhaustive.
I say again, my examples here are generic and not exhaustive.
Ah! The old smoking gun thing again, eh? If by smoking gun we mean a clear and unambiguous accident cause, then no, of course it wasn't.
Likewise the infamous Chinook FADEC wasn't a smoking gun, nor the known phenomena of UFCM's, or control jams in one, two, or even all three axis. So we shall never why ZD576 slammed into a Scottish hillside taking all 29 lives with it. What we do know though is that it was Grossly Unairworthy, and was known to be so. That is what these accidents have in common.
As an aside, are we to believe that there was no crew action that could be taken to ameliorate the danger of a blue on blue had they known that they had an IFF failure? I find that hard to believe, but there again I was never a roughty toughty type and await clarification from those who are, or were...
If I read right the Patriot system declared it as a Anti Radiation Missile attack - this raises all sorts of questions as to how it was set up (what was the ARM 'threat' in this theatre, a Kh28? Was there really a credible capability existing in Iraq? From what launch platform, which airfield? Even if yes, what are its operational characteristics - isn't it basically a Mach 3 missile? How do you confuse the radar returns from such a threat with a GR4?
EDIT: I've just read this....
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/32E5E...10_22mar03.pdf
...very diplomatically put, but you can almost here the writers thinking "WTF" as they write about the "generic/broad" ARM profiles loaded into the patriot and training/doctrine that didn't appear to place much importance on focussing on the threats in theatre......
...some of the recommendations are revealing
a. make sure the US get the full report.
b. RAF liaison types must make sure changes are followed up in the US.
Last edited by JFZ90; 29th Dec 2011 at 13:20.
The main issue, as per the OP, was the BoI report. Subsidiary issues, posted a little later, were:
It seems that the answer to Q1 was no, it didn't. As to:
I'm not sure what you mean. Hostile action may well have caused the IFF to fail, if that's what you mean. Hostile action would not have then deprived the crew of a warning of that, for that had already been assured by its fit, unless you include as "hostile" the lack of "Duty of Care" by the Airworthiness Authority, aka the MOD, which I would consider a very appropriate comment, but I rather doubt that to be your meaning.
As to possible crew action had they been so alerted, I am indebted to both Courtney and you JFZ90 for your input. No doubt there were shortcomings in the Patriot end of the tragedy. There will always be such shortcomings in the "Fog of War", better then to make sure that one's own ducks are all in a row before they paddle into it, to grossly mix up the metaphors!
Can anyone answer the following qusetions (1) At the time, did ZG710 have a IFF Mode 4 integrated failure warning feature? (2) If it did, was it audio or visual? (3) What pre engine start IFF checks were carried out by ground crew? (4) When did ZG710 have its last Major?
If I recall, air safety, which includes airworthiness, excludes the effects of "hostile action". You could argue the functionality of an IFF system sits both sides of the line here.
As to possible crew action had they been so alerted, I am indebted to both Courtney and you JFZ90 for your input. No doubt there were shortcomings in the Patriot end of the tragedy. There will always be such shortcomings in the "Fog of War", better then to make sure that one's own ducks are all in a row before they paddle into it, to grossly mix up the metaphors!
I'm not sure what you mean.
To draw a parallel, if you fit a jammer system to an aircraft, but it fails to defeat in incoming missile that e.g. has enabled a HOJ mode that was not known, this would clearly be outside of the scope of air safety as defined by the MAA etc. - though you could argue its not fit for purpose or operationally effective (as the baddies know how to defeat your technology).
IFF in some ways could be considered similar, e.g. its use of crypto for some modes is designed to deny exploitation by hostiles etc. This where the argument can get complicated as it can be argued that some aspects of its design are "military" and clearly intended to counter hostile action. Where you start including such capabilities into your systems, assuring the integrity of such systems can get complicated.
This is not to say that a warning of a power supply failure should not be provided if feasible - just saying it is not necessarily a simple matter..
Indeed, it is not a simple matter at all. And as I said way back near the start, we should also consider the difference between mission and safety - specifically "mission critical" and "safety critical" and the level of acceptable risk in training and on ops.