Gulf Tornado/Patriot
Courtney/Tuc
There are UORs and UORs in my opinion. When complete UORs are procured as a complete system, ie. RPAS, aircraft, vehicles, boats, etc... things appear to be OK. It's when lash-up UORs are put into core equipment programs that things go wrong - Nimrod AAR, Mode 4, Snatch Landrover armour, etc...
As Courtney says, yes, OK for ops in the short term, but unfortunately we have a habit of running UORs on for decades - Nimrod AAR from 1982-2007 and Tornado IFF from 1991-2003 to name but a few.
I agree that MkXII Mode 4 wasn't the best of integrations (coupled to Havequick under UOR it was an ergonomic nightmare!), but it did have some failure mode indications - just not 100% fool proof so a blue-on-blue was always a possibility (but hey, when is anything 100%?). We also spent too long using the UOR when SIFF kept getting slipped year on year to pay for the uber-expensive Type 45, Astute, MRA4 and Typhoon programs (yes, there is a common denominator!).
It won't bring back the 2x GR4 aircrew mates and I'm pretty sure the American who pushed the button still "goes through hell and back" thinking about their action (and how they would've done it differently with hindsight). But we can learn from this and look for languishing UOR modifications such as these and push for them to be tested and fully integrated.
LJ
There are UORs and UORs in my opinion. When complete UORs are procured as a complete system, ie. RPAS, aircraft, vehicles, boats, etc... things appear to be OK. It's when lash-up UORs are put into core equipment programs that things go wrong - Nimrod AAR, Mode 4, Snatch Landrover armour, etc...
As Courtney says, yes, OK for ops in the short term, but unfortunately we have a habit of running UORs on for decades - Nimrod AAR from 1982-2007 and Tornado IFF from 1991-2003 to name but a few.
I agree that MkXII Mode 4 wasn't the best of integrations (coupled to Havequick under UOR it was an ergonomic nightmare!), but it did have some failure mode indications - just not 100% fool proof so a blue-on-blue was always a possibility (but hey, when is anything 100%?). We also spent too long using the UOR when SIFF kept getting slipped year on year to pay for the uber-expensive Type 45, Astute, MRA4 and Typhoon programs (yes, there is a common denominator!).
It won't bring back the 2x GR4 aircrew mates and I'm pretty sure the American who pushed the button still "goes through hell and back" thinking about their action (and how they would've done it differently with hindsight). But we can learn from this and look for languishing UOR modifications such as these and push for them to be tested and fully integrated.
LJ
I totally agree with all the comments on this page. UORs often gave us (still do) what we needed in short timescales and when the defence budget (which has ALWAYS been squeezed) couldn't do everything the MoD wanted. And, yes, we always knew there were some risks. Usually better to run the UORs on rather than remove the kit altogether.
In the 80s and in some cases the 90s we weren't allowed to rely on our own EID to engage aircraft - largely because of the points made here. But it was better to have it for pesonal protection and to aid tgt ID. At least we and other friendlies could eliminate blues from the target list.
As I (think I) mentioned, the incident in questin was dreadful, but how many lives were saved because we had the kit? Without the "bolt ons" we wouldn't have been allowed to play with the big boys anyway.
Sorry if last night's post didn't make my points clearly. I was on a roll!
Courtney
In the 80s and in some cases the 90s we weren't allowed to rely on our own EID to engage aircraft - largely because of the points made here. But it was better to have it for pesonal protection and to aid tgt ID. At least we and other friendlies could eliminate blues from the target list.
As I (think I) mentioned, the incident in questin was dreadful, but how many lives were saved because we had the kit? Without the "bolt ons" we wouldn't have been allowed to play with the big boys anyway.
Sorry if last night's post didn't make my points clearly. I was on a roll!
Courtney
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Did the UOR for IFF Mode 4 get installed using the Speial Trials Fit (STF) procedure?
Was the Mode 4 kit just a "bolt on" to the main IFF system?
DV
Was the Mode 4 kit just a "bolt on" to the main IFF system?
DV
Guys, sorry about this. Checked my notes and the answer is:
"The IFF equipments are detailed in the confidential suppliment to the Aircrew Weapons Manual (CD101d-xxxx-xxx)."
Cannot offer more.
Courtney.
"The IFF equipments are detailed in the confidential suppliment to the Aircrew Weapons Manual (CD101d-xxxx-xxx)."
Cannot offer more.
Courtney.
Excellent points everyone.
Good question on STFs Distant Voice. Their mismanagement has cropped up on other cases as well. Chinook and Nimrod wasn't it?
tuc
I remember this case. Fraud would be being polite. The company even had the cheek to lodge a complaint about a certain programme manager being too robust when he challenged what you mention. It was said the complaint was upheld and it entered his service record. Shame on the bastards who rolled over and well done the PM.
Good question on STFs Distant Voice. Their mismanagement has cropped up on other cases as well. Chinook and Nimrod wasn't it?
tuc
I had recommended MoD pursue free rectification / breach of contract, but it was decided this would have upset a few people, not least the original IFF PM and his mentor, so payment was made again, and something else chopped out of the design.
I remember this case. Fraud would be being polite. The company even had the cheek to lodge a complaint about a certain programme manager being too robust when he challenged what you mention. It was said the complaint was upheld and it entered his service record. Shame on the bastards who rolled over and well done the PM.
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Their mismanagement has cropped up on other cases as well. Chinook and Nimrod wasn't it
DV
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Without the "bolt ons" we wouldn't have been allowed to play with the big boys anyway.
DV
DV
It was a complete refit - made by Thomson CSF if I recall correctly (my notes say NRAI-7). The later SIFF that incorporated Mode 4 and civvy Mode S was again a total change.
LJ
It was a complete refit - made by Thomson CSF if I recall correctly (my notes say NRAI-7). The later SIFF that incorporated Mode 4 and civvy Mode S was again a total change.
LJ
Leon, that's right, Dude. The IFF panel in the cockpit was replaced - so modes1-4 and C were all on the same box. Also all the old transponders and (part of the) interrogators had to be replaced. One of the reasons it wa a bit of a rushed job. I still say we were better of with it, albeit rushed, than without it, or to have waited to have a complete and fully tested integration.
Just my personal view.
Courtney
Just my personal view.
Courtney
There seems to be a very familiar ring to this tale. On the one hand it is portrayed (as by Courtney above) as an urgent mod necessary for imminent operational deployment, yet on the other as another example of basic airworthiness procedures being circumvented to supposedly save money (as posted by tuc):
Time no doubt was of the essence, it invariably is, but the wilful subversion of the Military Airworthiness Regulations is now such a familiar theme, together with the resultant death toll, that the bells are ringing loud and clear. As to the saving of money, as ever it wasn't, for yet more time and more money was spent, but only after yet more lives were lost.
Not being able to afford kit within the Defence budget is not the same as providing it and then wilfully failing to integrate it properly (rendering the aircraft functionally unsafe), but making the false declaration that the job is complete and paying off the contract.
In the case I mentioned, which gave rise to this question of failure warning integration and the recommendations Tornado be checked, the proper integration would have been carried out in parallel with other activities, with time saved at both Boscombe and during flight trials because they wouldn't have had to track down why none of the warnings were working. Not to mention the lengthy machinations in MoD(PE) while the aircraft office fought in vain trying to get 2 Stars to accept aircraft should be delivered safe, supported by valid Safety Cases.
In the case I mentioned, which gave rise to this question of failure warning integration and the recommendations Tornado be checked, the proper integration would have been carried out in parallel with other activities, with time saved at both Boscombe and during flight trials because they wouldn't have had to track down why none of the warnings were working. Not to mention the lengthy machinations in MoD(PE) while the aircraft office fought in vain trying to get 2 Stars to accept aircraft should be delivered safe, supported by valid Safety Cases.
Quite right, Chugs. It is a very familiar tale. And please don't get me wrong, I'm not condoning the wilful subversion of the Military Airworthiness Regulations, I'm just telling it as I saw it at the time. I think we knew the fit wasn't perfect, but I also think we were all happy to receive it.
It is, to my mind, an excellent example of why we should procure our systems as COMPLETE packages in the first place and then apply the mods as the technology becomes available or becomes a necessary capability. Better than waiting until it's all too late and relying on STFs, UORs, etc. Buy the insurance policy BEFORE you have the crash, eh?
Sorry, I think I may be stating the bleedin' obvious now.
Courtney
It is, to my mind, an excellent example of why we should procure our systems as COMPLETE packages in the first place and then apply the mods as the technology becomes available or becomes a necessary capability. Better than waiting until it's all too late and relying on STFs, UORs, etc. Buy the insurance policy BEFORE you have the crash, eh?
Sorry, I think I may be stating the bleedin' obvious now.
Courtney
Courtney, I can see your point that something, no matter how flawed, is better than nothing (though even that might be wrong). It is high time that UK Military Procurement rose above such abysmal and life threatening standards. Please don't apologise for stating the bleeding obvious. If there were one criticism of this forum and its members then it would be that not enough of them do just that. Unless and until there is an outcry from professional aviators that Military Airworthiness Regulations be enforced rather than subverted then the needless death toll will continue unchallenged.
The MOD and the RAF have proved themselves unfit to discharge the responsibilities of Airworthiness Authority and Air Accident Investigator respectively. Nothing less than an independent MAA and MAAIB, separated both from the MOD and from each other, will suffice. We have yet to achieve either and Flight Safety is compromised until we do.
Self Regulation doesn't work and in Aviation it Kills!
The MOD and the RAF have proved themselves unfit to discharge the responsibilities of Airworthiness Authority and Air Accident Investigator respectively. Nothing less than an independent MAA and MAAIB, separated both from the MOD and from each other, will suffice. We have yet to achieve either and Flight Safety is compromised until we do.
Self Regulation doesn't work and in Aviation it Kills!
I can see the sense in that, Chugs. Just out of interest, do you think there is ever a case for cutting corners when operational imperative dictates or should the MoD always put safety first?
Courtney, the MOD should put the Regulations first. If they wish to do otherwise they should put it to the MAA. That is why they should not be their own judge and jury. It is more likely though that Tactical Commanders might wish to so operate. The Regulations must cater for the realities of war. It is that which is always raised in argument against an independent MAA. It is a red herring, as any operational commander must have the freedom to call it as he sees fit. He must do so though in the knowledge that he will subsequently have to report and explain any deviation from the Regulations. Blokes clinging to the outside of an Apache being landed into a firefight in order to effect a casualty evacuation comes to mind for example.
Well thank you for such kind words, Courtney. The "accountability thing" is the very nub of it of course. If, for example, an independent MAA had given the go-ahead to the MOD to procure an IFF fit for the Tornado that was not fully integrated and had known failure warning issues, it would itself be liable to criticism in a subsequent IFF Related Fatal Air Accident Investigation report by an independent MAAIB. I have a suspicion that such accountability would tend to ensure that the fit would be got right first time round and even perhaps on time and within budget, though maybe that is expecting too much!
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Courtney, you said at post #35
If this was the case, then it would be very serious. If there is a common RX for all modes (prior to decoding) then it would mean that regardless of the mode selected the system would not be interrogated. So going to Mode 1 would not help.
DV
I think one of these was if the system was switched on (the master switch was in the on position), but power to the RX was lost, then it wouldn't sense an interrogation and therefore not be concerned that it hadn't replied
DV
Yes indeed. I'm really stretching the limits of memory here and remember I'm talking F3 not GR4. Tempting to think the two installations would be identical, but there were obvious differences such as the additional interrogator function. I've been unable to locate my old (unclass, obviously) notes on this kit, which is a real shame. I do have a mate nearby who was GR4s. I'll seek his council.
Of course, that wouldn't have been the only single point of failure either. For example, wiring or antenna damage would be another inherrent week point that may cause an unalarmed failure.
Of course, that wouldn't have been the only single point of failure either. For example, wiring or antenna damage would be another inherrent week point that may cause an unalarmed failure.