Gulf Tornado/Patriot
Courtney
Well said, and I also concur with your analysis. There is little we can do for those that have lost jobs or have been given poor equipment; some of which cost our people their lives. We can't undo the past, but we can make sure that we don't do it again - can't we?
Well the Govt are telling us we must invest in this:
MOD Invests In Future Of Combat Air Systems
We all know it will be late, over budget and probably have less capability than is currently available off the shelf. It will leave another hole, or just contribute to the current hole in the defence budget. Saving jobs in MP's constituencies, buying their votes and leading to more misery within HMForces (more redundancies and more "mend and make do" UORs and STFs).
It's so corrupt, I decided that I no longer wanted a part and declined my future post in the MoD at the front-end of a major procurement program for 2020 to 2030 - I also took PVR to work as far away from it as possible. Until this point, I thought that the UK always played with a "straight bat" but we're not much better than the corrupt local host-nation Police I used to deal with on detachments around the world - maybe, I'm too naive? I had hoped that when Nu Labour were outed that things would improve, but the Coalition seem just as hell-bent to protect their seats by buying off their constituents vice what we really want and need at the sharp end. Things will probably get worse with the introduction of the new Project SIRIUS officers' career stream - 18 to 24 months in a key MoD post, keep the Ministers happy and then progress to the next rank or command tour. Sadly, I can only foresee further trouble ahead as the stabilising influence of experienced SO1s and SO2s are dragged away from where the key decisions are made.
Lynx Wildcat, SAR-H, Hawk128, MRA4, Typhoon and Tornado F3 are all classic Govt meddling tales. We end up being told what we want by Min DEST various and we pay through the nose in lack of capability and lives.
LJ
Well said, and I also concur with your analysis. There is little we can do for those that have lost jobs or have been given poor equipment; some of which cost our people their lives. We can't undo the past, but we can make sure that we don't do it again - can't we?
Well the Govt are telling us we must invest in this:
MOD Invests In Future Of Combat Air Systems
We all know it will be late, over budget and probably have less capability than is currently available off the shelf. It will leave another hole, or just contribute to the current hole in the defence budget. Saving jobs in MP's constituencies, buying their votes and leading to more misery within HMForces (more redundancies and more "mend and make do" UORs and STFs).
It's so corrupt, I decided that I no longer wanted a part and declined my future post in the MoD at the front-end of a major procurement program for 2020 to 2030 - I also took PVR to work as far away from it as possible. Until this point, I thought that the UK always played with a "straight bat" but we're not much better than the corrupt local host-nation Police I used to deal with on detachments around the world - maybe, I'm too naive? I had hoped that when Nu Labour were outed that things would improve, but the Coalition seem just as hell-bent to protect their seats by buying off their constituents vice what we really want and need at the sharp end. Things will probably get worse with the introduction of the new Project SIRIUS officers' career stream - 18 to 24 months in a key MoD post, keep the Ministers happy and then progress to the next rank or command tour. Sadly, I can only foresee further trouble ahead as the stabilising influence of experienced SO1s and SO2s are dragged away from where the key decisions are made.
Lynx Wildcat, SAR-H, Hawk128, MRA4, Typhoon and Tornado F3 are all classic Govt meddling tales. We end up being told what we want by Min DEST various and we pay through the nose in lack of capability and lives.
LJ
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I understand what Glojo and Courtney are saying, if you go to war you can not expect everything to be perfect. However, I restate what I posted at #34,
The CinC's recommendation "The Tornado IFF installation be modified to ensure that the cockpit warning is triggered in all failure modes", indicates that they were not. So people like LJ, who believed that the CWP light would illuminate for all the modes that he has listed, were being mislead. The IFF system in the GR4 Tornado aircraft appears to have been delivered "Functionally Unsafe".
It is important that people who use kit such as IFF Mode 4 and body armour, to use Courtney's example, are aware of its "non-perfect" limitations. Of course you can only specify what they are if the installation is tested, and End-to-End testing was rejected in TART on the grounds of "shortage of LRUs, test equipment and trained manpower". Just because a piece of equipment appears to perform correctly on the bench does not mean the same applies to an installed system.
DV
The CinC's recommendation "The Tornado IFF installation be modified to ensure that the cockpit warning is triggered in all failure modes", indicates that they were not. So people like LJ, who believed that the CWP light would illuminate for all the modes that he has listed, were being mislead. The IFF system in the GR4 Tornado aircraft appears to have been delivered "Functionally Unsafe".
It is important that people who use kit such as IFF Mode 4 and body armour, to use Courtney's example, are aware of its "non-perfect" limitations. Of course you can only specify what they are if the installation is tested, and End-to-End testing was rejected in TART on the grounds of "shortage of LRUs, test equipment and trained manpower". Just because a piece of equipment appears to perform correctly on the bench does not mean the same applies to an installed system.
DV
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DV
Another interesting post that highlights a key part of safety that is often forgotten in this debate. Accurate information and knowledge of safety issues, patricularly those relevant to a specific op task is key to enabling any crew to make the best possible decision. This is especially true when the s*** hits the fan, by which time it's too late. Although it does sound a lot like a proper SMS....
Another interesting post that highlights a key part of safety that is often forgotten in this debate. Accurate information and knowledge of safety issues, patricularly those relevant to a specific op task is key to enabling any crew to make the best possible decision. This is especially true when the s*** hits the fan, by which time it's too late. Although it does sound a lot like a proper SMS....
Thank you, guys. I think the point here is that there has been a lot of blame laid at the door of the MoD blokes and them alone. I cannot say how much blame should rest in their shoulders, but I think it is very important not to leave the responsibility of the politicians out of this. After all, whatever happens, isn't the Minister in the MoD ultimately responsible for everything that happens on his watch?
Think I might go quiet for a while now.
Happy New Year to you all. I mean that.
Think I might go quiet for a while now.
Happy New Year to you all. I mean that.
Courtney, your concise summing up of the period in question rings bells for us all, I'm sure. All those projects, all those pressures, all those calls for so much with so little money, end up with a 2* lambasting individually an entire IPT, all of whom were present throughout, and specifically ordering them to suborn the Military Airworthiness Regulations, ie to ignore them but sign them off as complied with. That is the cost of all that "punching above our weight" that you recall, because someone had the bright idea to plunder the ring fenced airworthiness budget and to simply forget about airworthiness. Over 30 years later the cost goes on being paid, in blood and treasure. What amazes and appals me in all this is that professional pilots were party to this criminal activity. The Engineers, with some very notable exceptions, could not be depended on to collaborate in this desecration of their trade, and so were replaced with Adminers and Equippers who could be. But Aircrew SO's, who were the main beneficiaries when flying of a Flight Safety system second to none, bent to the task of demolishing it as ordered. It may be a sweeping denunciation, an unfair generalisation, but what happened was a classic example of "Evil happens when Good Men do Nothing".
Chugs,
Wow. From the heart, I think. I know you're right in your condemnation, but I'm very glad about your words concerning the enigineers. Some very professional people in my book. What a shame so many were silenced.
Happy New Year.
Wow. From the heart, I think. I know you're right in your condemnation, but I'm very glad about your words concerning the enigineers. Some very professional people in my book. What a shame so many were silenced.
Happy New Year.
Courtney:
Indeed, but at the end of the day it is they who silenced themselves. The 2* that I mentioned issued a blatantly illegal order, which we all know must not be obeyed but rather reported. With very few worthy exceptions, most chose not to do so. Those who did were simply told that the order was indeed proper, and that disobeying it was a disciplinary matter. That did not of course mean that the order was legal, it plainly wasn't, but simply shows the corruption and negligence extant in the MOD and the High Command of HM Forces, in this case all the way to and including the SoS. I make the point though that it is never too late to speak out. Many must have lived with similar orders obeyed gnawing away at their consciences ever since. What happened then is not best just forgotten, water under the bridge, best to let sleeping dogs lie, and all the other opt-out platitudes, for the evil is still with us. Unless and until all this is laid bare, the MOD will be able to resist pressures to divest itself of control over airworthiness enforcement (or rather lack thereof) and air accident investigation (or skirting thereof). Unless and until there be a separate and independent MAA and MAAIB, avoidable airworthiness related military air accidents will continue to kill. That is why the silence has to stop!
What a shame so many were silenced.
Chugs,
I cannot argue with anything you say. You clearly know more than I about the disgraceful happenings. To be honest, it makes me wonder what I would have done had I found myself on the receiving end of those orders. I hope I would have done the right thing, who knows. I doubt I could have kept my mouth shut, it wasn't in my nature to let people get away with things I didn't think was right - probably more because of my rebellious streak than a matter of true honour.
Once again, your MAA/MAAIB push looks like to logical answer.
I cannot argue with anything you say. You clearly know more than I about the disgraceful happenings. To be honest, it makes me wonder what I would have done had I found myself on the receiving end of those orders. I hope I would have done the right thing, who knows. I doubt I could have kept my mouth shut, it wasn't in my nature to let people get away with things I didn't think was right - probably more because of my rebellious streak than a matter of true honour.
Once again, your MAA/MAAIB push looks like to logical answer.
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I have been thinking about all the excellent posts on this thread and a question has been in my head for a few days and will not go away.
There has been mention of an American F16 being 'lit up' by a patriot battery and the pilot of that aircraft was possibly not amused by that action
I accept there is a few years between these two incidents but could any British aircraft have detect when it had attracted the attention of these lethal batteries? If not why not.
If not and the Americans had it then..... Multiple questions as to why not fitted.
It is so easy to put most of the blame elsewhere but as usual with hind sight lots of what ifs could have avoided this awful incident.
War is a female dog that bites and at times bites VERY hard
Such a tragic, tragic loss of life.
John
There has been mention of an American F16 being 'lit up' by a patriot battery and the pilot of that aircraft was possibly not amused by that action
It started with a discussion about an F16 with HTS firing a HARM at another Patriot battery that locked it up after this tragic event. Then we have been discussing the belief that ZG710 was on an ALARM mission and the F3 had been modded to do this better than the GR4 but denied a chance to play - the F3 was fitted with the better integrated SIFF. So the last post was the supposition that, with hindsight, the GR4 blue on blue should never have happened in the first place.
Do keep up 007!
Do keep up 007!
If not and the Americans had it then..... Multiple questions as to why not fitted.
It is so easy to put most of the blame elsewhere but as usual with hind sight lots of what ifs could have avoided this awful incident.
War is a female dog that bites and at times bites VERY hard
Such a tragic, tragic loss of life.
John
Glojo,
I'm going to make a bit of an assumption here that the GR4 RHWR (radar warning receiver) was much the same as the F3's (apart from where the antennas were located). If I'm right, it certainly would have picked up the Patriot battery illuminating them, but that happens all the time. On ops like that the crews get used to being lit up by friendlies and, in my experience, never believe that the buggers are actually going to shoot you.
Actually, a lot of my air defence work in my early days was with the Royal Navy. You'll love this. One of the most difficult things to do on exercise was to join the fleet without getting shot down by them. And who can blame the guys sitting in their boats not wanting air assets to come near them without being absolutely sure our intent was friendly!
Your other questions there, way out of my league!!!!
Courtney
I'm going to make a bit of an assumption here that the GR4 RHWR (radar warning receiver) was much the same as the F3's (apart from where the antennas were located). If I'm right, it certainly would have picked up the Patriot battery illuminating them, but that happens all the time. On ops like that the crews get used to being lit up by friendlies and, in my experience, never believe that the buggers are actually going to shoot you.
Actually, a lot of my air defence work in my early days was with the Royal Navy. You'll love this. One of the most difficult things to do on exercise was to join the fleet without getting shot down by them. And who can blame the guys sitting in their boats not wanting air assets to come near them without being absolutely sure our intent was friendly!
Your other questions there, way out of my league!!!!
Courtney
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Excellent reply that I should have thought of... They knew that battery was there and as you rightly point out, pound to a pint of Guinness the cry wolf syndrome bit them..
I guess that second question was also answered by your reply
As if we would shoot you folks down... Now if it was a week-end or after 5pm on a week day then we would be really suspicious of any incoming aircraft!!
Note your 'boat' comment went waaay over my head.
BOAT he says.... blooming boat.. Not going to bite, not going to bite
I am off to fly my kite
I guess that second question was also answered by your reply
As if we would shoot you folks down... Now if it was a week-end or after 5pm on a week day then we would be really suspicious of any incoming aircraft!!
Note your 'boat' comment went waaay over my head.
BOAT he says.... blooming boat.. Not going to bite, not going to bite
I am off to fly my kite
Courtney - you're right on the assumption ref RHWR similarities. I believe that there were some differences in PFMs to fit in with the different roles, but bottom line is that any threat and any friendly would/is in an op PFM for all the reasons outlined in this thread.
In pre-TELIC days the Rapiers at Ali would track our recovery and you'd get all the associated indications, but you assumed they knew who you were and wouldn't shoot you down! Fair to assume the same ref Patriot too I would think. Certainly did at the 'Deid later!
30 mRad
In pre-TELIC days the Rapiers at Ali would track our recovery and you'd get all the associated indications, but you assumed they knew who you were and wouldn't shoot you down! Fair to assume the same ref Patriot too I would think. Certainly did at the 'Deid later!
30 mRad
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I do not know anything about the Patriot radar system, but if it is anything like similar systems it will have various modes of operation; acquisition, track and lock on. Being illuminate in the acquisition and track modes is not too bad, but once the radar goes to "lock on" you should question the intent and make noises.
Some years ago, flying against the Soviet Fleet at North Cape in a Nimrod, I experience all the modes of a fire control radar. I still remember the continuous tone of "lock on". In this case there was little point in shouting "I am a friendly Nimrod, do not shoot".
DV
Some years ago, flying against the Soviet Fleet at North Cape in a Nimrod, I experience all the modes of a fire control radar. I still remember the continuous tone of "lock on". In this case there was little point in shouting "I am a friendly Nimrod, do not shoot".
DV
Indeed. Agree all the above. But lock-ons weren't that uncommon either. Those guys couldn't even get through to the battery, though. And lock to band with that system is very quick. Even at 18,000 feet.
DV
I know a little bit about Patriot and it would depend on the missile type; PAC-2 standard or PAC-3 standard.
I believe the major issue would be that PAC-2 that uses command guidance from the Patriot RADAR which switches to semi-active guidance using high powered illumination from the Patriot RADAR making hostile intent easy to detect, but, PAC-3 that uses a mix of command, inertial and low-power active missile guidance would be far harder to detect. Also, the newer PAC-3 may not have been in the GR4's RADAR Homing and Warning Reciever (RHWR) threat library - again, though, this is my conjecture.
That said, with a Mach 5 (ish) missile coming towards you, what difference is seeing it on the RHWR going to make?
Finally, I know that Patriot uses an ID matrix and that if GR4 had been fitted with Link 16/JTIDS (as it was supposed to have been over successive yearly upgrade plans that were cancelled) then the Patriot would not have been fired - Mode 4 or no Mode 4. Another own goal by the procurement teams and manufacturer.
LJ
I know a little bit about Patriot and it would depend on the missile type; PAC-2 standard or PAC-3 standard.
I believe the major issue would be that PAC-2 that uses command guidance from the Patriot RADAR which switches to semi-active guidance using high powered illumination from the Patriot RADAR making hostile intent easy to detect, but, PAC-3 that uses a mix of command, inertial and low-power active missile guidance would be far harder to detect. Also, the newer PAC-3 may not have been in the GR4's RADAR Homing and Warning Reciever (RHWR) threat library - again, though, this is my conjecture.
That said, with a Mach 5 (ish) missile coming towards you, what difference is seeing it on the RHWR going to make?
Finally, I know that Patriot uses an ID matrix and that if GR4 had been fitted with Link 16/JTIDS (as it was supposed to have been over successive yearly upgrade plans that were cancelled) then the Patriot would not have been fired - Mode 4 or no Mode 4. Another own goal by the procurement teams and manufacturer.
LJ
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Please do not dwell on my question folks as it can stir up memories that are best locked away in our little cubby holes that should perhaps be pushed into those far away corners.
My question has been answered and I am guessing a few folks are once more saying those oft repeated words....
'There but for the grace of God.....'
Leon I say this with the VERY greatest of respect....
No amount of 'if only' will fetch those brave men back but let us all pray that this funding paid for other equipment that saved more lives than the two it lost.
Courtney also summed up that situation far better than I ever could: post #120 refers
PLEASE do not think for a millisecond that I am trying to belittle your very poignant post. Your observation will stick in my mind for a long, long time.
Respect to one and all
John
My question has been answered and I am guessing a few folks are once more saying those oft repeated words....
'There but for the grace of God.....'
if GR4 had been fitted with Link 16/JTIDS
No amount of 'if only' will fetch those brave men back but let us all pray that this funding paid for other equipment that saved more lives than the two it lost.
Courtney also summed up that situation far better than I ever could: post #120 refers
PLEASE do not think for a millisecond that I am trying to belittle your very poignant post. Your observation will stick in my mind for a long, long time.
Respect to one and all
John
CM
What you say is very true in general terms. The important thing to remember on the IFF programme that highlighted these systemic failings in 1998 is this; It was fully funded and the contractor (who wasn’t the Design Authority for the IFF, but erroneously claimed to be, which meant there would be huge uncertainties over things like up to date drawings, Interface Control Documents, Radio Installation Memoranda, and hence valid Safety Cases) was contracted to fully integrate by the IFF office, not the aircraft offices.
It was only when Boscombe rejected the installation, citing failure to integrate failure warnings properly as an “Essential” (i.e. for all practical purposes, no RTS) that the aircraft offices were engaged. This in itself is a major failing – the equipment office failing to engage the aircraft office or Aircraft and Equipment Design Authorities on a programme requiring minor aircraft mods and MAJOR equipment mods (e.g. to the intercom if the convention was audio warnings, as it was on at least one of the aircraft). This is what raised the red flag. When asked if these mods had been designed (as we knew they hadn’t been embodied) all DAs said “Never spoken to the IFF office”. The cost of regression work on parallel design programmes was astronomical – the cost of ignoring programmatic integration.
The dismissive statement by the IFF office that “It works on the bench, so it’ll work on the aircraft” did not just omit one hoop to jump through, but many critical hoops. Not least, sub-system integration rigs (which had been dismantled and destroyed as a savings measure by AMSO some years earlier). No Co-ordinating Design Authority appointed (to co-ordinate Equipment DAs and accept responsibility for integration rig performance – which is then delivered to the Aircraft DA who undertakes to maintain that performance when installed). And so on. No mods to the simulator. No ATP amendments. No spares. Bottom line – Ask if there was a Safety Case re-issue. There wasn’t.
The programme was fully funded, so one is entitled to ask why the contract was paid off in full, knowing at least one installation was functionally unsafe (remember, Tornado didn’t reply when warned they may be affected and the 2 Stars refused to recommend fleet inspections) and major modifications had yet to be contracted, never mind installed. (Apart from anything else, this is a major fraud as false declarations must have been made). Given the aircraft that WAS made safe was told to fund this amelioration itself, to avoid criticism and awkward questions of the IFF office, where did these MILLIONS come from? THAT is what created the black hole in this case, and contributes to the greater hole we see today. The need to pay the same company AGAIN to do what they were already in default on. Contracting them again was directed from on high in DPA, against our wishes. (Why would you think them competent or honest when they had laughed in your face the first time round, while pocketing a huge profit for work not carried out?). They screwed up AGAIN. As usual, in stepped Westland and sorted it all out, under direction from MoD programme staff who ignored 2 Star orders. So, 3 lots of payment amounting to millions over the original (correct) level of funding. Plus, £1.6M on spares that hadn’t been procured (just for one fleet). Plus about £500k to upgrade the integration rig (that had been resurrected despite AML complaints, as it highlighted their previous waste).
This case is a catalogue of systemic failings encapsulating all that we have discussed for years on Nimrod, C130, Chinook and others.
Look at the criticism here (let alone anywhere else) for installing, incompletely, a life-saving piece of kit. Done by people, for all sorts of motives, some honourable, some self-serving I'm sure. Imagine the public response if, for example, the guy running the body armour procurement had said, "Well, it's not properly funded, we can't guarantee it's perfect so we'll cancel it for now."
It was only when Boscombe rejected the installation, citing failure to integrate failure warnings properly as an “Essential” (i.e. for all practical purposes, no RTS) that the aircraft offices were engaged. This in itself is a major failing – the equipment office failing to engage the aircraft office or Aircraft and Equipment Design Authorities on a programme requiring minor aircraft mods and MAJOR equipment mods (e.g. to the intercom if the convention was audio warnings, as it was on at least one of the aircraft). This is what raised the red flag. When asked if these mods had been designed (as we knew they hadn’t been embodied) all DAs said “Never spoken to the IFF office”. The cost of regression work on parallel design programmes was astronomical – the cost of ignoring programmatic integration.
The dismissive statement by the IFF office that “It works on the bench, so it’ll work on the aircraft” did not just omit one hoop to jump through, but many critical hoops. Not least, sub-system integration rigs (which had been dismantled and destroyed as a savings measure by AMSO some years earlier). No Co-ordinating Design Authority appointed (to co-ordinate Equipment DAs and accept responsibility for integration rig performance – which is then delivered to the Aircraft DA who undertakes to maintain that performance when installed). And so on. No mods to the simulator. No ATP amendments. No spares. Bottom line – Ask if there was a Safety Case re-issue. There wasn’t.
The programme was fully funded, so one is entitled to ask why the contract was paid off in full, knowing at least one installation was functionally unsafe (remember, Tornado didn’t reply when warned they may be affected and the 2 Stars refused to recommend fleet inspections) and major modifications had yet to be contracted, never mind installed. (Apart from anything else, this is a major fraud as false declarations must have been made). Given the aircraft that WAS made safe was told to fund this amelioration itself, to avoid criticism and awkward questions of the IFF office, where did these MILLIONS come from? THAT is what created the black hole in this case, and contributes to the greater hole we see today. The need to pay the same company AGAIN to do what they were already in default on. Contracting them again was directed from on high in DPA, against our wishes. (Why would you think them competent or honest when they had laughed in your face the first time round, while pocketing a huge profit for work not carried out?). They screwed up AGAIN. As usual, in stepped Westland and sorted it all out, under direction from MoD programme staff who ignored 2 Star orders. So, 3 lots of payment amounting to millions over the original (correct) level of funding. Plus, £1.6M on spares that hadn’t been procured (just for one fleet). Plus about £500k to upgrade the integration rig (that had been resurrected despite AML complaints, as it highlighted their previous waste).
This case is a catalogue of systemic failings encapsulating all that we have discussed for years on Nimrod, C130, Chinook and others.
Tuc,
As usual, your analysis of how the programme was run and all the unforgivable failings is undeniable and well put. As I am discovering here, there was even more bad (understatement) practice going on than even I thought - and I was pretty cynical about it all. And you are right, I was being general and, as Glojo says, trying to summarise the point with a slightly different slant on it.
I think the biggest thing you have shown me in this and other threads is how all these airworthiness failings are linked - procurement, installation, BoIs, etc, in a way that I had never fully mentally connected before.
LJ,
If everything was running properly and all the various units (surface and air) were fully integrated then, yes, JTIDS could have saved the day having a full network (or networks in fact) would get my vote every time. In this case, though, it probably wouldn't have saved the crew as the Patriot battery in question was still waiting for all their kit to be delivered from the USA. So they (probably) wouldn't have had their Link and the HQ couldn't contact them quickly enough to advise them of their Link picture. That's why they were operation autonomously.
Your points about threat libraries and detecting a Mach 5 missile are well made.
30mRad,
Thank you for your thoughts on the PFM.
Courtney
As usual, your analysis of how the programme was run and all the unforgivable failings is undeniable and well put. As I am discovering here, there was even more bad (understatement) practice going on than even I thought - and I was pretty cynical about it all. And you are right, I was being general and, as Glojo says, trying to summarise the point with a slightly different slant on it.
I think the biggest thing you have shown me in this and other threads is how all these airworthiness failings are linked - procurement, installation, BoIs, etc, in a way that I had never fully mentally connected before.
LJ,
If everything was running properly and all the various units (surface and air) were fully integrated then, yes, JTIDS could have saved the day having a full network (or networks in fact) would get my vote every time. In this case, though, it probably wouldn't have saved the crew as the Patriot battery in question was still waiting for all their kit to be delivered from the USA. So they (probably) wouldn't have had their Link and the HQ couldn't contact them quickly enough to advise them of their Link picture. That's why they were operation autonomously.
Your points about threat libraries and detecting a Mach 5 missile are well made.
30mRad,
Thank you for your thoughts on the PFM.
Courtney