I'm not sure what you mean.
I mean you
could argue its correct function under hostile action is not part of the air safety / airworthiness question. Hostile action can include EW / RF / jamming / exploitation attack as well as kinetic of course.
To draw a parallel, if you fit a jammer system to an aircraft, but it fails to defeat in incoming missile that e.g. has enabled a HOJ mode that was not known, this would clearly be outside of the scope of air safety as defined by the MAA etc. - though you could argue its not fit for purpose or operationally effective (as the baddies know how to defeat your technology).
IFF in some ways could be considered similar, e.g. its use of crypto for some modes is designed to deny exploitation by hostiles etc. This where the argument can get complicated as it can be argued that some aspects of its design are "military" and clearly intended to counter hostile action. Where you start including such capabilities into your systems, assuring the integrity of such systems can get complicated.
This is not to say that a warning of a power supply failure should not be provided if feasible - just saying it is not necessarily a simple matter..