Easy Street
Excellent questions.
The easy answer is one I was given a few months ago when I asked the same of an MP on the All Party Armed Forces Committee. There is no difference between Ministers and their Departments. Convention has it that they speak with one voice. As very few MPs have the slightest clue about their Ministerial brief, their default position is that their officials MUST be right. Convention dictates that to contradict the officials is to admit you don’t have a clue and that you, yourself, are wrong. That is the way it was explained to me when I asked why no Ministers were interested. The honourable exception in all this is Sir Malcolm Rifkind who spoke out (after he left office) when he became aware he had been misled by omission and commission on Mull of Kintyre. I believe his evidence swayed Lord Philip. What was omitted? The fact the aircraft was not cleared to fly.
Haddon-Cave was given detailed facts and written supporting evidence demonstrating the systematic rundown of airworthiness from 1991-onwards. The main submission to Lord Philip included all those papers, and more; the passage of time had allowed research to reveal the evidence that pushed this rundown back to a June 1987 policy by AMSO. The weight of evidence probably swayed him in general terms, but the natural reaction of both was to concentrate on one key issue that underpinned their recommendations. The legal mind introducing sufficient doubt, perhaps. In both cases, it was reasonable of them to assume MoD would understand all the failures that led to the ultimately flawed Safety Cases. But, of course, they don’t. That is why the ARTs have been sought, because they reported the failings in excruciating detail to the RAF Chief Engineer, whose job it was to govern the process. He did nothing; evidenced when the 1996 Puma ART reported the same failures as its predecessor in 1992. 4 crucial years, with MoK right in the middle.
And therein lies the problem. The self healing nature of MoD, the culture that incompetence is acceptable and the malign influence of retired VSOs. But in the past 11 months (since this was reported to Minsters and, in turn, to MoD) I really do see a difference. Not as a result of Haddon-Cave – he made an a*** of his report and blamed the wrong people. I believe he was swayed. It wasn’t so much who he blamed, but those he praised, that is the giveaway. He accepted all the evidence against them, but blamed others. I always ask this – “Who is protected by this decision?” and adhere to the basic principle of “Follow the lies, because that is where you’ll find the truth.” For example, he attributed a 1991 airworthiness failing to General Cowan, who only took up post in 1999.
No, the catalyst will prove to be the Mull of Kintyre verdict. That has reasserted Ministerial governance of the Department. We all read the pompous rubbish from Graydon, Alcock etc in their letters to the press. Post-verdict, the telling question is “Why the silence?”. The answer lies in the detailed evidence to Lord Philip. He did not need to publish it publicly, but you can rest assured it has been thrust under the noses of senior officers and officials. That evidence explained in detail the comment by Haddon-Cave that savings had been made at the expense of safety. Haddon-Cave had not explored the root of the problem, despite being dragged there screaming. That the savings had been thought necessary by the wanton waste that had created a black hole in AMSO’s budget in 1990 (as a result of the above June 1987 policy). Ring bells? That black hole was filled, in part, by robbing the hitherto ring fenced airworthiness pot. One problem was hidden, but the bow wave built up. From a personal perspective, my concern is that all this was identified and notified in January 1988. Who was it that did nothing? See letters to the press (above). As I said, self healing.
I don’t like getting into politics, but the Coalition is doing good deeds here. Say what you like about the cutbacks, but their appointment of Bernard Gray is potentially a major step forward. At the moment (!) he is not toeing a party line; he seems his own man and is following through proposals he made while independent of Government. His biggest battle will not be political, but with the above VSOs and officials, because radical change will reveal their past shortcomings. Importantly, it will reveal they KNEW of these shortcomings and the adverse effect they had, and sat back and did nothing. While servicemen died. Did you listen to “Buying Defence” on Radio 4 on Tuesday evening? In 40 mins of regurgitation, Gray came out with the telling phrase “Co-ordinating Authority”. Where does that come from ? I’ll tell you. The only Defence Standard dedicated to maintaining airworthiness. Last amended in 1991 (when AMSO chopped funding and stopped most activities) and finally cancelled 3 years ago. But quoted extensively in evidence to both Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip. Every experienced project manager knows that Def Stan is not only the procedures for maintaining airworthiness, but the template for all procurement. Got a problem? The solution is in those 2 books. If you don’t know them off by heart, you’re years shy of being experienced enough to work in the MAA and even further away from being a project manager!