5th C-17 for RAAF
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Col, from some of the comments you've made, I suspect your name may well appear in my log book.
Back on to the subject in hand.
The killer issue overriding all else in these purchases that go wrong (or, given how many there have been, should that be "these-purchases-that-go-wrong"?) is one that Bushranger 71 has touched on already. The Department of Defence has ceased being about providing the best and most suited equipment for our soldiers, sailors and airmen to go into battle with - (or perhaps more importantly, to be able to project Australia's interests quickly and effectively and therefore not to have to go into battle with). It has instead become, to an overwhelming degree, a Department of Defence Industry, with its main aim being to provide the biggest returns to the people who will build said equipment.
Like many such skewed ideas, it started out with noble (or as noble as things can get in the halls of government) ideas of providing the maximum number of jobs for Australian workers and developing local industry. However, as defence equipment has become more complex and so expensive to buy, local defence companies have found it impossible to bid as stand alone contractors, and so very few have survived as independant entities. Instead, almost all have become branches of major European or US defence conglomorates and the local jobs such purchases generate are all too frequently short term or so so uneconomic in terms of what the taxpayer has to fork out to generate those jobs, it's just not worth it. And, most importantly, much if not most of the profits now go overseas.
Insisting on a specialised local product, (which involves huge added expenditure, as well as very long delays), has also been been shown - in almost every case - to be a disaster, and after huge outlays far in excess of what originally budgeted for, in some cases, (Seasprite), resulting in no product reaching the end user at all, while in others, (Tiger), political pressure has resulted in the end user being forced to take delivery of a product that clearly was not reaching many of the promised performance parameters set down in the original contract and promised by the manufacturer. This too has resulted, to date at least, in no product reaching the end user, and the end user having to accept that when the (incredibly expensive) product eventually arrives, many years after it was due, it will not perform as promised.
Added to this is the very ignoble aspect of some people at the top, both the civilian 'suits' - (and I stress that I include very senior politicians among these 'suits' - just look who some ex-ministers of the Howard government are working for now) -and those in uniform who have allowed the job they have been promised post-retirement, or the job they hope to win post-retirement, to colour their judgement in what company should be chosen for a particular contract. (This is by no means peculiar to Defence.)
In short, a very unhappy situation, and one that, if the Australian population was not so apathetic, (or perhaps just plain ignorant) about how much has been spent - and continues to be spent - to so little effect, would be causing an outcry as loud as is currently being made over the ill-conceived carbon tax.
In an attempt to bet back onto the topic of this thread, the C-17 purchase has shown how any such purchase should be done - and for this country to be running a fleet of King Airs in lieu of a Caribou (or its modern day equivalent) fleet is a travesty of the first order and one that will cost us dearly should we ever have to go into battle in our local area.
Back on to the subject in hand.
The killer issue overriding all else in these purchases that go wrong (or, given how many there have been, should that be "these-purchases-that-go-wrong"?) is one that Bushranger 71 has touched on already. The Department of Defence has ceased being about providing the best and most suited equipment for our soldiers, sailors and airmen to go into battle with - (or perhaps more importantly, to be able to project Australia's interests quickly and effectively and therefore not to have to go into battle with). It has instead become, to an overwhelming degree, a Department of Defence Industry, with its main aim being to provide the biggest returns to the people who will build said equipment.
Like many such skewed ideas, it started out with noble (or as noble as things can get in the halls of government) ideas of providing the maximum number of jobs for Australian workers and developing local industry. However, as defence equipment has become more complex and so expensive to buy, local defence companies have found it impossible to bid as stand alone contractors, and so very few have survived as independant entities. Instead, almost all have become branches of major European or US defence conglomorates and the local jobs such purchases generate are all too frequently short term or so so uneconomic in terms of what the taxpayer has to fork out to generate those jobs, it's just not worth it. And, most importantly, much if not most of the profits now go overseas.
Insisting on a specialised local product, (which involves huge added expenditure, as well as very long delays), has also been been shown - in almost every case - to be a disaster, and after huge outlays far in excess of what originally budgeted for, in some cases, (Seasprite), resulting in no product reaching the end user at all, while in others, (Tiger), political pressure has resulted in the end user being forced to take delivery of a product that clearly was not reaching many of the promised performance parameters set down in the original contract and promised by the manufacturer. This too has resulted, to date at least, in no product reaching the end user, and the end user having to accept that when the (incredibly expensive) product eventually arrives, many years after it was due, it will not perform as promised.
Added to this is the very ignoble aspect of some people at the top, both the civilian 'suits' - (and I stress that I include very senior politicians among these 'suits' - just look who some ex-ministers of the Howard government are working for now) -and those in uniform who have allowed the job they have been promised post-retirement, or the job they hope to win post-retirement, to colour their judgement in what company should be chosen for a particular contract. (This is by no means peculiar to Defence.)
In short, a very unhappy situation, and one that, if the Australian population was not so apathetic, (or perhaps just plain ignorant) about how much has been spent - and continues to be spent - to so little effect, would be causing an outcry as loud as is currently being made over the ill-conceived carbon tax.
In an attempt to bet back onto the topic of this thread, the C-17 purchase has shown how any such purchase should be done - and for this country to be running a fleet of King Airs in lieu of a Caribou (or its modern day equivalent) fleet is a travesty of the first order and one that will cost us dearly should we ever have to go into battle in our local area.
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Wiley said:
The DWP2009 say that "Australia should continue to play a leading role in supporting internal stability and effective governance within the countries of our immediate neighbourhood, which makes sense from both a humanitarian and a strategic perspective."
If someone were trying to destablise our immediate neighbourhood, how would they get around from place to place, could the ADF match/counter them, and where would the ADF have to go in order to do that?
BR71, I expect that you would have some astute observations regrading this?
for this country to be running a fleet of King Airs in lieu of a Caribou (or its modern day equivalent) fleet is a travesty of the first order and one that will cost us dearly should we ever have to go into battle in our local area.
If someone were trying to destablise our immediate neighbourhood, how would they get around from place to place, could the ADF match/counter them, and where would the ADF have to go in order to do that?
BR71, I expect that you would have some astute observations regrading this?
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Accountability
Bravo herkman and Wiley your latest posts.
BB; shedding of the Caribou was really stupid as they performed an invaluable role throughout the regional archipelago and in Vietnam during their service. Doubtless, the C-27 Spartan would be a good replacement; but I have reservations about funding being available over the next decade or so for kit envisaged in the Defence Capability Plan, despite supposed quarantining of planned increases in defence expenditure out to 2030 by both of the major political parties. Australia is facing too many other economic imperatives and voters will inevitably complain more about defence as they come under escalating cost pressures.
The King Air move was arguably even dumber than sacrificing the 'Bou, but I think it is all about preserving the Air Order of Battle. If squadrons are closed down while a requirement exists in the DCP for a replacement aircraft, there is lessened justification for that project to materialise, especially if the politicians are forced downstream to consider defence spending economies. On another tack, given the parlous status of the Joint Strike Fighter project, it would seem prudent to mothball 1 or 2 fighter squadrons to extend the in-service life of the F-18; but if the F-35 dies (as seems possible), those lost flying units would probably never be recovered. The same reasoning could be applied to the Order of Battle for Navy and Army.
While the Service Chiefs are now more subservient to the Public Service defence machinery and the job creation posturing of politicians than was the case pre-Tange Re-organisation in 1974, military leader influence in some of the inappropriate force structuring decisions over the past decade in particular should be highlighted. CDF support for the hugely costly and unnecessary ADF helo fleet rationalisation plan and withdrawal of the long-range F-111 from service - which could have been cost-effectively enhanced for maritime strike - are just 2 examples of leadership shortcomings. As I see it, military history will not judge him kindly.
BB; shedding of the Caribou was really stupid as they performed an invaluable role throughout the regional archipelago and in Vietnam during their service. Doubtless, the C-27 Spartan would be a good replacement; but I have reservations about funding being available over the next decade or so for kit envisaged in the Defence Capability Plan, despite supposed quarantining of planned increases in defence expenditure out to 2030 by both of the major political parties. Australia is facing too many other economic imperatives and voters will inevitably complain more about defence as they come under escalating cost pressures.
The King Air move was arguably even dumber than sacrificing the 'Bou, but I think it is all about preserving the Air Order of Battle. If squadrons are closed down while a requirement exists in the DCP for a replacement aircraft, there is lessened justification for that project to materialise, especially if the politicians are forced downstream to consider defence spending economies. On another tack, given the parlous status of the Joint Strike Fighter project, it would seem prudent to mothball 1 or 2 fighter squadrons to extend the in-service life of the F-18; but if the F-35 dies (as seems possible), those lost flying units would probably never be recovered. The same reasoning could be applied to the Order of Battle for Navy and Army.
While the Service Chiefs are now more subservient to the Public Service defence machinery and the job creation posturing of politicians than was the case pre-Tange Re-organisation in 1974, military leader influence in some of the inappropriate force structuring decisions over the past decade in particular should be highlighted. CDF support for the hugely costly and unnecessary ADF helo fleet rationalisation plan and withdrawal of the long-range F-111 from service - which could have been cost-effectively enhanced for maritime strike - are just 2 examples of leadership shortcomings. As I see it, military history will not judge him kindly.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 9th Apr 2011 at 21:14.
Bushranger,
the Caribou was dead as a viable and maintable airframe - simple as that. No amount of sustainment money was going to make it last any longer.
The King Air decision was all about providing a gap fill capability of some description and help maintain a workforce mass that is going to transition basically every platform over the next decade. You need to maintain a level of 'spare' capacity to introduce new types whilst maintaining capability with the old.
Not to mention in an environmebt where pilots course graduates are waiting up to 18 months for conversions in ALG, its not a bad thing to have a cheap option to generate experience and captaincy in junior aircrew. The King Air does provide valuable and cost effective outcomes - it shouldnt be thought of as a Caribou replacement, its an option to generate some form of capability with remaining elements of what was the Caribou workforce. The cost of this capability is relatively small especially with rationalisations achieved with the merger of the Army KA capability.
No one argues that airlift capability is reduced without a dedicated light transport - its all a decision on how best to apportion limited acquisition funds (which are different buckets than sustainment) - and a prioritisation decision. Light tactical transport just happens to be assessed as the low priority in competition.
It is always interesting to hear the 'veterans' sprouting how obvious the answers are, and that the current leadership are completely clueless - give them some credit for having a clue. Your belief that maintaining the 'long range' F111 as a viable and cost effective maritime strike capability clearly indicates you dont have as much a clue as you think you do.
the Caribou was dead as a viable and maintable airframe - simple as that. No amount of sustainment money was going to make it last any longer.
The King Air decision was all about providing a gap fill capability of some description and help maintain a workforce mass that is going to transition basically every platform over the next decade. You need to maintain a level of 'spare' capacity to introduce new types whilst maintaining capability with the old.
Not to mention in an environmebt where pilots course graduates are waiting up to 18 months for conversions in ALG, its not a bad thing to have a cheap option to generate experience and captaincy in junior aircrew. The King Air does provide valuable and cost effective outcomes - it shouldnt be thought of as a Caribou replacement, its an option to generate some form of capability with remaining elements of what was the Caribou workforce. The cost of this capability is relatively small especially with rationalisations achieved with the merger of the Army KA capability.
No one argues that airlift capability is reduced without a dedicated light transport - its all a decision on how best to apportion limited acquisition funds (which are different buckets than sustainment) - and a prioritisation decision. Light tactical transport just happens to be assessed as the low priority in competition.
It is always interesting to hear the 'veterans' sprouting how obvious the answers are, and that the current leadership are completely clueless - give them some credit for having a clue. Your belief that maintaining the 'long range' F111 as a viable and cost effective maritime strike capability clearly indicates you dont have as much a clue as you think you do.
withdrawal of the long-range F-111 from service - which could have been cost-effectively enhanced for maritime strike
As for cost effective, ha ha ha. The F111 was sucking an insane amount of cash for each and every flying hour. $100000+ per hour.
Just let the F111 die......
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ftrplt; off the theme I know and ignoring your rude opinion of me, maybe you should think a bit more outside the propaganda square.
An estimate of enhancement cost for the F-111 to maintain a good capability out to about 2030 was around $2.5billion whereas the Super Hornets will cost something like $6.5billion.
In a 3 or 6 month snapshot of Afghanistan ops for the USAF, offensive air racked up 10,000 hours with 4,000 hours of tankering support.
Super Hornet requires K-30 to achieve things the F-111 could do without tankering so that does not equate to cost-effective operations in my view.
An estimate of enhancement cost for the F-111 to maintain a good capability out to about 2030 was around $2.5billion whereas the Super Hornets will cost something like $6.5billion.
In a 3 or 6 month snapshot of Afghanistan ops for the USAF, offensive air racked up 10,000 hours with 4,000 hours of tankering support.
Super Hornet requires K-30 to achieve things the F-111 could do without tankering so that does not equate to cost-effective operations in my view.
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ftrplt, I think all of us 'old veterans' see the reason (and the sense) in maintaining some semblance of experience levels for RAAF light transport crews in use of the (hopefully interim) King Air. I just think most of us are appalled that the powers that be allowed such a need to become necessary.
Why the light transport force was allowed to reach such a state is instructive.
It's no secret that there are some at Russell Hill who are holding out for the Osprey to replace the Caribou and the Chinook. Myself, (and ignorant old veteran, so wtf would I know), I think the Osprey would be a huge mistake, a mistake along similar lines to the (I think, misguided) choice of the Tiger and the MRH-90.
Buying the Osprey would be hugely expensive, both in purchase price and in hourly operating costs, and the ADF would end up in a similar situation to what they currently have with helicopter support - unable to afford enough airframes to provide meaningful support to all but a very few ground units, and with hardware so expensive per unit, we simply couldn't dare to put them in harm's way lest we lose one. (Someone, a serving member, I understand, has already made this same comment here about our current helicopters - the the loss of one helicopter in Afghanistan is 'politically unacceptable'.)
Such sentiments cause a choking sensation in those of us old enough to remember the attitude of quite a few in the Australian Army to the RAAF's tactics with the Iroquois in Vietnam. Many in the Army wanted the RAAF to operate their helicopters the same way the US Army operated, where the utility helicopter was treated almost as a throwaway item. It was the ill feelings (and the Army-created myth) generated by that clash of cultures that led to the Army taking over the helicopter force in 1988-9.
If there's someone out there who honestly believes that AAAvn have presented the ground units they support with a better product to the same number of units than the "5 star hotel, 10am to 3.30pm, Monday to Thursday" RAAF (the utterly bull**** myth some in the Army would have the younger ones who don't know any better to believe), I'd like to hear them argue their case.
Why the light transport force was allowed to reach such a state is instructive.
It's no secret that there are some at Russell Hill who are holding out for the Osprey to replace the Caribou and the Chinook. Myself, (and ignorant old veteran, so wtf would I know), I think the Osprey would be a huge mistake, a mistake along similar lines to the (I think, misguided) choice of the Tiger and the MRH-90.
Buying the Osprey would be hugely expensive, both in purchase price and in hourly operating costs, and the ADF would end up in a similar situation to what they currently have with helicopter support - unable to afford enough airframes to provide meaningful support to all but a very few ground units, and with hardware so expensive per unit, we simply couldn't dare to put them in harm's way lest we lose one. (Someone, a serving member, I understand, has already made this same comment here about our current helicopters - the the loss of one helicopter in Afghanistan is 'politically unacceptable'.)
Such sentiments cause a choking sensation in those of us old enough to remember the attitude of quite a few in the Australian Army to the RAAF's tactics with the Iroquois in Vietnam. Many in the Army wanted the RAAF to operate their helicopters the same way the US Army operated, where the utility helicopter was treated almost as a throwaway item. It was the ill feelings (and the Army-created myth) generated by that clash of cultures that led to the Army taking over the helicopter force in 1988-9.
If there's someone out there who honestly believes that AAAvn have presented the ground units they support with a better product to the same number of units than the "5 star hotel, 10am to 3.30pm, Monday to Thursday" RAAF (the utterly bull**** myth some in the Army would have the younger ones who don't know any better to believe), I'd like to hear them argue their case.
maybe you should think a bit more outside the propaganda square
An estimate of enhancement cost for the F-111 to maintain a good capability out to about 2030 was around $2.5billion whereas the Super Hornets will cost something like $6.5billion
offensive air racked up 10,000 hours with 4,000 hours of tankering support
Super Hornet requires K-30 to achieve things the F-111 could do without tankering
I note you haven't offered an opinion on the fact that the Caribou was unsustainable.
My statements were not in any way presented as slights on you or your history - just a statement against some of your opinion being presented as fact, and using that opinion to make invalid claims against some senior leadership. Your claim that the Bou was 'sacrificed' and the 'F111 retirement was a poor reflection on CDF' are the statements that I have a problem with.
Why the light transport force was allowed to reach such a state is instructive
We would all love to have a strong light transport force, based on goverments view of the world its has just not been a high enough priority in the last decade. Its clear you dont agree which is fine, but dont assume its occured due to ignorance.
choice of the Tiger and the MRH-90
If there's someone out there who honestly believes that AAAvn have presented the ground units they support with a better product to the same number of units than the "5 star hotel, 10am to 3.30pm, Monday to Thursday" RAAF (the utterly bull**** myth some in the Army would have the younger ones who don't know any better to believe), I'd like to hear them argue their case.
It's no secret that there are some at Russell Hill who are holding out for the Osprey to replace the Caribou and the Chinook
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The Kingair replaces the Caribou in only one way.....generate candidates with 300 PIC to complete Flying Instructors Course.
Only a hand full of Bou pilots remained to Fly Kingairs and 2 dozen techos at best.
I think in 10 years when the RAAF, Navy and Army has changed every airborne platform in their inventory we should assess the ability and leadership of the people running things at the moment.
Only a hand full of Bou pilots remained to Fly Kingairs and 2 dozen techos at best.
I think in 10 years when the RAAF, Navy and Army has changed every airborne platform in their inventory we should assess the ability and leadership of the people running things at the moment.
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RAAF Aircraft Inventory
As one of those "old veterans" whom, it seems, some would have everyone believe should be denied an opinion I simply offer the undeniable fact that our RAAF has been allowed to be "disenfranchised" in terms of maintenance capability due to the "out sourcing" to civil maintenance organisations.
It would seem to me that this loss of numbers of serving maintenance personnel, the run down of airlift capability diversification in now not having an aircraft capable of performing the tasks previously undertaken by the Caribou and no rotary wing element in the RAAF certainly leads me to believe the RAAF is not the force it was.
We have the Super Hornet, a stop-gap measure, the King Air which it may be argued is in no way capable of much in comparison to the Caribou and it seems a less than adequate training organisation within ALG if pilots are having to wait 18 months for conversion. The RAAF will achieve it's tasking, as it always has, however to do so is becoming increasingly difficult as our aircraft inventory shrinks.
It would seem to me that this loss of numbers of serving maintenance personnel, the run down of airlift capability diversification in now not having an aircraft capable of performing the tasks previously undertaken by the Caribou and no rotary wing element in the RAAF certainly leads me to believe the RAAF is not the force it was.
We have the Super Hornet, a stop-gap measure, the King Air which it may be argued is in no way capable of much in comparison to the Caribou and it seems a less than adequate training organisation within ALG if pilots are having to wait 18 months for conversion. The RAAF will achieve it's tasking, as it always has, however to do so is becoming increasingly difficult as our aircraft inventory shrinks.
This is starting to get way off thread, but:
no one is being denied an opinion - its when opinion is presented as (incorrect) fact - i.e bollox - then its only fair to make a call on it.
yep - harking back to the 'good old days'. Are you sure that the overall ADF maintenance capability is reduced because the RAAF workforce has been reduced - what is the basis of this 'fact'. (example - a significant historical cause of J model reduced availability has been spares inventories, not maintenance capacity)
Are you for real - the RAAF's global airlift capability has never been so good - its agreed that light tactical is worse but look at it in relation to what the ADF has been involved in for the last decade or so. As already acknowledged its a limited budget acquisition prioritisation decision. C-17's, stretched J models and Chinooks supporting the guys in the desert - a pretty big improvement of the all C130 fleet of decades past. Just how would a light tactical transport be contributing to defence outcomes as directed by Govt in the last decade?
What is the basis of fact for this 'stop-gap' assessment?
It wouldnt have anything to do with a number of C130 airframes deployed on operations for the greater part of the last decade would it?
some would have everyone believe should be denied an opinion
RAAF has been allowed to be "disenfranchised" in terms of maintenance capability due to the "out sourcing" to civil maintenance organisations
the run down of airlift capability diversification
We have the Super Hornet, a stop-gap measure
than adequate training organisation within ALG if pilots are having to wait 18 months for conversion
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Defence planning priorities
If someone were trying to destabilise our immediate neighbourhood, how would they get around from place to place, could the ADF match/counter them, and where would the ADF have to go in order to do that?
Australia's past involvement in PNG is relevant. Post-WW2 ,Qantas and TAA, which were then both government-owned, provided a range of air transportation means often used for military purposes in addition to RAAF Dakotas. Under Australian government administration, the 2 battalions of the Pacific Island Regiment were trained and mentored by the Australian Army with extensive patrolling along remote and very rugged western border areas to counter intrusions. Post-PNG independence, there was substantial provisioning of Australian military air support for the PIR vide C-130, Caribou, Iroquois with much positioning of drummed Avtur by C-130 and Caribou in particular.
There is uncontrolled air movement all over the northern archipelago as ground means are often impossible or too arduous. Customs and immigration control is pretty non-existent beyond a few major centres so it is quite easy for people who might have subversive intentions to move around.
As a slight aside, Australia is not too dissimilar. I flew the Darwin-based Dakota in the early 1960s and some tasks were monitoring of the old wartime airstrips around the coastline and maintaining the Navy sponsored coast-watcher network, which was based on mission-run beaut little aboriginal communities around the northern coast and on nearby islands. We occasionally found aircraft tyre tracks on remote airstrips and the Aborigine coast-watchers, who took their responsibility seriously, often reported suspicious aircraft movements.
An incident perhaps of interest. In January 1963, pre-Confrontation with Indonesia, the coast-watchers at Millingimbi nabbed 5 Indonesians who had come ashore in a small vessel. We flew out there with a Navy IntellO and the Sergeant of Police from Darwin (the only one armed) and discovered 2 of the group wearing military green shirts. We tipped out several baskets of maggoty food to find epaulettes with Indonesian insignia and other documentation. They were perhaps a bit unlucky to be detected considering the vastness of the Australian coastline, which is arguably impossible to adequately monitor. We took the Indons back to Darwin and they disappeared into the 'spook' system with nought publicly said, although there were other similar happenings.
Only small groups of people are necessary for generation of subversive activities and if appropriately skilled, could disrupt communications and power sources for example to create political strife. The federal government has admitted that identification fraud is now so sophisticated that illegal entry to Australia via routine airline transportation is common and we also have a wide open back door via New Zealand. So it is unrealistic that Australia can be militarily defended.
It is always interesting to hear the 'veterans' sprouting how obvious the answers are, and that the current leadership are completely clueless - give them some credit for having a clue.
The Defence Capability Plan is a shambles with capability gaps emerging everywhere, hence the knee-jerk Super Hornet acquisition, leasing of tankers, no gunship capability since mid-2004, shedding of utility helo capability, civilian helos leased by Army and Navy, unplanned acquisition of a Bay Class amphibious support ship (although a good move), leasing of King Airs in substitution for Caribou, etcetera. There seems a tendency among the serving fraternity to blame DMO entirely for this parlous situation without also questioning the influence of the military leadership.
I think the whole planning process got derailed in the aftermath of East Timor intervention with emphasis becoming bent toward movement of largish expeditionary forces and creation of an enlarged hardened and less mobile Army as part of a mythical Force 2030 concept. Had acquisition of some smallish amphibious support ships like Bay Class been initiated at that time (in lieu of aircraft carriers), the RAN would have been better oriented toward regional archipelago operations and existing amphibious support deficiencies might not have emerged.
I would argue that defence planning priorities are back to front in that capacity for regional archipelago operations should have primacy and tactical air transport is a vital function. Defence planners and politicians are somewhat ignoring the lessons from Australia's regional military involvement post-WW2.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 10th Apr 2011 at 21:17.
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Air force eyes 18 more Super Hornets as delays dog our new fighter | The Australian
So tell me, ftrplt, having read the article above, what's your definition of "stop gap"?
You've cast a few extremely thinly veiled (if veiled at all!) personal insults at veterans who've posted here, so let me return the compliment with knobs on. From the tenor of your posts, to me, you come across as a Department of Defence PR man and not much more.
DEVELOPMENT of the revolutionary Joint Strike Fighter, intended to provide Australia's air defence through this century, is running well behind schedule and the RAAF may need to buy 18 more Super Hornets for $1.5 billion to fill the gap.
You've cast a few extremely thinly veiled (if veiled at all!) personal insults at veterans who've posted here, so let me return the compliment with knobs on. From the tenor of your posts, to me, you come across as a Department of Defence PR man and not much more.
The Howard government bought 24 Super Hornets for $6bn in 2007 to fill an earlier strategic gap left when the RAAF's F-111 bombers were withdrawn ahead of time because of concerns about fatigue.
Children stop it.
A very good thread with some interesting points (and conflicting ones) is in risk of becoming like the backbar after a long and boring dining in!
Lets ease springs and return to well argued, if different, points of view.
By all means ask each other to back things up, but nicely....surely we remember the rules of banter.....or uckers!
A very good thread with some interesting points (and conflicting ones) is in risk of becoming like the backbar after a long and boring dining in!
Lets ease springs and return to well argued, if different, points of view.
By all means ask each other to back things up, but nicely....surely we remember the rules of banter.....or uckers!
Andu,
please point out where I have insulted anyone - I have made some fairly strong rebuttals of opinion. There is no insult in the use of the term veteran (my father was one!) - I am entitled to defend the senior leadership when I believe those who dont have all the facts (for example people retired who may have previous expertise, but arguably not 'current') make assertions against the current leadership based on their personnal opinion of what the priorities should be.
As in all walks of life its very easy to cheer or jeer from the cheap seats.
I'm definitely not PR - why waste time trying to guess my motive without attempting to rebut my points?
The query about 'stop-gap' is subtle - the SH capability was acquired as a Bridging Air Combat Capability (BACC), as a hedge against JSF delays. Looking more and more like a good decision.
My point was the original post used the 'stop gap' acquisition of Super Hornet as an example of bad leadership decisions - my point is that it was a good leadership decision! (albeit one actually made by the then Defence Minister!)
Bushranger,
dont get me wrong, I am in now way saying that all acquisition decisions have been good, or even close to good. My point is that (generally) all those stating that' lack of a light transport capability' is purely because of poor and/or stupid senior leadership - are missing the point as it is more about lack of acquisition funding to buy all capabilities required vs the highest ranked priorities.
Government directed ADF Activities since 2003 is a major contributor to the prioritisation decisions.
One of the key issues with capability acquisition is that funding is not all about total value, its all about when the spend can be scheduled - automatically leads to prioritisation conflicts (blame Financial policy here).
If the ADF hadnt been involved in the Middle East continuously since 2003 (C130, P3 and now C17) nor chasing people smugglers across the oceans - I genuinely believe we would have a viable light transport capability now. Caribou was stretched as far as humanly possible, maybe with an element of 'hope' that a replacement would have got across the line by now - unfortunately it didnt.
please point out where I have insulted anyone - I have made some fairly strong rebuttals of opinion. There is no insult in the use of the term veteran (my father was one!) - I am entitled to defend the senior leadership when I believe those who dont have all the facts (for example people retired who may have previous expertise, but arguably not 'current') make assertions against the current leadership based on their personnal opinion of what the priorities should be.
As in all walks of life its very easy to cheer or jeer from the cheap seats.
I'm definitely not PR - why waste time trying to guess my motive without attempting to rebut my points?
The query about 'stop-gap' is subtle - the SH capability was acquired as a Bridging Air Combat Capability (BACC), as a hedge against JSF delays. Looking more and more like a good decision.
My point was the original post used the 'stop gap' acquisition of Super Hornet as an example of bad leadership decisions - my point is that it was a good leadership decision! (albeit one actually made by the then Defence Minister!)
Bushranger,
dont get me wrong, I am in now way saying that all acquisition decisions have been good, or even close to good. My point is that (generally) all those stating that' lack of a light transport capability' is purely because of poor and/or stupid senior leadership - are missing the point as it is more about lack of acquisition funding to buy all capabilities required vs the highest ranked priorities.
Government directed ADF Activities since 2003 is a major contributor to the prioritisation decisions.
One of the key issues with capability acquisition is that funding is not all about total value, its all about when the spend can be scheduled - automatically leads to prioritisation conflicts (blame Financial policy here).
If the ADF hadnt been involved in the Middle East continuously since 2003 (C130, P3 and now C17) nor chasing people smugglers across the oceans - I genuinely believe we would have a viable light transport capability now. Caribou was stretched as far as humanly possible, maybe with an element of 'hope' that a replacement would have got across the line by now - unfortunately it didnt.
An estimate of enhancement cost for the F-111 to maintain a good capability out to about 2030 was around $2.5billion whereas the Super Hornets will cost something like $6.5billion.
Bushranger: a comment on the ability to keep old airframes alive.
A variety of program and budget and cost decisions time and again run into, ten years later, parts, vendors, and sub contractors either jacking prices for parts up, or simply not making the parts any longer. This kind of "death of a thousand small cuts" creates downstream cost burden legacy (see F-111) platforms since industry time and again finds it uneconomical to support small numbers of these old airframes.
I have recent personal understanding of non-trivial problems in supporting non-glass cockpit, and legacy avionics in the US Navy's T-44 trainer. This is a few years ago, mind you, but what it amounted to was a cheap, legacy program becoming significantly more expensive to support and sustain due to parts obsolescence ... sure, industry would get us repair parts, and significant mark ups. Fatigue life is a separate (but non-trivial) related issue.
With that in mind, you then run into "pay me now" with a bit more, or "pay me later" when you have no choice but to upgrade -- at the systems (sorry, $ystem$) level.
On that basis, and on the criterion of fewer maintenance man hours per flight hour, the Super Hornet may not have been the weak decision you suggest it is. (My being a Yank in no way biases this, as both are originally Yank platforms ...
)
Super Hornet requires K-30 to achieve things the F-111 could do without tankering so that does not equate to cost-effective operations in my view.
I suggest that your modern archipelego operations would benefit from the F-18's availability.
I may misunderstand your mission requirements for the fighter arm, but if you need to loiter, it's good practice to launch, tank, then proceed on to your mission. That was a common practice for our Navy, and became increasingly common in the more recent fights due to the need to loiter and await calls for fire ...
As a last point, which is related to one of my first contributions, the political flexibliity that the government accrues from an additional C-17 for "non mil" operations (see the Japan example) seems to me one of the reasons that the pol folks allocate the money to a platform that is "dual use" rather than "tactical military use" in terms of its capability.
I'll paraphrase a discussion Colonel Harry Summers had with a NVA counterpart some years after the Viet Nam War
"It doesn't matter how good you were tactically if, at the strategic level, your country was aiming at the wrong target with the wrong weapon."
To put that into the context of the discussion here, with regard to how to spend short dollars to meet Australia's overall strategic needs, I'll open with the Axiom that a nation's military tools and capability are acquired to serve its strategic interests, (the use of armed forces to achieve politically defined ends) which requires competence at the tactical level, and a suitable tool kit.
That said, the strategic interests aren't always combat critical, but the uniformed folks happen to be
a) damned good at what they do
b) dependable,
c) organized, and
d) available without negotiation or yet another contract needing to be ironed out.
Your C-17 is thus a tool that gives the Australians a strategic capability that serves her strategic political interests. (We in the US consider C-17 Strategic/intertheater lift and C-130 tactical/intratheater lift). The risk decision made regarding what the uniformed folks will make do wit at the tactical level for most plausible scenarios is the same old thing ... where "worse case scenarios" are to be found, that was a risk decision taken. (Having spent a few decades on the uniformed end, I appreciate your frustration with how the pols time and again do that to us
.) The next question is: at what level does Australia deal in strategic infrastructure development in their near abroad? Non-military, government funded aid that helps upgrade or create higher quality air strips ... that allow larger planes to phase in Australian forces on an as needed basis when the speed of air transport is a tactical requirement ... that's not mil equipment money, but it's money spent for the local theater of operations that would aid and abet your mission accomplishment.
Does Australia do this or not?
That isn't a weapons procurement question. It is a theater level strategic question (both pol and mil) that uses "dual use" money to position a military capability that your services will need in the case of rapid reaction force deployments.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 11th Apr 2011 at 16:48.
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Prioritising
Ftrplt; just to kill off a couple of issues.
A while back, I was invited (and privileged) to be involved in an Air Power Australia related group compiling submissions to the New Air Combat Capability study conducted within the Australian DoD. The group of about 10, some only recently retired, included very experienced pilots and engineers embracing 4 x Star rankers and 2 test pilots. Collectively, comprehensive experience and knowledge of high speed aircraft design, operating and maintenance considerations including intimate awareness of F-111 enhancement and sustainment aspects. All capable of outside the square thinking and Carlo Kopp's brilliant scientific mind added to the analytical potential of the group.
Well-researched evaluations of potential options and costings were presented to the NACC study team and information offered contradicted evidence by a now retired (male) Chief Defence Scientist and senior military officers to Senate Estimates hearings for the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. The validity of much misleading information peddled by Lockheed Martin concerning the Joint Strike Fighter was also justifiably challenged considering the now parlous status of that project. You might find Hansard for the last few years very interesting reading in that regard.
2 years ago, a young Navy bod just out of recruit training at HMAS Cerberus visited a neighbour who told him I had RAAF service and without any preliminary discussion, he launched into a derogatory tirade about Air Power Australia. Similar stuff has emerged in other forums from contributors who have identified themselves as being involved in the DoD realm. Instead of the APA website being viewed as an invaluable broadly based information resource for matters military, they seem cast as the enemy by Defence because some of the material published dares to challenge woolly thinking. Those who have worked in Canberra know that much time is spent defending decisions made by people with big egos who cannot be seen to suffer loss of face.
But enough of that aspect.
Lonewolf 50; you again raise some good points.
Years back when I flew Sabres, we pined for flight refuelling; but it took many years for the Air Force hierarchy to become sufficiently supportive, even though AAR capable fighter and strike aircraft had been acquired. It does offer great tactical flexibility, but ups the cost of mounting operations for assets with shortish range capabilities. That is why the attributes of the F-111 were so well-suited to Australia's regional operations, but that's now a dead duck. Herkman highlighted it would have been much more cost-effective for Australia to just lease some enhanced KC-135R from the USAF than indulge in a flawed program to convert RAAF 707s and now acquire a somewhat uncommon military KC-30 that does not even have a cargo floor.
Australia operated extensively throughout our nearby island chain during WW2 and subsequently; but dare I say there now seems a lessened awareness of military operating considerations in this very rugged and somewhat forbidding wet tropics region where Australia annually contributes hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid. Australia did develop some airfields in PNG but no longer has much influence on how they are managed.
Despite policy emphasis on capabilities for regional operations, defence planning seems more oriented toward gearing strategically for wars in other parts of the world than equipping appropriately for closer to home regional operations. Would it not be wiser to also acquire a 24 hour all weather long range/endurance AC-130 firepower capability for example, which might be much more effective in foreseeable regional operating circumstances than say the Super Hornet or F/A-18 with tanker support, and bring forward acquisition of C-27 in lieu of some other project?
Australia's Defence Capability Plan is clearly a farce and really needs freezing for a top level review of just where the nation is heading with defence structuring. But, both of the major political parties are presently bent on unaffordable increased defence spending out to 2030 and the Federal Cabinet comprises politicians who are blindly committed to taxpayer subsidisation of employment via motor vehicle and defence industries in particular. Add to that, the involvement of former Prime Minister Rudd who generated the overly-ambitious Defence White Paper 2009 and prospects seem low for improved prioritisation of defence spending, unless forced upon the nation sometime downstream by world economic circumstances.
I remake my earlier contentions; Australia could have more credible defence capabilities by progressively optimising in-service hardware (where cost-effective) rather than indulging in acquisition of costly relatively unproven hardware. And, priorities need to be better sorted if we are able to react adequately to short-notice (more tactical than strategic) regional requirements, moreso than building towards a mythical Force 2030 for military circumstances nobody can envisage.
Perhaps enough now said re this broader discussion as this has been a great thread regarding air lift in particular.
Exactly what propoganda square would that be - the one that doesnt necessarily agree with the Carlo Kopp view of the world and with some understanding of the real capabilities (now and future) of the F111 vs its sustainment costs?
Well-researched evaluations of potential options and costings were presented to the NACC study team and information offered contradicted evidence by a now retired (male) Chief Defence Scientist and senior military officers to Senate Estimates hearings for the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. The validity of much misleading information peddled by Lockheed Martin concerning the Joint Strike Fighter was also justifiably challenged considering the now parlous status of that project. You might find Hansard for the last few years very interesting reading in that regard.
2 years ago, a young Navy bod just out of recruit training at HMAS Cerberus visited a neighbour who told him I had RAAF service and without any preliminary discussion, he launched into a derogatory tirade about Air Power Australia. Similar stuff has emerged in other forums from contributors who have identified themselves as being involved in the DoD realm. Instead of the APA website being viewed as an invaluable broadly based information resource for matters military, they seem cast as the enemy by Defence because some of the material published dares to challenge woolly thinking. Those who have worked in Canberra know that much time is spent defending decisions made by people with big egos who cannot be seen to suffer loss of face.
But enough of that aspect.
Lonewolf 50; you again raise some good points.
Years back when I flew Sabres, we pined for flight refuelling; but it took many years for the Air Force hierarchy to become sufficiently supportive, even though AAR capable fighter and strike aircraft had been acquired. It does offer great tactical flexibility, but ups the cost of mounting operations for assets with shortish range capabilities. That is why the attributes of the F-111 were so well-suited to Australia's regional operations, but that's now a dead duck. Herkman highlighted it would have been much more cost-effective for Australia to just lease some enhanced KC-135R from the USAF than indulge in a flawed program to convert RAAF 707s and now acquire a somewhat uncommon military KC-30 that does not even have a cargo floor.
Australia operated extensively throughout our nearby island chain during WW2 and subsequently; but dare I say there now seems a lessened awareness of military operating considerations in this very rugged and somewhat forbidding wet tropics region where Australia annually contributes hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid. Australia did develop some airfields in PNG but no longer has much influence on how they are managed.
Despite policy emphasis on capabilities for regional operations, defence planning seems more oriented toward gearing strategically for wars in other parts of the world than equipping appropriately for closer to home regional operations. Would it not be wiser to also acquire a 24 hour all weather long range/endurance AC-130 firepower capability for example, which might be much more effective in foreseeable regional operating circumstances than say the Super Hornet or F/A-18 with tanker support, and bring forward acquisition of C-27 in lieu of some other project?
Australia's Defence Capability Plan is clearly a farce and really needs freezing for a top level review of just where the nation is heading with defence structuring. But, both of the major political parties are presently bent on unaffordable increased defence spending out to 2030 and the Federal Cabinet comprises politicians who are blindly committed to taxpayer subsidisation of employment via motor vehicle and defence industries in particular. Add to that, the involvement of former Prime Minister Rudd who generated the overly-ambitious Defence White Paper 2009 and prospects seem low for improved prioritisation of defence spending, unless forced upon the nation sometime downstream by world economic circumstances.
I remake my earlier contentions; Australia could have more credible defence capabilities by progressively optimising in-service hardware (where cost-effective) rather than indulging in acquisition of costly relatively unproven hardware. And, priorities need to be better sorted if we are able to react adequately to short-notice (more tactical than strategic) regional requirements, moreso than building towards a mythical Force 2030 for military circumstances nobody can envisage.
Perhaps enough now said re this broader discussion as this has been a great thread regarding air lift in particular.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 11th Apr 2011 at 20:32.
Just a quick comeback, and thanks again for the response.
Depending on what you percieve the ROC and POE to be, AC-130 is a great choice until everybody and his cousin has IR and night vision equipment. Not sure how soon that will be ... and AC-130 tends to be a night operator only for air to ground missions. On the other hand it is brilliant in that role.
However, for much cheaper local Close Air Support (albeit with virtually NO Air to Air capability) I suspect Predator would be a better choice, or Reaper, than either F-18 or JSF. The trick is to get them and the local control suites at a decent price from Uncle Sam ... and to find a runway long enough to handle that particular aircraft. I won't ask if you all have considered that, as we are on a public forum.
As to JSF, even we in the fat and rich land of DoD appropriations in Yank Land find its fly away cost to border on extortionary (to say nothing of F-22). Since you already have the Hornet, (and Super Hornet?) and you have posited to us a local fight as the requirements driver (not WW III with the Chinese, who will tend to use economics to fight their larger war, I agree) then you need not go with Bleeding Edge Tech for strike. The Viper/F-16 is still with us, and it's over thirty years old. It's doing a great job in the CAS role, and has done for two wars now. I see the Super Hornet doing as well as the Phantom did, in terms of longevity.
I now understand the tanker versus fighter issue better in re F-111, but cannot any of your C-130 be put up with tanking kits?
Yes, that hits the tactical lift yet again, and possibly restores your entering argument that more Hercs is the better idea.
Cheers.
Depending on what you percieve the ROC and POE to be, AC-130 is a great choice until everybody and his cousin has IR and night vision equipment. Not sure how soon that will be ... and AC-130 tends to be a night operator only for air to ground missions. On the other hand it is brilliant in that role.
However, for much cheaper local Close Air Support (albeit with virtually NO Air to Air capability) I suspect Predator would be a better choice, or Reaper, than either F-18 or JSF. The trick is to get them and the local control suites at a decent price from Uncle Sam ... and to find a runway long enough to handle that particular aircraft. I won't ask if you all have considered that, as we are on a public forum.
As to JSF, even we in the fat and rich land of DoD appropriations in Yank Land find its fly away cost to border on extortionary (to say nothing of F-22). Since you already have the Hornet, (and Super Hornet?) and you have posited to us a local fight as the requirements driver (not WW III with the Chinese, who will tend to use economics to fight their larger war, I agree) then you need not go with Bleeding Edge Tech for strike. The Viper/F-16 is still with us, and it's over thirty years old. It's doing a great job in the CAS role, and has done for two wars now. I see the Super Hornet doing as well as the Phantom did, in terms of longevity.
I now understand the tanker versus fighter issue better in re F-111, but cannot any of your C-130 be put up with tanking kits?
Yes, that hits the tactical lift yet again, and possibly restores your entering argument that more Hercs is the better idea. Cheers.