Prioritising
Ftrplt; just to kill off a couple of issues.
Exactly what propoganda square would that be - the one that doesnt necessarily agree with the Carlo Kopp view of the world and with some understanding of the real capabilities (now and future) of the F111 vs its sustainment costs?
A while back, I was invited (and privileged) to be involved in an Air Power Australia related group compiling submissions to the New Air Combat Capability study conducted within the Australian DoD. The group of about 10, some only recently retired, included very experienced pilots and engineers embracing 4 x Star rankers and 2 test pilots. Collectively, comprehensive experience and knowledge of high speed aircraft design, operating and maintenance considerations including intimate awareness of F-111 enhancement and sustainment aspects. All capable of outside the square thinking and Carlo Kopp's brilliant scientific mind added to the analytical potential of the group.
Well-researched evaluations of potential options and costings were presented to the NACC study team and information offered contradicted evidence by a now retired (male) Chief Defence Scientist and senior military officers to Senate Estimates hearings for the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. The validity of much misleading information peddled by Lockheed Martin concerning the Joint Strike Fighter was also justifiably challenged considering the now parlous status of that project. You might find Hansard for the last few years very interesting reading in that regard.
2 years ago, a young Navy bod just out of recruit training at HMAS Cerberus visited a neighbour who told him I had RAAF service and without any preliminary discussion, he launched into a derogatory tirade about Air Power Australia. Similar stuff has emerged in other forums from contributors who have identified themselves as being involved in the DoD realm. Instead of the APA website being viewed as an invaluable broadly based information resource for matters military, they seem cast as the enemy by Defence because some of the material published dares to challenge woolly thinking. Those who have worked in Canberra know that much time is spent defending decisions made by people with big egos who cannot be seen to suffer loss of face.
But enough of that aspect.
Lonewolf 50; you again raise some good points.
Years back when I flew Sabres, we pined for flight refuelling; but it took many years for the Air Force hierarchy to become sufficiently supportive, even though AAR capable fighter and strike aircraft had been acquired. It does offer great tactical flexibility, but ups the cost of mounting operations for assets with shortish range capabilities. That is why the attributes of the F-111 were so well-suited to Australia's regional operations, but that's now a dead duck. Herkman highlighted it would have been much more cost-effective for Australia to just lease some enhanced KC-135R from the USAF than indulge in a flawed program to convert RAAF 707s and now acquire a somewhat uncommon military KC-30 that does not even have a cargo floor.
Australia operated extensively throughout our nearby island chain during WW2 and subsequently; but dare I say there now seems a lessened awareness of military operating considerations in this very rugged and somewhat forbidding wet tropics region where Australia annually contributes hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid. Australia did develop some airfields in PNG but no longer has much influence on how they are managed.
Despite policy emphasis on capabilities for regional operations, defence planning seems more oriented toward gearing strategically for wars in other parts of the world than equipping appropriately for closer to home regional operations. Would it not be wiser to also acquire a 24 hour all weather long range/endurance AC-130 firepower capability for example, which might be much more effective in foreseeable regional operating circumstances than say the Super Hornet or F/A-18 with tanker support, and bring forward acquisition of C-27 in lieu of some other project?
Australia's Defence Capability Plan is clearly a farce and really needs freezing for a top level review of just where the nation is heading with defence structuring. But, both of the major political parties are presently bent on unaffordable increased defence spending out to 2030 and the Federal Cabinet comprises politicians who are blindly committed to taxpayer subsidisation of employment via motor vehicle and defence industries in particular. Add to that, the involvement of former Prime Minister Rudd who generated the overly-ambitious Defence White Paper 2009 and prospects seem low for improved prioritisation of defence spending, unless forced upon the nation sometime downstream by world economic circumstances.
I remake my earlier contentions; Australia could have more credible defence capabilities by progressively optimising in-service hardware (where cost-effective) rather than indulging in acquisition of costly relatively unproven hardware. And, priorities need to be better sorted if we are able to react adequately to short-notice (more tactical than strategic) regional requirements, moreso than building towards a mythical Force 2030 for military circumstances nobody can envisage.
Perhaps enough now said re this broader discussion as this has been a great thread regarding air lift in particular.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 11th Apr 2011 at 20:32.