5th C-17 for RAAF
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
MC-130J Roll-out
See the MC-130J Roll-out thread for some interesting reading; also these links:
MC-130J rollout accelerates AFSOC recapitalization | Air Force News at DefenseTalk
Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Lockheed MC-130 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
It seems others also recognize the essential need for maintaining C-130 capabilities, in addition to C-17.
MC-130J rollout accelerates AFSOC recapitalization | Air Force News at DefenseTalk
Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Lockheed MC-130 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
It seems others also recognize the essential need for maintaining C-130 capabilities, in addition to C-17.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 7th Apr 2011 at 21:39.
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
And, it has also been said before that the KC-30 is a virtual airliner, not tactical air transport.
Maybe 6 x C130 would be needed to swiftly move an infantry company group with some mobile firepower into some rudimentary airfields where C-17 cannot go. Assuming 50 percent online availability, that would require maximum Herc effort; but some might be operating elsewhere in the world. The RAAF once had 2 x 12 aircraft C-130 squadrons and the need arguably still exists.
As for C-27 Spartan, it might never be acquired due to compounding funding difficulties for Australia's other national economic imperatives. And the worldwide economic consequences of likely US economic collapse might force a total recast of Australia's defence capability planning. See these disturbing articles:
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article24771.html
The stench of US default | Bill Gross, PIMCO | Commentary | Business Spectator
Maybe 6 x C130 would be needed to swiftly move an infantry company group with some mobile firepower into some rudimentary airfields where C-17 cannot go. Assuming 50 percent online availability, that would require maximum Herc effort; but some might be operating elsewhere in the world. The RAAF once had 2 x 12 aircraft C-130 squadrons and the need arguably still exists.
As for C-27 Spartan, it might never be acquired due to compounding funding difficulties for Australia's other national economic imperatives. And the worldwide economic consequences of likely US economic collapse might force a total recast of Australia's defence capability planning. See these disturbing articles:
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article24771.html
The stench of US default | Bill Gross, PIMCO | Commentary | Business Spectator
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 8th Apr 2011 at 01:34.
Thread Starter
B71 you're only looking at one scenario. Trooping by KC-30 is a better idea than a flock of Hercs flying across the country/world at 280kts burning up hours. C-17's are operating into reasonably forward areas in A/Stan which happens to an Australia AofO right now. Agree on funding issues for C-27 but why send a Herc to carry a few bods or bits...?
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes TBM-L, I am looking at one scenario based on 50 plus years of comprehensive RAAF experience in our regional tropical archipelago where there are numerous airfields probably unsuited to C-17 operations. The forward airfields in Afghanistan have perhaps been enhanced for C-17 ops.
It is far more cost-effective to quickly deploy smallish forces as near as practicable to the area of operations than having to utilize KC-30 or whatever into airliner suitable airheads with need for cargo handling gear and additional in-theatre transportation for on-move of troops and equipment. Similar problems with slower sea lift and especially for movement of heavy military hardware in the wet tropics.
My basic point is our defence planners seem to be dismissive of highly desirable flexibility in mounting operations and have focused mainly on strategic movement of larger expeditionary forces.
We could have had an optimised C-130 force including AAR and AC capabilities for money wasted (in my view) on the KC-30. Hercs would have been adequate for F-18 tankering, provided potential for flight-refuelable Blackhawks and long range/endurance all weather firepower for remote area operations. Why has Australia not learned from US operating practices?
It is far more cost-effective to quickly deploy smallish forces as near as practicable to the area of operations than having to utilize KC-30 or whatever into airliner suitable airheads with need for cargo handling gear and additional in-theatre transportation for on-move of troops and equipment. Similar problems with slower sea lift and especially for movement of heavy military hardware in the wet tropics.
My basic point is our defence planners seem to be dismissive of highly desirable flexibility in mounting operations and have focused mainly on strategic movement of larger expeditionary forces.
We could have had an optimised C-130 force including AAR and AC capabilities for money wasted (in my view) on the KC-30. Hercs would have been adequate for F-18 tankering, provided potential for flight-refuelable Blackhawks and long range/endurance all weather firepower for remote area operations. Why has Australia not learned from US operating practices?
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Great Southern Land
Age: 57
Posts: 434
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BR71 another take on potential US financial difficulties is that nations like Australia will have no choice but to stop riding the US security coat tails. If the US becomes profoundly less able to project power and employ battlespace effects ..... who will?
For stoushes we don't choose - fine, we won't choose them. But what about the stoushes we DON'T choose, but choose us instead? I'd have thought that there is a pretty good chance of the defence vote having to increase beyond the current estimates. Not a certainty, but can't be ruled out.
In which case - bring on the C-27Js! In fact, bring on the C-27Js regardless.
Another alternative is to look at the drum you've been beating - why does our defence budget buy so little compared to other middle powers? Not an easy comparison to make: there are strategic horses for courses; some things appear in some nations' budgets which are external in others' budgets; current operational tempo; etc etc. Has our history of procurement debacles left us without systems and capabilities we ought to have? No doubt, but we're hardly unique in that regard.
For stoushes we don't choose - fine, we won't choose them. But what about the stoushes we DON'T choose, but choose us instead? I'd have thought that there is a pretty good chance of the defence vote having to increase beyond the current estimates. Not a certainty, but can't be ruled out.
In which case - bring on the C-27Js! In fact, bring on the C-27Js regardless.
Another alternative is to look at the drum you've been beating - why does our defence budget buy so little compared to other middle powers? Not an easy comparison to make: there are strategic horses for courses; some things appear in some nations' budgets which are external in others' budgets; current operational tempo; etc etc. Has our history of procurement debacles left us without systems and capabilities we ought to have? No doubt, but we're hardly unique in that regard.
Thread Starter
KC-30's are planned to refuel the C-17 [US practice if needed] as well as the Wedgetail and other KC-30's. This is in addition to fighters and coalition aircraft. The secondary uplift of troops and freight boosts our resources.
No argument about a KC/MC-130 configuration either. We have "sneaky pete" C-130/P-3 assets as well, just not advertised.
About the AofO, we can't predict our next role or area given the global nature of fast changing events.
No argument about a KC/MC-130 configuration either. We have "sneaky pete" C-130/P-3 assets as well, just not advertised.
About the AofO, we can't predict our next role or area given the global nature of fast changing events.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: Australia
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From a role/function, if the KC30 was equipped with a cargo floor their function would be the same as the KC135R, The KC10 and so on.
We are restricting the use of the KC30 after all they will not always be tasked for AR and just to carry troops. Under floor space is I believe restricted compared with main cabin. Other wise the troops and their vehicles would require two types of uplift aircraft and that could restrict tasking.
Either way the uplift capacity needs improving.
As for the C130H let us not repeat the C130E problem and lets get them into upgrade. The RNZAF is putting theirs through that beaut shop in WACO Texas and my understanding they are coming out almost as new airframes. After all there is at least one 1958 airframe still flying in the USA and with the Aero Products props to boot. My understanding that it is about to get zero time main planes and a new centre section.
In the meantime six of our E models now fly with the PAF as super E's.
Regards
Col
We are restricting the use of the KC30 after all they will not always be tasked for AR and just to carry troops. Under floor space is I believe restricted compared with main cabin. Other wise the troops and their vehicles would require two types of uplift aircraft and that could restrict tasking.
Either way the uplift capacity needs improving.
As for the C130H let us not repeat the C130E problem and lets get them into upgrade. The RNZAF is putting theirs through that beaut shop in WACO Texas and my understanding they are coming out almost as new airframes. After all there is at least one 1958 airframe still flying in the USA and with the Aero Products props to boot. My understanding that it is about to get zero time main planes and a new centre section.
In the meantime six of our E models now fly with the PAF as super E's.
Regards
Col
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TBM-L; some thread drift in response unavoidable so herewith repeat of bits from Defence White Paper 2009 aired previously:
'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.
In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...
Deterrence of interference with regional trade corridors is realistic; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is arguably militarily impractical. The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations and not for wandering the world, although governments might choose to also engage in international combined operations, if Australia has suitable capacity.
However, the strategic basis for DWP2009 already warrants review by national intelligence agencies. The US will inevitably be forced to withdraw from South East Asia (China's First Island Chain) toward American territories in the South West Pacific (China's perceived Second Island Chain). The US island fortress Guam is the same distance from Darwin as is Canberra so the ANZUS alliance will henceforth be more focused on Australia's immediate neighbourhood. China appears not to have any territorial ambitions beyond its regional FIC, but has an economic stranglehold on Australia and thus no need to exert military pressure. In effect, China's growing economic strength in our region could be seen as a defacto form of security assurance in parallel with the US alliance.
The fundamental weakness in Australian defence planning is focusing on a mythical force structure 2 decades downstream instead of progressively optimising in-service hardware (where cost-effective) to continually maintain adequate and credible military capabilities for regional operations. Multiple capability gaps have emerged from flawed hardware acquisition planning, ergo the prudent acquisition of a Bay Class amphibious support ship for $100million.
There are ongoing manufacturer upgrade programs for aircraft that Australia intends shedding so it would seem wise to suspend the Defence Capabilities Plan, put the C-130H through the factory refurbishment program as 'herkman' suggests, spend another $100million on 50 x Huey II to recover forfeited utility helo capability, perhaps another $100million or so optimising Sea Kings and acquiring some more. These comparatively modest cost actions would materially enhance capabilities for regional military operations and restore some credibility in defence planning.
'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.
In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...
Deterrence of interference with regional trade corridors is realistic; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is arguably militarily impractical. The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations and not for wandering the world, although governments might choose to also engage in international combined operations, if Australia has suitable capacity.
However, the strategic basis for DWP2009 already warrants review by national intelligence agencies. The US will inevitably be forced to withdraw from South East Asia (China's First Island Chain) toward American territories in the South West Pacific (China's perceived Second Island Chain). The US island fortress Guam is the same distance from Darwin as is Canberra so the ANZUS alliance will henceforth be more focused on Australia's immediate neighbourhood. China appears not to have any territorial ambitions beyond its regional FIC, but has an economic stranglehold on Australia and thus no need to exert military pressure. In effect, China's growing economic strength in our region could be seen as a defacto form of security assurance in parallel with the US alliance.
The fundamental weakness in Australian defence planning is focusing on a mythical force structure 2 decades downstream instead of progressively optimising in-service hardware (where cost-effective) to continually maintain adequate and credible military capabilities for regional operations. Multiple capability gaps have emerged from flawed hardware acquisition planning, ergo the prudent acquisition of a Bay Class amphibious support ship for $100million.
There are ongoing manufacturer upgrade programs for aircraft that Australia intends shedding so it would seem wise to suspend the Defence Capabilities Plan, put the C-130H through the factory refurbishment program as 'herkman' suggests, spend another $100million on 50 x Huey II to recover forfeited utility helo capability, perhaps another $100million or so optimising Sea Kings and acquiring some more. These comparatively modest cost actions would materially enhance capabilities for regional military operations and restore some credibility in defence planning.
Thread Starter
B71: all points taken however we now have to live with the decisions taken. The issue is to work out what to do next. You will never reverse the current decisions good or bad.
I agree that we could do much better with less ie. C-130H rebuilds etc. I spoke to the CO of Sea King squadron recently and he would be very happy to see them upgraded; mainly a an avionics fit and they could soldier on for another ten years or so. The people in charge are obsessed with fewer types is better no mater what the cost it seems.
I agree that we could do much better with less ie. C-130H rebuilds etc. I spoke to the CO of Sea King squadron recently and he would be very happy to see them upgraded; mainly a an avionics fit and they could soldier on for another ten years or so. The people in charge are obsessed with fewer types is better no mater what the cost it seems.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: Australia
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The problem is that the planning process is made without a clear understanding of what our REAL needs are.
We bought the C130E when in actual fact going down the line were higher HP C130's and whilst they may not have been full H models they would have given us a better operating situation particularly as most of our take off and landings were done well above the standard plus 20 day.
We kept the A models which were really not suited for long range operation and lost the chance to trade them with Lockheed, who wanted to turn them into AC130 gunships.
Then we buggered around with the 707 buy to a stage we had to go onto the world market because Qantas had sold most of their frames. Then the contract with the Jews was far from satisfactory for the AR conversion, and we could have bought KC135R's cheaper and quicker than we got the 707 into AR service.
Then there is the little bou, we were talking of converting them to turbo props in 1968, but the army bitched about another fuel they had to deploy, guess which fuel the army tanks use now.
The people who have the operational knowledge and and hands on should be listened to instead of the chair born leaders who often have had nothing to really contribute that would make the purchase a real good deal.
The aircraft that we have clearly bought off the shelf, after we have defined what we need are the ones that were good buys. Going back to the C47, Neptune and on to all four of the C130 buys all have done a good job. As did the various models of the UH1's. I could but will not list all the junk that the three services have bought that was not fit for use.
We need to have the best of information so we can plan on what operations we will have to conduct to ensure that we get what is best suited for the job.
Regards
Col
We bought the C130E when in actual fact going down the line were higher HP C130's and whilst they may not have been full H models they would have given us a better operating situation particularly as most of our take off and landings were done well above the standard plus 20 day.
We kept the A models which were really not suited for long range operation and lost the chance to trade them with Lockheed, who wanted to turn them into AC130 gunships.
Then we buggered around with the 707 buy to a stage we had to go onto the world market because Qantas had sold most of their frames. Then the contract with the Jews was far from satisfactory for the AR conversion, and we could have bought KC135R's cheaper and quicker than we got the 707 into AR service.
Then there is the little bou, we were talking of converting them to turbo props in 1968, but the army bitched about another fuel they had to deploy, guess which fuel the army tanks use now.
The people who have the operational knowledge and and hands on should be listened to instead of the chair born leaders who often have had nothing to really contribute that would make the purchase a real good deal.
The aircraft that we have clearly bought off the shelf, after we have defined what we need are the ones that were good buys. Going back to the C47, Neptune and on to all four of the C130 buys all have done a good job. As did the various models of the UH1's. I could but will not list all the junk that the three services have bought that was not fit for use.
We need to have the best of information so we can plan on what operations we will have to conduct to ensure that we get what is best suited for the job.
Regards
Col