If someone were trying to destabilise our immediate neighbourhood, how would they get around from place to place, could the ADF match/counter them, and where would the ADF have to go in order to do that?
I think post #143 is very pertinent and apologies BB that I was not more specific regarding your query.
Australia's past involvement in PNG is relevant. Post-WW2 ,Qantas and TAA, which were then both government-owned, provided a range of air transportation means often used for military purposes in addition to RAAF Dakotas. Under Australian government administration, the 2 battalions of the Pacific Island Regiment were trained and mentored by the Australian Army with extensive patrolling along remote and very rugged western border areas to counter intrusions. Post-PNG independence, there was substantial provisioning of Australian military air support for the PIR vide C-130, Caribou, Iroquois with much positioning of drummed Avtur by C-130 and Caribou in particular.
There is uncontrolled air movement all over the northern archipelago as ground means are often impossible or too arduous. Customs and immigration control is pretty non-existent beyond a few major centres so it is quite easy for people who might have subversive intentions to move around.
As a slight aside, Australia is not too dissimilar. I flew the Darwin-based Dakota in the early 1960s and some tasks were monitoring of the old wartime airstrips around the coastline and maintaining the Navy sponsored coast-watcher network, which was based on mission-run beaut little aboriginal communities around the northern coast and on nearby islands. We occasionally found aircraft tyre tracks on remote airstrips and the Aborigine coast-watchers, who took their responsibility seriously, often reported suspicious aircraft movements.
An incident perhaps of interest. In January 1963, pre-Confrontation with Indonesia, the coast-watchers at Millingimbi nabbed 5 Indonesians who had come ashore in a small vessel. We flew out there with a Navy IntellO and the Sergeant of Police from Darwin (the only one armed) and discovered 2 of the group wearing military green shirts. We tipped out several baskets of maggoty food to find epaulettes with Indonesian insignia and other documentation. They were perhaps a bit unlucky to be detected considering the vastness of the Australian coastline, which is arguably impossible to adequately monitor. We took the Indons back to Darwin and they disappeared into the 'spook' system with nought publicly said, although there were other similar happenings.
Only small groups of people are necessary for generation of subversive activities and if appropriately skilled, could disrupt communications and power sources for example to create political strife. The federal government has admitted that identification fraud is now so sophisticated that illegal entry to Australia via routine airline transportation is common and we also have a wide open back door via New Zealand. So it is unrealistic that Australia can be militarily defended.
It is always interesting to hear the 'veterans' sprouting how obvious the answers are, and that the current leadership are completely clueless - give them some credit for having a clue.
Ftrplt; veterans are usually pretty forthright about matters military because they have mostly taken on board the lessons from combat experience and Australia's prior military involvement. This does not seem to be the case with the higher echelon of Defence. Senior public servants involved in capabilities planning largely have no military background and combat experience is very thin among the reigning military hierarchy from CDF down.
The Defence Capability Plan is a shambles with capability gaps emerging everywhere, hence the knee-jerk Super Hornet acquisition, leasing of tankers, no gunship capability since mid-2004, shedding of utility helo capability, civilian helos leased by Army and Navy, unplanned acquisition of a Bay Class amphibious support ship (although a good move), leasing of King Airs in substitution for Caribou, etcetera. There seems a tendency among the serving fraternity to blame DMO entirely for this parlous situation without also questioning the influence of the military leadership.
I think the whole planning process got derailed in the aftermath of East Timor intervention with emphasis becoming bent toward movement of largish expeditionary forces and creation of an enlarged hardened and less mobile Army as part of a mythical Force 2030 concept. Had acquisition of some smallish amphibious support ships like Bay Class been initiated at that time (in lieu of aircraft carriers), the RAN would have been better oriented toward regional archipelago operations and existing amphibious support deficiencies might not have emerged.
I would argue that defence planning priorities are back to front in that capacity for regional archipelago operations should have primacy and tactical air transport is a vital function. Defence planners and politicians are somewhat ignoring the lessons from Australia's regional military involvement post-WW2.