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Old Fella, ref your post about the J. It can do a lot more than it is currently doing if the there weren't alot of Nav's/FLT ENG's trying to protect their careers by extending the H. The J is strectched - therefore more pallets, flies higher, faster, more fuel effiecient, has TCAS, a proper auto pilot that can actually level off from a climb/descent. not to mention ATCS.
I have heard that flying a J on three engines is like flying a H on four. AND there are 2 less crew (saving 2 salaries).
The J is only limited by the hirearchy. Like an pensioner with a iphone - the senior ranks just don't understand
Don't hate it, embrace it
Frazzled
I have heard that flying a J on three engines is like flying a H on four. AND there are 2 less crew (saving 2 salaries).
The J is only limited by the hirearchy. Like an pensioner with a iphone - the senior ranks just don't understand
Don't hate it, embrace it
Frazzled
Originally Posted by Bushranger71
Blackhawk and MRH90 are not light and agile being roughly twice as heavy as the Huey II, between 10 and 20 times more expensive to purchase (depending on cost sources referenced) and at least 4 times more costly to operate. And, the Huey II is superior in hot and high performance.
Bushranger71, I do not find your assertions valid in this passage from a few pages back.
1. For Huey II (which I think you mean to be the UH-1Y?) to be 10-20 times cheaper than Blackhawk, they would have to cost 1-2 million, which we know is not the case. It's run by two T-700's, which is about where your first one to two million would get soaked up.
L's used to cost betweel 7-10 million back in the 90's, I think the M's are coming in under 20, but with the size of a US Army order and a multi year contract, odds are that pricing on that bird will vary, as you mentioned. I don't see anyone flying a UH-1Y away for less than 6-10 million, do you? 2. I have flown both Blackhawk (L model) and Huey (E and L model, single engine) and do not concur with your point on agility. (However, if your "agility" point is on the deployability of the Blackhawk or H90, rather than its handling stick and rudder wise, I think I see what you mean.) For those down playing the UH-1Y in this thread, the USMC appear to be pretty happy with the new 4-blade tail, 4 blade head, and its improved high hot and heavy performance. Afghanistan is a tough place to run a fully loaded helicopter in the summer time, that's for sure.
3. Your numbers on "cost to operate" are based on some data, I presume? I do not get how you derive "four times as high" from BH to others. I am also not sure which Huey you are basing your cost point on. Maybe your data are due to Australia having small fleets of any given aircraft, and some costs not spreading as well as others. Not sure. Cost per flight hour on Blackhawk and Seahawk, for example, were somewhat different a couple of decades ago, in part due to their different operational environment. But I don't have figures to hand that I consider reliable for current ops, so I'll not comment further.
4. Comment to anyone on "automatic blade fold" and Maritime helicopters.
It's a load of crap.
I operated SH-2F with manual blade fold, and SH-60B with auto, and I do not buy this tripe about how your "operations" are limited by manual bladefold. In my experience, I found manual to be much more reliable, faster (with a trained crew) and utterly lacking the profound operational limitations that arose time and again when the blasted blade fold failed to work as advertised in actual conditions. (Slip rings and corrosion were one of many problems.)
However, the Rube Goldbergs of the aviation world won that round ... auto blade fold appears to be here to stay. I suppose that some of the annoying features that plagued me may have been overcome in the intervening years. I hope so, anyway.
C-17: great capability, but I think the analysis of how to balance scarce money on airlift is extremely dependent on ROC and POE. (Required Operational Capability and Predicted Operating Environment). We discussed this some months back, BR71, and I note that your current deployment model is a company sized fight ... in what time frame and with what follow on forces in what timeframe???
How one phases the operation is crucial to how one builds the transport scheme to support an op.
The more I think through your point, the more I appreciate your concern on Hercs being given short shrift, given the expected tactical scenarios you envision the Aussies engaging in for the near to mid term.
That said, the C-17 is a fine bird, and more to the point, a bird that gives the POLITICAL leadership a larger number of options and flexibility than hercs ... the Japan event being a fine case in point.
But, if the armed forces are to provide security for some serious Aussie homeland and local area fighting and defense as a primary role, then perhaps the C-17 is a luxury, and a boosting of the Hercs a necessity.
This thread has been most educational. Thanks to all.
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Hi Lonewolf 50; you make some interesting points and I hope some thread drift might be forgiven in answer.
The Huey II and UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) are different Iroquois derivatives. The Huey II is a totally refurbished, rewired, re-engined UH-1H airframe with multiple performance upgrade features and lots of optional enhancements, including various glass cockpit options. This link gives a broad overview but more comprehensive info is available from Bell Helicopter: Bell Helicopter - The Bell UH-1H (Huey II).
Over 200 Huey II are now in service worldwide including military and civil versions with long supportability envisaged due to component commonality of multiple Bell types. The hot and high performance of the Huey II beats the pants off any other utility types and it just has to be the bargain of the century at around US2million for enhancement of a UH-1H acquired by Bell from stored US reserves. Conversion of wholly-owned UH-1H would of course be cheaper.
The twin-engine UH-1Y Venom was originally intended to be an upgraded UH-1N but that subsequently changed to new airframe production. The primary difference is a cabin stretch of about 530mm but also other enhancements. The overall project cost of the USMC AH-1Z/UH-1Y program seems pretty expensive, but the bulk of that outlay is for the AH-1Z. I have not yet seen any unit cost figure for a UH-1Y but I wager it would be appreciably cheaper than the MH-60R or the NFH90 while having many of the desirable naval support features for shipboard operations.
Herewith a little bit of related nonsense received last week from an 'Advisor' to the Australian Minister for Defence: '...even upgraded Iroquois helicopters would not provide a contemporary level of crash protection for Defence aircrew and personnel required by current policy...' The practice of writing absurd type specifications for military hardware has been going on worldwide for years in response to lobbying by arms manufacturers against consideration of competitor equipment. The Australian DoD is clearly writing out consideration of cost-effective helo types like the Huey II and UH-1Y despite their growing use elsewhere in the world and actively in military operations.
The necessity for 'light and agile' utility helicopters was highlighted by Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, US Army in a very comprehensive analysis of Vietnam War operations. Agility in my sense means the capability of rapidly and efficiently adapting to changes which the Iroquois does well in both aircraft handling and versatility considerations. Blackhawk is roughly twice as heavy as the Huey II with several consequent operating penalties; similarly for the MRH90 which is touted in many references as a medium lift helicopter. The ongoing need for a light and agile machine seems to have been further endorsed with the advent of the UH-72 Lakota into US Army service as a so-called 'Light Utility Helicopter'. Unit cost seems a bit rubbery, perhaps between US5-8million; though still not comparable with the Huey II in my view for capacity, performance, flexibility and versatility.
Helo operating costs outlined previously (for FY2007) were supplied by Australian DoD. Blackhawk is quoted at $20,659 per flying hour and Huey II would be about $5,000 or less.
But back to the thread theme.
The C-17 is indeed a great bird and substantially enhances Australia's military airlift capacity and more of them would be a wise move; but it cannot operate into many low grade airfields in our regional tropical archipelago (without higher risk of engine damage in particular) that are accessible by C-130. Over many years, the RAAF became very skilled at C-130 deployment of Iroquois and M113 APCs to provide an appropriate level of support for military deployments in remote areas. Running down C-130 capacity (and discarding the Iroquois) somewhat forfeits the tactical ability to deploy/redeploy smallish quick reaction forces swiftly in remote areas whereas operating other airlift capacity into airheads or airliner compatible airfields requires the provision of secondary in-theatre transportation means, substantially escalating the overheads of mounting smaller scale military operations. The Herc enables highly desirable great flexibility in military planning.
These extracts from Australian Defence Policy (Defence White Paper 2009) are pertinent:
'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.
In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...
Military capacity to deter interference with regional trade corridors is a realistic and affordable requirement; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is militarily impractical in my view.
The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations, although the government might choose to also engage in international combined operations and strategic aid to civil powers, if Australia has suitable capacity. But the taxpayer rightfully deserves that adequate military capabilities for regional operations be continually maintained.
The Huey II and UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) are different Iroquois derivatives. The Huey II is a totally refurbished, rewired, re-engined UH-1H airframe with multiple performance upgrade features and lots of optional enhancements, including various glass cockpit options. This link gives a broad overview but more comprehensive info is available from Bell Helicopter: Bell Helicopter - The Bell UH-1H (Huey II).
Over 200 Huey II are now in service worldwide including military and civil versions with long supportability envisaged due to component commonality of multiple Bell types. The hot and high performance of the Huey II beats the pants off any other utility types and it just has to be the bargain of the century at around US2million for enhancement of a UH-1H acquired by Bell from stored US reserves. Conversion of wholly-owned UH-1H would of course be cheaper.
The twin-engine UH-1Y Venom was originally intended to be an upgraded UH-1N but that subsequently changed to new airframe production. The primary difference is a cabin stretch of about 530mm but also other enhancements. The overall project cost of the USMC AH-1Z/UH-1Y program seems pretty expensive, but the bulk of that outlay is for the AH-1Z. I have not yet seen any unit cost figure for a UH-1Y but I wager it would be appreciably cheaper than the MH-60R or the NFH90 while having many of the desirable naval support features for shipboard operations.
Herewith a little bit of related nonsense received last week from an 'Advisor' to the Australian Minister for Defence: '...even upgraded Iroquois helicopters would not provide a contemporary level of crash protection for Defence aircrew and personnel required by current policy...' The practice of writing absurd type specifications for military hardware has been going on worldwide for years in response to lobbying by arms manufacturers against consideration of competitor equipment. The Australian DoD is clearly writing out consideration of cost-effective helo types like the Huey II and UH-1Y despite their growing use elsewhere in the world and actively in military operations.
The necessity for 'light and agile' utility helicopters was highlighted by Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, US Army in a very comprehensive analysis of Vietnam War operations. Agility in my sense means the capability of rapidly and efficiently adapting to changes which the Iroquois does well in both aircraft handling and versatility considerations. Blackhawk is roughly twice as heavy as the Huey II with several consequent operating penalties; similarly for the MRH90 which is touted in many references as a medium lift helicopter. The ongoing need for a light and agile machine seems to have been further endorsed with the advent of the UH-72 Lakota into US Army service as a so-called 'Light Utility Helicopter'. Unit cost seems a bit rubbery, perhaps between US5-8million; though still not comparable with the Huey II in my view for capacity, performance, flexibility and versatility.
Helo operating costs outlined previously (for FY2007) were supplied by Australian DoD. Blackhawk is quoted at $20,659 per flying hour and Huey II would be about $5,000 or less.
But back to the thread theme.
The C-17 is indeed a great bird and substantially enhances Australia's military airlift capacity and more of them would be a wise move; but it cannot operate into many low grade airfields in our regional tropical archipelago (without higher risk of engine damage in particular) that are accessible by C-130. Over many years, the RAAF became very skilled at C-130 deployment of Iroquois and M113 APCs to provide an appropriate level of support for military deployments in remote areas. Running down C-130 capacity (and discarding the Iroquois) somewhat forfeits the tactical ability to deploy/redeploy smallish quick reaction forces swiftly in remote areas whereas operating other airlift capacity into airheads or airliner compatible airfields requires the provision of secondary in-theatre transportation means, substantially escalating the overheads of mounting smaller scale military operations. The Herc enables highly desirable great flexibility in military planning.
These extracts from Australian Defence Policy (Defence White Paper 2009) are pertinent:
'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.
In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...
Military capacity to deter interference with regional trade corridors is a realistic and affordable requirement; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is militarily impractical in my view.
The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations, although the government might choose to also engage in international combined operations and strategic aid to civil powers, if Australia has suitable capacity. But the taxpayer rightfully deserves that adequate military capabilities for regional operations be continually maintained.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 26th Mar 2011 at 21:42.
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Hi Frazzled; re your post #82.
Because the C-130 airframe is so wonderfully versatile, it is adaptable for a broad range of special operations roles. I have crawled over some such birds and they mostly require additional aircrew members to operate specialised gear and command missions. The larger flight deck of earlier model Hercules has been adapted in varying ways to provide additional crew stations with some also having modular units installed in the cargo hold.
I have not been on board the C-130J, but the reduced crewing and stretched cargo hold make it more like a civilian air-freighter albeit with short-field characteristics. When the 'J' model was being introduced to RAAF service, experienced Herc qualified friends commented that some black boxes had been repositioned to just above the ramp, somewhat impeding loading of higher gear for which earlier models had been cleared; but maybe that problem has been overcome.
Post-Air Force, I spent a decade in airline flight training when glass cockpit technology and computerised flight management systems were coming into vogue. Beaut stuff of course enabling crewing economies for airline operators; but the varying ability of aircrew to assimilate a whole lot of floating data soon became apparent. Not a problem in routine operations; but when the pressure comes on, some information that gets displayed is not always adequately absorbed.
These days, glass cockpit enhancements are available for most types of aircraft, but there seems some risk to me of overloading the ability of aircrew to stay ahead of the game in stressful combat roles, unless there are adequate crew members to cope with all of the essential information monitoring in addition to just driving the aircraft. Designing military aircraft flight decks around crewing economies is arguably not altogether wise.
RAAF C-130H would be eagerly sought and refurbished as necessary by other operators if discarded by the ADF.
Because the C-130 airframe is so wonderfully versatile, it is adaptable for a broad range of special operations roles. I have crawled over some such birds and they mostly require additional aircrew members to operate specialised gear and command missions. The larger flight deck of earlier model Hercules has been adapted in varying ways to provide additional crew stations with some also having modular units installed in the cargo hold.
I have not been on board the C-130J, but the reduced crewing and stretched cargo hold make it more like a civilian air-freighter albeit with short-field characteristics. When the 'J' model was being introduced to RAAF service, experienced Herc qualified friends commented that some black boxes had been repositioned to just above the ramp, somewhat impeding loading of higher gear for which earlier models had been cleared; but maybe that problem has been overcome.
Post-Air Force, I spent a decade in airline flight training when glass cockpit technology and computerised flight management systems were coming into vogue. Beaut stuff of course enabling crewing economies for airline operators; but the varying ability of aircrew to assimilate a whole lot of floating data soon became apparent. Not a problem in routine operations; but when the pressure comes on, some information that gets displayed is not always adequately absorbed.
These days, glass cockpit enhancements are available for most types of aircraft, but there seems some risk to me of overloading the ability of aircrew to stay ahead of the game in stressful combat roles, unless there are adequate crew members to cope with all of the essential information monitoring in addition to just driving the aircraft. Designing military aircraft flight decks around crewing economies is arguably not altogether wise.
RAAF C-130H would be eagerly sought and refurbished as necessary by other operators if discarded by the ADF.
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Saving 2 Salaries????
Frazzled. My comment regarding the C130J was not intended to be a "put-down" of that aircraft. I am aware that it is a fine aircraft but it has not yet, to my knowledge, been developed in RAAF service to be used in some of the roles in which the A, E & H all had demonstrated their abilities. Yes the "J" can carry more in payload and can fly faster. The cruise altitude is not normally a problem, unless things have changed where FL260 was the max with passengers (Due no supplementary oxygen for pax and the time to get down to a breathing altitude))
As for "saving 2 salaries", I would contest that assertion. In the C130 world, pre "H" model at least, the Flight Engineer carried out all the maintenance required away base on almost all operations. One or more of three different "Fly-away Spares" kits were carried and as well as performing the inflight duties of Flight Engineer the F/E was responsible for any rectifications required, It was only on longer duration exercises or trips such as Staff College tours that any technical ground crew were carried. So, who do you think might perform that role today? Not the pilots I'll wager. I do not know with any certaintity however I would believe that at least one, if not two, technicians would accompany the "J" model on most flights. Not much of a salary saving I think.
Far from hating the "J" model, I believe it is a fine aircraft following in the traditions of it's forebears. If you have not had the experience of operating the "H" or earlier models of the C130, don't underestimate their value or capability.
As for "saving 2 salaries", I would contest that assertion. In the C130 world, pre "H" model at least, the Flight Engineer carried out all the maintenance required away base on almost all operations. One or more of three different "Fly-away Spares" kits were carried and as well as performing the inflight duties of Flight Engineer the F/E was responsible for any rectifications required, It was only on longer duration exercises or trips such as Staff College tours that any technical ground crew were carried. So, who do you think might perform that role today? Not the pilots I'll wager. I do not know with any certaintity however I would believe that at least one, if not two, technicians would accompany the "J" model on most flights. Not much of a salary saving I think.
Far from hating the "J" model, I believe it is a fine aircraft following in the traditions of it's forebears. If you have not had the experience of operating the "H" or earlier models of the C130, don't underestimate their value or capability.
Last edited by Old Fella; 28th Mar 2011 at 03:09. Reason: correction
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Two tech's are carried on away J tasking, usually more if it's a complicated task. Haven't checked the latest P&C but I believe 1 LAC & 1 CPL are still slightly cheaper than a single FSGT or above FENG on flying pay/disability.
MEAO sucks up most of the J training capacity so things like MFP, PLF, PLAT haven't been followed up. Other stuff was cancelled like wedge or postponed like RAPSL.
Moving beyond ABNOPS to higher tier capability will be interesting. ARDU did a human factors study 6 years ago specifically into this and recommended more crew members to handle the load on tasks that warranted it. This will never happen with the career's that have been staked on a modern flight deck arrangement. Funny enough the Marines with the MC130J and AFSOC with the HC130J are employing a 4 crew flight deck. I guess the RAAF knows better.
MEAO sucks up most of the J training capacity so things like MFP, PLF, PLAT haven't been followed up. Other stuff was cancelled like wedge or postponed like RAPSL.
Moving beyond ABNOPS to higher tier capability will be interesting. ARDU did a human factors study 6 years ago specifically into this and recommended more crew members to handle the load on tasks that warranted it. This will never happen with the career's that have been staked on a modern flight deck arrangement. Funny enough the Marines with the MC130J and AFSOC with the HC130J are employing a 4 crew flight deck. I guess the RAAF knows better.
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2 Tech Crew
Lost again. Doesn't matter how you look at it, replacing one flight crew member (F/E) with two technical ground crew is not cheap. Those two personnel are not available at home base, so either the maintenance crews are left short at home or additional personnel are required to be brought on strength. Maybe a technically qualified Loadmaster, such as was the case with the Caribou (in the days when they were classified as Loadmasters, later Creman Tech, and finally Flight Engineer) but were in fact also the "flying spanner". As for the Nav's, I expect a Nav is carried on Tactical sorties where the "J" is used in that role.
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Bushranger71: thanks for the response. While Huey II payload per mission is less than Blackhawk, I appreciate the clarification and cost (per flight hour) references.* If I can get my hands on current US Army cost per hour numbers, (and the basis for calculation) I'll see how they compare to what you cited. MH-60R is heavier and more expensive for a lot of reasons. In re your deployability concerns, certainly not in the ball park.
The crashworthiness criterion for utlity helicopters is a specification that also owed its genesis to lessons learned from Viet Nam operations. I am neutral on the topic: as aircrew, you want to be able to walk away from a controlled crash and not, like in the SH-2F, have things like the radar rack end up in your lap when you sit in the rear seat. The weight penalty has its own downside, of course. FWIW, a friend of mine walked away (actually swam away) from crashed SH-60 thanks in part to the crashworthy criterion of the S-70 series pilot seats ... and he still had back problems for years, thanks to that crash. Lacking that energy absorbtion capability, he'd have fed the fish instead.
Again, a most educational thread.
Getting there with the most capability per unit of cube & weight of tactical (or strategic) lift is a problem planners won't stop trying to optimize any time soon.
That rock keeps being rolled up the hill ...
* = looked at the numbers and I see the internal payload is very similar, depending upon how you arrive at "useful load" numbers. The major difference is external load bonus to the Blackhawk. Internal load is close enough, based on the stats offered for the Huey II and Blackhawk, to make the decision on economics an interesting one.
The crashworthiness criterion for utlity helicopters is a specification that also owed its genesis to lessons learned from Viet Nam operations. I am neutral on the topic: as aircrew, you want to be able to walk away from a controlled crash and not, like in the SH-2F, have things like the radar rack end up in your lap when you sit in the rear seat. The weight penalty has its own downside, of course. FWIW, a friend of mine walked away (actually swam away) from crashed SH-60 thanks in part to the crashworthy criterion of the S-70 series pilot seats ... and he still had back problems for years, thanks to that crash. Lacking that energy absorbtion capability, he'd have fed the fish instead.
Again, a most educational thread.
Getting there with the most capability per unit of cube & weight of tactical (or strategic) lift is a problem planners won't stop trying to optimize any time soon.
That rock keeps being rolled up the hill ...* = looked at the numbers and I see the internal payload is very similar, depending upon how you arrive at "useful load" numbers. The major difference is external load bonus to the Blackhawk. Internal load is close enough, based on the stats offered for the Huey II and Blackhawk, to make the decision on economics an interesting one.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 28th Mar 2011 at 13:00.
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Old Fella. No navigator is ever carried on the J in the tactical roles. The two pilot's run the show themselves. The only times nav's were "kind of" used was during the initial JPADS OT&E as a PADS operator. The ABNOPS standard was re-written about 5 years ago and dumbed down to the current level to allow quicker training. The test will be when they take a J to Red Flag or other high tempo exercise and see if it works in these roles. The USAF and RAF are still running around with Talon II's or C130K's on this exercise.
I agree about the cost of 2 tech's to be honest with the loss of two bod's on the flightline. However, since the Sea King at Nias crash, the number of jobs that a FENG's is legally signed off to fix has been drastically reduced and the H requires a rescue just as often.
I agree about the cost of 2 tech's to be honest with the loss of two bod's on the flightline. However, since the Sea King at Nias crash, the number of jobs that a FENG's is legally signed off to fix has been drastically reduced and the H requires a rescue just as often.
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Loss of the SeaKing
Lost Again. Very interesting to read your comments regarding the crewing of the J and also the reduction in areas of responsibility for the currfent F/E's. As one of the "Old Brigade" of C130 F/E's I am not surprised at the changes which have been made, although I must admit to being disappointed that it was necessary to do so.
Many things have changed I guess, such as the way in which candidates for F/E training are selected and the backgrounds of some chosen. Is the reason the "H" requires rescue as often as the "J" due to the limitations on the F/E or the reliability of the "H"? Short of having to have an engine change, prop change, a hydraulic system pump flush or some other major airframe component change "Rescues" were very uncommon in the days when only relatively long-term ground technicians were considered for training as F/E's and they were trained by the respective squadron using current F/E's as instructors for all ground subjects and in the simulator.
Having been gone from the RAAF for thirty years I know times have changed, not always for the best it seems. If you don't want to go public please PM me. I am interested to know how things works these days.
Many things have changed I guess, such as the way in which candidates for F/E training are selected and the backgrounds of some chosen. Is the reason the "H" requires rescue as often as the "J" due to the limitations on the F/E or the reliability of the "H"? Short of having to have an engine change, prop change, a hydraulic system pump flush or some other major airframe component change "Rescues" were very uncommon in the days when only relatively long-term ground technicians were considered for training as F/E's and they were trained by the respective squadron using current F/E's as instructors for all ground subjects and in the simulator.
Having been gone from the RAAF for thirty years I know times have changed, not always for the best it seems. If you don't want to go public please PM me. I am interested to know how things works these days.
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Back in the days of A and E models, (and I'm assuming little would have changed with the 'H' model), on a long trip, the FE would take away two very large boxes, (as I recall, but am ready to be corrected, the 'A' kit and the 'B' kit), containing a rather large number of parts to replace those likely to go wrong while away.
It was not unusual for the FE to have to replace quite a large number of instruments and other sundry items during the week away on a Vung Tau or Phan Rang service. With the bits from the A and B kit in place of the originals, the aircraft would depart Darwin perfectly serviceable... but arrive in Richmond u/s, with multiple entries in the -500, because the paperwork required by the hapless FE to transfer all those parts from the A or B kit inventory and onto the aircraft inventory was formidable and extremely time-consuming.
So the FE and the co-pilot, (much to the horror of any pax who visited the flight deck for a smoke), usually spent a major part of the cruise between Darwin and Richmond ripping out all the serviceable bits and replacing those that could be replaced while maintaining safe flight with the original u/s bits... which the poor bloody ground crew had to turn around and replace again after the aircraft arrived.
Stipid? Everyone acknowledged it. But apparently, it took less time and work (for the FE at least?) than leaving the serviceable A and b kit pieces in place.
I'd be willing to bet that something very similar happens with the H model to this day.
It was not unusual for the FE to have to replace quite a large number of instruments and other sundry items during the week away on a Vung Tau or Phan Rang service. With the bits from the A and B kit in place of the originals, the aircraft would depart Darwin perfectly serviceable... but arrive in Richmond u/s, with multiple entries in the -500, because the paperwork required by the hapless FE to transfer all those parts from the A or B kit inventory and onto the aircraft inventory was formidable and extremely time-consuming.
So the FE and the co-pilot, (much to the horror of any pax who visited the flight deck for a smoke), usually spent a major part of the cruise between Darwin and Richmond ripping out all the serviceable bits and replacing those that could be replaced while maintaining safe flight with the original u/s bits... which the poor bloody ground crew had to turn around and replace again after the aircraft arrived.
Stipid? Everyone acknowledged it. But apparently, it took less time and work (for the FE at least?
) than leaving the serviceable A and b kit pieces in place. I'd be willing to bet that something very similar happens with the H model to this day.
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Flyaway Kits
Wiley Those A & B kits were the cause of more than their fair share of "back busting". You can recall, I'm sure, lifting the darn things into and out of the aircraft. There was also a C kit, which I think had a couple of fire bottles in it. You will also likely remember that many of the items in the kits could only be used when on the ground and as a consequence the FE, often assisted by the LM, would be stuck rectifying defects well after the rest of the crew had left for the bar. In fact I recall one trip in an A model, where we departed Richmond with four overhauled engines and the aircraft just out of a "D" check, on a Staff College jolly. Within 18 hours of flight time three of the four engines had to have the duplex oil scavenge pump removed and the seals replaced, no small task. Two showed the tell tale signs (oil dripping from the oil cooler flap actuator) after landing and one let go in flight with a subsequent shutdown and diversion into Honiara. Anyone with any significant hours on the A model will know what I'm talking about. I am not sure just how it is done these days with the H model, but up until I left the RAAF in '81 it was still the FE who looked after the aircraft away base on almost all tasking.
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Yes I recall on many occasions as the Load I had the joy of assisting the Engineer with rectification of defects. Even though we were not technically adept, many of us would jump in and assist and many times did one task whilst the engineer would do something else. When the engineer leader was on the plane not only did we assist but at the end when he was checking what had been done, he expected that I brief him on how I did the task and my understanding of what to look for.
I am sure that in today's Air Force things would be very different and maybe they should be, but never the less in the back of my mind I have a memory, after our tasking had been extended, the engineer and myself pulled the C service which had become due. When we got home I expected to see the techo's pull the service again, but that did not happen, they just turned it around and sent her out again.
The fact that they have reduced the flight engineers role, in no way is it critical of many of the engineers. It is caused by the Air Force deciding that new staff did not need the knowledge and ability.
Now that was a step backwards.
The ability of the Load on the J model has been enhanced and the LM now performs both the pre and after flight checks.
Regards
Col
I am sure that in today's Air Force things would be very different and maybe they should be, but never the less in the back of my mind I have a memory, after our tasking had been extended, the engineer and myself pulled the C service which had become due. When we got home I expected to see the techo's pull the service again, but that did not happen, they just turned it around and sent her out again.
The fact that they have reduced the flight engineers role, in no way is it critical of many of the engineers. It is caused by the Air Force deciding that new staff did not need the knowledge and ability.
Now that was a step backwards.
The ability of the Load on the J model has been enhanced and the LM now performs both the pre and after flight checks.
Regards
Col
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Hi again Lonewolf 50; re your post #92 and hoping not to drift too much off good airlift discussion this thread.
Somewhere in these forums was mentioned a fully-equipped ADF soldier weighs 300 pounds! Ridiculous of course because they would not be able to run and/or fight efficiently and soon become cripples. However, it would be of interest to know just what figures are actually used these days for airlift planning purposes in both fixed and rotary wing realms.
During Vietnam War ops, a fully-equipped RAAF Hotel model Iroquois manned by 4 crew and with full fuel carried 7 troops; although when working with NZ forces, fuel was usually reduced by about 200 pounds because Maori warriors are generally big heavy men who mostly draped themselves in belted ammunition.
Just to finalise your Huey II capabilities queries. Lots of enhancement options which would trim payload a bit, but H2 has the internal lift capacity for 10 troops (a notional infantry squad/section) with reconfigured simple clip-in fabric seating. A bit crowded which is probably why the UH-1Y cabin has been stretched around 530mm.
The H2 cargo hook capacity is 5,000 pounds and maximum operating gross weight increases by 700 pounds for external loading which translates to lift potential of around 3,000 pounds on the hook, more if fuel loading and/or 4 man crewing is reduced. Less than the Blackhawk of course but still pretty useful.
Re aircraft crash-worthiness features. I do not take a bean-counter view of war-fighting, but rather having adequate resources and capabilities to get the job done. Having more of employable lower cost assets assures sustainment of operations compared with lesser numbers of very expensive kit. Risk is inherent in military operations and overly-expensive cocooning against harm is arguably somewhat impractical. If I were a theatre commander, I would be quite satisfied with a bunch of very modest cost Huey II and enhanced M113 APCs for example, although they might not have the expensive inbuilt protection features of contemporary costly vehicles.
There are differing qualities between UH-60M and Huey II, but obviously much commonality in roles performable. If accepting that some casualties are inevitable in military operations, Huey II at $2million is clearly more cost-effective than UH-60M at maybe $20million.
Somewhere in these forums was mentioned a fully-equipped ADF soldier weighs 300 pounds! Ridiculous of course because they would not be able to run and/or fight efficiently and soon become cripples. However, it would be of interest to know just what figures are actually used these days for airlift planning purposes in both fixed and rotary wing realms.
During Vietnam War ops, a fully-equipped RAAF Hotel model Iroquois manned by 4 crew and with full fuel carried 7 troops; although when working with NZ forces, fuel was usually reduced by about 200 pounds because Maori warriors are generally big heavy men who mostly draped themselves in belted ammunition.
Just to finalise your Huey II capabilities queries. Lots of enhancement options which would trim payload a bit, but H2 has the internal lift capacity for 10 troops (a notional infantry squad/section) with reconfigured simple clip-in fabric seating. A bit crowded which is probably why the UH-1Y cabin has been stretched around 530mm.
The H2 cargo hook capacity is 5,000 pounds and maximum operating gross weight increases by 700 pounds for external loading which translates to lift potential of around 3,000 pounds on the hook, more if fuel loading and/or 4 man crewing is reduced. Less than the Blackhawk of course but still pretty useful.
Re aircraft crash-worthiness features. I do not take a bean-counter view of war-fighting, but rather having adequate resources and capabilities to get the job done. Having more of employable lower cost assets assures sustainment of operations compared with lesser numbers of very expensive kit. Risk is inherent in military operations and overly-expensive cocooning against harm is arguably somewhat impractical. If I were a theatre commander, I would be quite satisfied with a bunch of very modest cost Huey II and enhanced M113 APCs for example, although they might not have the expensive inbuilt protection features of contemporary costly vehicles.
There are differing qualities between UH-60M and Huey II, but obviously much commonality in roles performable. If accepting that some casualties are inevitable in military operations, Huey II at $2million is clearly more cost-effective than UH-60M at maybe $20million.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 30th Mar 2011 at 00:24.
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Bushranger
Re "Somewhere in these forums was mentioned a fully-equipped ADF soldier weighs 300 pounds! Ridiculous of course because they would not be able to run and/or fight efficiently and soon become cripples."
300 pounds is only 136kgs.
If I looked at what my weight and gear was with Standard equipment carried (and this was before the days of Steyr, Helmet, Body Armour)
Self 90kgs
Webbing 12kg
Pack 50kg
SLR 3.2kg
TOTAL 155.2 KGS
= 342 Lbs
Apologise for the thread drift. Great thread.
Re "Somewhere in these forums was mentioned a fully-equipped ADF soldier weighs 300 pounds! Ridiculous of course because they would not be able to run and/or fight efficiently and soon become cripples."
300 pounds is only 136kgs.
If I looked at what my weight and gear was with Standard equipment carried (and this was before the days of Steyr, Helmet, Body Armour)
Self 90kgs
Webbing 12kg
Pack 50kg
SLR 3.2kg
TOTAL 155.2 KGS
= 342 Lbs
Apologise for the thread drift. Great thread.
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That figure is probably closer to a Patrol Order (Heavy) once you take into account some form of armour whether it be MCBAS, TBAS, Eagle Marine or whatever and the extra water and ammo that go in the day packs. Once you look at Marching Order than you've got all that plus an extra 15-20kg in pers kit and associated loss of space on whatever means of TPT you take.
Thankfully a lot of dismounted work is supported via Bushmasters (hopefully in overwatch) so most of the kit can be left with them but there's still a whole shed load of gear that the average guy is lumping around all day everyday.
Forget the M113s, the Bushmasters are saving too many lives over there ATM. The flat bottom (on both the LAVs and M113) just doesn't cut it anymore.
Without the tab data to compare on hand, how many of each can the Herc and C17 carry of each? The M113s are unlikely to be deployed anywhere that has shown to develop and use EFPs so that only leaves the Bushmaster as a deployed IMV, PMV (whatever it's called today)
Thankfully a lot of dismounted work is supported via Bushmasters (hopefully in overwatch) so most of the kit can be left with them but there's still a whole shed load of gear that the average guy is lumping around all day everyday.
Forget the M113s, the Bushmasters are saving too many lives over there ATM. The flat bottom (on both the LAVs and M113) just doesn't cut it anymore.
Without the tab data to compare on hand, how many of each can the Herc and C17 carry of each? The M113s are unlikely to be deployed anywhere that has shown to develop and use EFPs so that only leaves the Bushmaster as a deployed IMV, PMV (whatever it's called today)
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Agree with Frazzled.
The J is an amazing aircraft - beautiful to fly, great to operate, gutsy, robust and can cop a bollocking and get up and fight another day.
Has been limited by naivety by non-J operators, E/H fraternity (F/E, Nav and pilot) willing to stick the dagger in it's back every time they can, lack of money thrown at it (bought it without required spares/logistics pipeline and still hurting from it) and lack of man power to develop it.
It cannot do half the roles of the H because 1) Navigator union won't let it 2) lack of manpower to do test and evaluation for those roles 3) it is stuck on operations.
To be honest, I am sick of the J bashing that goes on - so are all the other nations out there with Js. The RAF J v K issue was massive - now the Ks are gone, but the J bashing continues.
In summary, the J could have been an absolutely brilliant aircraft in RAAF service - but due to beauracracy, it will always be remembered for being mediocre.
Shame, shame, shame.
The J is an amazing aircraft - beautiful to fly, great to operate, gutsy, robust and can cop a bollocking and get up and fight another day.
Has been limited by naivety by non-J operators, E/H fraternity (F/E, Nav and pilot) willing to stick the dagger in it's back every time they can, lack of money thrown at it (bought it without required spares/logistics pipeline and still hurting from it) and lack of man power to develop it.
It cannot do half the roles of the H because 1) Navigator union won't let it 2) lack of manpower to do test and evaluation for those roles 3) it is stuck on operations.
To be honest, I am sick of the J bashing that goes on - so are all the other nations out there with Js. The RAF J v K issue was massive - now the Ks are gone, but the J bashing continues.
In summary, the J could have been an absolutely brilliant aircraft in RAAF service - but due to beauracracy, it will always be remembered for being mediocre.
Shame, shame, shame.