Bushranger,
the Caribou was dead as a viable and maintable airframe - simple as that. No amount of sustainment money was going to make it last any longer.
The King Air decision was all about providing a gap fill capability of some description and help maintain a workforce mass that is going to transition basically every platform over the next decade. You need to maintain a level of 'spare' capacity to introduce new types whilst maintaining capability with the old.
Not to mention in an environmebt where pilots course graduates are waiting up to 18 months for conversions in ALG, its not a bad thing to have a cheap option to generate experience and captaincy in junior aircrew. The King Air does provide valuable and cost effective outcomes - it shouldnt be thought of as a Caribou replacement, its an option to generate some form of capability with remaining elements of what was the Caribou workforce. The cost of this capability is relatively small especially with rationalisations achieved with the merger of the Army KA capability.
No one argues that airlift capability is reduced without a dedicated light transport - its all a decision on how best to apportion limited acquisition funds (which are different buckets than sustainment) - and a prioritisation decision. Light tactical transport just happens to be assessed as the low priority in competition.
It is always interesting to hear the 'veterans' sprouting how obvious the answers are, and that the current leadership are completely clueless - give them some credit for having a clue. Your belief that maintaining the 'long range' F111 as a viable and cost effective maritime strike capability clearly indicates you dont have as much a clue as you think you do.