Hi Lonewolf 50; you make some interesting points and I hope some thread drift might be forgiven in answer.
The Huey II and UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) are different Iroquois derivatives. The Huey II is a totally refurbished, rewired, re-engined UH-1H airframe with multiple performance upgrade features and lots of optional enhancements, including various glass cockpit options. This link gives a broad overview but more comprehensive info is available from Bell Helicopter: Bell Helicopter - The Bell UH-1H (Huey II).
Over 200 Huey II are now in service worldwide including military and civil versions with long supportability envisaged due to component commonality of multiple Bell types. The hot and high performance of the Huey II beats the pants off any other utility types and it just has to be the bargain of the century at around US2million for enhancement of a UH-1H acquired by Bell from stored US reserves. Conversion of wholly-owned UH-1H would of course be cheaper.
The twin-engine UH-1Y Venom was originally intended to be an upgraded UH-1N but that subsequently changed to new airframe production. The primary difference is a cabin stretch of about 530mm but also other enhancements. The overall project cost of the USMC AH-1Z/UH-1Y program seems pretty expensive, but the bulk of that outlay is for the AH-1Z. I have not yet seen any unit cost figure for a UH-1Y but I wager it would be appreciably cheaper than the MH-60R or the NFH90 while having many of the desirable naval support features for shipboard operations.
Herewith a little bit of related nonsense received last week from an 'Advisor' to the Australian Minister for Defence: '...even upgraded Iroquois helicopters would not provide a contemporary level of crash protection for Defence aircrew and personnel required by current policy...' The practice of writing absurd type specifications for military hardware has been going on worldwide for years in response to lobbying by arms manufacturers against consideration of competitor equipment. The Australian DoD is clearly writing out consideration of cost-effective helo types like the Huey II and UH-1Y despite their growing use elsewhere in the world and actively in military operations.
The necessity for 'light and agile' utility helicopters was highlighted by Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, US Army in a very comprehensive analysis of Vietnam War operations. Agility in my sense means the capability of rapidly and efficiently adapting to changes which the Iroquois does well in both aircraft handling and versatility considerations. Blackhawk is roughly twice as heavy as the Huey II with several consequent operating penalties; similarly for the MRH90 which is touted in many references as a medium lift helicopter. The ongoing need for a light and agile machine seems to have been further endorsed with the advent of the UH-72 Lakota into US Army service as a so-called 'Light Utility Helicopter'. Unit cost seems a bit rubbery, perhaps between US5-8million; though still not comparable with the Huey II in my view for capacity, performance, flexibility and versatility.
Helo operating costs outlined previously (for FY2007) were supplied by Australian DoD. Blackhawk is quoted at $20,659 per flying hour and Huey II would be about $5,000 or less.
But back to the thread theme.
The C-17 is indeed a great bird and substantially enhances Australia's military airlift capacity and more of them would be a wise move; but it cannot operate into many low grade airfields in our regional tropical archipelago (without higher risk of engine damage in particular) that are accessible by C-130. Over many years, the RAAF became very skilled at C-130 deployment of Iroquois and M113 APCs to provide an appropriate level of support for military deployments in remote areas. Running down C-130 capacity (and discarding the Iroquois) somewhat forfeits the tactical ability to deploy/redeploy smallish quick reaction forces swiftly in remote areas whereas operating other airlift capacity into airheads or airliner compatible airfields requires the provision of secondary in-theatre transportation means, substantially escalating the overheads of mounting smaller scale military operations. The Herc enables highly desirable great flexibility in military planning.
These extracts from Australian Defence Policy (Defence White Paper 2009) are pertinent:
'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.
In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...
Military capacity to deter interference with regional trade corridors is a realistic and affordable requirement; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is militarily impractical in my view.
The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations, although the government might choose to also engage in international combined operations and strategic aid to civil powers, if Australia has suitable capacity. But the taxpayer rightfully deserves that adequate military capabilities for regional operations be continually maintained.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 26th Mar 2011 at 21:42.