Aussie MRH-90
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Australia
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BBad, AIR 87 didn't start in 1987 any more than JP2048 started in the year 2048. There was a lot pie in the sky thinking, but when the proposals were put to government, that was the end of a 3 or 4 year analysis.
Bear in mind that the entire ADF acquisition process has been fundamentally changed twice in the last 15 years, with the Kinnaird review just the latest version of a difficult and unwieldy system. The big problem with Kiowa/Tiger was convincing government we needed a new recce platform at all.
DMO didn't get it wrong any more than CDG got it wrong. Against the criteria set, the Tiger was the best platform. Many people were more upset that we didn't select Mangusta, and the Cobra lobby was quite vocal too. It's one thing to say "we should have bought Apache", it's quite another to convince cabinet of that fact.
Bear in mind that the entire ADF acquisition process has been fundamentally changed twice in the last 15 years, with the Kinnaird review just the latest version of a difficult and unwieldy system. The big problem with Kiowa/Tiger was convincing government we needed a new recce platform at all.
DMO didn't get it wrong any more than CDG got it wrong. Against the criteria set, the Tiger was the best platform. Many people were more upset that we didn't select Mangusta, and the Cobra lobby was quite vocal too. It's one thing to say "we should have bought Apache", it's quite another to convince cabinet of that fact.
Join Date: Dec 1998
Location: Down Under
Posts: 210
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
emergov
Mate, you are seriously deluded if you believe that all crews are adequately trained. It isn't absurd, vexatious or ignorant - it is fact absolute fact. Tell me how you many hours are available to train crews before they deploy and whether all formation, NVD and tactical training is completed before deployment.....my evidence would suggest a different position to that which you are suggesting. And to say that you do all sorts out training in theatre because you always have is a feeble excuse and surely must signify that you are one of the 16th Aviation Brigade spin doctors....you should be ashamed of yourself....!
HPT
4. Every pilot and aircrewman in AAAvn is getting all the night flying they need. Those who fall uncurrent for whatever reason are given all the training they require before we ask them to step out on a dark night.
5. We do all sorts of training in theatre. We always have. The assertion that we are somehow putting our people at risk because we don't have enough Chinooks is absurd, vexatious and based on ignorance.
5. We do all sorts of training in theatre. We always have. The assertion that we are somehow putting our people at risk because we don't have enough Chinooks is absurd, vexatious and based on ignorance.
HPT
emergov says: BBad, AIR 87 didn't start in 1987 any more than JP2048 started in the year 2048.
Emergov, don't want to get into slanging matches here, as we both know the sorry procurement system and we're not anarak wearers.
I didn't say it started in 1987, but said the process took "more like 20 years" - which is not too far off the mark. I stand corrected, but think the process for AIR 87 started circa 1992. We may see IOC in 2012?
Emergov, don't want to get into slanging matches here, as we both know the sorry procurement system and we're not anarak wearers.
I didn't say it started in 1987, but said the process took "more like 20 years" - which is not too far off the mark. I stand corrected, but think the process for AIR 87 started circa 1992. We may see IOC in 2012?
Join Date: Dec 1998
Location: Down Under
Posts: 210
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As someone involved in delivering capability to Army, the 'initial' training system is first rate. In fact we train and our pilots to death and I believe they are overtrained compared to the civilian/other countries. I agree we may not have the hours in unit to prep for ops, but the initial training is excellent.
I meant operational unit training is insufficient....glad you agree about emergov being a spin doctor....
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Australia
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm not a spin doctor. I have no responsibility to anyone to 'spin'.
I just happen to actually be in the capability, and I will tell you all what I think.
I have not ever stated that we are kicking great goals with ARH and MRH90.
It's been a long hard road, and there is a long way to go. I also didn't say everyone is getting 300 hours each. What I will say is that 150 hours in Afghanistan, or 250 in Timor is worth 400 hours transiting between Darwin and somewhere useful, or Townsville to Shoalwater Bay.
The people we send overseas are indeed well trained and ready for their operational mission. ARH pilots aren't going anywhere soon. When it's time to deploy and they haven't managed to get sufficient night flying, then my comment will be wrong. until then, my comment stands. We have simulators and part task trainers, and as ARH Tiger said, the product from the school is still first rate.
I don't see the hand wringing and anguish. I just see a bunch of keen, smart pilots, aircrewmen and maintainers going about their job and doing great things. The frustrations with Tiger and MRH90 are well known and briefed to the highest levels. The legacy aircraft are flying and operating very well thanks.
Hydraulic Palm Tree, you need to reply to my personal message with your concerns about pre-deployment training. Doing an HDA course in Timor with a QFI is not the end of the world, and the capability runs Mission Rehearsal Exercises and certification before every Timor and AFG deployment specifically to ensure everyone is ready to go.
I just happen to actually be in the capability, and I will tell you all what I think.
I have not ever stated that we are kicking great goals with ARH and MRH90.
It's been a long hard road, and there is a long way to go. I also didn't say everyone is getting 300 hours each. What I will say is that 150 hours in Afghanistan, or 250 in Timor is worth 400 hours transiting between Darwin and somewhere useful, or Townsville to Shoalwater Bay.
The people we send overseas are indeed well trained and ready for their operational mission. ARH pilots aren't going anywhere soon. When it's time to deploy and they haven't managed to get sufficient night flying, then my comment will be wrong. until then, my comment stands. We have simulators and part task trainers, and as ARH Tiger said, the product from the school is still first rate.
I don't see the hand wringing and anguish. I just see a bunch of keen, smart pilots, aircrewmen and maintainers going about their job and doing great things. The frustrations with Tiger and MRH90 are well known and briefed to the highest levels. The legacy aircraft are flying and operating very well thanks.
Hydraulic Palm Tree, you need to reply to my personal message with your concerns about pre-deployment training. Doing an HDA course in Timor with a QFI is not the end of the world, and the capability runs Mission Rehearsal Exercises and certification before every Timor and AFG deployment specifically to ensure everyone is ready to go.
Join Date: Dec 1998
Location: Down Under
Posts: 210
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It's been a long hard road, and there is a long way to go. I also didn't say everyone is getting 300 hours each. What I will say is that 150 hours in Afghanistan, or 250 in Timor is worth 400 hours transiting between Darwin and somewhere useful, or Townsville to Shoalwater Bay.
Hydraulic Palm Tree, you need to reply to my personal message with your concerns about pre-deployment training. Doing an HDA course in Timor with a QFI is not the end of the world, and the capability runs Mission Rehearsal Exercises and certification before every Timor and AFG deployment specifically to ensure everyone is ready to go.
Who approves the deployment and ceryfies the crews are ready? That;s right.....hardly going to say they are not ready.....might lose the next rank or gong!!
I just happen to actually be in the capability, and I will tell you all what I think.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Australia
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I thought you were not in the capability because your pessimism and lack of insight are breathtaking.
You should have your PM now. Reply or not, it's your choice.
If you really think the guys deployed without sufficient NVD and formation training, at least talk to your OC, or call DDAAFS. This really isn't the appropriate forum to address your concerns.
You should have your PM now. Reply or not, it's your choice.
If you really think the guys deployed without sufficient NVD and formation training, at least talk to your OC, or call DDAAFS. This really isn't the appropriate forum to address your concerns.
Join Date: Dec 1998
Location: Down Under
Posts: 210
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I thought you were not in the capability because your pessimism and lack of insight are breathtaking.
If you really think the guys deployed without sufficient NVD and formation training, at least talk to your OC, or call DDAAFS. This really isn't the appropriate forum to address your concerns.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Australia
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
OK.
Well done for speaking up. I guess your boss disagreed with you. I hope he was right. If you want to have another shot at the issue, PM me and I'll take it up with those people you have lost faith with.
Well done for speaking up. I guess your boss disagreed with you. I hope he was right. If you want to have another shot at the issue, PM me and I'll take it up with those people you have lost faith with.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Bushranger is on the boil. A mega million dollar platform is not going to be put into harms way. We saw this in 9 Squadrons Vietnam deployment. The edict from Department of Air was that Hueys were not to be exposed to possible enemy action. This lead to much aggravation with the Army as might be expected, since they were fighting a war. An extract re the Long Tan battle,
A grave dispute between the army and the RAAF imperilled Smith's men. They desperately needed ammunition, and Jackson had approved the ammunition resupply, to be dropped by helicopter.` But the RAAF's Group Captain Peter Raw opposed the plan; he refused to permit his pilots to hover at treetop height, in a monsoon, exposed to heavy ground fire. Raw invoked the Department of Air doctrine that required forward landing zones to be 'relatively secure'.` Permission may even be needed from Canberra, Raw suggested.
The word 'Canberra' surged through Jackson like an electric shock. Relations between the RAAF and the army, already strained, now fell apart. 'Well, I'm about to lose a company Jackson fumed. 'What the hell's a few more choppers and a few more pilots!" Raw demurred and insisted on sticking to correct procedure.
A disgusted Jackson sent for the Americans. None doubted the exceptional courage of the US rotary wing pilots. Air Marshal Murdoch, US Chief of Air Staff, had just visited Nui Dat; his liaison officer casually promised a few Hueys within twenty minutes. Raw had little choice: either send the Australian pilots or leave the RAAF open to charges of failure. In any event, Raw's own pilots scorned 'correct procedure'. Flight Lieutenant Frank Riley insisted on flying to Delta Company's relief and would go on his own, if necessary'." Flight Lieutenant Bruce Lane felt the same way.'At last a little RAAF guts!' thought Jackson, greatly heartened.
Riley and his co-pilot Flight Lieutenant Bob Grandin boarded one helicopter; Flight Lieutenant Cliff Dohle and Lane flew the second; there were two machine-gunners per helicopter. Major Owen O'Brien and Warrant Officer George Chinn volunteered to hurl the ammunition boxes down to the men. Chinn, the 6th Battalion's formidable RSM, 'forcefully and almost insubordinately' demanded to go, 'come what may'. Grandin was less keen; he felt it a suicide mission:'It was insanity. I felt petrified. I tried to talk Riley out of it. Frank said shut up, stop giving me the ****s.`
and
The Army felt very undersupported in Vietnam, and came to regard the RAAF's reluctance to face ground fire with contempt. They were under orders not to get casualties. Many RAAF pilots sympathised with the Army. "The RAAF policy on helicopters was a bit absurb" said Air Commodore Roger Wilson. They told them "don't lose any aircraft, be safe". Hell there was a war going on.
Long Hai mountains 21st Feb 1967, the Task Force suffered many casualties as a result of mines. The RAAF refused to supply support (medevac) to extricate the dead, dying and wounded, and the tasking was left to the Australian Army 161 Recce Flight in Bell 47's and US Army Hueys.
With all due respect to Bushranger (I know from whence the callsign comes) we can only advance if we recognise our past failures. To my mind, a mega dollar piece of equipment, of which we can afford to buy few, is going to suffer from the same mind set as the RAAF in Vietnam.
A grave dispute between the army and the RAAF imperilled Smith's men. They desperately needed ammunition, and Jackson had approved the ammunition resupply, to be dropped by helicopter.` But the RAAF's Group Captain Peter Raw opposed the plan; he refused to permit his pilots to hover at treetop height, in a monsoon, exposed to heavy ground fire. Raw invoked the Department of Air doctrine that required forward landing zones to be 'relatively secure'.` Permission may even be needed from Canberra, Raw suggested.
The word 'Canberra' surged through Jackson like an electric shock. Relations between the RAAF and the army, already strained, now fell apart. 'Well, I'm about to lose a company Jackson fumed. 'What the hell's a few more choppers and a few more pilots!" Raw demurred and insisted on sticking to correct procedure.
A disgusted Jackson sent for the Americans. None doubted the exceptional courage of the US rotary wing pilots. Air Marshal Murdoch, US Chief of Air Staff, had just visited Nui Dat; his liaison officer casually promised a few Hueys within twenty minutes. Raw had little choice: either send the Australian pilots or leave the RAAF open to charges of failure. In any event, Raw's own pilots scorned 'correct procedure'. Flight Lieutenant Frank Riley insisted on flying to Delta Company's relief and would go on his own, if necessary'." Flight Lieutenant Bruce Lane felt the same way.'At last a little RAAF guts!' thought Jackson, greatly heartened.
Riley and his co-pilot Flight Lieutenant Bob Grandin boarded one helicopter; Flight Lieutenant Cliff Dohle and Lane flew the second; there were two machine-gunners per helicopter. Major Owen O'Brien and Warrant Officer George Chinn volunteered to hurl the ammunition boxes down to the men. Chinn, the 6th Battalion's formidable RSM, 'forcefully and almost insubordinately' demanded to go, 'come what may'. Grandin was less keen; he felt it a suicide mission:'It was insanity. I felt petrified. I tried to talk Riley out of it. Frank said shut up, stop giving me the ****s.`
and
The Army felt very undersupported in Vietnam, and came to regard the RAAF's reluctance to face ground fire with contempt. They were under orders not to get casualties. Many RAAF pilots sympathised with the Army. "The RAAF policy on helicopters was a bit absurb" said Air Commodore Roger Wilson. They told them "don't lose any aircraft, be safe". Hell there was a war going on.
Long Hai mountains 21st Feb 1967, the Task Force suffered many casualties as a result of mines. The RAAF refused to supply support (medevac) to extricate the dead, dying and wounded, and the tasking was left to the Australian Army 161 Recce Flight in Bell 47's and US Army Hueys.
With all due respect to Bushranger (I know from whence the callsign comes) we can only advance if we recognise our past failures. To my mind, a mega dollar piece of equipment, of which we can afford to buy few, is going to suffer from the same mind set as the RAAF in Vietnam.
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Emergov; re your #79 post.
'Keeping and upgrading Huey and Kiowa will be a waste of money. We need to shed the airworthiness and sustainment overhead for the 8 or nine (or 10) types we currently operate and reduce to four or five types.
The Australian military was largely technically de-skilled when Defence committed to outsourcing of maintenance services on a false economic premise that strongly favoured defence industry (which is largely parented by the major arms manufacturers) so operating costs have climbed. When the services controlled their own maintenance, airworthiness assurance was inbuilt. These days, Defence seems to mainly call in retired pilots and engineers to conduct the airworthiness assurance process so I question whether that would be a significant cost factor.
Sustainment funding and operating costs need to be budgeted for any military hardware acquisition, but the outrageous unit cost of some gear, like Tiger and MRH90, is not justifiable when there are adequate lower cost alternatives.
The Project Air9000 helo force rationalisation program seems unduly inflexible and is thus inferior planning.The overall cost of upgrading Iroquois and Kiowa and keeping them in service to maybe around 2030 would be piddling compared to other wasteful expenditure in Air9000.
'Most acquisition projects take about 3 years to get from concept definition to government decision, except where there is an urgent operational requirement. Most acquisitions require a multi-year acceptance program. A 4-year budget is flawed for that reason alone.'
I guess you are referring to cumbersome processes in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual which was created in Year 2000 to replace the worthy Capital Equipment Procurement manual. I am told the DPPM has been turned into a very academic publication by DMO legal council and its provisions are shaped to favour the nexus between DMO/DSTO and defence industry which both major political parties abide.
Acquisitions requiring a multi-year acceptance program will inevitably generate capability gaps if they involve Australian-based defence industry because Defence does not adequately invest in progressively optimising in-service hardware to maintain military preparedness. This is why the Service Chiefs now push for buying more 'off-the-shelf' proven gear like C-130J, C-17, etcetera.
Flexible 10 year draft acquisition planning has obvious merit, but long-term taxpayer funding for defence industry should not be guaranteed when overall national budgeting can only be reasonably projected for 4 years.
'Keeping and upgrading Huey and Kiowa will be a waste of money. We need to shed the airworthiness and sustainment overhead for the 8 or nine (or 10) types we currently operate and reduce to four or five types.
The Australian military was largely technically de-skilled when Defence committed to outsourcing of maintenance services on a false economic premise that strongly favoured defence industry (which is largely parented by the major arms manufacturers) so operating costs have climbed. When the services controlled their own maintenance, airworthiness assurance was inbuilt. These days, Defence seems to mainly call in retired pilots and engineers to conduct the airworthiness assurance process so I question whether that would be a significant cost factor.
Sustainment funding and operating costs need to be budgeted for any military hardware acquisition, but the outrageous unit cost of some gear, like Tiger and MRH90, is not justifiable when there are adequate lower cost alternatives.
The Project Air9000 helo force rationalisation program seems unduly inflexible and is thus inferior planning.The overall cost of upgrading Iroquois and Kiowa and keeping them in service to maybe around 2030 would be piddling compared to other wasteful expenditure in Air9000.
'Most acquisition projects take about 3 years to get from concept definition to government decision, except where there is an urgent operational requirement. Most acquisitions require a multi-year acceptance program. A 4-year budget is flawed for that reason alone.'
I guess you are referring to cumbersome processes in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual which was created in Year 2000 to replace the worthy Capital Equipment Procurement manual. I am told the DPPM has been turned into a very academic publication by DMO legal council and its provisions are shaped to favour the nexus between DMO/DSTO and defence industry which both major political parties abide.
Acquisitions requiring a multi-year acceptance program will inevitably generate capability gaps if they involve Australian-based defence industry because Defence does not adequately invest in progressively optimising in-service hardware to maintain military preparedness. This is why the Service Chiefs now push for buying more 'off-the-shelf' proven gear like C-130J, C-17, etcetera.
Flexible 10 year draft acquisition planning has obvious merit, but long-term taxpayer funding for defence industry should not be guaranteed when overall national budgeting can only be reasonably projected for 4 years.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Jul 2010 at 19:24.
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hello Brian Abraham;
Like many, you seem to have succumbed to the plethora of misinformation and emotive stuff that has been generated in numerous writings over decades, much of it based on hearsay. Have another look at post #50 and I will respond further soon.
Like many, you seem to have succumbed to the plethora of misinformation and emotive stuff that has been generated in numerous writings over decades, much of it based on hearsay. Have another look at post #50 and I will respond further soon.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Jul 2010 at 20:24.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Australia
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi BR,
Brian's point is really about C2, not about whether the aircraft are too expensive to risk. Whatever the risk management methodology used in Vietnam, it seems that the end result was that the high risk of certain missions was passed to Air Command (or whatever it was called then) in Canberra. This is clearly unacceptable.
In a similar situation today, the risk would be held by the Joint Task Force Commander, who could make decisions about tactical risk based on his read of the situation. It may end up being a person of the same rank and service, but that person would be responsible for the outcome of the mission as well as the aircraft and crews, and will have a better perspective on the level of acceptable risk.
Brian's point is really about C2, not about whether the aircraft are too expensive to risk. Whatever the risk management methodology used in Vietnam, it seems that the end result was that the high risk of certain missions was passed to Air Command (or whatever it was called then) in Canberra. This is clearly unacceptable.
In a similar situation today, the risk would be held by the Joint Task Force Commander, who could make decisions about tactical risk based on his read of the situation. It may end up being a person of the same rank and service, but that person would be responsible for the outcome of the mission as well as the aircraft and crews, and will have a better perspective on the level of acceptable risk.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia - South of where I'd like to be !
Age: 59
Posts: 4,261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
emergov
But that's if they ever get to the theatre.
Before all this happens, the Gubbermut has to actually decide to
put the assets in harms way, something they always seem reluctant to do.
But that's if they ever get to the theatre.
Before all this happens, the Gubbermut has to actually decide to
put the assets in harms way, something they always seem reluctant to do.
Thread Starter
Dithering, procrastination, failure to look at reality, thinking that "they" always know best inspite of the evidence has always been the hallmark of the post World War 1 defence planners and procurers...
Wirraways as fighters!
Spitfires in the Pacific as fighters [long legged machines actually needed]
Ignorance of helo capabilities in 1950's not remedied until purchase of some Hueys for SAR in about '62. The carrier Sydney had to "borrow" USN helos for SAR in Korea.
A concept of buying stuff fitted for but not with almost always...
Our fighting Allies in this area will be the USofA so why not tailor all of our core major equipment off the back of their proven product? Commonality should be part of the big picture not the little one.
Wirraways as fighters!
Spitfires in the Pacific as fighters [long legged machines actually needed]
Ignorance of helo capabilities in 1950's not remedied until purchase of some Hueys for SAR in about '62. The carrier Sydney had to "borrow" USN helos for SAR in Korea.
A concept of buying stuff fitted for but not with almost always...
Our fighting Allies in this area will be the USofA so why not tailor all of our core major equipment off the back of their proven product? Commonality should be part of the big picture not the little one.
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Re post #94.
Pre-Vietnam involvement, the Australian armed forces functioned in accord with British Joint Service Planning doctrine and this was applicable in Malaysian counter-insurgency operations by 5SQN RAAF preceding change of name to 9SQN on deployment to Vietnam. The 'infamous' Air Staff Instruction issued in Canberra pertaining to Vietnam operations was simply an extract from the JSPs under which RAAF helos had been operating in conjunct with Brit forces. It was ignored at the operating level in Vietnam and soon after by the in-theatre command chain although I think it still remained in the Confidential Order Book throughout involvement.
I am not familiar with the publication from which you offer extracts Brian and to be truthful, I ceased reading many of them years ago because the bibliographies reflect so much regurgitated stuff that was largely ill-informed hearsay promulgated by people who were not involved. Even some of the so-called military historians have published inaccurate records of happenings.
If you are really interested in factual accounts of what occurred at 1ATF in early days Vietnam regarding 9SQN activities and the Battle of Long Tan, best speak with Air Commodore Ray Scott who was then CO 9SQN and Air Commodore Bruce Lane. Both are retired with Ray living at Banora Point, NSW and Bruce in Canberra.
'The Army felt very under-supported in Vietnam, and came to regard the RAAF's reluctance to face ground fire with contempt. They were under orders not to get casualties. Many RAAF pilots sympathised with the Army.'
Far from the truth considering the statistics in post #50 and the number of Army unit reunions to which former 9SQN personnel get invited.
"The RAAF policy on helicopters was a bit absurd" said Air Commodore Roger Wilson. They told them "don't lose any aircraft, be safe". Hell there was a war going on.'
Roger served as a FAC with the USAF between April and October 1968 and I was there either side of his tour on my first of 3 stints - I later served a few months at Nui Dat as Task Force Air Commander Representative. I cannot recall his presence much down Phuoc Tuy way but he is correct in stating that the ASI was inappropriate, but it really was irrelevant. There was never any edict to 9SQN like that inferred, according to my pretty comprehensive awareness of records and unit history.
'Long Hai mountains 21st Feb 1967, the Task Force suffered many casualties as a result of mines. The RAAF refused to supply support (medevac) to extricate the dead, dying and wounded, and the tasking was left to the Australian Army 161 Recce Flight in Bell 47's and US Army Hueys.'
Can you supply the 1ATF Log reference to substantiate this claim? 9SQN was involved in lots of operations in and around the Long Hai mountains and that is where the sole shoot-down loss occurred.
The ammo drop at Long Tan was a fly-by exercise and herewith another anecdote to portray how it was done in scores of later instances:
An OPDEM for V Coy/4RAR in contact in lowish jungle about 80 feet high towards FSB Bearcat en route to Saigon. Sunray: 'We are pinned down and cannot move, do not go past our smoke' . A slow crawl forward at tree top level to hover over yellow smoke. The din of continuous firing from both sides was deafening causing raised voices on intercom. 'Move laterally a bit Albatross and we will tell you when to drop. Overhead, drop now. Thanks Albatross, right where we need it; can you take out a casualty?' Albatross 01: 'Sure'. Sunray: 'Please move a bit more but no further forward'. We were right over their gun muzzles and employing some near vertical door-gun suppression while winching up a grinning perforated Maori warrior. We slowly backed away from the brawl and headed for Vung Tau with our casualty who was in worsening state but we got him to hospital pretty quick and he survived. Gunship support was not available for this episode, as in some other similar situations.
Hoping the discussion can stay a bit more civil now.
Pre-Vietnam involvement, the Australian armed forces functioned in accord with British Joint Service Planning doctrine and this was applicable in Malaysian counter-insurgency operations by 5SQN RAAF preceding change of name to 9SQN on deployment to Vietnam. The 'infamous' Air Staff Instruction issued in Canberra pertaining to Vietnam operations was simply an extract from the JSPs under which RAAF helos had been operating in conjunct with Brit forces. It was ignored at the operating level in Vietnam and soon after by the in-theatre command chain although I think it still remained in the Confidential Order Book throughout involvement.
I am not familiar with the publication from which you offer extracts Brian and to be truthful, I ceased reading many of them years ago because the bibliographies reflect so much regurgitated stuff that was largely ill-informed hearsay promulgated by people who were not involved. Even some of the so-called military historians have published inaccurate records of happenings.
If you are really interested in factual accounts of what occurred at 1ATF in early days Vietnam regarding 9SQN activities and the Battle of Long Tan, best speak with Air Commodore Ray Scott who was then CO 9SQN and Air Commodore Bruce Lane. Both are retired with Ray living at Banora Point, NSW and Bruce in Canberra.
'The Army felt very under-supported in Vietnam, and came to regard the RAAF's reluctance to face ground fire with contempt. They were under orders not to get casualties. Many RAAF pilots sympathised with the Army.'
Far from the truth considering the statistics in post #50 and the number of Army unit reunions to which former 9SQN personnel get invited.
"The RAAF policy on helicopters was a bit absurd" said Air Commodore Roger Wilson. They told them "don't lose any aircraft, be safe". Hell there was a war going on.'
Roger served as a FAC with the USAF between April and October 1968 and I was there either side of his tour on my first of 3 stints - I later served a few months at Nui Dat as Task Force Air Commander Representative. I cannot recall his presence much down Phuoc Tuy way but he is correct in stating that the ASI was inappropriate, but it really was irrelevant. There was never any edict to 9SQN like that inferred, according to my pretty comprehensive awareness of records and unit history.
'Long Hai mountains 21st Feb 1967, the Task Force suffered many casualties as a result of mines. The RAAF refused to supply support (medevac) to extricate the dead, dying and wounded, and the tasking was left to the Australian Army 161 Recce Flight in Bell 47's and US Army Hueys.'
Can you supply the 1ATF Log reference to substantiate this claim? 9SQN was involved in lots of operations in and around the Long Hai mountains and that is where the sole shoot-down loss occurred.
The ammo drop at Long Tan was a fly-by exercise and herewith another anecdote to portray how it was done in scores of later instances:
An OPDEM for V Coy/4RAR in contact in lowish jungle about 80 feet high towards FSB Bearcat en route to Saigon. Sunray: 'We are pinned down and cannot move, do not go past our smoke' . A slow crawl forward at tree top level to hover over yellow smoke. The din of continuous firing from both sides was deafening causing raised voices on intercom. 'Move laterally a bit Albatross and we will tell you when to drop. Overhead, drop now. Thanks Albatross, right where we need it; can you take out a casualty?' Albatross 01: 'Sure'. Sunray: 'Please move a bit more but no further forward'. We were right over their gun muzzles and employing some near vertical door-gun suppression while winching up a grinning perforated Maori warrior. We slowly backed away from the brawl and headed for Vung Tau with our casualty who was in worsening state but we got him to hospital pretty quick and he survived. Gunship support was not available for this episode, as in some other similar situations.
Hoping the discussion can stay a bit more civil now.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 18th Jul 2010 at 02:45.
Join Date: Apr 2004
Location: The Dark Side
Posts: 483
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just a couple of perspective points
Prior to the build up in helicopters in RSVN the US Army went to great lengths to develop Air Assault doctrine in the early '60s in the US by the 11th AIR Assault Division (Howse Air Mobility Study). Over a period of 2 years this unit developed Air Assault tactics out of Fort Benning, Georgia and became the 1st Cavalry Division on deployment to SV.
The other side of the coin, RAAF 9 Sqd consisted of a bunch of "old and very bold" Meteor pilots who had done a helicopter course and were essentially SAR pilots who took a bunch of "B" model Hueys to SV not knowing WTF they doing.
I personally knew and flew with Frank Riley and Bruce Lane - in fact I still have a .303 SMLE given to me by Frank with his initials FTR stamped on the receiver - both these men were prepared to put their lives on the line to support the Digger. My FIRST hand experience shows this to be the case with 99% of all junior Navy and RAAF pilots who served in Nine. I'll walk naked through Victoria Barracks if you can find an SAS soldier from SVN who says RAAF support was sh1te.
In the early days Army hierarchy hadn't a clue as to how to utilise Huey assets and, yes, some of Nine's more belligerent CO's had a rather tactless way of pointing out Army's lack of knowledge. I've got to say both in the 135th and Nine the pilots most likely to hang out their @rse were Navy.
It is a fact that the US Army lost more helicopters due to accidents than to enemy action in SV. The trend continues today - three of Australia's finest were killed in the latest US Army stuff up. I have a vested interest in this - my son is on his sixth deployment to Afghanistan in the infantry.
By the way, Army is now learning (relearning?) that helicopters are not Land Rovers and that a tradesman can't work all day on a $30 million helicopter and then stand on a gun all night. Have even heard the comment that AAAVN is developing a "RAAF attitude".
GAGS
E86
Prior to the build up in helicopters in RSVN the US Army went to great lengths to develop Air Assault doctrine in the early '60s in the US by the 11th AIR Assault Division (Howse Air Mobility Study). Over a period of 2 years this unit developed Air Assault tactics out of Fort Benning, Georgia and became the 1st Cavalry Division on deployment to SV.
The other side of the coin, RAAF 9 Sqd consisted of a bunch of "old and very bold" Meteor pilots who had done a helicopter course and were essentially SAR pilots who took a bunch of "B" model Hueys to SV not knowing WTF they doing.
I personally knew and flew with Frank Riley and Bruce Lane - in fact I still have a .303 SMLE given to me by Frank with his initials FTR stamped on the receiver - both these men were prepared to put their lives on the line to support the Digger. My FIRST hand experience shows this to be the case with 99% of all junior Navy and RAAF pilots who served in Nine. I'll walk naked through Victoria Barracks if you can find an SAS soldier from SVN who says RAAF support was sh1te.
In the early days Army hierarchy hadn't a clue as to how to utilise Huey assets and, yes, some of Nine's more belligerent CO's had a rather tactless way of pointing out Army's lack of knowledge. I've got to say both in the 135th and Nine the pilots most likely to hang out their @rse were Navy.
It is a fact that the US Army lost more helicopters due to accidents than to enemy action in SV. The trend continues today - three of Australia's finest were killed in the latest US Army stuff up. I have a vested interest in this - my son is on his sixth deployment to Afghanistan in the infantry.
By the way, Army is now learning (relearning?) that helicopters are not Land Rovers and that a tradesman can't work all day on a $30 million helicopter and then stand on a gun all night. Have even heard the comment that AAAVN is developing a "RAAF attitude".
GAGS
E86
Last edited by eagle 86; 18th Jul 2010 at 04:38.
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi Emergov; re your #97.
HQ 1ATF was initially structured as a Joint Force HQ via Army/RAAF planning in accord with doctrine existing at the time. This embraced a Task Force Air Commander, Task Force Air Support Officer, small transport ops cell and a (close) air support cell with essential communications infrastructure. These latter bits were small annexes of the Command Post.
9&35SQNs were properly based at Vung Tau with a Base Support Flight that was later enlarged to 1 Operational Support Unit when a RAAF cantonment had been developed on Vung Tau airfield. The anomolous situation then was that only 9SQN was under operational control of 1ATF with 35SQN Caribou under opcon US 7th Air Force; so the initial Air Force representation at Nui Dat was arguably top heavy, although conforming with JSPs.
After the cantonment was established, TFAC moved to Vung Tau to become a virtual RAAF base commander and 9SQN provided a TFAC Representative at Nui Dat. This was a defacto TFASO role shared by Squadron Leaders and experienced Flight Lieutenants.
Post-Battle of Long Tan, there was soul searching within 1ATF regarding command and control aspects among Army fighting arms which was ultimately sorted. Late 1967/early 1968, another battalion was added plus a squadron of tanks and 9SQN doubled in aircraft and personnel strength. A very comprehensive upgrade of 1ATF SOPs was undertaken involving 9SQN and thereafter, the system hummed along quite smoothly in joint fashion.
Opcon of 9SQN activities was exercised by the CP via the small transport ops tasking cell manned by a couple of RAAF junior officers and clerks. TFAC Rep acted as an air advisor as did the FAC in the offensive air support cell, although both got involved in the planning aspects for major activities. The secondary function of TFAC Rep was to monitor the integrity of 9SQN operations.
I usually only spent enough time in the CP to stay across all of the briefings and to get the Sitreps at start and end of each day. The only time I ever intervened in a CP decision was when the 9SQN night dustoff aircraft was tasked to recover a badly wounded prisoner whom the Intell guys wanted to interrogate. The aircraft captain was a pretty inexperienced young pilot who was approaching a strobe light in dense jungle for winching up the prisoner and reported seeing 2 strobe lights in close proximity. I was monitoring all of the radio nets and the ground callsign was adamant they only had one strobe light. The opposition had another nearby so I directed the aircraft captain to abort. The G2Ops got pretty peeved but the prisoner died soon after.
There was no requirement to refer tasking aspects for 9SQN beyond local command, either to higher headquarters in Saigon or in Australia.
Post-Vietnam, the Air Force established Air Liaison Officer appointments at several major Army formations in Australia.
Finally, the RAAF has long been criticised for basing 9SQN at Vung Tau, just 10 minutes flight time from Nui Dat; but proceedings of the Chief of Army History Conference 2002 belatedly acknowledged that 1ATF should have been based at Vung Tau in lieu of Nui Dat.
HQ 1ATF was initially structured as a Joint Force HQ via Army/RAAF planning in accord with doctrine existing at the time. This embraced a Task Force Air Commander, Task Force Air Support Officer, small transport ops cell and a (close) air support cell with essential communications infrastructure. These latter bits were small annexes of the Command Post.
9&35SQNs were properly based at Vung Tau with a Base Support Flight that was later enlarged to 1 Operational Support Unit when a RAAF cantonment had been developed on Vung Tau airfield. The anomolous situation then was that only 9SQN was under operational control of 1ATF with 35SQN Caribou under opcon US 7th Air Force; so the initial Air Force representation at Nui Dat was arguably top heavy, although conforming with JSPs.
After the cantonment was established, TFAC moved to Vung Tau to become a virtual RAAF base commander and 9SQN provided a TFAC Representative at Nui Dat. This was a defacto TFASO role shared by Squadron Leaders and experienced Flight Lieutenants.
Post-Battle of Long Tan, there was soul searching within 1ATF regarding command and control aspects among Army fighting arms which was ultimately sorted. Late 1967/early 1968, another battalion was added plus a squadron of tanks and 9SQN doubled in aircraft and personnel strength. A very comprehensive upgrade of 1ATF SOPs was undertaken involving 9SQN and thereafter, the system hummed along quite smoothly in joint fashion.
Opcon of 9SQN activities was exercised by the CP via the small transport ops tasking cell manned by a couple of RAAF junior officers and clerks. TFAC Rep acted as an air advisor as did the FAC in the offensive air support cell, although both got involved in the planning aspects for major activities. The secondary function of TFAC Rep was to monitor the integrity of 9SQN operations.
I usually only spent enough time in the CP to stay across all of the briefings and to get the Sitreps at start and end of each day. The only time I ever intervened in a CP decision was when the 9SQN night dustoff aircraft was tasked to recover a badly wounded prisoner whom the Intell guys wanted to interrogate. The aircraft captain was a pretty inexperienced young pilot who was approaching a strobe light in dense jungle for winching up the prisoner and reported seeing 2 strobe lights in close proximity. I was monitoring all of the radio nets and the ground callsign was adamant they only had one strobe light. The opposition had another nearby so I directed the aircraft captain to abort. The G2Ops got pretty peeved but the prisoner died soon after.
There was no requirement to refer tasking aspects for 9SQN beyond local command, either to higher headquarters in Saigon or in Australia.
Post-Vietnam, the Air Force established Air Liaison Officer appointments at several major Army formations in Australia.
Finally, the RAAF has long been criticised for basing 9SQN at Vung Tau, just 10 minutes flight time from Nui Dat; but proceedings of the Chief of Army History Conference 2002 belatedly acknowledged that 1ATF should have been based at Vung Tau in lieu of Nui Dat.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 18th Jul 2010 at 05:25.