Aussie MRH-90
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"Good discussion but we may be mixing apples and oranges a little."
I was thinking the same thing when I typed my reply. I hope I am not the cause of thread drift !!! LOL
Understand.
Since I am new, FYI, I am not a flyer or backroom, just an interested party that
did some time in the ARES green machine where the blue and green machines
flew us around a bit. I understand strategic and tactical concepts etc etc......
thanks
I was thinking the same thing when I typed my reply. I hope I am not the cause of thread drift !!! LOL
Understand.
Since I am new, FYI, I am not a flyer or backroom, just an interested party that
did some time in the ARES green machine where the blue and green machines
flew us around a bit. I understand strategic and tactical concepts etc etc......
thanks
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Reading between the lines on this topic, the most important phrase would seem to be contained in ARH Tiger's last paragraph:
That, and the sad fact that Australia simply cannot afford enough units of this top shelf equipment to make them useful to enough land units that AAVN attempts to support.
If only they flew/worked............................?????
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There is a fair bit of apprehension in many forums re supposed vulnerability/survivability of helicopters during combat operations and perhaps some questionable thinking generally re the merits of armed helicopter escort.
Consider this extract from the previously referenced US Army study on Vietnam War operations: ‘Statistics on relative vulnerability (of helicopters) reveal that out of 1,147 sorties, one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties. Used properly, the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted.’ Some of these statistics resulted from the dubious merit practice of attempting to land troops right on to known enemy held positions via so-called combat air assault.
No. 9 Squadron RAAF operated Iroquois more prudently during 5.5 years of Vietnam involvement flying 237,808 sorties with only 25 aircraft being hit (1:9,512 probability), 3 aircraft shot down (1:79,270) and only 1 lost to ground-fire (1:237,808). Although RPG-style weaponry in particular has improved over the past 40 years, the risk of being hit is still very low depending somewhat on helo operating techniques.
The only aircraft lost by 9SQN to enemy ground-fire was when attempting winching of a Vietnamese soldier who had both legs blown off by a mine. The fighting was still ongoing among rocky outcrops in mountainous terrain when an enemy soldier stepped out from behind an adjacent boulder firing a burst directly into the engine of the hovering Huey. The aircraft fell on to some on the ground beneath and 2 Australians and 1 American perished in the inferno. Bushranger gunships were also involved but could not prevent the shoot-down. Incredibly, the disabled Vietnamese soldier managed to crawl away and is still living.
Another anecdote in the opposite sense. A gentle straight-in approach toward the treeline of a 100 metre diameter clearing to deposit a SAS patrol; virtually stationary and touching down when 4 enemy popped up from behind fallen timber in the middle of the clearing and began engaging us with AK-47s. Swift collective response from our crewman with his M60, SAS on board and supporting US Army charlie model gunships clobbered the opposition. The 4 enemy fired maybe 100 rounds all up at a stationary aircraft, side-on and in clear view at 50 metres range; but amazingly, we did not take a single hit. It is much more difficult to hit a moving aircraft due to a continually changing aiming picture and especially when adrenalin is pumping.
During 4,360 sorties and involvement in 50 engagement scenarios with the opposition, my aircraft was only hit twice; once by a 12.7mm fluke shot when flying at !,500 feet over jungle and by 2 x 7.62mm rounds in another instance during a ground level close-quarters contest.
Some contend the threats in Afghanistan differ from Vietnam. The proliferation of 7.62, 12.7mm and RPGs is similar, but there is a greater MANPAD risk in Afghanistan causing some losses. The necessity in that scenario is of course adjustment of operating practices. Over years, many have said that AC-130 gunships would not survive, but they have done so in multiple theatres against much stronger anti-aircraft threats incurring only minimal losses and they are still one of the most valuable firepower assets in the USAF inventory with the USMC also moving in that direction. War-fighting is a dangerous and risky business and some losses just have to be considered acceptable – it is all part of the warrior game.
Army Aviation generally contends that higher speed attack helos are necessary to escort other battlefield helos like Chinook, but the value of this requirement is overstated. Would escort deter launch of missilery targeting a Chinook or whatever by some doped-up fanatic hoping to be glorified at meeting Allah? Highly unlikely, although the launch site if detected could be belatedly suppressed but not before an aircraft might be downed.
Escort of RAAF Iroquois by gunships in Vietnam mainly applied to special operations roles and the principal value of gunships in troop insertion situations was having them loiter for immediate response to ground actions. Most single aircraft operations were conducted unescorted and battlefield survivability was more about operating methods. I could also enumerate mutliple instances where utility helo door-guns knocked the opposition around appreciably.
Finally; responding to ARH Tiger post #63. Mate; the principal reason Chinooks are being used in Afghanistan for utility helo roles is hot and high performance. If sufficient up-engined Blackhawks and Huey II were available, then much of this very costly effort would not be necessary.
Futuristically, the ADF might at best have 4 of 7 CH-47F available continually to provide for whole of Army's heavy lift needs. We already know that the US Army removed Longbow radar on Apaches so they could carry enough ammunition and the ADF Tiger was accepted with deficient engine performance; so is anybody aware of what operating limitations have been revealed by belated French trialling of the Tiger in Afghanistan? On present indications, both Tiger and MRH90 will be seriously deficient regarding hot and high performance, let alone operating cost penalties.
There are multiple reasons why it would be wise to upgrade all the Iroquois to Huey II or even just leave them stored until the serious operational limitations and cost penalties of the envisaged new ADF helo fleet become glaringly obvious. Army Aviation will likely be very seriously embarrassed through lack of capability downstream if this prudent action is not taken. They should appeal to Minister Combet to exercise commonsense.
Apologies for the hefty post, but I hope it promotes some beneficial discussion.
Consider this extract from the previously referenced US Army study on Vietnam War operations: ‘Statistics on relative vulnerability (of helicopters) reveal that out of 1,147 sorties, one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties. Used properly, the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted.’ Some of these statistics resulted from the dubious merit practice of attempting to land troops right on to known enemy held positions via so-called combat air assault.
No. 9 Squadron RAAF operated Iroquois more prudently during 5.5 years of Vietnam involvement flying 237,808 sorties with only 25 aircraft being hit (1:9,512 probability), 3 aircraft shot down (1:79,270) and only 1 lost to ground-fire (1:237,808). Although RPG-style weaponry in particular has improved over the past 40 years, the risk of being hit is still very low depending somewhat on helo operating techniques.
The only aircraft lost by 9SQN to enemy ground-fire was when attempting winching of a Vietnamese soldier who had both legs blown off by a mine. The fighting was still ongoing among rocky outcrops in mountainous terrain when an enemy soldier stepped out from behind an adjacent boulder firing a burst directly into the engine of the hovering Huey. The aircraft fell on to some on the ground beneath and 2 Australians and 1 American perished in the inferno. Bushranger gunships were also involved but could not prevent the shoot-down. Incredibly, the disabled Vietnamese soldier managed to crawl away and is still living.
Another anecdote in the opposite sense. A gentle straight-in approach toward the treeline of a 100 metre diameter clearing to deposit a SAS patrol; virtually stationary and touching down when 4 enemy popped up from behind fallen timber in the middle of the clearing and began engaging us with AK-47s. Swift collective response from our crewman with his M60, SAS on board and supporting US Army charlie model gunships clobbered the opposition. The 4 enemy fired maybe 100 rounds all up at a stationary aircraft, side-on and in clear view at 50 metres range; but amazingly, we did not take a single hit. It is much more difficult to hit a moving aircraft due to a continually changing aiming picture and especially when adrenalin is pumping.
During 4,360 sorties and involvement in 50 engagement scenarios with the opposition, my aircraft was only hit twice; once by a 12.7mm fluke shot when flying at !,500 feet over jungle and by 2 x 7.62mm rounds in another instance during a ground level close-quarters contest.
Some contend the threats in Afghanistan differ from Vietnam. The proliferation of 7.62, 12.7mm and RPGs is similar, but there is a greater MANPAD risk in Afghanistan causing some losses. The necessity in that scenario is of course adjustment of operating practices. Over years, many have said that AC-130 gunships would not survive, but they have done so in multiple theatres against much stronger anti-aircraft threats incurring only minimal losses and they are still one of the most valuable firepower assets in the USAF inventory with the USMC also moving in that direction. War-fighting is a dangerous and risky business and some losses just have to be considered acceptable – it is all part of the warrior game.
Army Aviation generally contends that higher speed attack helos are necessary to escort other battlefield helos like Chinook, but the value of this requirement is overstated. Would escort deter launch of missilery targeting a Chinook or whatever by some doped-up fanatic hoping to be glorified at meeting Allah? Highly unlikely, although the launch site if detected could be belatedly suppressed but not before an aircraft might be downed.
Escort of RAAF Iroquois by gunships in Vietnam mainly applied to special operations roles and the principal value of gunships in troop insertion situations was having them loiter for immediate response to ground actions. Most single aircraft operations were conducted unescorted and battlefield survivability was more about operating methods. I could also enumerate mutliple instances where utility helo door-guns knocked the opposition around appreciably.
Finally; responding to ARH Tiger post #63. Mate; the principal reason Chinooks are being used in Afghanistan for utility helo roles is hot and high performance. If sufficient up-engined Blackhawks and Huey II were available, then much of this very costly effort would not be necessary.
Futuristically, the ADF might at best have 4 of 7 CH-47F available continually to provide for whole of Army's heavy lift needs. We already know that the US Army removed Longbow radar on Apaches so they could carry enough ammunition and the ADF Tiger was accepted with deficient engine performance; so is anybody aware of what operating limitations have been revealed by belated French trialling of the Tiger in Afghanistan? On present indications, both Tiger and MRH90 will be seriously deficient regarding hot and high performance, let alone operating cost penalties.
There are multiple reasons why it would be wise to upgrade all the Iroquois to Huey II or even just leave them stored until the serious operational limitations and cost penalties of the envisaged new ADF helo fleet become glaringly obvious. Army Aviation will likely be very seriously embarrassed through lack of capability downstream if this prudent action is not taken. They should appeal to Minister Combet to exercise commonsense.
Apologies for the hefty post, but I hope it promotes some beneficial discussion.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 16th Jul 2010 at 08:45.
Bushranger 71 wrote: There are multiple reasons why it would be wise to upgrade all the Iroquois to Huey II or even just leave them stored until the serious operational limitations and cost penalties of the envisaged new ADF helo fleet become glaringly obvious.
Good call BD, that would be the way to go, bearing in mind the ADF's poor record of trying to take the Rolls-Royce solution.
Of the current 6 CH-47D (remembering 4 are recycled CH-47Cs from 12 SQN), 2 are in-theatre, 2 probably typically in DM, leaving 1 out of 2 serviceable on the flight line.
With the 7 CH-47F, these figures will improve slightly, but doubt we would ever deploy 4. Fairly pathetic numbers. I don't know if there is an opening to recycle the 6 Ds to F standard, but 13 aircraft would make a viable force. In the meantime, we are playing at capability.
MRH - ok they can carry more troops than a UH-60 (S-70) and further. Certainly a plus. But were they fully militarised for war? And what does our major coalition partner fly? Our requirement for an MRH has changed I would suggest since the original spec was released (around 1998?), but MRH is not flying, and it is doubtful whether it would be deployed to theatre.
ARH - similar sad story. When will it see IOC? We should have picked Apache (did not need Longbow). The Tiger's engines were always under question for H&H performance. Another orphan, which may never be suitable to deploy.
Upgraded Huey IIs from our surviving Hotels would make strategic and logistical sense, as also may upgrading Kiowas for retention in the training role.
Good call BD, that would be the way to go, bearing in mind the ADF's poor record of trying to take the Rolls-Royce solution.
Of the current 6 CH-47D (remembering 4 are recycled CH-47Cs from 12 SQN), 2 are in-theatre, 2 probably typically in DM, leaving 1 out of 2 serviceable on the flight line.
With the 7 CH-47F, these figures will improve slightly, but doubt we would ever deploy 4. Fairly pathetic numbers. I don't know if there is an opening to recycle the 6 Ds to F standard, but 13 aircraft would make a viable force. In the meantime, we are playing at capability.
MRH - ok they can carry more troops than a UH-60 (S-70) and further. Certainly a plus. But were they fully militarised for war? And what does our major coalition partner fly? Our requirement for an MRH has changed I would suggest since the original spec was released (around 1998?), but MRH is not flying, and it is doubtful whether it would be deployed to theatre.
ARH - similar sad story. When will it see IOC? We should have picked Apache (did not need Longbow). The Tiger's engines were always under question for H&H performance. Another orphan, which may never be suitable to deploy.
Upgraded Huey IIs from our surviving Hotels would make strategic and logistical sense, as also may upgrading Kiowas for retention in the training role.
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A question for the AAVN drivers: does the mix of European (clockwise rotation) and American (counterclockwise rotation) cause any problems in training and switching between types? Probably not a big deal for experienced crews, but I would have thought it might be one extra dimension ("which foot do I use today?") that less experienced pilots could do without.
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Good points raised however it doesn't change the fact that AAAvn has to play the hand it's dealt i.e MRH and ARH. The jets are ordered and / or on the way now we have to make it work. The rest is pure 20/20 (6/6) hindsight and wishful thinking.
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Some of the contributors to this forum seem to give up too easily. If Army Aviation does not retain the Iroquois and Kiowa, then there will foreseeably be less flying available as the inevitable pressure comes on regarding soaring ADF operating costs. Defence spending over the past 2 years has increased from 7.6 percent of federal government revenue to nearer 10 percent which will not be sustainable as the world slides toward economic stagnation.
Politicians seldom take notice of occasional letters from people like me; but multiple communications on the same topic can make them squirm a bit, particularly with an election imminent. Herewith my submission and feel free to copy/massage as suits; but if you are a serving member, then of course use another name. Recommend despatch by both electronic and postal means.
The Hon. Greg Combet, AM, MP
Minister for Defence Material & Science
Parliament House
Canberra, ACT, 2600
Dear Minister,
Successive Australian governments have generally failed to maintain adequate military capacities through continuous optimisation of in-service hardware (where cost-effective) leading to widening capability deficiencies. Inability to provide integral ADF helicopter support in Afghanistan beyond a token commitment of just 2 Chinooks is testimony.
Blackhawk, Iroquois, Kiowa versions are being widely operated in theatres of conflict around the world and moderate cost upgrading of these proven Australian military assets would have made waste of around $4billion on unproven and technically deficient Tiger and MRH90 unjustifiable. Hot and high performance capability is essential in many geographic environs like Iraq, Afghanistan and in the regional tropical archipelago with only later model Chinook having adequate performance. Both Tiger and MRH90 were not thoroughly evaluated in this regard and are proving very inferior.
ADF helicopter operating costs per flying hour for 2006/07 provided by Defence were: Seahawk - $45,317; Sea King - $23,616; Blackhawk - $20,659; Iroquois - $7,738; Squirrel - $5,208; Kiowa - $2,865. Operating costs for Tiger, MRH90 and MH-60S (if acquired) are not yet determined but will likely exceed those of Blackhawk and Seahawk.
Bell Helicopter conducts an ongoing Hotel model Iroquois rebuild program in the US enhancing the aircraft to much improved Huey II performance standard. UH-1H from military reserves storage are converted to virtually as new condition for around US$2million including multiple improvement features. The comparative hot and high performance of the Huey II surpasses all fore-mentioned helicopter types with long-term supportability and reduced operating cost approximating $5,000 per hour. The USAF ordered 24 with a glass cockpit option and Iraq will eventually possess 32 Huey II.
The Iroquois is the only utility helicopter in the ADF inventory that can be speedily prepared for deployment by C-130 for regional support needs and discarding this very versatile asset will leave the ADF without the most valuable of battlefield support helos, a light inexpensive utility aircraft capable of widely varied roles that can be operated very cost-effectively with some affordable losses in combat.
ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation planning is proving to be hugely flawed and diminishing military capacity, ultimately causing national embarrassment. All 20 or so Iroquois could be upgraded to Huey II for less than the cost of 1 Tiger or MRH90, so they should be converted through the Bell Helicopter factory program at modest overall cost of about $40million or just remain stored until the deficient capabilities and forbidding operating costs of outrageously expensive replacement aircraft become glaringly obvious.
I respectfully urge you Minister to rescind the Iroquois disposal decision, in the national interest.
Politicians seldom take notice of occasional letters from people like me; but multiple communications on the same topic can make them squirm a bit, particularly with an election imminent. Herewith my submission and feel free to copy/massage as suits; but if you are a serving member, then of course use another name. Recommend despatch by both electronic and postal means.
The Hon. Greg Combet, AM, MP
Minister for Defence Material & Science
Parliament House
Canberra, ACT, 2600
Dear Minister,
IROQUOIS HELICOPTER DISPOSAL
You recently announced shedding of the invaluable Iroquois, primarily for historical purposes, but this is a monumentally bad decision compromising the national interest.Successive Australian governments have generally failed to maintain adequate military capacities through continuous optimisation of in-service hardware (where cost-effective) leading to widening capability deficiencies. Inability to provide integral ADF helicopter support in Afghanistan beyond a token commitment of just 2 Chinooks is testimony.
Blackhawk, Iroquois, Kiowa versions are being widely operated in theatres of conflict around the world and moderate cost upgrading of these proven Australian military assets would have made waste of around $4billion on unproven and technically deficient Tiger and MRH90 unjustifiable. Hot and high performance capability is essential in many geographic environs like Iraq, Afghanistan and in the regional tropical archipelago with only later model Chinook having adequate performance. Both Tiger and MRH90 were not thoroughly evaluated in this regard and are proving very inferior.
ADF helicopter operating costs per flying hour for 2006/07 provided by Defence were: Seahawk - $45,317; Sea King - $23,616; Blackhawk - $20,659; Iroquois - $7,738; Squirrel - $5,208; Kiowa - $2,865. Operating costs for Tiger, MRH90 and MH-60S (if acquired) are not yet determined but will likely exceed those of Blackhawk and Seahawk.
Bell Helicopter conducts an ongoing Hotel model Iroquois rebuild program in the US enhancing the aircraft to much improved Huey II performance standard. UH-1H from military reserves storage are converted to virtually as new condition for around US$2million including multiple improvement features. The comparative hot and high performance of the Huey II surpasses all fore-mentioned helicopter types with long-term supportability and reduced operating cost approximating $5,000 per hour. The USAF ordered 24 with a glass cockpit option and Iraq will eventually possess 32 Huey II.
The Iroquois is the only utility helicopter in the ADF inventory that can be speedily prepared for deployment by C-130 for regional support needs and discarding this very versatile asset will leave the ADF without the most valuable of battlefield support helos, a light inexpensive utility aircraft capable of widely varied roles that can be operated very cost-effectively with some affordable losses in combat.
ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation planning is proving to be hugely flawed and diminishing military capacity, ultimately causing national embarrassment. All 20 or so Iroquois could be upgraded to Huey II for less than the cost of 1 Tiger or MRH90, so they should be converted through the Bell Helicopter factory program at modest overall cost of about $40million or just remain stored until the deficient capabilities and forbidding operating costs of outrageously expensive replacement aircraft become glaringly obvious.
I respectfully urge you Minister to rescind the Iroquois disposal decision, in the national interest.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Jul 2010 at 05:32.
The Hon. Greg Combet, AM, MP
Minister for Defence Material & Science
Parliament House
Canberra, ACT, 2600
Dear Minister, ??
The Election being called today for late August, which means no decisions by Govt now as they enter caretaker mode. It may be better to feed this information to the Opposition so they can stir the pot.
Minister for Defence Material & Science
Parliament House
Canberra, ACT, 2600
Dear Minister, ??
The Election being called today for late August, which means no decisions by Govt now as they enter caretaker mode. It may be better to feed this information to the Opposition so they can stir the pot.
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Of the current 6 CH-47D (remembering 4 are recycled CH-47Cs from 12 SQN), 2 are in-theatre, 2 probably typically in DM, leaving 1 out of 2 serviceable on the flight line.
Dear Mrs Smith, we are sorry to tell you that your son was shot down and died whilst flying a training sortie in Afghanistan that he couldn't do back in in Australia because we don't have the appropriate number of aircraft or hours to support the Government's Strategy (or is it that the Army won't tell the Government that it shouldn't be deploying ill prepared crews to war fighting operations?).
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Hydraulic Palm Tree, I'd written my post (below) before seeing your offering, but I see we're on almost the same wavelength.
The Opposition would normally be the right avenue to take to stir the pot on a matter like this. However, too many of the bad decisions on equipment purchases for the military were made by the Opposition when they were in power.
If you think the choice of helicopter types for the Army have been bad, ask someone with a Navy background about some of the choices that have been made for fleet replacement. And forget Seasprite. I'm not talking about helicopters, but ships. (Hint: try "Spain" as a starting point. I assure you, the mind will boggle, I kid you not.)
I can see Army Aviation pilots in their incredibly expensive and almost impossible to maintain in the field Rolls Royces following the path of European fighter pilots over the last 20 years - getting 100 hours or less (a LOT less) a year and only being allowed to actually fly their aircraft in once a year carefully stage-managed exercises.
I suspect you'll be logging a lot more sim. time than actual.
The Opposition would normally be the right avenue to take to stir the pot on a matter like this. However, too many of the bad decisions on equipment purchases for the military were made by the Opposition when they were in power.
If you think the choice of helicopter types for the Army have been bad, ask someone with a Navy background about some of the choices that have been made for fleet replacement. And forget Seasprite. I'm not talking about helicopters, but ships. (Hint: try "Spain" as a starting point. I assure you, the mind will boggle, I kid you not.)
I can see Army Aviation pilots in their incredibly expensive and almost impossible to maintain in the field Rolls Royces following the path of European fighter pilots over the last 20 years - getting 100 hours or less (a LOT less) a year and only being allowed to actually fly their aircraft in once a year carefully stage-managed exercises.
I suspect you'll be logging a lot more sim. time than actual.
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The Opposition Shadow Cabinet were badgered in this regard when Combet announced his disposal decision and one of their MPs has requested I meet with him next week. Earlier this AM, I also despatched the subject letter to 30 Opposition MPs. Please assist by adding pressure.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Jul 2010 at 05:33.
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I suspect you'll be logging a lot more sim. time than actual.
Australia needs:
(a) something that will work
(b) something we can afford to fly and train in
(c) something we can afford to buy in large enough quantities to make a meaningful contribution in the field to all the land units who will require support
I don't think what we have and are getting fits any of those requirements. But golly, they'll look good on the flight line.
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"You are quite correct BBadanov - how on earth does AAAvn think it can keep it pilots current in even the simplest manoeuvres when back home, let alone prepare its crews for deployment. How can you do multi-ship NVD training with just one aircraft available - oh yes, that's right, train your crews in the operational theatre - nice plan."
I would hope the Aust Def forces would have learn't a few lessons from the past about night flying. We don't need another accident.
I would hope the Aust Def forces would have learn't a few lessons from the past about night flying. We don't need another accident.
Wiley said: However, too many of the bad decisions on equipment purchases for the military were made by the Opposition when they were in power.
Yes, correct. But they can claim that withdrawal of UH-1H is current Govt decision, and push the sense and economy of keeping the airframes.
Remember too, it was the Libs that pushed the increase in Defence spending, and the supplementary allocations for C-17 and F/A-18F acquisitions - you will never see Labor do that.
Yes, correct. But they can claim that withdrawal of UH-1H is current Govt decision, and push the sense and economy of keeping the airframes.
Remember too, it was the Libs that pushed the increase in Defence spending, and the supplementary allocations for C-17 and F/A-18F acquisitions - you will never see Labor do that.
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Why is it that posters on PPRUNE are perfectly gullible when it comes to negative or scandalous gossip, and hardened and cynical when people post positive information? It does my head in.
When someone says MRH90 will be OK, people reply "no it won't, Black Hawk is the only answer". When someone posts "Tiger may never be deployed" everyone nods wisely, and waits eagerly for the next bit of unsubstantiated errant crap to be anonymously posted.
Maybe it's because the issues are never simple enough to be described adequately on a thread like this, and the only guys who actually know anything about the subject are generally not willing to comment. So, we are stuck with people who know someone who quit 10 years ago, people working as contractors and people who flew in Air Force 30 years ago discussing their own feelings that everything might be all screwed up.
I must make the following points:
1. The entire ARH program is designed to end with the aircraft in a deployable state. There is nothing, and I mean nothing to suggest that it may never be deployable. Ditto for MRH90.
2. There is no underlying scandal brewing about costs of ownership and sustainability. The very reason we are getting rid of our current fleet of ageing legacy platforms, some of which were designed in the 1950s, is to reduce cost of ownership. Huey II will cost us more than an equivalent buy of MRH90.
3. Huey is not suitable as an airmobile or air gunnery platform. The only reason they got away with it in Vietnam is because of the thick jungle. Let's not forget the US Army lost almost 10,000 helos in that conflict, and designed the Black Hawk (starting in 1968) as a direct result of the lessons learned.
4. Every pilot and aircrewman in AAAvn is getting all the night flying they need. Those who fall uncurrent for whatever reason are given all the training they require before we ask them to step out on a dark night.
5. We do all sorts of training in theatre. We always have. The assertion that we are somehow putting our people at risk because we don't have enough Chinooks is absurd, vexatious and based on ignorance.
5. The assertion that MRH90 is not "fully militarised for war" is equally absurd and based on nothing other than inference from foolish and ill-informed posts on this thread.
Finally, I am stunned and ashamed of all of you for suggesting that our fighting men and women in some way don't deserve the Rolls Royce solution.
Bushranger 71, why not use your 9 Sqn contacts and go visit or just phone any Avn unit. Talk to the people who are actually going to war - there are lots, and ask them how they feel about the prospect of, in 2020, flying a 65 year old acft with lashed up avionics and no EWSP on ops. Ask them if they feel the need to smell the enemy. Then get back to us.
When someone says MRH90 will be OK, people reply "no it won't, Black Hawk is the only answer". When someone posts "Tiger may never be deployed" everyone nods wisely, and waits eagerly for the next bit of unsubstantiated errant crap to be anonymously posted.
Maybe it's because the issues are never simple enough to be described adequately on a thread like this, and the only guys who actually know anything about the subject are generally not willing to comment. So, we are stuck with people who know someone who quit 10 years ago, people working as contractors and people who flew in Air Force 30 years ago discussing their own feelings that everything might be all screwed up.
I must make the following points:
1. The entire ARH program is designed to end with the aircraft in a deployable state. There is nothing, and I mean nothing to suggest that it may never be deployable. Ditto for MRH90.
2. There is no underlying scandal brewing about costs of ownership and sustainability. The very reason we are getting rid of our current fleet of ageing legacy platforms, some of which were designed in the 1950s, is to reduce cost of ownership. Huey II will cost us more than an equivalent buy of MRH90.
3. Huey is not suitable as an airmobile or air gunnery platform. The only reason they got away with it in Vietnam is because of the thick jungle. Let's not forget the US Army lost almost 10,000 helos in that conflict, and designed the Black Hawk (starting in 1968) as a direct result of the lessons learned.
4. Every pilot and aircrewman in AAAvn is getting all the night flying they need. Those who fall uncurrent for whatever reason are given all the training they require before we ask them to step out on a dark night.
5. We do all sorts of training in theatre. We always have. The assertion that we are somehow putting our people at risk because we don't have enough Chinooks is absurd, vexatious and based on ignorance.
5. The assertion that MRH90 is not "fully militarised for war" is equally absurd and based on nothing other than inference from foolish and ill-informed posts on this thread.
Finally, I am stunned and ashamed of all of you for suggesting that our fighting men and women in some way don't deserve the Rolls Royce solution.
Bushranger 71, why not use your 9 Sqn contacts and go visit or just phone any Avn unit. Talk to the people who are actually going to war - there are lots, and ask them how they feel about the prospect of, in 2020, flying a 65 year old acft with lashed up avionics and no EWSP on ops. Ask them if they feel the need to smell the enemy. Then get back to us.
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Hello again Men, A bit more to fill out the political picture.
Both of the major political parties have been complicit in dubious merit acquisitions and strongly supportive of the murky nexus between DMO and the major arms conglomerates. Recall the 'me too' extravagant defence spending promises out to 2018 preceding Election 2007 and see this link trumpeting the 10 year Defence Capability Plan: Combet back flips on critical defence capability plan - Liberal Party of Australia
Arguably, a 10 year DCP done in pencil is wise, but the existing document aiming toward a mythical Force 2030 structure seems welded to the long-range spending promises, as does Air9000 the ADF helo force rationalisation program embraced therein.
Consider also the employment of a former MinDef and a CGS by big arms corporates associated with the Tiger, MRH90, LPD decisions with Nick Minchin also having been a strong driver of these projects in the Howard Government. Seems to me now that both of the major parties are so in thrall to the all powerful arms industry that they are very loathe to even bend long-range hardware acquisition planning. This statement by Bob Baldwin indicates where the priorities lie: ‘Defence industry, independent Defence policy analysts and the Coalition all advised Minister Combet that a four year DCP would not provide industry with enough information to plan for future Defence projects or to develop future workforce structures.’
In my view, Joel Fitzgibbon got it right pulling defence spending projections back to a 4 year budget forward estimates horizon as nobody can judge what the economic and perhaps strategic scenarios will be beyond that time-frame. And defence spending should be all about maintaining the best affordable continual military preparedness, not primarily benefiting defence industry.
It would cost little to just put Iroquois, Kiowa and maybe Squirrel in storage as appropriate and then to figure out whether and how to fund upgrade as the necessities become obvious. I have been hammering this angle but it is just bouncing off both political parties and I will be far from nice if necessary at my meeting with Bob Baldwin next Thursday (he needs my vote).
Both Army Aviation and the Fleet Air Arm will eventually be in dire straits if we cannot get the politicians to act sensibly so we need to apply serious pressure on the Opposition pretty quick. Please get involved, in our national military interest.
Both of the major political parties have been complicit in dubious merit acquisitions and strongly supportive of the murky nexus between DMO and the major arms conglomerates. Recall the 'me too' extravagant defence spending promises out to 2018 preceding Election 2007 and see this link trumpeting the 10 year Defence Capability Plan: Combet back flips on critical defence capability plan - Liberal Party of Australia
Arguably, a 10 year DCP done in pencil is wise, but the existing document aiming toward a mythical Force 2030 structure seems welded to the long-range spending promises, as does Air9000 the ADF helo force rationalisation program embraced therein.
Consider also the employment of a former MinDef and a CGS by big arms corporates associated with the Tiger, MRH90, LPD decisions with Nick Minchin also having been a strong driver of these projects in the Howard Government. Seems to me now that both of the major parties are so in thrall to the all powerful arms industry that they are very loathe to even bend long-range hardware acquisition planning. This statement by Bob Baldwin indicates where the priorities lie: ‘Defence industry, independent Defence policy analysts and the Coalition all advised Minister Combet that a four year DCP would not provide industry with enough information to plan for future Defence projects or to develop future workforce structures.’
In my view, Joel Fitzgibbon got it right pulling defence spending projections back to a 4 year budget forward estimates horizon as nobody can judge what the economic and perhaps strategic scenarios will be beyond that time-frame. And defence spending should be all about maintaining the best affordable continual military preparedness, not primarily benefiting defence industry.
It would cost little to just put Iroquois, Kiowa and maybe Squirrel in storage as appropriate and then to figure out whether and how to fund upgrade as the necessities become obvious. I have been hammering this angle but it is just bouncing off both political parties and I will be far from nice if necessary at my meeting with Bob Baldwin next Thursday (he needs my vote).
Both Army Aviation and the Fleet Air Arm will eventually be in dire straits if we cannot get the politicians to act sensibly so we need to apply serious pressure on the Opposition pretty quick. Please get involved, in our national military interest.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Jul 2010 at 05:29.
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The acquisitions planned under the 8 phases of AIR 9000 will be in service for 25-30 years. They are expensive because the airworthiness assurance framework, and initial sustainment funding (for approx 10-15 years, depending on the platform) are included in the cost.
Keeping and upgrading Huey and Kiowa will be a waste of money. We need to shed the airworthiness and sustainment overhead for the 8 or nine (or 10) types we currently operate and reduce to four or five types.
Most acquisition projects take about 3 years to get from concept definition to government decision, except where there is an urgent operational requirement. Most acquisitions require a multi-year acceptance program. A 4-year budget is flawed for that reason alone.
I wish you well in your quest to have our government spend much less money for much less capability. I think the best you can do is mention the light utility gap left by the departure of Huey.
Keeping and upgrading Huey and Kiowa will be a waste of money. We need to shed the airworthiness and sustainment overhead for the 8 or nine (or 10) types we currently operate and reduce to four or five types.
Most acquisition projects take about 3 years to get from concept definition to government decision, except where there is an urgent operational requirement. Most acquisitions require a multi-year acceptance program. A 4-year budget is flawed for that reason alone.
I wish you well in your quest to have our government spend much less money for much less capability. I think the best you can do is mention the light utility gap left by the departure of Huey.
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Hello again emergov; a while now since we jousted on a forum; but, respectfully, I think you are yet again off track in your #70 post.
First up; I have been retired from the military for 32 years but I am still just as capable as anybody of research and analysis, where you seem to be falling a bit short.
'...The very reason we are getting rid of our current fleet of ageing legacy platforms, some of which were designed in the 1950s, is to reduce cost of ownership. Huey II will cost us more than an equivalent buy of MRH90.'
Really! 46 x Huey II would cost around $100million or less considering we own about 20 Hotel models, but double that if you like to $200million for sustainment support costing. 46 x MRH90 will apparently cost us around $2.5billion.
'Huey is not suitable as an airmobile or air gunnery platform.'
Go have a look at posts #48 and #50. The overwhelming bulk of US Army and 9SQN RAAF Iroquois employment was airmobile trooping. The US Army UH-1C and RAAF UH-1H Bushangers were highly successful air gunnery platforms.
'The only reason they got away with it in Vietnam is because of the thick jungle.'
You should look at picto-mapping on the web for awareness of terrain and vegetation in and around Saigon, Bien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy and neighbouring provinces. Perhaps half of Phuoc Tuy was largely cleared of vegetation and much was rice paddy surrounding urban areas. Many engagements were within villages or in fairly open terrain.
'...and designed the Black Hawk (starting in 1968) as a direct result of the lessons learned.'
Blackhawk was arguably not a quantum leap on the Iroquois being twice as heavy and about 4 times more costly to operate for general utility roles, although it has some better attributes for special operations requirements. Both Boeing and Sikorsky erred somewhat in not sticking with the Huey cabin floor plan in the UTTAS competition. The twin-engined UH-1Y, which has a 500mm cabin extension, is being produced new for the USMC for general utility and gunship roles and they have previously used the UH-1N in those capacities for years.
'...flying a 65 year old acft with lashed up avionics and no EWSP on ops.'
The Huey II is a virtual as new platform with long-term supportability envisaged and for which a myriad of modular and bolt-on systems are certified. A range of enhancements are offered in the avionics upgrade and EWSP could be easily incorporated. These are hardly 'lashed-up' systems if incorporated in the factory upgrade program.
You cannot choose your chariot for war-fighting or expect to go to war in a cocoon. It really gets down to affordable capabilities.
Finally; I do have multiple former Army Aviation friends, one of whom kindly supplied me with all of the Bell Helicopter technical data for Huey II.
First up; I have been retired from the military for 32 years but I am still just as capable as anybody of research and analysis, where you seem to be falling a bit short.
'...The very reason we are getting rid of our current fleet of ageing legacy platforms, some of which were designed in the 1950s, is to reduce cost of ownership. Huey II will cost us more than an equivalent buy of MRH90.'
Really! 46 x Huey II would cost around $100million or less considering we own about 20 Hotel models, but double that if you like to $200million for sustainment support costing. 46 x MRH90 will apparently cost us around $2.5billion.
'Huey is not suitable as an airmobile or air gunnery platform.'
Go have a look at posts #48 and #50. The overwhelming bulk of US Army and 9SQN RAAF Iroquois employment was airmobile trooping. The US Army UH-1C and RAAF UH-1H Bushangers were highly successful air gunnery platforms.
'The only reason they got away with it in Vietnam is because of the thick jungle.'
You should look at picto-mapping on the web for awareness of terrain and vegetation in and around Saigon, Bien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy and neighbouring provinces. Perhaps half of Phuoc Tuy was largely cleared of vegetation and much was rice paddy surrounding urban areas. Many engagements were within villages or in fairly open terrain.
'...and designed the Black Hawk (starting in 1968) as a direct result of the lessons learned.'
Blackhawk was arguably not a quantum leap on the Iroquois being twice as heavy and about 4 times more costly to operate for general utility roles, although it has some better attributes for special operations requirements. Both Boeing and Sikorsky erred somewhat in not sticking with the Huey cabin floor plan in the UTTAS competition. The twin-engined UH-1Y, which has a 500mm cabin extension, is being produced new for the USMC for general utility and gunship roles and they have previously used the UH-1N in those capacities for years.
'...flying a 65 year old acft with lashed up avionics and no EWSP on ops.'
The Huey II is a virtual as new platform with long-term supportability envisaged and for which a myriad of modular and bolt-on systems are certified. A range of enhancements are offered in the avionics upgrade and EWSP could be easily incorporated. These are hardly 'lashed-up' systems if incorporated in the factory upgrade program.
You cannot choose your chariot for war-fighting or expect to go to war in a cocoon. It really gets down to affordable capabilities.
Finally; I do have multiple former Army Aviation friends, one of whom kindly supplied me with all of the Bell Helicopter technical data for Huey II.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Jul 2010 at 05:44.
emergov says: Most acquisition projects take about 3 years to get from concept definition to government decision, except where there is an urgent operational requirement.
3 years from concept definition to govt decision - Really, you know how long AIR 87 (ARH) went? It was more like 20 years wasn't it? From a cheap-and-cheerful Kiowa recce helo, through a crazy phase that also included a fixed-wing SAR surveillance platform and UGS, finally back on track to an armed reconn helo? And still over a 20 year period the procurement/DMO process got it wrong.
3 years from concept definition to govt decision - Really, you know how long AIR 87 (ARH) went? It was more like 20 years wasn't it? From a cheap-and-cheerful Kiowa recce helo, through a crazy phase that also included a fixed-wing SAR surveillance platform and UGS, finally back on track to an armed reconn helo? And still over a 20 year period the procurement/DMO process got it wrong.
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BR71,
I think you are very much understating the costs associated with acquiring a new helicopter platform. If we bought 46 Huey II in place of the MRH90, it really would have cost a lot less. I was rather coming from where we are right now, where we are, where your proposal would be an increase in the number of aircraft we operate, and another type we would have to sustain.
The costs associated with any new purchase are only partly explained by the platform. We have a unit cost of $35M per MRH90, with no role equipment. times 46, that makes about $1.6BN. The other costs associated with the project are TLS, simulators, role equipment, training contracts, other training devices and facility upgrades. This includes funding for the systems project office personnel and links to the engineering authority.
This buys us 46 aircraft which are fly by wire, with integrated systems architecture, with upgrade potential, with new engines at the start of their development life. It includes floatation systems, external tanks, chaff and flare dispensers, FLIR, MFD, ballistic protection, crashworthy seats for all occupants, FDR, CVR, maintenance management information systems, a mission planning suite, and weather radar.
These aircraft have already demonstrated a deck landing envelope roughly twice that of Black Hawk, and their blades can be folded without use of a crane. The aircraft has wheels - it can be easily towed around the deck of a naval platform. It is made of composites, and so will not need the kinds of stringent corrosion preventative measures a Huey would when used as an amphibious assault platform.
Almost as an aside, it has 18 seats for soldiers and an endurance on internal fuel of over 5 hours. The only other aircraft that even comes close to meeting the requirement established by defence, and agreed to by government is Black Hawk Mikes, or Merlin. Merlin is too big and too expensive, Black Hawk lost the competition, so we have MRH 90.
As I said, your proposal is to pay a lot less money for a lot less capability.
Just because Huey was acceptable when Col Joye was on the wireless doesn't mean it's acceptable now. The fact that it would be cheap is kind of irrelevant, because it would be an additional cost to AIR 9000.
As I said, Hueys for light utility, great idea. MRH90 was selected for a reason - actually for dozens of reasons. Your suggestion that HueyII could do the same job does not stand scrutiny.
I think you are very much understating the costs associated with acquiring a new helicopter platform. If we bought 46 Huey II in place of the MRH90, it really would have cost a lot less. I was rather coming from where we are right now, where we are, where your proposal would be an increase in the number of aircraft we operate, and another type we would have to sustain.
The costs associated with any new purchase are only partly explained by the platform. We have a unit cost of $35M per MRH90, with no role equipment. times 46, that makes about $1.6BN. The other costs associated with the project are TLS, simulators, role equipment, training contracts, other training devices and facility upgrades. This includes funding for the systems project office personnel and links to the engineering authority.
This buys us 46 aircraft which are fly by wire, with integrated systems architecture, with upgrade potential, with new engines at the start of their development life. It includes floatation systems, external tanks, chaff and flare dispensers, FLIR, MFD, ballistic protection, crashworthy seats for all occupants, FDR, CVR, maintenance management information systems, a mission planning suite, and weather radar.
These aircraft have already demonstrated a deck landing envelope roughly twice that of Black Hawk, and their blades can be folded without use of a crane. The aircraft has wheels - it can be easily towed around the deck of a naval platform. It is made of composites, and so will not need the kinds of stringent corrosion preventative measures a Huey would when used as an amphibious assault platform.
Almost as an aside, it has 18 seats for soldiers and an endurance on internal fuel of over 5 hours. The only other aircraft that even comes close to meeting the requirement established by defence, and agreed to by government is Black Hawk Mikes, or Merlin. Merlin is too big and too expensive, Black Hawk lost the competition, so we have MRH 90.
As I said, your proposal is to pay a lot less money for a lot less capability.
Just because Huey was acceptable when Col Joye was on the wireless doesn't mean it's acceptable now. The fact that it would be cheap is kind of irrelevant, because it would be an additional cost to AIR 9000.
As I said, Hueys for light utility, great idea. MRH90 was selected for a reason - actually for dozens of reasons. Your suggestion that HueyII could do the same job does not stand scrutiny.