Bushranger is on the boil. A mega million dollar platform is not going to be put into harms way. We saw this in 9 Squadrons Vietnam deployment. The edict from Department of Air was that Hueys were not to be exposed to possible enemy action. This lead to much aggravation with the Army as might be expected, since they were fighting a war. An extract re the Long Tan battle,
A grave dispute between the army and the RAAF imperilled Smith's men. They desperately needed ammunition, and Jackson had approved the ammunition resupply, to be dropped by helicopter.` But the RAAF's Group Captain Peter Raw opposed the plan; he refused to permit his pilots to hover at treetop height, in a monsoon, exposed to heavy ground fire. Raw invoked the Department of Air doctrine that required forward landing zones to be 'relatively secure'.` Permission may even be needed from Canberra, Raw suggested.
The word 'Canberra' surged through Jackson like an electric shock. Relations between the RAAF and the army, already strained, now fell apart. 'Well, I'm about to lose a company Jackson fumed. 'What the hell's a few more choppers and a few more pilots!" Raw demurred and insisted on sticking to correct procedure.
A disgusted Jackson sent for the Americans. None doubted the exceptional courage of the US rotary wing pilots. Air Marshal Murdoch, US Chief of Air Staff, had just visited Nui Dat; his liaison officer casually promised a few Hueys within twenty minutes. Raw had little choice: either send the Australian pilots or leave the RAAF open to charges of failure. In any event, Raw's own pilots scorned 'correct procedure'. Flight Lieutenant Frank Riley insisted on flying to Delta Company's relief and would go on his own, if necessary'." Flight Lieutenant Bruce Lane felt the same way.'At last a little RAAF guts!' thought Jackson, greatly heartened.
Riley and his co-pilot Flight Lieutenant Bob Grandin boarded one helicopter; Flight Lieutenant Cliff Dohle and Lane flew the second; there were two machine-gunners per helicopter. Major Owen O'Brien and Warrant Officer George Chinn volunteered to hurl the ammunition boxes down to the men. Chinn, the 6th Battalion's formidable RSM, 'forcefully and almost insubordinately' demanded to go, 'come what may'. Grandin was less keen; he felt it a suicide mission:'It was insanity. I felt petrified. I tried to talk Riley out of it. Frank said shut up, stop giving me the ****s.`
and
The Army felt very undersupported in Vietnam, and came to regard the RAAF's reluctance to face ground fire with contempt. They were under orders not to get casualties. Many RAAF pilots sympathised with the Army. "The RAAF policy on helicopters was a bit absurb" said Air Commodore Roger Wilson. They told them "don't lose any aircraft, be safe". Hell there was a war going on.
Long Hai mountains 21st Feb 1967, the Task Force suffered many casualties as a result of mines. The RAAF refused to supply support (medevac) to extricate the dead, dying and wounded, and the tasking was left to the Australian Army 161 Recce Flight in Bell 47's and US Army Hueys.
With all due respect to Bushranger (I know from whence the callsign comes) we can only advance if we recognise our past failures. To my mind, a mega dollar piece of equipment, of which we can afford to buy few, is going to suffer from the same mind set as the RAAF in Vietnam.