Emergov; re your #79 post.
'Keeping and upgrading Huey and Kiowa will be a waste of money. We need to shed the airworthiness and sustainment overhead for the 8 or nine (or 10) types we currently operate and reduce to four or five types.
The Australian military was largely technically de-skilled when Defence committed to outsourcing of maintenance services on a false economic premise that strongly favoured defence industry (which is largely parented by the major arms manufacturers) so operating costs have climbed. When the services controlled their own maintenance, airworthiness assurance was inbuilt. These days, Defence seems to mainly call in retired pilots and engineers to conduct the airworthiness assurance process so I question whether that would be a significant cost factor.
Sustainment funding and operating costs need to be budgeted for any military hardware acquisition, but the outrageous unit cost of some gear, like Tiger and MRH90, is not justifiable when there are adequate lower cost alternatives.
The Project Air9000 helo force rationalisation program seems unduly inflexible and is thus inferior planning.The overall cost of upgrading Iroquois and Kiowa and keeping them in service to maybe around 2030 would be piddling compared to other wasteful expenditure in Air9000.
'Most acquisition projects take about 3 years to get from concept definition to government decision, except where there is an urgent operational requirement. Most acquisitions require a multi-year acceptance program. A 4-year budget is flawed for that reason alone.'
I guess you are referring to cumbersome processes in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual which was created in Year 2000 to replace the worthy Capital Equipment Procurement manual. I am told the DPPM has been turned into a very academic publication by DMO legal council and its provisions are shaped to favour the nexus between DMO/DSTO and defence industry which both major political parties abide.
Acquisitions requiring a multi-year acceptance program will inevitably generate capability gaps if they involve Australian-based defence industry because Defence does not adequately invest in progressively optimising in-service hardware to maintain military preparedness. This is why the Service Chiefs now push for buying more 'off-the-shelf' proven gear like C-130J, C-17, etcetera.
Flexible 10 year draft acquisition planning has obvious merit, but long-term taxpayer funding for defence industry should not be guaranteed when overall national budgeting can only be reasonably projected for 4 years.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Jul 2010 at 19:24.