Re post #94.
Pre-Vietnam involvement, the Australian armed forces functioned in accord with British Joint Service Planning doctrine and this was applicable in Malaysian counter-insurgency operations by 5SQN RAAF preceding change of name to 9SQN on deployment to Vietnam. The 'infamous' Air Staff Instruction issued in Canberra pertaining to Vietnam operations was simply an extract from the JSPs under which RAAF helos had been operating in conjunct with Brit forces. It was ignored at the operating level in Vietnam and soon after by the in-theatre command chain although I think it still remained in the Confidential Order Book throughout involvement.
I am not familiar with the publication from which you offer extracts Brian and to be truthful, I ceased reading many of them years ago because the bibliographies reflect so much regurgitated stuff that was largely ill-informed hearsay promulgated by people who were not involved. Even some of the so-called military historians have published inaccurate records of happenings.
If you are really interested in factual accounts of what occurred at 1ATF in early days Vietnam regarding 9SQN activities and the Battle of Long Tan, best speak with Air Commodore Ray Scott who was then CO 9SQN and Air Commodore Bruce Lane. Both are retired with Ray living at Banora Point, NSW and Bruce in Canberra.
'The Army felt very under-supported in Vietnam, and came to regard the RAAF's reluctance to face ground fire with contempt. They were under orders not to get casualties. Many RAAF pilots sympathised with the Army.'
Far from the truth considering the statistics in post #50 and the number of Army unit reunions to which former 9SQN personnel get invited.
"The RAAF policy on helicopters was a bit absurd" said Air Commodore Roger Wilson. They told them "don't lose any aircraft, be safe". Hell there was a war going on.'
Roger served as a FAC with the USAF between April and October 1968 and I was there either side of his tour on my first of 3 stints - I later served a few months at Nui Dat as Task Force Air Commander Representative. I cannot recall his presence much down Phuoc Tuy way but he is correct in stating that the ASI was inappropriate, but it really was irrelevant. There was never any edict to 9SQN like that inferred, according to my pretty comprehensive awareness of records and unit history.
'Long Hai mountains 21st Feb 1967, the Task Force suffered many casualties as a result of mines. The RAAF refused to supply support (medevac) to extricate the dead, dying and wounded, and the tasking was left to the Australian Army 161 Recce Flight in Bell 47's and US Army Hueys.'
Can you supply the 1ATF Log reference to substantiate this claim? 9SQN was involved in lots of operations in and around the Long Hai mountains and that is where the sole shoot-down loss occurred.
The ammo drop at Long Tan was a fly-by exercise and herewith another anecdote to portray how it was done in scores of later instances:
An OPDEM for V Coy/4RAR in contact in lowish jungle about 80 feet high towards FSB Bearcat en route to Saigon. Sunray: 'We are pinned down and cannot move, do not go past our smoke' . A slow crawl forward at tree top level to hover over yellow smoke. The din of continuous firing from both sides was deafening causing raised voices on intercom. 'Move laterally a bit Albatross and we will tell you when to drop. Overhead, drop now. Thanks Albatross, right where we need it; can you take out a casualty?' Albatross 01: 'Sure'. Sunray: 'Please move a bit more but no further forward'. We were right over their gun muzzles and employing some near vertical door-gun suppression while winching up a grinning perforated Maori warrior. We slowly backed away from the brawl and headed for Vung Tau with our casualty who was in worsening state but we got him to hospital pretty quick and he survived. Gunship support was not available for this episode, as in some other similar situations.
Hoping the discussion can stay a bit more civil now.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 18th Jul 2010 at 02:45.