Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
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The problem is Chug that you are making out that the other Services act in the same way as the RAF have done. The truth is they do not (at least the RN hasn't and doesn't). You continue to cite senior officers interfering, again I am not aware that the RN do and I do not think the Army do. Part of this issue is due to the fact that the RAF are an aviation Service, it is all they have to think about and so senior officers think that they know better - it is a real weakness as has been prove time and again (I am not aware of any RN accident investigation being "interfered with" by senior officers).
The RAF have a real problem here, Haddon-Cave recognised it and hence the recommendation for the MAA (not an invention of H-C by the way, it was the imposition of a study conducted a year or so before -which he quoted from in his report), the RN and Army had no choice but to follow. H-C recognised on many occasions that the RN had best practice re A/W. THe RN always were the most obedient towards JSP318 etc - the RAF had to have their own "additional" orders in GASOs.
I am not being anti-RAF in all ofthis but the other Services have been tarred with their particular brush in this thread.
The RAF have a real problem here, Haddon-Cave recognised it and hence the recommendation for the MAA (not an invention of H-C by the way, it was the imposition of a study conducted a year or so before -which he quoted from in his report), the RN and Army had no choice but to follow. H-C recognised on many occasions that the RN had best practice re A/W. THe RN always were the most obedient towards JSP318 etc - the RAF had to have their own "additional" orders in GASOs.
I am not being anti-RAF in all ofthis but the other Services have been tarred with their particular brush in this thread.
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Bismark.
Forgive me for saying so chap but you are very much out of date. Us rotary types are subject to the FOB of a well known rotary organisation. That is whether you are Army, Navy or RAF. GASO's are the equivalent to that FOB. So where do we differ as Services?
Forgive me for saying so chap but you are very much out of date. Us rotary types are subject to the FOB of a well known rotary organisation. That is whether you are Army, Navy or RAF. GASO's are the equivalent to that FOB. So where do we differ as Services?
Agreed...
The MAA's title is indeed the "Military Aviation Authority" and it supposedly does what it says in the title for all military aviation, not excluding the navy.
And those denegrating the need for "risk" apparently do so without assessing the amount of "knowledge" or "experience" required to calculate the risk.
What "front line commander" would willingly hazard his future missions by not assuring the servicability of his assets? Even squaddies have fairly reliable guns and they clean them when they can. Why would you treat an aircraft differently?
The MAA's title is indeed the "Military Aviation Authority" and it supposedly does what it says in the title for all military aviation, not excluding the navy.
And those denegrating the need for "risk" apparently do so without assessing the amount of "knowledge" or "experience" required to calculate the risk.
What "front line commander" would willingly hazard his future missions by not assuring the servicability of his assets? Even squaddies have fairly reliable guns and they clean them when they can. Why would you treat an aircraft differently?
Bismark, whether or not Army and Royal Navy Aviation are the centres of good practise that you claim (and I'm afraid that the words stones and glass-houses keep coming to mind), you rather miss the point if you don't mind me saying so.
The crisis in UK Military Aviation Airworthiness Provision is not at single service level, it is at MOD level. If, for instance, a Sea King upgrade involved the substitution, without trials as mandated by the Regs, of High Intensity Strobe Lights in place of the existing Anti Collision Lights by simply swapping the ones for the others then the aircraft as released into Royal Navy Service would be unairworthy thanks to the MOD. That is not a theoretical scenario but an actual one. As a result, in hazy conditions at night pilots found themselves blinded by their own forward HISLs. Some chose to rectify that by switching them off, thus making their aircraft invisible to others closing from ahead. Two such aircraft, in such conditions, collided and seven lives were lost. The inquiry ruled out the HISLs as being a contributory cause! The sooner that airworthiness provision and air accident investigation is wrested away from the MOD and the three Services the better, if only to bring back objectivity into a world that can be very unforgiving to subjective self-confidence!
The crisis in UK Military Aviation Airworthiness Provision is not at single service level, it is at MOD level. If, for instance, a Sea King upgrade involved the substitution, without trials as mandated by the Regs, of High Intensity Strobe Lights in place of the existing Anti Collision Lights by simply swapping the ones for the others then the aircraft as released into Royal Navy Service would be unairworthy thanks to the MOD. That is not a theoretical scenario but an actual one. As a result, in hazy conditions at night pilots found themselves blinded by their own forward HISLs. Some chose to rectify that by switching them off, thus making their aircraft invisible to others closing from ahead. Two such aircraft, in such conditions, collided and seven lives were lost. The inquiry ruled out the HISLs as being a contributory cause! The sooner that airworthiness provision and air accident investigation is wrested away from the MOD and the three Services the better, if only to bring back objectivity into a world that can be very unforgiving to subjective self-confidence!
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Poor example Chug. If I recall the BoI correctly the only contributory factor re the forward/lower HISLs was that the crew decided to turn them off and that it had been practice in the Sqn to do so....even though the conditions (in the view of the BoI team) at the time did not require such an act. Sadly in that particular case we will never know the true reasons for their actions hence no cause or blame being found (apart from the fact they flew in to each other).
High spirits, The RN grey fleet are not part of JHC and they flew from the JSP, and BR 766 etc which was directly linked to the JSP.
High spirits, The RN grey fleet are not part of JHC and they flew from the JSP, and BR 766 etc which was directly linked to the JSP.
Poor example or no Bismark, it is an example of an airworthiness related fatal military air accident. We need far fewer of them and an independent MAA and MAAIB is the path to achieving that.
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it is an example of an airworthiness related fatal military air accident.
How can you possibly say that when the true reason for the accident will never be known? The HISLs may or may not have been a factor. In any event it is not unusual in war to fly with nav lights, and other transmitter off, - where does airworthiness come into that?
Bismark
While you are correct that it was primarily the RAF who knowingly ran down the MoD's airworthiness process it is wrong to say the RN were blameless.
The factor which links the Services is that AMSO had taken over support of RN equipment and of the centralised, core airworthiness functions vital to a valid Safety Case. They (AMSO) promptly slashed funding rendering Safety Cases (or safety arguments) progressively invalid.
At the same time, AMSO (and then AML, DLO, MoD(PE) and DPA) systematically rid themselves of the necessary engineering experience and corporate knowledge. (Lord Philip was given in evidence an internal AMSO letter boasting of this fact, that suppliers now "controlled" all procurement. Next time anyone has a pop at MoD project managers or engineering support staffs, think of that one).
The various Airworthiness Review Team (ART) reports of the 90s (Chinook, Nimrod, Puma, Wessex etc) consistently flagged the above as a major airworthiness concern; specifically citing the serious safety problems caused by non-engineers having airworthiness delegation and/or being allowed to make engineering decisions directly affecting safety. See the Sea King case cited by Chug - he is absolutely right. Engineers were over-ruled and the Critical Design Review waived. The two main safety nets torn down at a stroke.
MoD have since tried to spin these ARTs as evidence they addressed airworthiness, but this is wrong. First, they contain lots of recommendations, but few were implemented. This can be seen by the same recommendations popping up time and again, years apart. Also, if the regulations governing “continuous assessment” (of safety/airworthiness) had been implemented, such wide-ranging ARTs would not be required. It would be a “simple” case of assuring the regs were implemented. The very existence of the ARTs emphasises these serious failures. The recommendations are of startling consistency, and almost all can be mapped to contributory factors on Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King, Tornado, Hercules and more. That tragic list is the ultimate proof these recommendations were ignored. The Chief Engineer of the day has yet to explain why. Perhaps he’ll claim he was over-ruled too, but he is already on record noting his tenure being described as the “golden period” by Haddon-Cave. Fool’s gold I say.
From 1987-on the RN knew exactly what the RAF were doing. The RN formed the Aircraft Support Executive (DASE(N)), who were infamous for not supporting aircraft or making any executive decisions; largely because their previous roles had been chopped or transferred to AMSO (above) - who then chopped them. Their predecessors were required to "manage" airworthiness; ASE's terms of reference were diluted to "monitor". “We only monitor, and have noted the failures” is one of the all time classics. I was a monitor once; at school dinners.
Again, correspondence is available from this period demonstrating MoD(PE) consistently advised ASE of the impact on airworthiness and general support these AMSO policies were having. ASE's reply was "We are content to monitor progress and leave the RAF to manage". That was about the time the Sea Harrier fleet was down to one operational squadron (and a short one at that) due to AMSO suppliers deciding that key navigation / landing aid equipment was "consumable" instead of repairable; ordering that every arising (from SHAR and CVS) was to be scrapped instead of repaired. The effect was to transfer responsibility for replacement to another department (SM51) who did not have funding (and therefore didn’t replace). The original supply office (SM47) was seen to be efficient as they were spending less on repairs. (See Haddon-Cave – “savings at the expense of safety”). Not by coincidence was the 2 Star in charge of these clowns the same one who threatened civilian staffs with dismissal in December 1992 for voicing concerns about these actions. This, 3 months after CHART was published. That, better than anything else, illustrates the official RAF reaction to being told of systemic airworthiness failures.
This precise problem was cited in an inquiry into a Cat 4 SHAR. It was I who gave the evidence, direct to the BoI chairman. The pilot had complained he would have got home (after a bird strike I think) had he had the NavAid the suppliers had scrapped.
Of course, like the RAF the RN had very many who knew all this was wrong. I shall always be grateful to one particular Admiral who stepped in to support me when the non-engineers sought to discipline me for disobeying an order to ignore airworthiness regulations, and sign off on a design knowing it was functionally unsafe. But is it not extraordinary, and indicative of the scale of the problem, that a mere Admiral could only offer his support but not actually have the clout to do anything? (And his support didn’t carry any weight, because CDP ignored him and ruled I was wrong to insist on functional safety; later supported by 5 Mins(AF) and PUS). And then more died.
And finally, I notice no-one has replied to dervish’s posts. He is quite right. Lord Philip confirmed the status of the Chinook HC Mk2 Nav and Comms systems in 2nd June 1994 was Switch On Only Clearance. Another little gem that slipped through MoD and Government vetting. Switch On Only? The regs state that means you are not allowed to reply on this kit in any way whatsoever. That precludes meaningful flight in any aircraft. Why was this withheld from aircrew? THAT is the elephant Lord Philip left behind in the room. Quite deliberately I believe, as he concentrated (correctly) on the legal aspect. No wonder MoD have refused to hand over the correspondence between CA and ACAS that led to ACAS withholding this in his RTS. Forget the supposed poor legal advice to Wratten and Day – this is the key point the setting aside was intended to hide.
Sorry, my mistake, -re SHAR he would not have been the BoI chairman, but a Reviewing Officer, as he was a Captain RN. He phoned me in London and I submitted a written report. Still got it.
While you are correct that it was primarily the RAF who knowingly ran down the MoD's airworthiness process it is wrong to say the RN were blameless.
The factor which links the Services is that AMSO had taken over support of RN equipment and of the centralised, core airworthiness functions vital to a valid Safety Case. They (AMSO) promptly slashed funding rendering Safety Cases (or safety arguments) progressively invalid.
At the same time, AMSO (and then AML, DLO, MoD(PE) and DPA) systematically rid themselves of the necessary engineering experience and corporate knowledge. (Lord Philip was given in evidence an internal AMSO letter boasting of this fact, that suppliers now "controlled" all procurement. Next time anyone has a pop at MoD project managers or engineering support staffs, think of that one).
The various Airworthiness Review Team (ART) reports of the 90s (Chinook, Nimrod, Puma, Wessex etc) consistently flagged the above as a major airworthiness concern; specifically citing the serious safety problems caused by non-engineers having airworthiness delegation and/or being allowed to make engineering decisions directly affecting safety. See the Sea King case cited by Chug - he is absolutely right. Engineers were over-ruled and the Critical Design Review waived. The two main safety nets torn down at a stroke.
MoD have since tried to spin these ARTs as evidence they addressed airworthiness, but this is wrong. First, they contain lots of recommendations, but few were implemented. This can be seen by the same recommendations popping up time and again, years apart. Also, if the regulations governing “continuous assessment” (of safety/airworthiness) had been implemented, such wide-ranging ARTs would not be required. It would be a “simple” case of assuring the regs were implemented. The very existence of the ARTs emphasises these serious failures. The recommendations are of startling consistency, and almost all can be mapped to contributory factors on Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King, Tornado, Hercules and more. That tragic list is the ultimate proof these recommendations were ignored. The Chief Engineer of the day has yet to explain why. Perhaps he’ll claim he was over-ruled too, but he is already on record noting his tenure being described as the “golden period” by Haddon-Cave. Fool’s gold I say.
From 1987-on the RN knew exactly what the RAF were doing. The RN formed the Aircraft Support Executive (DASE(N)), who were infamous for not supporting aircraft or making any executive decisions; largely because their previous roles had been chopped or transferred to AMSO (above) - who then chopped them. Their predecessors were required to "manage" airworthiness; ASE's terms of reference were diluted to "monitor". “We only monitor, and have noted the failures” is one of the all time classics. I was a monitor once; at school dinners.
Again, correspondence is available from this period demonstrating MoD(PE) consistently advised ASE of the impact on airworthiness and general support these AMSO policies were having. ASE's reply was "We are content to monitor progress and leave the RAF to manage". That was about the time the Sea Harrier fleet was down to one operational squadron (and a short one at that) due to AMSO suppliers deciding that key navigation / landing aid equipment was "consumable" instead of repairable; ordering that every arising (from SHAR and CVS) was to be scrapped instead of repaired. The effect was to transfer responsibility for replacement to another department (SM51) who did not have funding (and therefore didn’t replace). The original supply office (SM47) was seen to be efficient as they were spending less on repairs. (See Haddon-Cave – “savings at the expense of safety”). Not by coincidence was the 2 Star in charge of these clowns the same one who threatened civilian staffs with dismissal in December 1992 for voicing concerns about these actions. This, 3 months after CHART was published. That, better than anything else, illustrates the official RAF reaction to being told of systemic airworthiness failures.
This precise problem was cited in an inquiry into a Cat 4 SHAR. It was I who gave the evidence, direct to the BoI chairman. The pilot had complained he would have got home (after a bird strike I think) had he had the NavAid the suppliers had scrapped.
Of course, like the RAF the RN had very many who knew all this was wrong. I shall always be grateful to one particular Admiral who stepped in to support me when the non-engineers sought to discipline me for disobeying an order to ignore airworthiness regulations, and sign off on a design knowing it was functionally unsafe. But is it not extraordinary, and indicative of the scale of the problem, that a mere Admiral could only offer his support but not actually have the clout to do anything? (And his support didn’t carry any weight, because CDP ignored him and ruled I was wrong to insist on functional safety; later supported by 5 Mins(AF) and PUS). And then more died.
And finally, I notice no-one has replied to dervish’s posts. He is quite right. Lord Philip confirmed the status of the Chinook HC Mk2 Nav and Comms systems in 2nd June 1994 was Switch On Only Clearance. Another little gem that slipped through MoD and Government vetting. Switch On Only? The regs state that means you are not allowed to reply on this kit in any way whatsoever. That precludes meaningful flight in any aircraft. Why was this withheld from aircrew? THAT is the elephant Lord Philip left behind in the room. Quite deliberately I believe, as he concentrated (correctly) on the legal aspect. No wonder MoD have refused to hand over the correspondence between CA and ACAS that led to ACAS withholding this in his RTS. Forget the supposed poor legal advice to Wratten and Day – this is the key point the setting aside was intended to hide.
Sorry, my mistake, -re SHAR he would not have been the BoI chairman, but a Reviewing Officer, as he was a Captain RN. He phoned me in London and I submitted a written report. Still got it.
Last edited by tucumseh; 14th Aug 2011 at 10:30.
where does airworthiness come into that?
See Board of Inquiry report. It quoted Def Stan 00-970 non-compliancies chapter and verse. (Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft). In doing so, the Board were far more robust than, for example, that of Nimrod XV230, which simply said the regulations were not implemented properly.
Para 101 - It is considered by the Board that the HISLis not fit for purpose and non-compliant with the requirement in DEF STAN 00970 Vol 2 para 2.1 (Enc. 42), in that the it should be located so that the emitted light shall not be detrimental to the crew's vision.
That is just a simple fact in an official RN report. I know others have argued against, and I also know there is a difference between airworthiness and fitness for purpose - which many of the recent posts ignore. But, the former is a pre-requisite to the latter.
Until that is understood, one cannot sensibly debate an independent MAA/MAAIB. In very simple terms, airworthiness can be independent, but fitness for purpose cannot. It is the definition and control of that boundary that becomes important. That is a simple systems integration discipline; but of course MoD don't do that either if it saves money!
Thank you for your timely and as always erudite contribution to the discussion, tucumseh. Indeed if this thread were a sticky I would have willingly left it as the last authoritative word on the matter, so it is merely in the role of bumper that I bring it back into view.
Bismark:
These aircraft were recovering to and launching from their carrier. The mid-air collision between them was close to the ship, well away from any hostile military threat, It was not a requirement for them to show no lights and it is rather disingenuous to suggest that it might have been. If ever there was a time for them to "see and be seen" this was it, and to have all such lights on (including the problematic fwd/lower HISL's) yet:
To then say that:
Is again rather disingenuous in my view. Plainly the reason they were turned off is because the existing conditions exacerbated the problem identified by the BoI, that the installation was unfit for purpose (it blinded the pilots). For the BoI then to say that in retrospect the conditions did not do that calls into question their judgement rather than that of the pilots, in my view. That may be unacceptable to you, but what is unacceptable to me is that very question hanging over an inquiry conducted by the operator itself! This not fit for purpose installation had been carried out contrary to the airworthiness regulations, as a result of which it was switched off during a manoeuvre when it was most needed. Seven men died, and yet you say there was:
I know where I could find possible cause and blame! In my book this is another compromised miliary air accident investigation to add to all the others.
This is not an inter-service willy waving game, it is instead a matter of life and death. Each compromised and partial investigation paves the way to the very next tragedy. Time that was all stopped and that Military Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation be placed alongside Caesar's Wife in the "nothing to see here" suspicion category.
Bismark:
The HISLs may or may not have been a factor. In any event it is not unusual in war to fly with nav lights, and other transmitter off, - where does airworthiness come into that?
the crew decided to turn them off and that it had been practice in the Sqn to do so
Sadly in that particular case we will never know the true reasons for their actions hence no cause or blame being found (apart from the fact they flew in to each other).
no cause or blame found
This is not an inter-service willy waving game, it is instead a matter of life and death. Each compromised and partial investigation paves the way to the very next tragedy. Time that was all stopped and that Military Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation be placed alongside Caesar's Wife in the "nothing to see here" suspicion category.
Bismark,
You say..... "There is a world of difference between what might be acceptable in UK/peacetime airspace, and what is required, on occasion, in a war-zone...." and you are of course correct.
However, what happens when the "ops only" clearance is applied to an aircraft flying "ops" in the UK in peacetime? Accepting a risk when troops are under fire is a relatively easy decision to take/justify. Accepting a similar risk in UK airspace when the results of not flying cannot be fully determined prior to launch is a different matter.
crab@SAAvn said "...surely an aircraft is either airworthy or not, it can't be both..." I'm not sure that his question has been answered by anyone subsequently. Unless people are saying that unairworthy aircraft are being flown on operations in times of extremis.
I assumed that aircraft were defined as being airworthy or not. Do we instead have a spectrum of airworthiness states, from fully airworthy to totally unairworthy with a range of in between definitions? If so, where, are they written down, and what guidance is there for the people who have to fly/authorise aircraft in an in-between airworthiness state?
You say..... "There is a world of difference between what might be acceptable in UK/peacetime airspace, and what is required, on occasion, in a war-zone...." and you are of course correct.
However, what happens when the "ops only" clearance is applied to an aircraft flying "ops" in the UK in peacetime? Accepting a risk when troops are under fire is a relatively easy decision to take/justify. Accepting a similar risk in UK airspace when the results of not flying cannot be fully determined prior to launch is a different matter.
crab@SAAvn said "...surely an aircraft is either airworthy or not, it can't be both..." I'm not sure that his question has been answered by anyone subsequently. Unless people are saying that unairworthy aircraft are being flown on operations in times of extremis.
I assumed that aircraft were defined as being airworthy or not. Do we instead have a spectrum of airworthiness states, from fully airworthy to totally unairworthy with a range of in between definitions? If so, where, are they written down, and what guidance is there for the people who have to fly/authorise aircraft in an in-between airworthiness state?
Bismark
A post-BoI investigation was conducted into the contributory factors and blame was laid on an individual.
The person cleared himself and no further action was taken. A few MPs later asked questions in the House. The answers MoD provided confirmed that person could not have been at fault. Peculiar that, having initiated an investigation, they didn't pursue it further. You begin to suspect they didn't like where it was leading.
no cause or blame being found
A post-BoI investigation was conducted into the contributory factors and blame was laid on an individual.
The person cleared himself and no further action was taken. A few MPs later asked questions in the House. The answers MoD provided confirmed that person could not have been at fault. Peculiar that, having initiated an investigation, they didn't pursue it further. You begin to suspect they didn't like where it was leading.
Biggus, if you are talking of known unairworthiness, then no such aircraft, military or civil may be permitted to fly in normal circumstances (abnormal ones being the "at war" scenarios that have been postulated).
The point being, of course, what is known and who by? The provision of airworthiness is an arcane and complex procedure that requires deep technical knowledge as typified by tucumseh's valuable contributions to this and other threads. It is sadly not typified by the MOD in whose stewardship we have seen that depth of knowledge stripped away as professional engineers who were wont to say "no" were replaced by the technically unqualified who could be relied upon to say "yes". With due respect to the MAA that lack of experience and depth of knowledge still pertains and there is no slick answer to it. The first and most urgent step though is to remove it from the pressures and influences that have reduced this vital arm of Military Flight Safety to the state we are in today. In parallel with that is the failure of BoI's over these decades of decline to face up to and expose this scandal. Again the answer must be to remove Military Air Accident Investigation from within the MOD/Services to without. Painting new signs and doors achieves nothing more than a false sense of security.
Just to emphasise, this is all about the provision and maintenance of airworthiness and not of serviceability. For all I know the Sea Kings, the Chinook, the Tornado, the Hercules and the Nimrod (all mentioned earlier and the subjects of individual threads within this Forum) could well have been serviceable pre-flight. My claim is however that they were not airworthy and/or fit for purpose, and that was known of by those whose duty it was to ensure that only airworthy military aircraft be Released to Service into the three Services. They failed in that duty and 62 people died in the subsequent airworthiness related accidents.
Self Regulation Never Works and In Aviation It Kills!
The point being, of course, what is known and who by? The provision of airworthiness is an arcane and complex procedure that requires deep technical knowledge as typified by tucumseh's valuable contributions to this and other threads. It is sadly not typified by the MOD in whose stewardship we have seen that depth of knowledge stripped away as professional engineers who were wont to say "no" were replaced by the technically unqualified who could be relied upon to say "yes". With due respect to the MAA that lack of experience and depth of knowledge still pertains and there is no slick answer to it. The first and most urgent step though is to remove it from the pressures and influences that have reduced this vital arm of Military Flight Safety to the state we are in today. In parallel with that is the failure of BoI's over these decades of decline to face up to and expose this scandal. Again the answer must be to remove Military Air Accident Investigation from within the MOD/Services to without. Painting new signs and doors achieves nothing more than a false sense of security.
Just to emphasise, this is all about the provision and maintenance of airworthiness and not of serviceability. For all I know the Sea Kings, the Chinook, the Tornado, the Hercules and the Nimrod (all mentioned earlier and the subjects of individual threads within this Forum) could well have been serviceable pre-flight. My claim is however that they were not airworthy and/or fit for purpose, and that was known of by those whose duty it was to ensure that only airworthy military aircraft be Released to Service into the three Services. They failed in that duty and 62 people died in the subsequent airworthiness related accidents.
Self Regulation Never Works and In Aviation It Kills!
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I give up with you lot. You are trying to apportion cause and blame when it is impossible to know the reason why those aircraft collided. There are always contributory factors, which when put into the chain could (but not do) lead to an accident. This is exactly what the Chinook issue digressed into and we still do not know whether that one was purely pilot error (they were grubbing it) or there was a deeper problem with the aircraft.
Most of what you are talking about is "engineering" airworthiness but of course there is much more to it than that. The fact remains that the crews were aware of the airworthiness limitations of their aircraft, including the fwd HISL issue and presumably took these into account in their flight planning and profile - we shall never know.
I recall hearing the tale of a Wasp pilot who, when night flying in the vicinity of his ship thought the aircraft was on fire. After the subsequent ditching his crewman asking what the h**l he thought he was doing. Turned out it was the anti-coll light reflecting off some cloud! Airworthy or not?
Most of what you are talking about is "engineering" airworthiness but of course there is much more to it than that. The fact remains that the crews were aware of the airworthiness limitations of their aircraft, including the fwd HISL issue and presumably took these into account in their flight planning and profile - we shall never know.
I recall hearing the tale of a Wasp pilot who, when night flying in the vicinity of his ship thought the aircraft was on fire. After the subsequent ditching his crewman asking what the h**l he thought he was doing. Turned out it was the anti-coll light reflecting off some cloud! Airworthy or not?
Bismark, you are right of course, we do not know for sure why the two Sea Kings collided, or why the Chinook crashed into the Mull of Kintyre. What we do know is that when they did so all three aircraft were unairworthy, as Released To Service. That is the issue here. The Royal Navy chose not to attribute blame to its deceased pilots, and I applaud their humanity, the Royal Air Force decided that theirs were Grossly Negligent and have been obliged to reverse that shameful deed.
The challenge now is to ensure the future airworthiness of the military airfleets so that; not fit for purpose HISLs, dysfunctional FADECs, fuel systems installed contrary to Regulations, fuel tanks unprotected from ballistic impact in AT aircraft, and IFF sets that do not show a visual failure warning are all consigned to the MAAIB's rogues gallery and not HM's aircraft.
You may have given up with me, Bismark, many others have. I will not give up though until the MAA and MAAIB are separate and independent of the MOD.
The challenge now is to ensure the future airworthiness of the military airfleets so that; not fit for purpose HISLs, dysfunctional FADECs, fuel systems installed contrary to Regulations, fuel tanks unprotected from ballistic impact in AT aircraft, and IFF sets that do not show a visual failure warning are all consigned to the MAAIB's rogues gallery and not HM's aircraft.
You may have given up with me, Bismark, many others have. I will not give up though until the MAA and MAAIB are separate and independent of the MOD.
"You may have given up with me, Bismark, many others have. I will not give up though until the MAA and MAAIB are separate and independent of the MOD. "
And then what happens?
Whilst your aim is laudable, there is a real danger in applying standards so strictly that the UK's Mil Aircraft won't be able to take off. At which point you might as well disband the RAF. Perfect is the enemy of good enough, and to be brutal, the loss of 'x' number of Servicemen and women a year is probably an acceptable loss rate when considering the wider effect the RAF/FAA/AAC provide. And let me be absolutely clear, whilst my sympathies lie with the families in each case, we sign up with unlimited liability; if you are not willing to explain to your loved ones what that means then it's your call....
And then what happens?
Whilst your aim is laudable, there is a real danger in applying standards so strictly that the UK's Mil Aircraft won't be able to take off. At which point you might as well disband the RAF. Perfect is the enemy of good enough, and to be brutal, the loss of 'x' number of Servicemen and women a year is probably an acceptable loss rate when considering the wider effect the RAF/FAA/AAC provide. And let me be absolutely clear, whilst my sympathies lie with the families in each case, we sign up with unlimited liability; if you are not willing to explain to your loved ones what that means then it's your call....
But when you launch an aircraft, which is questionably airworthy, against the enemy and you lose it due to that 'airworthiness' what have you actually achieved other than to do the enemy's job for him, especially if it is full of troops when it goes in?
Acceptable losses and attrition rates are one thing - wasting people's lives needlessly is another.
Acceptable losses and attrition rates are one thing - wasting people's lives needlessly is another.
ATG:
Quite right, Alfred (if I may be so presumptuous), the unairworthy ones most certainly won't, at least I hope so, don't you? The civilians seem to keep their aircraft airworthy and therefore airborne, so why shouldn't the military?
As to the notion of "unlimited liability", a noble sentiment indeed, but dying a needless death on a Scottish hillside makes it rather less so don't you think?
The point of Military Flight Safety is to preserve both aircrew and aircraft from avoidable accidents so that they remain available for unavoidable war. Nobly expending either in unnecessary and avoidable accidents is wasteful and helps no-one, other than our potential enemies. This isn't about wrapping up the little darlings in fluffy cotton wool, but of giving them aircraft that can be seen by others (unless at war), recognised by allies (when at war), able to withstand an AK47 round entering a fuel tank without exploding, able to conduct airborne refuelling without exploding, able to keep flying without a computer arbitrarily winding up the power, winding down the power, or cutting the power altogether, etc, etc. Seems like a good idea to me, though obviously not to the multi starred overlords who waved through such "unlimited liabilities". I guess they thought the same as you, eh?
there is a real danger in applying standards so strictly that the UK's Mil Aircraft won't be able to take off.
As to the notion of "unlimited liability", a noble sentiment indeed, but dying a needless death on a Scottish hillside makes it rather less so don't you think?
The point of Military Flight Safety is to preserve both aircrew and aircraft from avoidable accidents so that they remain available for unavoidable war. Nobly expending either in unnecessary and avoidable accidents is wasteful and helps no-one, other than our potential enemies. This isn't about wrapping up the little darlings in fluffy cotton wool, but of giving them aircraft that can be seen by others (unless at war), recognised by allies (when at war), able to withstand an AK47 round entering a fuel tank without exploding, able to conduct airborne refuelling without exploding, able to keep flying without a computer arbitrarily winding up the power, winding down the power, or cutting the power altogether, etc, etc. Seems like a good idea to me, though obviously not to the multi starred overlords who waved through such "unlimited liabilities". I guess they thought the same as you, eh?
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
But when you launch an aircraft, which is questionably airworthy, against the enemy and you lose it due to that 'airworthiness' what have you actually achieved other than to do the enemy's job for him, especially if it is full of troops when it goes in?
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The same old cr@p is surfacing in this thread about the Bagger crash.
"Para 101 - It is considered by the Board that the HISLis not fit for purpose and non-compliant with the requirement in DEF STAN 00970 Vol 2 para 2.1 (Enc. 42), in that the it should be located so that the emitted light shall not be detrimental to the crew's vision."
That is a statement written by an imbecile.
The light from the HISL is not directly visible by the pilot. In common with all Seaking helicopters, it reflects back up off the water or from precipitation. This is irritating so we used to turn it off. The previous light was less irritating because it was dimmer, but we still turned it off, but even when it was on it was less effective because, erm, it was dimmer. The HISL was brought in to enhance safety, and I think it does.
Helicopters don't have wingtips. If you want it to shine forward then it has to be on the front. If it is on the front then there will be reflection and diffusion through precipitation.
Anyway, the pilots called visual.
End of.
The embodiment of the HISLs on Seaking 7 was perfectly reasonable without a separate trial because the trial had been done on the 6.
Common sense is not a bad thing. The 6 and the 7 are to all purposes identical with respect to effects of lighting, except if anythin a 7 is far less likely, due to it's profiles to encounter the reflected light. As it happens, when the crashed they were flying in a 6 type profile, so the 6 trial was perfectly adequate.
"Para 101 - It is considered by the Board that the HISLis not fit for purpose and non-compliant with the requirement in DEF STAN 00970 Vol 2 para 2.1 (Enc. 42), in that the it should be located so that the emitted light shall not be detrimental to the crew's vision."
That is a statement written by an imbecile.
The light from the HISL is not directly visible by the pilot. In common with all Seaking helicopters, it reflects back up off the water or from precipitation. This is irritating so we used to turn it off. The previous light was less irritating because it was dimmer, but we still turned it off, but even when it was on it was less effective because, erm, it was dimmer. The HISL was brought in to enhance safety, and I think it does.
Helicopters don't have wingtips. If you want it to shine forward then it has to be on the front. If it is on the front then there will be reflection and diffusion through precipitation.
Anyway, the pilots called visual.
End of.
The embodiment of the HISLs on Seaking 7 was perfectly reasonable without a separate trial because the trial had been done on the 6.
Common sense is not a bad thing. The 6 and the 7 are to all purposes identical with respect to effects of lighting, except if anythin a 7 is far less likely, due to it's profiles to encounter the reflected light. As it happens, when the crashed they were flying in a 6 type profile, so the 6 trial was perfectly adequate.