Bismark
While you are correct that it was primarily the RAF who knowingly ran down the MoD's airworthiness process it is wrong to say the RN were blameless.
The factor which links the Services is that AMSO had taken over support of RN equipment and of the centralised, core airworthiness functions vital to a valid Safety Case. They (AMSO) promptly slashed funding rendering Safety Cases (or safety arguments) progressively invalid.
At the same time, AMSO (and then AML, DLO, MoD(PE) and DPA) systematically rid themselves of the necessary engineering experience and corporate knowledge. (Lord Philip was given in evidence an internal AMSO letter boasting of this fact, that suppliers now "controlled" all procurement. Next time anyone has a pop at MoD project managers or engineering support staffs, think of that one).
The various Airworthiness Review Team (ART) reports of the 90s (Chinook, Nimrod, Puma, Wessex etc) consistently flagged the above as a major airworthiness concern; specifically citing the serious safety problems caused by non-engineers having airworthiness delegation and/or being allowed to make engineering decisions directly affecting safety. See the Sea King case cited by Chug - he is absolutely right. Engineers were over-ruled and the Critical Design Review waived. The two main safety nets torn down at a stroke.
MoD have since tried to spin these ARTs as evidence they addressed airworthiness, but this is wrong. First, they contain lots of recommendations, but few were implemented. This can be seen by the same recommendations popping up time and again, years apart. Also, if the regulations governing “continuous assessment” (of safety/airworthiness) had been implemented, such wide-ranging ARTs would not be required. It would be a “simple” case of assuring the regs were implemented. The very existence of the ARTs emphasises these serious failures. The recommendations are of startling consistency, and almost all can be mapped to contributory factors on Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King, Tornado, Hercules and more. That tragic list is the ultimate proof these recommendations were ignored. The Chief Engineer of the day has yet to explain why. Perhaps he’ll claim he was over-ruled too, but he is already on record noting his tenure being described as the “golden period” by Haddon-Cave. Fool’s gold I say.
From 1987-on the RN knew exactly what the RAF were doing. The RN formed the Aircraft Support Executive (DASE(N)), who were infamous for not supporting aircraft or making any executive decisions; largely because their previous roles had been chopped or transferred to AMSO (above) - who then chopped them. Their predecessors were required to "manage" airworthiness; ASE's terms of reference were diluted to "monitor". “We only monitor, and have noted the failures” is one of the all time classics. I was a monitor once; at school dinners.
Again, correspondence is available from this period demonstrating MoD(PE) consistently advised ASE of the impact on airworthiness and general support these AMSO policies were having. ASE's reply was "We are content to monitor progress and leave the RAF to manage". That was about the time the Sea Harrier fleet was down to one operational squadron (and a short one at that) due to AMSO suppliers deciding that key navigation / landing aid equipment was "consumable" instead of repairable; ordering that every arising (from SHAR and CVS) was to be scrapped instead of repaired. The effect was to transfer responsibility for replacement to another department (SM51) who did not have funding (and therefore didn’t replace). The original supply office (SM47) was seen to be efficient as they were spending less on repairs. (See Haddon-Cave – “savings at the expense of safety”). Not by coincidence was the 2 Star in charge of these clowns the same one who threatened civilian staffs with dismissal in December 1992 for voicing concerns about these actions. This, 3 months after CHART was published. That, better than anything else, illustrates the official RAF reaction to being told of systemic airworthiness failures.
This precise problem was cited in an inquiry into a Cat 4 SHAR. It was I who gave the evidence, direct to the BoI chairman. The pilot had complained he would have got home (after a bird strike I think) had he had the NavAid the suppliers had scrapped.
Of course, like the RAF the RN had very many who knew all this was wrong. I shall always be grateful to one particular Admiral who stepped in to support me when the non-engineers sought to discipline me for disobeying an order to ignore airworthiness regulations, and sign off on a design knowing it was functionally unsafe. But is it not extraordinary, and indicative of the scale of the problem, that a mere Admiral could only offer his support but not actually have the clout to do anything? (And his support didn’t carry any weight, because CDP ignored him and ruled I was wrong to insist on functional safety; later supported by 5 Mins(AF) and PUS). And then more died.
And finally, I notice no-one has replied to dervish’s posts. He is quite right. Lord Philip confirmed the status of the Chinook HC Mk2 Nav and Comms systems in 2nd June 1994 was Switch On Only Clearance. Another little gem that slipped through MoD and Government vetting. Switch On Only? The regs state that means you are not allowed to reply on this kit in any way whatsoever. That precludes meaningful flight in any aircraft. Why was this withheld from aircrew? THAT is the elephant Lord Philip left behind in the room. Quite deliberately I believe, as he concentrated (correctly) on the legal aspect. No wonder MoD have refused to hand over the correspondence between CA and ACAS that led to ACAS withholding this in his RTS. Forget the supposed poor legal advice to Wratten and Day – this is the key point the setting aside was intended to hide.
Sorry, my mistake, -re SHAR he would not have been the BoI chairman, but a Reviewing Officer, as he was a Captain RN. He phoned me in London and I submitted a written report. Still got it.
Last edited by tucumseh; 14th Aug 2011 at 10:30.