Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
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Tuc, i understand your point, and am aware of the MoD's shortcomings in times past. Like you, I am concerned that we get any updated regulation right first time. I am involved in that process so your comments, and the lessons learnt, are very relevant to me. As for reading H-C, my copy sits on my desk and is used on a daily basis. The perenial question about developing the new regulations is "Does this meet the intent of H-C"?
SM may be chucking rocks (in others words), I am looking to make sure the current work is informed and relevant. Its easy to look back, much harder to work to make things better.
El Colonel
SM may be chucking rocks (in others words), I am looking to make sure the current work is informed and relevant. Its easy to look back, much harder to work to make things better.
El Colonel
CC
Thank you for your considered response. I wish you well.
One of the things I try to emphasise is that MoD look to learn from mistakes, but it wise to learn from successes. That is why I find it so strange the MAA have not sought out the specialist staffs from the early 90s, who held these posts before they were disbanded and not replaced. The cynic in me thinks part of the reason is that senior staffs don't want to admit the problem goes back so far (despite it having been admitted in numerous reports).
For example, if one slavishly stuck to Haddon-Cave, the RAF would appoint a new Chief Engineer and that box would be ticked. But you have to ask why, in the years 1991-96, the Chief Engineer of the day didn't react to the systematic dismantling of the airworthiness processes. H-C implies he had the power and wherewithall to prevent it, but demonstrably he did not. I cannot claim he knew of the problems. We had no direct dealings with him as we reported through our line management, which he was not part of. I can only prove that AMSO and PE staff, to DG level (AVM in AMSO, civilian in PE) knew, but that is the point. They not only did nothing, they railed against those who tried to halt the decline. It would seem the CE (a) did not know (b) was ineffective or (c) he knew what was being reported but simply took the word of the senior staffs - those who had implemented the cutbacks to make their books balance.
This is a major problem the MAA, and MoD in general, must address. The management ethos that senior staffs are always right, despite (in this case) junior staffs with years of airworthiness delegation waving a red flag. In my experience, this goes against everything senior officers are taught. It is anathema to them to listen to someone junior and admit he may know his subject. That is why I think it a good idea to man these posts with experienced and competent older (but not necessarily senior) staffs who, to put it crudely, have nothing to lose and are immune to the bullying they'll inevitably encounter. We used to call them troubleshooters, but that concept was ditched as well.
I'm afraid if the MAA use 1998 as their baseline for retrospective action, there will still be upwards of 10 years of mistakes untouched. Better to recognise that now rather than go cap in hand to the Treasury in a few years time. And they need to make the point that much of this corrective action is not volume related. THAT was the answer the MAA DG should have given to the question on possible funding cuts. It was the mistake AMSO made 20 years ago. Don't repeat it. Assuming you have the submissions to H-C, it's all in there.
Best wishes
Thank you for your considered response. I wish you well.
One of the things I try to emphasise is that MoD look to learn from mistakes, but it wise to learn from successes. That is why I find it so strange the MAA have not sought out the specialist staffs from the early 90s, who held these posts before they were disbanded and not replaced. The cynic in me thinks part of the reason is that senior staffs don't want to admit the problem goes back so far (despite it having been admitted in numerous reports).
For example, if one slavishly stuck to Haddon-Cave, the RAF would appoint a new Chief Engineer and that box would be ticked. But you have to ask why, in the years 1991-96, the Chief Engineer of the day didn't react to the systematic dismantling of the airworthiness processes. H-C implies he had the power and wherewithall to prevent it, but demonstrably he did not. I cannot claim he knew of the problems. We had no direct dealings with him as we reported through our line management, which he was not part of. I can only prove that AMSO and PE staff, to DG level (AVM in AMSO, civilian in PE) knew, but that is the point. They not only did nothing, they railed against those who tried to halt the decline. It would seem the CE (a) did not know (b) was ineffective or (c) he knew what was being reported but simply took the word of the senior staffs - those who had implemented the cutbacks to make their books balance.
This is a major problem the MAA, and MoD in general, must address. The management ethos that senior staffs are always right, despite (in this case) junior staffs with years of airworthiness delegation waving a red flag. In my experience, this goes against everything senior officers are taught. It is anathema to them to listen to someone junior and admit he may know his subject. That is why I think it a good idea to man these posts with experienced and competent older (but not necessarily senior) staffs who, to put it crudely, have nothing to lose and are immune to the bullying they'll inevitably encounter. We used to call them troubleshooters, but that concept was ditched as well.
I'm afraid if the MAA use 1998 as their baseline for retrospective action, there will still be upwards of 10 years of mistakes untouched. Better to recognise that now rather than go cap in hand to the Treasury in a few years time. And they need to make the point that much of this corrective action is not volume related. THAT was the answer the MAA DG should have given to the question on possible funding cuts. It was the mistake AMSO made 20 years ago. Don't repeat it. Assuming you have the submissions to H-C, it's all in there.
Best wishes
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Tuc, that would be you assuming that those involved in developing the regulations have all the submissions, and are sharing them out in a joined up fashion with those who will need to implement the regulations.
On that point, you are right; we need to see more to learn more!
El Colonel
On that point, you are right; we need to see more to learn more!
El Colonel
El Colonel
Sounds like you are being severely hamstrung. It isn't as if the MAA hierarchy haven't got access to the submissions. One of the 2 Stars was seconded to the Haddon-Cave Review and must have read them.
Is there not a risk here of much wheel re-inventing? For example, on the assumption I would be ignored if I simply listed a few criticisms in my submissions, I accompanied each with verifiable evidence and proposed solutions - in fact, much of this was in the form of existing reports over the last 18 years or so. Others I have seen are the same.
At the very least, the MAA "Management Board" should have a consolidated list of H-C's recommendations and the evidence he presented to support them. It would seem wise to at least validate and varify these so they can form the basis of MAA staff tasking. After all, MoD accepted 80 of the 84 recommendations and the only slight difficulty is identifying where H-C's reasoning was flawed, lacking or too simplistic.
An alternative thought is that MoD would rather accept years of wheel redesign than reveal the true scale of the problem. A quick glance at the DE&S staff list shows a number of people of influence who will be hostile to what you are trying to achieve. It only takes one or two, as we saw in the 90s.
Best of luck.
Sounds like you are being severely hamstrung. It isn't as if the MAA hierarchy haven't got access to the submissions. One of the 2 Stars was seconded to the Haddon-Cave Review and must have read them.
Is there not a risk here of much wheel re-inventing? For example, on the assumption I would be ignored if I simply listed a few criticisms in my submissions, I accompanied each with verifiable evidence and proposed solutions - in fact, much of this was in the form of existing reports over the last 18 years or so. Others I have seen are the same.
At the very least, the MAA "Management Board" should have a consolidated list of H-C's recommendations and the evidence he presented to support them. It would seem wise to at least validate and varify these so they can form the basis of MAA staff tasking. After all, MoD accepted 80 of the 84 recommendations and the only slight difficulty is identifying where H-C's reasoning was flawed, lacking or too simplistic.
An alternative thought is that MoD would rather accept years of wheel redesign than reveal the true scale of the problem. A quick glance at the DE&S staff list shows a number of people of influence who will be hostile to what you are trying to achieve. It only takes one or two, as we saw in the 90s.
Best of luck.
Colonel Cluster, Sir, might I point out that your sign-off as "El Colonel" seems suddenly more apposite, given your observation that the MAA is not being given access to all the submissions presented to Mr Haddon-Cave for his Report.
I refer of course to the novel by Gabriel Garcia Marquez; "El Coronel No Tiene Quien Le Escriba". In English it translates as "No-one writes to the Colonel". A synopsis of the film based on the novel is here:
El Coronel No Tiene Quien Le Escriba Movie Facts and Details
Perhaps that is the point of your ID, if not it is doubly appropriate I would suggest. The answer to your plaintive plea is simply; "authority". If the MAA truly was a regulatory authority it could demand and get such information as it requires to perform its duties. It isn't, so it can't!
The answer therefore seems plain, to me at least. The MAA must separate from, and be truly independent of, the MOD. Then and only then will you be free to rebuild the provision of UK Military Airworthiness. Your "independence" is now just all smoke and mirrors, I'm afraid.
Chug
I refer of course to the novel by Gabriel Garcia Marquez; "El Coronel No Tiene Quien Le Escriba". In English it translates as "No-one writes to the Colonel". A synopsis of the film based on the novel is here:
El Coronel No Tiene Quien Le Escriba Movie Facts and Details
Perhaps that is the point of your ID, if not it is doubly appropriate I would suggest. The answer to your plaintive plea is simply; "authority". If the MAA truly was a regulatory authority it could demand and get such information as it requires to perform its duties. It isn't, so it can't!
The answer therefore seems plain, to me at least. The MAA must separate from, and be truly independent of, the MOD. Then and only then will you be free to rebuild the provision of UK Military Airworthiness. Your "independence" is now just all smoke and mirrors, I'm afraid.
Chug
Chugalug2
The MAA must separate from, and be truly independent of, the MOD. Then and only then will you be free to rebuild the provision of UK Military Airworthiness. Your "independence" is now just all smoke and mirrors, I'm afraid.
AODD, it could relocate to Timbuktu yet still not be independent as long as it remains a part of the MOD. Whatever the problems involved in it being separated from and independent of the MOD, be they financial, manning, security, etc, they are as nothing compared to the contradiction of it supposedly being a Regulatory Authority with powers to investigate and punish transgressions such as, for example, the deliberate and prolonged suborning of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations by very senior personnel at the MOD, when it is itself part of that organisation and subservient to its Secretary of State. That has already cost too many lives (62 if one reckons on those lost in airworthiness related accidents featured here in various threads, but I suspect that the true figure is greater by far) and many aircraft.
The MAA as presently constituted is that contradiction, even within itself, for it investigates the accidents of aircraft for which it regulates airworthiness. Will it find itself at fault for poor enforcement of those regulations that lead to fatal accidents? It is a turkey, and no amount of remonstration, of talk of "Chinese Walls", honour, or whatever, will change that.
Self Regulation Never Works and in Aviation it Kills!
The MAA as presently constituted is that contradiction, even within itself, for it investigates the accidents of aircraft for which it regulates airworthiness. Will it find itself at fault for poor enforcement of those regulations that lead to fatal accidents? It is a turkey, and no amount of remonstration, of talk of "Chinese Walls", honour, or whatever, will change that.
Self Regulation Never Works and in Aviation it Kills!
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Gentlemen
This letter appeared in the September 2010 issue of RAeS Aerospace Professional Monthly.
This site, detailing the work so far of we 3 Fellows may also be of interest.
http://sites.google.com/site/heathwaypilot/home
Ralph Kohn (FRAeS)
This letter appeared in the September 2010 issue of RAeS Aerospace Professional Monthly.
This site, detailing the work so far of we 3 Fellows may also be of interest.
http://sites.google.com/site/heathwaypilot/home
Ralph Kohn (FRAeS)
Last edited by Ralph Kohn; 1st Sep 2010 at 05:55. Reason: Enlarge image
Apologies if this post is in the wrong place, but what became of the discussion on the 1998 Nimrod airworthiness review Haddon-Cave mentioned? There was a Chinook one. Were there others? 2 reviews implies a problem had been detected. 6 years apart implies nothing was done about the first one.
After watching the MOD/MAA websites I am pleased to announce the release of new MAA regulations that look very much more like EASA Regs than the previous Def-Stan's (05-130) did.
MILITARY AVIATION AUTHORITY ENGINEERING REGULATION, PROCESSES AND DOCUMENTATION WEBSITE
Does this mean that things will get better quicker? - I somehow doubt it, but continue to live in hope.
MILITARY AVIATION AUTHORITY ENGINEERING REGULATION, PROCESSES AND DOCUMENTATION WEBSITE
Does this mean that things will get better quicker? - I somehow doubt it, but continue to live in hope.
Rigga, the scandal of UK Military Airworthiness Regulation has not been due to the Regulations themselves, but rather in the lack of their enforcement. In short, the regulations were suborned at the highest levels and nothing that the MAA is or announces as presently constituted can prevent that from happening again and again. That is the inherent flaw in this re-branding exercise for, unless and until the MAA and the MAAIB are completely independent of the MOD and of each other, UK Military Airworthiness remains compromised. As a result avoidable airworthiness related accidents will continue to happen and further avoidable deaths will add to the already dreadful toll of the 2 Sea Kings, the Mull Chinook, the Iraq Tornado and Hercules, the Afghanistan Nimrod that have featured in threads on this Forum.
This is a fundamental Flight Safety no brainer. The purpose of UK Military Aviation is to conduct air operations against the enemies of this country, not to be decimated in expensive and tragic avoidable accidents that bring only comfort to those enemies and never ending suffering to grieving families.
Self Regulation Does Not Work And In Aviation It Kills!
This is a fundamental Flight Safety no brainer. The purpose of UK Military Aviation is to conduct air operations against the enemies of this country, not to be decimated in expensive and tragic avoidable accidents that bring only comfort to those enemies and never ending suffering to grieving families.
Self Regulation Does Not Work And In Aviation It Kills!
If the MAR/MAA works, how is it we can still have a situation where an aircraft is cleared for 'ops only' as a certain type has been for the last week. Either the aircraft is airworthy (as I believe it is) or not - it can't be both!
an aircraft is cleared for 'ops only' as a certain type has been for the last week
Is that better or worse than the Chinook HC2 which only had Switch On clearance in June 1994? That is "non-ops" I believe. Lord Phillips called this situation "mandated".
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Either the aircraft is airworthy (as I believe it is) or not - it can't be both!
The issue with the Nimrod was not that it was flying in a war-zone in the condition it was (that may have been deemed an acceptable risk given the mission, but that the RAF "system" had knowingly allowed the aircraft to fly routinely in that condition). The checks and balances were ignored.
A similar situation exists with the life of a squaddie. In peacetime it would be unacceptable to send him on a training mission where death was likely, but in war it would be deemed an acceptable risk for the success of the overall strategy.
We must remember that Hadden-Cave did not find the system broken in the other Services, in the sense that in peacetime the "heirachy" were over-riding airworthiness decisions made at a lower level. Of course, this was also found to be the case in the way Boards of Inquiry were handled (viz Mull of Kintyre - where in the RN and Army the finding of the BoI leader would not be over-ridden by senior officers - they would have ordered a separate provost investigation).
Bismark:
I have absolutely no argument with the point you make re operational risk. It is clearly an issue which the MAA has to take account of, whether within the MOD or without. If a tactical commander orders operational use of an aircraft outside of its operating clearance, eg that an Apache be sent into the middle of a fire fight with troops clinging precariously to the airframe in order to effect a casevac, then that must be his/her prerogative. Such action of course must be subject to review later by the MAA, in a similar though graver manner as to when crew duty time limits are exceeded, but the basic issue is not in contention. What is though is that aircraft be released knowingly into service in known conflict with the military airworthiness regulations, eg Sea King HISLs, Hercules unprotected fuel tanks, Nimrod fuel systems, Tornado IFFs, Chinook FADECs, etc. It is that high level suborning of the regulations rather than the low level operating and maintenance that is the issue, and the urgent need for provision and investigation to be freed from such malevolent direction ever again.
I don't like it particularly but, in war, the commander in the field must have the final say (taking all advice of course). There have been and will be situations where normally unacceptable risk becomes acceptable risk. The problem with Chugalug's "totally independent" system is that as described it does not allow for the operational situation.
We must remember that Hadden-Cave did not find the system broken in the other Services
I thought that was the whole point of the "MAA" recommendation. The failings were not confined to Nimrod, or even the RAF, but applied across the board.
Bismark said:
"The problem with Chugalug's "totally independent" system is that as described it does not allow for the operational situation. There is a world of difference between what might be acceptable in UK/peacetime airspace, and what is required, on occasion, in a war-zone. We need an airworthiness situation/ decision making profile that can cope with this."
Actually, this situation IS catered for (and is so even in EASA regulations) but in a manner you probably have not been trained to see. There are many people trained to use this system - except for the MOD/RAF it seems!
However, to use this system properly relies upon a basic honesty and openess in the true and declared status of the Line/Forward maintenance environments by their managers.
Like any rules, regulations or laws, these new MAA regulations are only of any use if anyone bothers to follow them... Which, according to Chug's writing, is a situation that does not seem to be wilfully or enthusiasticly forthcoming.
Looking at the new format - the true mettle of the MAA will be proved in the amount of variations allowed from the AMC. If the MAA allows individual's, Stations or Squadrons to vary because they "want" to be different - the MAA will openly be seen as the Toothless Poodle we hope(d) it should not be.
"The problem with Chugalug's "totally independent" system is that as described it does not allow for the operational situation. There is a world of difference between what might be acceptable in UK/peacetime airspace, and what is required, on occasion, in a war-zone. We need an airworthiness situation/ decision making profile that can cope with this."
Actually, this situation IS catered for (and is so even in EASA regulations) but in a manner you probably have not been trained to see. There are many people trained to use this system - except for the MOD/RAF it seems!
However, to use this system properly relies upon a basic honesty and openess in the true and declared status of the Line/Forward maintenance environments by their managers.
Like any rules, regulations or laws, these new MAA regulations are only of any use if anyone bothers to follow them... Which, according to Chug's writing, is a situation that does not seem to be wilfully or enthusiasticly forthcoming.
Looking at the new format - the true mettle of the MAA will be proved in the amount of variations allowed from the AMC. If the MAA allows individual's, Stations or Squadrons to vary because they "want" to be different - the MAA will openly be seen as the Toothless Poodle we hope(d) it should not be.
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Bismarck
so a Lt Col ordering a Sgt pilot to fly outside the cleared envelope is acceptable if the circumstances dictate?
I've seen this happen wrt temp limits. Unfortunately, the commander on the ground (usually) has no understanding as to what drove the limit to be what it is. He/she will be unsighted as to what 'safety margin' was applied to the limit, what system in the ac will suffer first and what implications that will have on the ac and the mission.
I've seen captains bust a VMax in order to "save lives". Honourable and understandable perhaps.... As long as the crew understand the effects of exceeding VMax, and the ac is placed u/s on return to establish what the short or long term impact has been as a result of operating outside of the cleared envelope
I have no problems with Op commanders taking risk, however all too often we have operational leaders that don't understand risk management, let alone the risks they are taking.
There have been and will be situations where normally unacceptable risk becomes acceptable risk.
I've seen this happen wrt temp limits. Unfortunately, the commander on the ground (usually) has no understanding as to what drove the limit to be what it is. He/she will be unsighted as to what 'safety margin' was applied to the limit, what system in the ac will suffer first and what implications that will have on the ac and the mission.
I've seen captains bust a VMax in order to "save lives". Honourable and understandable perhaps.... As long as the crew understand the effects of exceeding VMax, and the ac is placed u/s on return to establish what the short or long term impact has been as a result of operating outside of the cleared envelope
I have no problems with Op commanders taking risk, however all too often we have operational leaders that don't understand risk management, let alone the risks they are taking.
Ah, the cottage industry that is "risk". How much analysis do you want the Commander to carry out, and when, and using what techniques? And how long should the system be grounded - until returned to the UK, ashore, or after the SMR has had a good look at it?
Frankly I suspect this will be used by non-operational commanders to tie the hands of those at the front line; stopping the release of not fit to fly aircraft is entirely understandable, anything else is chuff. We sign on with unlimited liability, deal with the fact you might die.
Frankly I suspect this will be used by non-operational commanders to tie the hands of those at the front line; stopping the release of not fit to fly aircraft is entirely understandable, anything else is chuff. We sign on with unlimited liability, deal with the fact you might die.
I think that we are in danger of getting bogged down here in a pointless discussion about military tactics and operational decisions by forward commanders. Whatever the rights or wrongs involved, they would be subject to investigation by the MAA and would not be affected by whether or not the MAA is independent of the MOD.
What would be changed, if the MAA were truly independent, would be the the ability of very high ranking commanders to order the release of unairworthy aircraft into service for reasons of expediency. That is not a theoretical scenario, it has happened repeatedly and has cost lives. It has rarely been revealed by subsequent BoI's, for they too are under the control of very high ranking commanders. That is why airworthiness provision and air accident investigation must be made independent of the MOD.
At the moment we are reliant on the likes of HM Coroners to shine a light into these dark recesses and to tell the RAF that "There is something wrong with your bloody aircraft!". Time that aviation professionals were free to do their job, unhindered from above, and so make such helpful advice unnecessary again.
What would be changed, if the MAA were truly independent, would be the the ability of very high ranking commanders to order the release of unairworthy aircraft into service for reasons of expediency. That is not a theoretical scenario, it has happened repeatedly and has cost lives. It has rarely been revealed by subsequent BoI's, for they too are under the control of very high ranking commanders. That is why airworthiness provision and air accident investigation must be made independent of the MOD.
At the moment we are reliant on the likes of HM Coroners to shine a light into these dark recesses and to tell the RAF that "There is something wrong with your bloody aircraft!". Time that aviation professionals were free to do their job, unhindered from above, and so make such helpful advice unnecessary again.