Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Anyone interested in this case would be well advised to read this document (this is not the simulation).
TAC
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TAC
After years of weapons trials analysis, it is my opinion that the Boeing effort is not bad based upon the available data (which is all it is); it makes sense to me and, in the absence of anything similar in the public domain done by anyone else, it is a good starting point and framework for anyone else interested in doing a better job. Why do you say it is “not very good guesswork at that”? Is there a better analysis available that I can access?
Arkroyal
I almost forgot – you wrote:
<<… The visual references for VFR flight would still have to be met …>>
Not for a helicopter in SVFR – I think you’ll find that provided they were in clear contact with the ground (the sea, in this case) they could proceed SVFR at low level with as little as ½ a mile lateral visibility – this concession because helicopters can always SLOW DOWN.
This gives helo pilots a great deal of discretion: if they are happy, their actual speed is up to them; in this case they would have known that the mist started at the shoreline and their waypoint was more than ½ a mile before it; provided that they intended to turn ½ a mile before the mist, they were not doing anything wrong under SVFR; they would not have let the SuperTANS influence their judgment of their distance off the coast (this crew in particular had misgivings about its accuracy as has been discussed at length here before); if they were keeping their eyes on the range to a DME beacon (normally very accurate) its clear, numeric readout could strongly influence their visual judgment of their distance off a grey, amorphous mass; they could see the (mist covered) landmass ahead but could have become disorientated range wise – they could have just turned away or slowed down but what does a pilot do when first disorientated? – looks at his instruments? – and if a readout says he still has ½ a mile to go, could he then have been reassured to carry on?
The point is, if the DME readout was wrong (for whatever reason) and could therefore have misled the pilots, they could not have been held negligent as they were intending to turn away from the mist at a range within SVFR guidelines.
The “Campaign” group, as an interested party, could put together a set of formal questions which could settle this once and for all – I suggest the following for starters:
Was SVFR agreed with ATC;
If so, what squawk code was assigned and what was there any special significance;
(this could explain 7760)
Was there a DME transponder at the time on the Mull that a low level helicopter on this approach could use;
What of the radar recordings that apparently existed shortly after the crash;
(the radar track could help establish that the a/c was under control or at least not deviating madly from its intended course or help with the analysis of its actions)
What explanation is there for the unanswered radio call (or lack of recording after this point) – was there definitely no other transmission heard – was not further radio dialogue expected with an a/c at low level intending to cross the approach to a main runway (Macrihanish);
Was there a special practice for this leg towards the Mull (eg by 7 Sqn);
What equipment were the US SEALS recovering – were ANY of them interviewed (if not why not).
After years of weapons trials analysis, it is my opinion that the Boeing effort is not bad based upon the available data (which is all it is); it makes sense to me and, in the absence of anything similar in the public domain done by anyone else, it is a good starting point and framework for anyone else interested in doing a better job. Why do you say it is “not very good guesswork at that”? Is there a better analysis available that I can access?
Arkroyal
I almost forgot – you wrote:
<<… The visual references for VFR flight would still have to be met …>>
Not for a helicopter in SVFR – I think you’ll find that provided they were in clear contact with the ground (the sea, in this case) they could proceed SVFR at low level with as little as ½ a mile lateral visibility – this concession because helicopters can always SLOW DOWN.
This gives helo pilots a great deal of discretion: if they are happy, their actual speed is up to them; in this case they would have known that the mist started at the shoreline and their waypoint was more than ½ a mile before it; provided that they intended to turn ½ a mile before the mist, they were not doing anything wrong under SVFR; they would not have let the SuperTANS influence their judgment of their distance off the coast (this crew in particular had misgivings about its accuracy as has been discussed at length here before); if they were keeping their eyes on the range to a DME beacon (normally very accurate) its clear, numeric readout could strongly influence their visual judgment of their distance off a grey, amorphous mass; they could see the (mist covered) landmass ahead but could have become disorientated range wise – they could have just turned away or slowed down but what does a pilot do when first disorientated? – looks at his instruments? – and if a readout says he still has ½ a mile to go, could he then have been reassured to carry on?
The point is, if the DME readout was wrong (for whatever reason) and could therefore have misled the pilots, they could not have been held negligent as they were intending to turn away from the mist at a range within SVFR guidelines.
The “Campaign” group, as an interested party, could put together a set of formal questions which could settle this once and for all – I suggest the following for starters:
Was SVFR agreed with ATC;
If so, what squawk code was assigned and what was there any special significance;
(this could explain 7760)
Was there a DME transponder at the time on the Mull that a low level helicopter on this approach could use;
What of the radar recordings that apparently existed shortly after the crash;
(the radar track could help establish that the a/c was under control or at least not deviating madly from its intended course or help with the analysis of its actions)
What explanation is there for the unanswered radio call (or lack of recording after this point) – was there definitely no other transmission heard – was not further radio dialogue expected with an a/c at low level intending to cross the approach to a main runway (Macrihanish);
Was there a special practice for this leg towards the Mull (eg by 7 Sqn);
What equipment were the US SEALS recovering – were ANY of them interviewed (if not why not).
Just a numbered other
Well said TAC. The guesswork starts from a radio call somewhere near Aldergrove's zone boundary, NOT a known point at all.
Walter
Yes, because it is nonsense. SVFR is only applcable in controlled airspace. The Mull isn't in it.
So we agree then. The use of DME to 'count down' to the mull would have been negligent.
They would not be in receipt of any ATC service, so no code would be assigned
Walter
Yet again, an intuitively obvious line is being summarily dismissed
I almost forgot – you wrote:
<<… The visual references for VFR flight would still have to be met …>>
Not for a helicopter in SVFR – I think you’ll find that provided they were in clear contact with the ground (the sea, in this case) they could proceed SVFR at low level with as little as ½ a mile lateral visibility – this concession because helicopters can always SLOW DOWN.
<<… The visual references for VFR flight would still have to be met …>>
Not for a helicopter in SVFR – I think you’ll find that provided they were in clear contact with the ground (the sea, in this case) they could proceed SVFR at low level with as little as ½ a mile lateral visibility – this concession because helicopters can always SLOW DOWN.
Was SVFR agreed with ATC;
If so, what squawk code was assigned and what was there any special significance;
(this could explain 7760)
If so, what squawk code was assigned and what was there any special significance;
(this could explain 7760)
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Arkroyal
You wrote:
<<SVFR is only applcable in controlled airspace. The Mull isn't in it.>>
I'm sorry but I am not familiar with the bounds (if any) of controlled airspace near the approach to the runway at Macrihanish and cannot argue further.
I take it that you are and that there would be no ATC interest in a low flying helicopter about to cross this?
You wrote:
<<SVFR is only applcable in controlled airspace. The Mull isn't in it.>>
I'm sorry but I am not familiar with the bounds (if any) of controlled airspace near the approach to the runway at Macrihanish and cannot argue further.
I take it that you are and that there would be no ATC interest in a low flying helicopter about to cross this?
Just a numbered other
The Machrihanish MATZ is some distance north, and would require a call to cross. A clearance to do so would be VFR. Matzs are not Controlled Airspace. In my experience, Maccrihanish ATC was very hard to contact low level in the mull area due to terrain blocking, but would not be an issue. Crossing this very quiet MATZ would not have been a problem, or necessarily given any thought prior to turning along the coast.
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But Prestwick heard the call and were surely handling the area, not Mac tower?
And approaching up the coast, the high ground to the right and the all too common mist would not have often allowed a VFR low level helo to safely see the aerodrome to its right – surely this is a classic situation for Special VFR?
The Machrihanish MATZ is immediately to the north, only minutes away, and would have had to have been considered at the time in question. Surely it would have been a sensible practice to get low flying helos on this leg to standardize their turning point and accurately estimate their ETA to cross the runway approach by having a reliable reference (purely visual could have resulted in different turning points away from the Mull depending upon the conditions resulting in inaccurate ETAs and perhaps not so square crossings) – hence the utility of a local DME beacon.
This is, I suggest, subtly different to using the DME for terrain avoidance – it was being used to get the a/c close in for a standard leg; while visual reference was the rule for safety, with the difficult scene of land whose detail was obscured, a clear numeric readout from a trusted system would have had a strong bias on their visual judgment. Had such a readout been wrong, they may have got too close to the mist before they had clear indications (eg, actually seeing the shoreline pass beneath them, entering the mist, or hearing a radar altimeter warning – all of which would have been possible at the time of their final desperate evasive turn) to effect their intended turn away in time – which is what I believe happened.
And approaching up the coast, the high ground to the right and the all too common mist would not have often allowed a VFR low level helo to safely see the aerodrome to its right – surely this is a classic situation for Special VFR?
The Machrihanish MATZ is immediately to the north, only minutes away, and would have had to have been considered at the time in question. Surely it would have been a sensible practice to get low flying helos on this leg to standardize their turning point and accurately estimate their ETA to cross the runway approach by having a reliable reference (purely visual could have resulted in different turning points away from the Mull depending upon the conditions resulting in inaccurate ETAs and perhaps not so square crossings) – hence the utility of a local DME beacon.
This is, I suggest, subtly different to using the DME for terrain avoidance – it was being used to get the a/c close in for a standard leg; while visual reference was the rule for safety, with the difficult scene of land whose detail was obscured, a clear numeric readout from a trusted system would have had a strong bias on their visual judgment. Had such a readout been wrong, they may have got too close to the mist before they had clear indications (eg, actually seeing the shoreline pass beneath them, entering the mist, or hearing a radar altimeter warning – all of which would have been possible at the time of their final desperate evasive turn) to effect their intended turn away in time – which is what I believe happened.
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The proximity to Machrihanish airfield is a pure red herring to any hypothesis. Looking at the map, logic dictates that the likely track from the intended Mull turning point (which would probably have been short of the coast) would have been northerly or slightly west of north. This would have had the aircraft flying more than 5nm west of the airfield, which would have put it outside the MATZ, be it civilian (2nm radius) or military (5nm radius) - I cannot remember if the full military MATZ had been de-activated at that time. The crew would have no need to call the tower, since below 500ft, low level, there would have been no conflict with aircraft in the circuit or on the aproach to the easterly runway (even if it was in use at the time). Low level, by definition, is to avoid active airfields; there is no requirement to call local airfields (except where airmanship dictates, eg a very busy site - which Machrihanish wasn't).
Even if the intention was to call the tower, there would have been ample time to dial up the frequncy and call, once the terrain masking had cleared AFTER the turning point.
You are wasting your time arguing the case for or against whether or not the crew could SEE the coast, or flew into IMC - we will never know. The conditions reported by ground eye witnesses as to visibility are also meaningless - the visibility to the crew could easily have been vastly different (observers looking in/out of sun, local effect of hill fog, and so on).
None of your arguments detract from the contention that because we don't have crew statements or other definitive evidence, you cannot prove negligence beyond reasonable doubt.
Even if the intention was to call the tower, there would have been ample time to dial up the frequncy and call, once the terrain masking had cleared AFTER the turning point.
You are wasting your time arguing the case for or against whether or not the crew could SEE the coast, or flew into IMC - we will never know. The conditions reported by ground eye witnesses as to visibility are also meaningless - the visibility to the crew could easily have been vastly different (observers looking in/out of sun, local effect of hill fog, and so on).
None of your arguments detract from the contention that because we don't have crew statements or other definitive evidence, you cannot prove negligence beyond reasonable doubt.
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..........let alone (to add to the above post), beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Walter
SVFR may be dismissed because they weren't using it. I get the impression that you think that military aircraft have to be under someone's command and control at all times. This is true in the sense of someone having control over the resource (aircraft and crew) and what it does on a particular day, but this does not extend to control of the resource once it has been despatched to carry out its task. Mil aircraft (rotary and fixed-wing) spend a lot of their time flying around without need to speak to any ATC unit and, to address your point about Machrahanish, they would have no requirement to speak to their ATC unless planning to enter the MATZ. Normally, though, a courtesy call is made to let ATC know that one is about to fly close to their MATZ (so they don't worry too much if they see a 'blip' approaching on their radar or if they visually see a Chinook apparently heading towards them. Unanswered calls are not uncommon when stooging around at low level.
Incidentally, the most common use of SVFR that I can think of is when the weather at an airfield isn't considered good enough for VFR approaches, particularly, for example, for fast-jet tactical formations. A departing pilot intending to transit VFR once outside the localised bad weather may request a SVFR departure, meaning that he'll be liaising closely with ATC but, effectively, maintaining his own separation from the ground.
Walter
SVFR may be dismissed because they weren't using it. I get the impression that you think that military aircraft have to be under someone's command and control at all times. This is true in the sense of someone having control over the resource (aircraft and crew) and what it does on a particular day, but this does not extend to control of the resource once it has been despatched to carry out its task. Mil aircraft (rotary and fixed-wing) spend a lot of their time flying around without need to speak to any ATC unit and, to address your point about Machrahanish, they would have no requirement to speak to their ATC unless planning to enter the MATZ. Normally, though, a courtesy call is made to let ATC know that one is about to fly close to their MATZ (so they don't worry too much if they see a 'blip' approaching on their radar or if they visually see a Chinook apparently heading towards them. Unanswered calls are not uncommon when stooging around at low level.
Incidentally, the most common use of SVFR that I can think of is when the weather at an airfield isn't considered good enough for VFR approaches, particularly, for example, for fast-jet tactical formations. A departing pilot intending to transit VFR once outside the localised bad weather may request a SVFR departure, meaning that he'll be liaising closely with ATC but, effectively, maintaining his own separation from the ground.
Special VFR is only relevant to aircraft in Class A, D or E airspace which are either unable to comply with IFR or do not wish to. An example would be transit of the London TMA (permanently IFR) in 'visual' condtions by an a/c of less than 5700 kg. Or flight at night in Class D airspace (all night flight in the UK is under IFR even in VMC) by a pilot whose licence privileges do not include flight in circumstances where flight under IFR in Regulated Airspace is mandatory.
Under no stretch of the imagination is SVFR flight applicable to the flight of this Chinook near the Mull, even Machrihanish MATZ and ATZ are only Class G airspace and clearance to transit such airspace requires compliance only with the normal VFR/IFR weather limitations for Class G airsapce.
Walter, this is another red herring, as is the idea of little green men planting spoof beacons around the Mull....
The basic point is that there is no clear and obvious proof of what happened which is beyond any reasonable doubt whatever. For that basic reason, Wratten and Day's verdict is fundamentally flawed.
My own opinion is that, had the pair of them reached any other verdict, MoD would have been involved in several very expensive compensation claims running to several millions - hence they blamed the pilots.
Under no stretch of the imagination is SVFR flight applicable to the flight of this Chinook near the Mull, even Machrihanish MATZ and ATZ are only Class G airspace and clearance to transit such airspace requires compliance only with the normal VFR/IFR weather limitations for Class G airsapce.
Walter, this is another red herring, as is the idea of little green men planting spoof beacons around the Mull....
The basic point is that there is no clear and obvious proof of what happened which is beyond any reasonable doubt whatever. For that basic reason, Wratten and Day's verdict is fundamentally flawed.
My own opinion is that, had the pair of them reached any other verdict, MoD would have been involved in several very expensive compensation claims running to several millions - hence they blamed the pilots.
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Exercising the idea of SVFR was intended to break the mindset of strictly VFR or IMC which was used to stump any discussion about any special arrangements that could have been made to get around the problem of getting in close to the shoreline in those common weather conditions local to the Mull which otherwise spoiled a straightforward VFR flight at low level. SVFR is an example of just such a compromise/special arrangement.
FJJP says <<…The conditions reported by ground eye witnesses as to visibility are also meaningless…>> - I agree; I believe that the conditions were prevalent in that area – clear at sea up to the shoreline but the land covered in ground hugging mist that obscured ground detail making visual judgment of distance off difficult.
And <<None of your arguments detract from the contention that because we don't have crew statements or other definitive evidence, you cannot prove negligence beyond reasonable doubt.>> I have been trying to get to the truth by making the most use of available data as opposed to dismissing everything; an example is the reports of the radar track recording which not only have been omitted from consideration but have actually been denied having existed. I have never ever thought that this crew was negligent – betrayed, yes, but negligent, no.
And <<Looking at the map, logic dictates that the likely track from the intended Mull turning point (which would probably have been short of the coast) would have been northerly or slightly west of north. This would have had the aircraft flying more than 5nm west of the airfield, which would have put it outside the MATZ>> According to one of the lighthouse keepers and my own observation on one occasion (in identical weather conditions) helicopters on this leg turned so as to be right over the shoreline and followed the shoreline up some way – this may have resulted in crossing a bit closer in.
In the book “Phoenix…” by Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix page 367/8 we have the reported testimony of a Wing Commander <<It was his opinion that the crew had been attempting to fly around the Mull coast. Flight Lieutenant Tapper’s unanswered call to the Scottish Military at Prestwick about 5 minutes before the crash could have been the first contact to prepare for the WP change which would have necessitated the craft flying through a military air zone. Approach and tower frequencies at Macrihanish had been noted on the maps the pilots had prepared, showing they intend (sic) to fly through military airspace.>>.
I have also come across transcripts of radio traffic between ATC and low level US military helicopters making low level approaches to Macrihanish recorded by AMATEURS …
Beagle says <<… this is another red herring, as is the idea of little green men planting spoof beacons around the Mull...>> The little green men were US SEALs, equipped with communication sets that could be used as DME transponders; they were all over the crash site and said they were recovering their equipment – only one would have been used of course (perhaps they had trouble finding the hand held size device?). If the powers that be had decided to remove this team as an obstacle to the peace process (heaven forbid!) then these personnel would have been the logical choice. At the very least, they should have been formally questioned as to their activity – as should anyone with a possible motive found present at any possible crime scene.
Anyway, at this stage you are correct – we are a million miles from establishing whether a DME beacon was used or not, let alone how it could have been altered to give an incorrect reading. The trail is well cold for identifying the perpetrators.
FJJP says <<…The conditions reported by ground eye witnesses as to visibility are also meaningless…>> - I agree; I believe that the conditions were prevalent in that area – clear at sea up to the shoreline but the land covered in ground hugging mist that obscured ground detail making visual judgment of distance off difficult.
And <<None of your arguments detract from the contention that because we don't have crew statements or other definitive evidence, you cannot prove negligence beyond reasonable doubt.>> I have been trying to get to the truth by making the most use of available data as opposed to dismissing everything; an example is the reports of the radar track recording which not only have been omitted from consideration but have actually been denied having existed. I have never ever thought that this crew was negligent – betrayed, yes, but negligent, no.
And <<Looking at the map, logic dictates that the likely track from the intended Mull turning point (which would probably have been short of the coast) would have been northerly or slightly west of north. This would have had the aircraft flying more than 5nm west of the airfield, which would have put it outside the MATZ>> According to one of the lighthouse keepers and my own observation on one occasion (in identical weather conditions) helicopters on this leg turned so as to be right over the shoreline and followed the shoreline up some way – this may have resulted in crossing a bit closer in.
In the book “Phoenix…” by Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix page 367/8 we have the reported testimony of a Wing Commander <<It was his opinion that the crew had been attempting to fly around the Mull coast. Flight Lieutenant Tapper’s unanswered call to the Scottish Military at Prestwick about 5 minutes before the crash could have been the first contact to prepare for the WP change which would have necessitated the craft flying through a military air zone. Approach and tower frequencies at Macrihanish had been noted on the maps the pilots had prepared, showing they intend (sic) to fly through military airspace.>>.
I have also come across transcripts of radio traffic between ATC and low level US military helicopters making low level approaches to Macrihanish recorded by AMATEURS …
Beagle says <<… this is another red herring, as is the idea of little green men planting spoof beacons around the Mull...>> The little green men were US SEALs, equipped with communication sets that could be used as DME transponders; they were all over the crash site and said they were recovering their equipment – only one would have been used of course (perhaps they had trouble finding the hand held size device?). If the powers that be had decided to remove this team as an obstacle to the peace process (heaven forbid!) then these personnel would have been the logical choice. At the very least, they should have been formally questioned as to their activity – as should anyone with a possible motive found present at any possible crime scene.
Anyway, at this stage you are correct – we are a million miles from establishing whether a DME beacon was used or not, let alone how it could have been altered to give an incorrect reading. The trail is well cold for identifying the perpetrators.
Heavens above, SVFR? Ladies and Gents, what does that have to do with things? VFR, SVFR or IFR, it matters not. I’ll not even address such things as "rogue DMEs".
Quite simply, no matter what the weather conditions are, or what Flight Rules are being adhered to, (or anything else for that matter) it is the responsibility of the Commander of an aircraft to ensure its’ safety. The good old ANO summarises it quite well "An aircraft registered in the United Kingdom shall carry a flight crew adequate in number and description to ensure the safety of the aircraft...." Period. I don't have access to the wording of the JSP with me tonight but the sentiments are the same.
Regrettably, the aircraft in question did, most tragically, crash. However, we must return to the basic legal argument, i.e. did the AVMs have evidence which proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the two pilots were negligent? No-one has unearthed such proof. In fact, several learned bodies have decided that such proof does not exist. Even the original BOI decided that such evidence could not be found.
What we have here are two Senior Military Gents (now rtd) who decided for some reason, a reason that they have never been able to adequately articulate, to overturn the findings of the BOI. Did they just wish to make an “example” of the pilots? I hope not – for, if that were their intention, what a despicable way to do such a thing. In addition, we have a Government and MoD who have now found themselves backed into a corner and cannot quite work out how to extract themselves from said darkened recess. A pretty pickle all told – one befitting of a special episode of “Yes Minister” were it not so sad.
Alas, all the hither-to mentioned players; the SMGs (rtd), Govt and MoD, need do is admit that they made an error in attributing blame. We can then all go home. Instead, the buffoonery of the General epitomised by the comic genius Kenny Everett, alas also sadly departed, springs to mind when I picture the two SMGs (rtd) – apart from the fact that Kenny’s’ General clearly had a better grasp on reality! Or we have the two old men from the Muppets - I leave you to select the analogy you prefer! And please don’t start me on your “average” Politician. Thankfully, there are many enlightened Politicians who support common sense and our cause but, alas, the supply of Oxygen as one approaches the heady heights of the Cabinet clearly affects the brain. Gents, we trust you can help remedy this extreme case of hypoxia.
This whole affair surpasses the tragic deaths of those on board, whose families and friends will never again see those who perished on that fateful day. Onto that pain and grief, a complete farce has been heaped! The AVMs got it wrong on two counts; they could provide no additional evidence to remove the “doubt” in the original finding of the BOI. Eminent legal persons have decided that. Even worse, they forgot that, should they have wished to make a point to all those in the Military flying community, a stern reminder issued by appropriate Military channels would have clearly got their concerns across to their target audience and retained/enhanced their personal credibility. Instead they are now being linked to a certain General of dubious “theatrical” sanity! Mmmmm, good effort chaps.
When will all this end………
Quite simply, no matter what the weather conditions are, or what Flight Rules are being adhered to, (or anything else for that matter) it is the responsibility of the Commander of an aircraft to ensure its’ safety. The good old ANO summarises it quite well "An aircraft registered in the United Kingdom shall carry a flight crew adequate in number and description to ensure the safety of the aircraft...." Period. I don't have access to the wording of the JSP with me tonight but the sentiments are the same.
Regrettably, the aircraft in question did, most tragically, crash. However, we must return to the basic legal argument, i.e. did the AVMs have evidence which proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the two pilots were negligent? No-one has unearthed such proof. In fact, several learned bodies have decided that such proof does not exist. Even the original BOI decided that such evidence could not be found.
What we have here are two Senior Military Gents (now rtd) who decided for some reason, a reason that they have never been able to adequately articulate, to overturn the findings of the BOI. Did they just wish to make an “example” of the pilots? I hope not – for, if that were their intention, what a despicable way to do such a thing. In addition, we have a Government and MoD who have now found themselves backed into a corner and cannot quite work out how to extract themselves from said darkened recess. A pretty pickle all told – one befitting of a special episode of “Yes Minister” were it not so sad.
Alas, all the hither-to mentioned players; the SMGs (rtd), Govt and MoD, need do is admit that they made an error in attributing blame. We can then all go home. Instead, the buffoonery of the General epitomised by the comic genius Kenny Everett, alas also sadly departed, springs to mind when I picture the two SMGs (rtd) – apart from the fact that Kenny’s’ General clearly had a better grasp on reality! Or we have the two old men from the Muppets - I leave you to select the analogy you prefer! And please don’t start me on your “average” Politician. Thankfully, there are many enlightened Politicians who support common sense and our cause but, alas, the supply of Oxygen as one approaches the heady heights of the Cabinet clearly affects the brain. Gents, we trust you can help remedy this extreme case of hypoxia.
This whole affair surpasses the tragic deaths of those on board, whose families and friends will never again see those who perished on that fateful day. Onto that pain and grief, a complete farce has been heaped! The AVMs got it wrong on two counts; they could provide no additional evidence to remove the “doubt” in the original finding of the BOI. Eminent legal persons have decided that. Even worse, they forgot that, should they have wished to make a point to all those in the Military flying community, a stern reminder issued by appropriate Military channels would have clearly got their concerns across to their target audience and retained/enhanced their personal credibility. Instead they are now being linked to a certain General of dubious “theatrical” sanity! Mmmmm, good effort chaps.
When will all this end………
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I think that most of us are bemused as to why they chose to find these guys "grossly negligent" and equally bemused as to why the MoD can't now turn round and own up to a mistake having been made.
I know it seems unlikely that the AM's wanted to make an example of these guys, despite there being no evidence, but you might be interested to know that AM Wratten wrote to his Group Commanders early in 1995, saying (and I quote the letter in front of me verbatim)........
"DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
1. You will know that, since taking up my appointment as Air Officer Commanding in Chief, I have been particularly concerned about aircraft accidents brought about by carelessness or indiscipline. By definition, such accidents are avoidable and I have made my views known on a number of occasions. In particular, I addressed the subject in the foreword to the Stike Command Flight Safety Review, published last October, and I spoke about it at my first Group Commanders' Conference in November and again in the presence of Group, Station and Squadron Commanders at the Waddington Air Power Symposium. You will remember that I also touched on the subject during my address to the Air Rank Officers' Conference in December. Nobody involved in the conduct or supervision of flying operations in Strike Command should therefore be in any doubt as to my stance on this issue which is, simply, that I will not tolerate shortcomings of concentration or personal discipline in aircrew.
2. It follows that I wish to put this policy into practical effect by ensuring that formal disciplinary action is taken whenever, following Board of Inquiry or Unit Inquiry investigations, clear evidence emerges of unmitigated indiscipline or negligence. The increasing incidence of such cases suggests that past practice, which has been to shun the disciplinary approach (even in some quite serious cases) is no longer appropriate to the high standards the Royal Air Force is entitled to expect from its aircrew, although of course an interview with the AOC remains available in cases of minor negligence, or where there is judged to be considerable mitigation. Formal disciplinary action has always been an option open to us and we should not steer away from it when it is clearly appropriate.
3. To give effect to this policy and in order to ensure consistency throughout the Command, aircrew who are involved in a flying accident are not to be cleared to resume flying duties until sufficient evidence has emerged to indicate whether or not there are possible issues of serious negligence, indiscipline or incompetence to address. Once that position is reached, which in most cases should only be a week or two into the inquiry, I wish you to refer the decision on resumption of flying to me, with your recommendation. In this respect I do not anticipate that all aircrew who are warned under QR 1269 will necessarily be grounded. Equally, a decision to ground would not necessarily imply that disciplinary action will follow. But I would hope and expect that a grounding decision would capture all those aircrew against whom subsequent disciplinary action, or action under QR 1021, proved necessary for reasons of carelessness, indiscipline or incompetence. However, a decision to allow an individual to resume flying would not necessarily preclude disciplinary or administrative action being taken subsequently.
4. In such cases of serious human failing, when it comes to forming your recommendations for disposal, I would wish you to consult with AOA and with DLS(RAF) and, if they advise that there is a prima facie case to answer, to prepare either a formal charge for disposal by the Appropriate Superior Authority or, in the most serious cases, disposal by Court Martial. This will also ensure consistent treatment across the Command. No action should of course be taken on your recommendation until endorsed by me in the usual way.
5. In summary, aircrew and their supervisors should be in no doubt that honest professional endeavour will never bring censure - and will indeed attract my strong support - even when in trying circumstances mistakes are made, as they surely will be. On the other hand, I wish you also to convey, once again, the clear message through the command chain that unmitigated carelessness or indiscipline will not be tolerated and will be met with formal proceedings. This will of course in no way undermine the certainty for those affected of a fair and unbiased hearing with all the safeguards entailed in the legal process.
6. I am content for this letter to be copied verbatim to Station Commanders."
The letter is signed by W. J. Wratten, AOCINC, STC
This letter was written AFTER the Chinook accident, but BEFORE the AMs' decision to find Tapper & Cook grossly negligent was published. I feel sure that AM Day's stance will have been affected by his master's (Wratten's) words, indeed I'd be very surprised if the 2 of them didn't discuss the case before Day made his initial judgement or that he (Day) might find it beneficial (to himself) to adopt the same stance. The words in the letter speak volumes. He (Wratten) has ignored his own promise to support "honest professional endeavour" in favour of finding these fine young officers negligent, despite having no evidence for such a finding. My contempt knows no bounds.
I know it seems unlikely that the AM's wanted to make an example of these guys, despite there being no evidence, but you might be interested to know that AM Wratten wrote to his Group Commanders early in 1995, saying (and I quote the letter in front of me verbatim)........
"DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
1. You will know that, since taking up my appointment as Air Officer Commanding in Chief, I have been particularly concerned about aircraft accidents brought about by carelessness or indiscipline. By definition, such accidents are avoidable and I have made my views known on a number of occasions. In particular, I addressed the subject in the foreword to the Stike Command Flight Safety Review, published last October, and I spoke about it at my first Group Commanders' Conference in November and again in the presence of Group, Station and Squadron Commanders at the Waddington Air Power Symposium. You will remember that I also touched on the subject during my address to the Air Rank Officers' Conference in December. Nobody involved in the conduct or supervision of flying operations in Strike Command should therefore be in any doubt as to my stance on this issue which is, simply, that I will not tolerate shortcomings of concentration or personal discipline in aircrew.
2. It follows that I wish to put this policy into practical effect by ensuring that formal disciplinary action is taken whenever, following Board of Inquiry or Unit Inquiry investigations, clear evidence emerges of unmitigated indiscipline or negligence. The increasing incidence of such cases suggests that past practice, which has been to shun the disciplinary approach (even in some quite serious cases) is no longer appropriate to the high standards the Royal Air Force is entitled to expect from its aircrew, although of course an interview with the AOC remains available in cases of minor negligence, or where there is judged to be considerable mitigation. Formal disciplinary action has always been an option open to us and we should not steer away from it when it is clearly appropriate.
3. To give effect to this policy and in order to ensure consistency throughout the Command, aircrew who are involved in a flying accident are not to be cleared to resume flying duties until sufficient evidence has emerged to indicate whether or not there are possible issues of serious negligence, indiscipline or incompetence to address. Once that position is reached, which in most cases should only be a week or two into the inquiry, I wish you to refer the decision on resumption of flying to me, with your recommendation. In this respect I do not anticipate that all aircrew who are warned under QR 1269 will necessarily be grounded. Equally, a decision to ground would not necessarily imply that disciplinary action will follow. But I would hope and expect that a grounding decision would capture all those aircrew against whom subsequent disciplinary action, or action under QR 1021, proved necessary for reasons of carelessness, indiscipline or incompetence. However, a decision to allow an individual to resume flying would not necessarily preclude disciplinary or administrative action being taken subsequently.
4. In such cases of serious human failing, when it comes to forming your recommendations for disposal, I would wish you to consult with AOA and with DLS(RAF) and, if they advise that there is a prima facie case to answer, to prepare either a formal charge for disposal by the Appropriate Superior Authority or, in the most serious cases, disposal by Court Martial. This will also ensure consistent treatment across the Command. No action should of course be taken on your recommendation until endorsed by me in the usual way.
5. In summary, aircrew and their supervisors should be in no doubt that honest professional endeavour will never bring censure - and will indeed attract my strong support - even when in trying circumstances mistakes are made, as they surely will be. On the other hand, I wish you also to convey, once again, the clear message through the command chain that unmitigated carelessness or indiscipline will not be tolerated and will be met with formal proceedings. This will of course in no way undermine the certainty for those affected of a fair and unbiased hearing with all the safeguards entailed in the legal process.
6. I am content for this letter to be copied verbatim to Station Commanders."
The letter is signed by W. J. Wratten, AOCINC, STC
This letter was written AFTER the Chinook accident, but BEFORE the AMs' decision to find Tapper & Cook grossly negligent was published. I feel sure that AM Day's stance will have been affected by his master's (Wratten's) words, indeed I'd be very surprised if the 2 of them didn't discuss the case before Day made his initial judgement or that he (Day) might find it beneficial (to himself) to adopt the same stance. The words in the letter speak volumes. He (Wratten) has ignored his own promise to support "honest professional endeavour" in favour of finding these fine young officers negligent, despite having no evidence for such a finding. My contempt knows no bounds.
Which only goes to prove that, apart from being a total $hit, Ba$tard Bill held extreme views which made his part in any formal proceedings totally unsafe.
Even more reason for this injustice to be overturned.
Even more reason for this injustice to be overturned.
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sangiovese.
I made sure that the House of Lords' Select Committee had sight of it during their deliberations, but it has not, to the best of my knowledge, been published openly before. And yes, the words I have posted are exactly as they appear in his letter (barring the odd possible typo on my part).
I had heard that an attempt was made to have all copies of this letter destroyed - if anyone can corroborate this, please let us know!
I made sure that the House of Lords' Select Committee had sight of it during their deliberations, but it has not, to the best of my knowledge, been published openly before. And yes, the words I have posted are exactly as they appear in his letter (barring the odd possible typo on my part).
I had heard that an attempt was made to have all copies of this letter destroyed - if anyone can corroborate this, please let us know!
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Sangiovese,
the report was noted by the House of Lords Select Committee. On 28 September 2001, Lord Brennan raised this very issue with Mr Wratten. Lord Brennan asked, "With that in mind, the paper you issued (I think it was early in 1995, as best our researches can establish) headed "Disciplinary Proceedings in Aircraft Accidents ", appears to have followed the Chinook disaster. Was it provoked by it? - provoked by experience, but particularly provoked by this disaster?
A lengthy reply is then given by Mr Wratten (although I can't work out whether it is a 'yes' or 'no' reply). For the full transcript, please go to the link on the campaign web site.
Therefore, Ark, it can't be classed as 'new evidence'. However, Wratten may have painted himself into the proverbial corner by issuing this directive prior to the findings of the BoI.
I mean, how could he not find the pilots guilty of a disciplinary matter, having issued such a directive only one month earlier.
30 Jan 1995 - BoI formally completed.
16 Feb 1995 - Directive from ACM Wratten
02 Mar 1995 - BoI comments from Gp Capt Wedge (OC Aldergrove)
03 Mar 1995 - BoI comments from Gp Capt Crawford (OC Odiham)
20 Mar 1995 - Reviewing Officer's comments from AVM Day - Negligence appears for the first time.
03 Apr 1995 - Reviewing Officer's comments from ACM Wratten - Negligence endorsed.
The Reviewing Officer's comments follow that directive just 32 days later and (although I have no evidence) the directive was presumably drafted at the same time that Mr Wratten was being kept updated about the Chinook crash investigation.
There's nothing like decisive leadership eh!
More updates as and when.
Thank you to everyone for your continued support.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
the report was noted by the House of Lords Select Committee. On 28 September 2001, Lord Brennan raised this very issue with Mr Wratten. Lord Brennan asked, "With that in mind, the paper you issued (I think it was early in 1995, as best our researches can establish) headed "Disciplinary Proceedings in Aircraft Accidents ", appears to have followed the Chinook disaster. Was it provoked by it? - provoked by experience, but particularly provoked by this disaster?
A lengthy reply is then given by Mr Wratten (although I can't work out whether it is a 'yes' or 'no' reply). For the full transcript, please go to the link on the campaign web site.
Therefore, Ark, it can't be classed as 'new evidence'. However, Wratten may have painted himself into the proverbial corner by issuing this directive prior to the findings of the BoI.
I mean, how could he not find the pilots guilty of a disciplinary matter, having issued such a directive only one month earlier.
30 Jan 1995 - BoI formally completed.
16 Feb 1995 - Directive from ACM Wratten
02 Mar 1995 - BoI comments from Gp Capt Wedge (OC Aldergrove)
03 Mar 1995 - BoI comments from Gp Capt Crawford (OC Odiham)
20 Mar 1995 - Reviewing Officer's comments from AVM Day - Negligence appears for the first time.
03 Apr 1995 - Reviewing Officer's comments from ACM Wratten - Negligence endorsed.
The Reviewing Officer's comments follow that directive just 32 days later and (although I have no evidence) the directive was presumably drafted at the same time that Mr Wratten was being kept updated about the Chinook crash investigation.
There's nothing like decisive leadership eh!
More updates as and when.
Thank you to everyone for your continued support.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook