Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[10W]

Unlike Wratten and Day, it is important that everyone should stick to the facts. Theories are fine for what they are ..... but they are all just theories with no back up (and in some cases incredulous claims worthy of a good fiction thriller).

This brings us back to the prime thrust of this thread. It cannot be proven that the crew were negligent, therefore the judgement must be set aside. Simple.

Walter Kennedy

Well Belfast was – they were tracking it initially and in communication with it until 10mins before crash – I wonder what squawk code they saw? And I mean, what did they actually see – not what could have been selected/should have been selected/ etc etc..

There are two ATC units providing ATC services in the Belfast area ... Belfast Aldergrove (operated by NATS) and Belfast City (operated by that airport, althought it was called Belfast Harbour at the time I believe). As you have been told before by others, neither had SSR. So how can either of them have seen and tracked a code ??

Aldergrove got SSR from Scottish Area Control Centre piped in only in late 1995, getting their own standalone system only in the last couple of years. Belfast City/Harbour do not have access to SSR, either their own or anyone elses.

Your point above falls because of these simple facts.

Circa 1st week July 1994 (reference detail lost - Author Owen Bowcott) – article titled “Radar recording ‘shows helicopter hit hillside due to navigation error’”
“Recordings of military radar tracking the RAF helicopter which crashed on the Mull of Kintyre last month show it flew straight into the hillside without altering course, writes Owen Bowcott.
“The flight path, revealed by air traffic control sources yesterday, reinforces suspicions that the accident was caused by a navigational error.
“… A controller who had seen the recordings, and requested his identity not be revealed, said: ‘The Chinook looks like it went more or less straight into the hillside. There was no distress signal. It all points toward some sort of navigational error. The pilot must have misjudged his position. He only needed to be half a mile to one side.’”

At the time of the accident, I was working in Operations and we regularly facilitated impounding copies of radar data for accident or incident investigation. We would also make videos for use in the same (much easier than bringing people here to view the replay on a console). No surprise then that we did the same for this accident, working alongside our RAF ATC colleagues. Quite simply, the radar does not show the aircraft all the way to the accident site. The laws of physics see to that, namely terrain shielding and the line of sight coverage formula. Again as has been stated, the radars available to Scottish ACC are not anywhere near the crash site. The nearest one is 70 Nautical Miles away !!

Similarly, neither of the Belfast radars (primary only) would be much better as they are around 40NM from the crash site and have high ground blocking their line of sight. I also don't believe there was any requirement for them to be recorded at the time of the accident and I am not aware of any recordings from them being available to any inquiry.

If the data showing the flight right up to the impact point existed, then don't you think more light would have been made at it in the BoI, or the Fatal Accident Inquiry ?? Perhaps even with graphics released to the press to show what exactly happened.

The aircraft did appear on radar for a portion of its flight, however, any statement that the aircraft flew straight in to the hillside is simply an interpolation. A logical one, but not one which is irrefutable fact and that is what this 'negligence' charge must be based on.

I cannot remember what code the aircraft was showing on the recordings, but as I don't remember anything about it then obviously nothing unusual registered with me at the time.

antenna

On this matter the authorities at Prestwick (who we should remember failed - even though they received it - to respond to Jon Tapper's introductory radio call as he was over the Irish Sea in transit)

I think 'failed' is far too strong. There are well documented concerns from ATC staff that on listening to replays of radio or telephone conversations, things are always much clearer than they hear on the console. The recording is made direct from source, whereas what the controller hears goes through several pieces of kit, not least being the headset, and each can add a little degradation to the received signal. Add in other working environment stuff such as the number of frequencies the controller was monitoring at the time, the possibility of already listening to other radio calls or carrying out co-ordination on the telephone, perhaps having the radio on speaker instead of through the headset, ambient noise in the Ops Room, and maybe even not having the frequency selected (in error of course), then it can be said factually that not every call is picked up first time. I am sure the pilots amongst us have heard a controller calling to say 'Station calling say again' when the controller has missed a call or thought they heard something but couldn't make it out.

Walter Kennedy

Unanswered radio call: on its own this anomaly on the calls could be regarded as insignificant (as regulars on this thread have insisted – I disagree) but together with a confused picture of the available radar track one has to wonder what is going on - perhaps there was more dialogue but the recordings were mislaid! Either it’s a circus or the powers that be are covering their embarrassment.

The recordings are made and held by a civilan agency and then provided to the MoD. Are you seriously suggesting that I, and my colleagues of the day, ran a circus or acquiesced to pressure from men in black suits and dark glasses to hide things or lose them ??

And I know we've been round the following buoy before with others replies but just to make it crystal clear ...

SVFR
The crew were OK to use DME near the Mull if so agreed in Special VFR.
This flight was a classic for SVFR: because of the icing limitation, IMC was not on and the difficult part (for VFR) was localized (at the Mull) – conditions so prevalent that a routine SVFR practice would have been expected.
Special VFR is a concession granted by ATC not to go IMC in a planned VFR flight where VFR conditions cannot be met for the whole flight but, with suitable arrangements by ATC and the pilot, the pilot wishes to proceed VFR (very common for helicopters who do not wish to fly IMC in cloud).

SVFR can only be granted in the UK in Controlled Airspace. There also appears to be a lot of mixing of IFR, VFR, IMC and VMC in this thread. The former two are a set of Rules which must be obeyed depending on the flight, the latter two are flight conditions (vis and cloud) and not rules. VFR does require the pilot to comply with VMC, but these rules are not particularly onerous for helicopters. For this flight all the pilot had to do to comply with VMC is remain clear of cloud, in sight of the surface, and fly at a reasonable speed for the actual visibility. Ergo he would remain compliant with VFR.

I believe that in an SVFR flight, use of a local beacon would have been allowed if agreed with ATC; however, ATC would probably have monitored progress in the area of concern (yes, I have found a credible reference to the aircraft track on military radar right up to the point of impact) and would probably have allocated an appropriate squawk code to identify the SVFR aircraft and remind them of what it was doing nav wise in that area (the possible origin of 7760 on ZD576’s IFF).

I disagree with your sources credibility. Unless he can specify which military radar saw this event.

If anyone was providing a separation service in the vicinity of the crash site, then it would be more logical for it to have been Macrihanish Approach. I am not sure if they still had radar at the time of the crash, but if they did then it was primary only and no SSR capability existed, nor were discrete SSR codes issued.

Further, an air traffic controller reported that it just went straight (and he specifically stated that he had seen the RECORDINGS).

So have I. See above.

That there is said to be no radar recording and it was not referred to in the inquiries is interesting as it certainly did exist immediately after the crash; together with the radio call anomaly (either the last call unanswered or the recordings after that point no longer available) this rather suggests censorship of some kind for whatever reason.

'There is said' .... by whom ?? Recordings are legal records and after an accident can be played once only before they are impounded and kept under lock and key. It takes a few layers of management approval to then get any further access, including approval from the accident investigation authorities. The recordings are probably not referred to in any inquiry because they add nothing except prove the aircraft was flying a good few minutes before the crash. Wherever the info you post comes from should know all that of course

<< VFR flight would still have to be met …>>
Not for a helicopter in SVFR – I think you’ll find that provided they were in clear contact with the ground (the sea, in this case) they could proceed SVFR at low level with as little as ½ a mile lateral visibility – this concession because helicopters can always SLOW DOWN.

See above, in the UK you can do this under VFR. We don't set a minimum visibility figure of 1/2 mile though, it is left to the pilot to determine a suitable speed for the visibility he is in.

Was SVFR agreed with ATC;

Not available in the airspace involved, nor was mandatory contact with ATC nor any clearance required.

If so, what squawk code was assigned and what was there any special significance;
(this could explain 7760)

No ATC agency with which the Chinook recieved a service from had SSR. No specific code was required to be issued.

What of the radar recordings that apparently existed shortly after the crash;
(the radar track could help establish that the a/c was under control or at least not deviating madly from its intended course or help with the analysis of its actions)

Probably in the vault alongside the Lockerbie ones and many others.

What explanation is there for the unanswered radio call (or lack of recording after this point) – was there definitely no other transmission heard – was not further radio dialogue expected with an a/c at low level intending to cross the approach to a main runway (Macrihanish);

See above. There are reasons why a call is sometimes missed. Any dialogue to cross the Macrihanish MATZ would be carried out without Macrihanish ATC and not Scottish Military. I don't even know if Mac ATC was manned at the time or if they recieved a call. It is perhaps of note that their Aeronautical Information entry at the time states that 'Hill screening causes large gaps in RT cover below 3,000' at ranges in excess of 10NM' The crash site was about 9NM away but below the level of the terrain between the airfield and the aircraft. I doubt Mac would have heard them if they had called running in to the Mull.

But Prestwick heard the call and were surely handling the area, not Mac tower?

The services provided by Scottish Military (NOT Prestwick Airport to remove any confusion) would be those commensurate with Class G airspace, namely Flight Information and Alerting Service. Radar services such as Radar Information Service were also a possibility within radar coverage. I am not sure what they would have done to prevent the accident even if 2 way contact was established. The pilot would have called in as VFR (as per his plan). Terrain clearance is therefore the pilots responsibility.

FJJP

This would have had the aircraft flying more than 5nm west of the airfield, which would have put it outside the MATZ, be it civilian (2nm radius) or military (5nm radius) - I cannot remember if the full military MATZ had been de-activated at that time.

Us civvies don\'t have MATZs At the time the full MATZ was active. The ATZ (as per the civvie world) was 2NM radius from the surface to 2000\' AAL. The MATZ proper was 5NM radius from the surface to 3000\' AAL. There was no \'Approach MATZ Stub\' on the Western side, only out to the East.

The operational hours of Macrihanish were HO, namely, a service provided to meet the operational requirement. Perhaps the Chinook crew checked this prior to departure and if having found Mac closed they could have transited the MATZ quite freely without a call ?


Walter Kennedy

an example is the reports of the radar track recording which not only have been omitted from consideration but have actually been denied having existed.

Sorry to harp on about this one ... who denies there are recordings ?? Certainly not anyone in authority I would wager. What can be said is there are no relevant recordings which would add any answer as to what occurred. Maybe that was what was stated and is being misinterpreted as there being no recordings at all ??

It was his opinion that the crew had been attempting to fly around the Mull coast. Flight Lieutenant Tapper’s unanswered call to the Scottish Military at Prestwick about 5 minutes before the crash could have been the first contact to prepare for the WP change which would have necessitated the craft flying through a military air zone. Approach and tower frequencies at Macrihanish had been noted on the maps the pilots had prepared, showing they intend (sic) to fly through military airspace.

I know this was a quote of a quote but the \'Wing Commander\' should know that Scottish Military operate on different frequencies from Macrihanish and had no control responsibilities for it. All I can see is that crew had carried out good flight planning and airmanship by having frequencies available that they \'may\' have needed. When I fly I carry maps, charts, and frequencies probably for the whole of the FIR I am flying in. It doesn\'t necessarily mean that I intend to pass through everyones airspace, even if transiting close by them . Well not till they build a Piper with a 24 hour fuel endurance anyway !!

Conjecture, but I would stick with the crew having checked the operating hours of Macrihanish that day and being aware of its planned opening times. If it wasn\'t planned to be open on the outbound journey, then it is possible that it may have been open at the time of their planned return.


I hope this post is not seen as too negative, but there are a lot of myths and red herrings out there which need to be dispelled so that the true fight for justice can continue.

[walter kennedy]

10W
Would suggesting that they could have been using a most basic and accurate navaid to judge their distance off that amorphous grey blob be part of <<incredulous claims worthy of a good fiction thriller>>?

<<It cannot be proven that the crew were negligent…>> seems to be the thrust of the campaign which unfortunately seems to work against digging any deeper with a view to establishing what actually happened. The crew should not have been found negligent by inquiries that were obviously flawed, say, by their omission of information pertinent to the flight path and the known intentions of the crew – I believe debating the case from a navigation viewpoint in this thread has at least shown that the inquiries did not make many such points.

If it turns out that they had been using a particular navaid, whether they should have or not, the possibility of tampering with it should have been considered bearing in mind who was on board – the importance of this being established supercedes the question of negligence and if it could not be established that such an aid was functioning normally, then surely negligence should not apply.

Now to specifics:
You acknowledge that the squawk code was present on recordings that you saw; my question was <<I wonder what squawk code they saw? And I mean, what did they actually see – not what could have been selected/should have been selected/ etc etc..>>. The inquiries laboured the point of how it could have got to what was found from what it could have been – I would have thought that it was obvious to state what was known to be set (from radar) before impact. Cannot someone like yourself put this to rest by finding out what it was?

Radar Recordings
I will try to get clarification on what the source saw but it may take some weeks.
What I read into the report was that the radar track supported the analysis of the available data which had the a/c carrying on towards the Mull in a steady flight until the final evasive manouevre. The two together correlate giving very much greater confidence than on their own. As I tried to explain previously, it very much looks like they were in control at waypoint change, consciously steering to a point inland of the lighthouse and holding that course, and then demonstrating control in the final moments in a meaningful evasive manouevre. To me, this suggests that they were using something as a reference.

<<If the data showing the flight right up to the impact point existed, then don't you think more light would have been made at it in the BoI, or the Fatal Accident Inquiry ?? Perhaps even with graphics released to the press to show what exactly happened.>> Well, that is what one would expect in an honest world, but since this we have had Hutton, Butler, Bliar and the rest of the Iraq fiasco. Specific to this case, the inquiries:
Failed to make clear the prevailing local weather conditions and just how common they were;
Did not make clear the intention to turn in close and “handrail” up the coast;
Did not mention that this was common practice;
Did not mention (in all the VFR/IMC etc discussions) that a helicopter at low level could legitimately approach very close to the coast with the mist on the land as it was (was it an AVM who made the case that they were already too close in for VFR at waypoint change?) – at a speed at the discretion of the pilot;
(This courtesy of our recent “SVFR” discussions. Here’s a point – I say they would not have approached at such a high speed in these conditions unless they had a reference to go on – it wasn’t visual with the lighthouse as they were going to the right of it, towards danger.)
Did not mention the possibility of an intermediate destination;
(Mac radio noted on maps; TACAN CU set to Mac; hours not exceeded if stopping at Mac; meetings more common at Mac than Ft George.)
Did not explain clearly/adequately the context of the unanswered radio call;
Did not mention the serious inaccuracies possible with the SuperTANS over water resulting from the combination of Doppler with GPS – a change in the MK2 and not a problem with the Mk1 as the systems were separate – which was known by this crew;
Did not mention the existence/availability on the a/c of another (more accurate local) navigation system with equipment on the Mk2 which could get accurate range and approximate bearing to a portable DME transponder (PRC112 type);
Did not mention the presence of US personnel all over the crash site, when they arrived, what equipment they were retrieving, and that regular equipment of this particular unit included a communication set that could act as a DME transponder;
Did not disclose the squawk code observed on radar despite the question of the setting found arising several times and there being much discussion on how it could have ended up so from possible settings without stating the starting condition which was KNOWN from radar recordings available (earlier in the flight).

Is this not enough to judge the inquiries as flawed? After omitting this lot, is it at all surprising that they were not forthcoming about the radar track recordings? Surely an inquiry should be presented with all the available evidence as a starting point?

For those who express disdain for consideration of the navigation angle, I suggest that it has not yet been satisfactorily closed in this crash which looks very like the a/c was consciously flown in too close (for whatever reason) and this consideration has not really been much of a distraction to those pursuing possible control problems for the last ten years for which there is no evidence.

[CarltonBrowne the FO]

Walter Kennedy
Conspiracy theories as to mythical extra nav beacons are pointless: you may be correct as to the existence of portable DMEs and their interface with the transponder fitted to the Chinook- however, aircrew current on the type, and in the role, have denied any knowledge. You went on to describe its use for such roles as SAR: perhaps you are unaware that the Chinook is not used in the SAR role by the RAF.
There is nothing sinister in the presence of US Navy SEALS on the Mull in the hours following the crash. SEALS used Macrihanish a great deal during the Cold War; for as long as the RAF station continued to exist afterward, it would be useful as a training facility.
As was shown in the aftermath of the Lockerbie crash, there can be survivors even from seemingly non-survivable crashes- if they are found in time. If a military force is on exercise in the area of a major accident, it is entirely logical that all available personnel should immediately be used to search- and keep searching until all hope of finding survivors is lost.
By continuing to advocate these increasingly intricate theories, you allow those who wish the whole affair forgotten to dismiss the whole Chinook Justice campaign as fringe nutters. Indeed, the scenario you offer as an alternative (use of a single, unverified, uncalibrated navaid below MSA) WOULD constitute negligence by the pilots.
I do not know what happened in the last few minutes of the flight- but your scenario is almost the LEAST likely I can imagine.

[polyglory]

CarltonBrowne the FO,

I completely agree and it is doing the campaign no good at all.

[Tandemrotor]

Walter

I have asked you before, and I will ask you again. Please conduct your enquiries elsewhere, as you will not find the answers you seek here!

You appear to be a lone voice proposing a theory that none of us with relevant experience believe to be even slightly plausible.

You will of course be aware we are interested in FACTUAL evidence here. Please let us know if you discover any.

Farewell.

[meadowbank]

Walter Kennedy

I echo the comments of the previous 3 posters and of many before.

The aim of this thread has become to show why, by the time of the waypoint change, the crew had not been negligent and that their actions up until that point were both legal and reasonable. By articluating your doubts that the pilots would have been able to judge their range from the coast (dismissed by several pilots) without using a DME range from a portable IFF set (for which the Chinook lacks the equipment to display) carried by US Navy SEALs (whose presence seems to indicate, in your mind, some kind of plot worthy of the 'X-files' TV program) you are undermining our efforts to bring about justice for two dead pilots who are unable to defend themselves. If this is your intention, come straight out with it and we'll have a proper argument about it. If you feel, like me, that the pilots have been unjustly treated, that negligence cannot even be proved 'beyond reasonable doubt' let alone 'beyond any doubt whatsoever', then help the campaign by expounding no further on your, frankly, often bizarre theories. Those of us actively involved in this campaign use our spare time to do what we can; answering your points takes up some of that time, which can't then be used more productively. Again, if this is your aim, declare your hand.

[walter kennedy]

My aim in putting my views to this site was to get objective discussion and possible support if appropriate from contributors with relevant experience.
Sabotage was summarily dismissed too early in this case – because of who was on board, any and every possible method should have been explored.
With deference to the aims of those in the Campaign for Justice and other contributors to this site, sabotage clears the pilots of negligence – whatever the details of their actions in the execution of their flight plan.
Notwithstanding that the pilots may be cleared (quite rightly, in my opinion too) on the grounds of “absolutely no doubt” the loss of that team requires some effort to get the full story, if possible, and I thought that this forum would be well suited to pursue this.
The inquiries thoroughly dealt with the physical condition of the wreckage and found no indication of damage consistent with, say, missile or on board explosion. Further, the a/c appeared to have been under control for much of its flight leaving any on board problem a very small window to manifest itself in before impact.
Thus the only readily apparent real opportunity for sabotage was of a navigational nature and this is what I have been exploring – if and when this line is brought to closure with reasonable argument and/or knowledgable, authorative statements we can forget it; to date, the discussion has gone into << increasingly intricate>> detail because some of the early, superficial objections were just plain wrong.
The starting point was that, with the prevalent conditions on the Mull, DME could have been a useful reference and, had it been used (and ZD576s TACAN CU was set to Mac TACAN), the ground equipment needed to be checked as it is very easy to set an error in that ground equipment.
It was pointed out (quite rightly) that there was not LOS to that beacon and therefore the Mac TACAN could not have been used – however, no one volunteered that the Mk2s were equipped to interrogate portable DMEs and so discussion and time was wasted establishing this.

There are two sources whose input can close this line right now:
ATC who viewed the radar track on SSR (yes, there was such a track as “10W” stated in his posting 6th October 2004 23:41) could confirm the squawk code; 7760 was said to be “meaningless” at one inquiry (getting to be set thus as the crew tried to set an emergency code or otherwise disturbed from its original setting on impact) but if it was actually used in the earlier part of the flight it may indicate that ZD576 was referring to a ground transponder.
A statement from the Special Forces Flight (to which ZD576 belonged) that they did not at the time use the facility that was available in HC2s (which would be strange as US and other NATO members did) or that no temporary/portable DME transponder was ever placed at the Mull other than for specific exercises.
If either of the above proves negative, then the idea of sabotaging the Navaid is dead (and as this was the only remaining readily possible means, then sabotage is no longer worth considering) – just a little ground work by you guys, using your contacts and the authority of the Campaign group as an interested party to formally ask the questions – please! Then I’ll go away sincerely wishing you success on your main objective.

By the way, the SEALS were there for 3 DAYS on a site presumably strewn with confidential documents – this was inappropriate for just helping with casualties.

I’ll say again that the discussions on this theme have done a lot to clear up the picture of the local weather conditions and the constraints on the crew (ie clearing up the VFR/IFR etc arguments). Also, descriptions of the limitations of the SuperTANS with its combined Doppler and GPS in the HC2 were worthwhile and of general interest, I thought.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Walter,
thanks for your post.

ZD576 didn't belong to the Special Forces Flight - the crew did. The aircraft was a Sqn asset, not a Flt one. The choice of aircraft is academic anyway, as it was the only one available, despite Jon Tapper requesting a Mk1 Chinook remain in the province. We all know his request was turned down. Possibly due to a shortage of serviceable aircraft available to fulfil the overall Chinook commitment (due to several being away on mid-life update).

You are correct in saying that American forces remained on site, but they did as you say - collect confidential documents. A lifeboat was also launched in case any such documents went into the sea too.

It is my understanding that the ATC Radar Track was studied by the BoI as well as the AAIB, so who else should look at it?

Assuming that your theory of a portable transmitter being used is correct, what residual evidence would be left in the wreckage - bearing in mind that the campaign would have nowhere else to look, as I'm sure the MoD would deny all knowledge of any alleged use.

Finally, irrespective of whether or not your theory is concluded one way or the other, I would hope that you stick around to offer support and comment. All views help to show the MoD that this injustice cannot go on forever!

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[jayteeto]

Walter, I was with the crew in the last few hours before the flight. I walked out with Jon Tapper to the ac next to his and went flying on another sortie. I can ABSOLUTELY confirm that this was not any 'special' flight. It was as routine as any other one. I can confirm (and would do on oath) that they were unhappy with the aircraft allocated and wanted a Mk1 Chinook. In the hour before the flight, the crew had a coffee and Jon insisted that they went through FADEC emergency drills because he (quote) could not trust the bloody systems to keep the engines running. Once again, I would state this on oath if required. Those of us who knew Jon have the knowledge that he liked to do things by the book and didn't like risk taking. Forget the sabotage theories, this is wasted effort. Who knows??? the crew might or might not have been negligent, but there was no proof. This equals NOT GUILTY.

[sycamore]

Just like to ask a few questions to those who have operated the Mk2 , when it was `new`.
Was the SuperTans exactly the same as that fitted to Mk1a/c, ie presentatio, operation, or had it been enhanced in any way?
The WPT CHG warning- was it a 30 sec. wrng, or 1 minute, that the warning flashed/audio , to indicate the waypoint approach ?
Did the warning depend on whether the Tans was in Tac or Route Steer mode; was it available to both pilots?
Can the Tans be used as an AFCS function, coupled as Hdg/Vor /ILS?
Is the Tans presentation only on the AI as a Flight Director; on the HSI, or both; can both pilots have the same presentation at the same time?
What was the then`current` SOP for Tans operation. Was it SOP to input QNH?
What was the SOP for Radar Altimeter ` bug` settings? The rad Alt audio- was it triggered by the lowest `bug`, or the highest ?
Are/were the `Squawk ` selectors rotary, or `tumbler` type. Did it have a separate `emergency` squawk selector ?

I realise that this may be old ground, but as I never flew the Chinook, and my Tans experience was S-K and Gaz. it would be appreciated if someone can give me a few answers, either here or PM. Thanks, Syc.

[Tandemrotor]

The majority of the information you are looking for is contained in this thread. What is your motivation before we invest time in your search?

[Tandemrotor]

OK sycamore, thanks for the PM, and welcome aboard.

Largely off the top of my head for the moment (I'm sure any inaccuracies will be promptly corrected by my learned colleagues!)

The Racal avionics RNS252 SuperTANS, combined with a Trimble TNL8000 GPS, was, I believe, the same as had been fitted earlier to the Mk1 Chinook. I never flew the Mk2, though some of our contributors did, so I am not the best person to comment on any subtle changes that may have been made between Mks.

In TAC steer mode, this SuperTANS generates a leg change alert one minute before reaching the selected waypoint.

SuperTANS was being operated in TAC steer mode, and a waypoint change had been manually selected at 0.95nm from 'power down.'

Supertans provides a 'Steer Meter' output directed on to the Attitude Indicators of both pilots. This instrument (of a Flight Director type) is also used for other functions by pilot selection.

Tans required a QNH input, and this was completed preflight.

Rad Alt bug setting policy is a long answer, and would probably have been influenced by SF policy (though this was not an SF sortie)

IFF/SSR fitted to this aircraft was of the thumbwheel design, and did have a separate selection for 'Emergency', which was independent of displayed code.

Have a think about where you are going with this, and may I ask if you do turn up anything interesting, you keep it out of the public domain for a short while.

PM someone like Brian, or myself, or one or two of our other stalwarts!

Cheers.

PS

In case you haven\'t seen it, you will find a little more SuperTANS information on page 82 of this thread.

[jayteeto]

Just to confirm..... Rad Alt setting was not 'SF policy'. The board questioned the settings, but they were the standard bugs set by ALL RAF types in N Ireland at the time. Before anyone goes into any more detail, I believe they are still meant to be at least restricted, more likely higher.

[STANDTO]

for what my humble opinion is worth, Sycamore's knowledge and experience is a welcome addition to this thread.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone.

I watched, with interest, the Conservative Party Conference speech by Mr Michael Howard MP - in particular his promised "Timetable for Action".

So, in the true spirit of being the Irritating Sod, I wrote to him and asked the following question: Taking into account your pledge of a Timetable for Action, may I ask how soon after being elected to Government, would you seek to have this unsustainable verdict of negligence removed from the service record of both pilots?

This is the reply, in full, received from Mr Gerald Howarth MP, Shadow Defence Minister:

Dear Mr Dixon,
Michael Howard, Leader of the Opposition, has passed me your letter of 11th October about the Chinook crash on the Mull of Kintyre and the 'Timetable for Action'.

I anticipate that when we come to power, on Day 1 all the papers on the crash of ZD576 will be submitted, including all the evidence before and findings of the Sheriff's Court, the Public Accounts Committee and the House of Lords Select Committee, to a High Court Judge to consider, on the basis of that paper evidence and without taking further oral evidence, whether the findings of the RAF Board of Inquiry remain, in all the circumstances sustainable and, if not, what steps should be taken.

I hope this will reassure you.
Yours sincerely,
Gerald Howarth

I would like to publically thank both Mr Howard and Mr Howarth for their positive and decisive response to my letter.

The campaign continues...

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

Edited for typo.

[Argus]

Brian Dixon

A very good result. Congratulations on your persistence.

What a shame that it takes a promise from the none too popular UK Opposition to do something which any Government Minister worth his salt would have done years ago.

Wouldn't be anything to do with the 'frank and fearless' advice given to Mr Hoon by senior bureaucrats and others, would it?

[Arkroyal]

Well done Brian.

Interesting, isn't it, that this lawyer's brain can see straight to the nub of our argument (that no new evidence is required to question the original finding) whilst two others; Messrs Bliar et 'oon can't.

Cant think of a better reson to vote for him!

[ZH875]

But there is a problem

I anticipate that when we come to power

1. If they come to power.
2. I anticipate.. NOT WE WILL pass all ...,

[Brian Dixon]

ZH875,

1. They will. If not this next time - eventually.
2. I will ensure that they DO pass everything - I'm sure they'd expect nothing less from me!

Unless, of course, if Mr Hoon would like to seize the initiative and do as Mr Howarth suggests, now (not holding my breath though).

Updates as and when.
My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[CarltonBrowne the FO]

It is, of course, worth remembering that the Conservatives were the governing party in 1994; they had three years to consider the evidence available and to overturn the verdict. Mr Howard was a Cabinet Minister in that Government.
I could paraphrase Mr Howarth's reply as:
"As soon as this issue ceases to be something we can attack the Labour Government over, we will hand it to a High Court Judge and forget about it. We will also take steps to ensure that no evidence of any possible misconduct by the Major Government can be presented during the investigation."
Maybe I am overly cynical: I have not, however, forgotten what Mr Howard was like as Home Secretary.