Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
A really irritating PPRuNer
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BOAC,
do you mean the address at the MoD?
If so, its:
The Assistant Director (Secretariat & Lower Airspace)
Directorate of Air Staff
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Level 5, Zone H
Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB
You are absolutely correct in saying that no one has conclusive proof as to what actually caused the accident. That has been the main thrust of the campaign for the past ten years!
If it needs another ten, then so be it!
Hopefully not, though.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
do you mean the address at the MoD?
If so, its:
The Assistant Director (Secretariat & Lower Airspace)
Directorate of Air Staff
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Level 5, Zone H
Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB
You are absolutely correct in saying that no one has conclusive proof as to what actually caused the accident. That has been the main thrust of the campaign for the past ten years!
If it needs another ten, then so be it!
Hopefully not, though.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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I concur entirely with Ark.
We should be very careful that any statements we make, are unambiguously rooted in fact.
Anybody interested in applying a rigorous standard of proof has to accept that, the only known FACTS are that the aircraft struck the Mull of Kintyre 'below their safety altitude', (only applicable when IMC!) at high speed, and in a high nose up attitude.
Nobody KNOWS how it got there!
A handful of witnesses on the Mull of Kintyre, have stated that the weather was poor, but have also said the weather was 'coming and going.'
NOBODY can tell us the weather conditions experienced from the cockpit. Nor indeed, what was occuring therein.
Though the last known witness to actually SEE the aircraft, very shortly before the accident, speaks of it unambiguosly flying in conditions perfectly suitable for VFR flight!
EVERYTHING ELSE IS A MATTER OF OPINION, AND NOT (r) NOT A MATTER OF FACT.
Including the simulations produced by the manufacturer of this 'unairworthy' aircraft, that suggest a straight and gentle climb from waypoint change to impact.
"Only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent."
These pilots were found negligent, not on the basis of ANY factual evidence, but on the basis, solely of political (with a small p!) expediency.
It remains a complete and utter disgrace.
We should be very careful that any statements we make, are unambiguously rooted in fact.
Anybody interested in applying a rigorous standard of proof has to accept that, the only known FACTS are that the aircraft struck the Mull of Kintyre 'below their safety altitude', (only applicable when IMC!) at high speed, and in a high nose up attitude.
Nobody KNOWS how it got there!
A handful of witnesses on the Mull of Kintyre, have stated that the weather was poor, but have also said the weather was 'coming and going.'
NOBODY can tell us the weather conditions experienced from the cockpit. Nor indeed, what was occuring therein.
Though the last known witness to actually SEE the aircraft, very shortly before the accident, speaks of it unambiguosly flying in conditions perfectly suitable for VFR flight!
EVERYTHING ELSE IS A MATTER OF OPINION, AND NOT (r) NOT A MATTER OF FACT.
Including the simulations produced by the manufacturer of this 'unairworthy' aircraft, that suggest a straight and gentle climb from waypoint change to impact.
"Only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent."
These pilots were found negligent, not on the basis of ANY factual evidence, but on the basis, solely of political (with a small p!) expediency.
It remains a complete and utter disgrace.
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CHINOOK
Brian Dixon, Yes, I survive, thankyou! As you know, I am very reluctant to contribute to yet another round in this long discussion, but the book to which I referred does at least offer an answer to something that had puzzled me all along about this tragedy. It is this; we are talking about a highly experienced and capable crew, and it is inconceivable that they would have pressed on at low level and high speed so close to that coast UNLESS they could see at least something ahead of them (agreed?). So what went wrong at that stage?
It is suggested that what they thought they saw was the lighthouse complex and the rock pinnacles below it. What they actually saw, because they were so far to the right of track, was the fog signal complex with its (very similar) rock complex below. So they thought that they could cruise climb above the hills behind the lighthouse, but unfortunately they actually faced the much higher high ground behind the fog signal complex.
Of course, there is no evidence from cockpit recorders to confirm this, but the whole supposition is in any case irrelevant because they should not have been at low level and high speed heading towards that coast in those weather conditions. That was the negligence, not the events that then followed - such as misreading the visual clues on the coast.
Meanwhile, read the book. Regards JP.
It is suggested that what they thought they saw was the lighthouse complex and the rock pinnacles below it. What they actually saw, because they were so far to the right of track, was the fog signal complex with its (very similar) rock complex below. So they thought that they could cruise climb above the hills behind the lighthouse, but unfortunately they actually faced the much higher high ground behind the fog signal complex.
Of course, there is no evidence from cockpit recorders to confirm this, but the whole supposition is in any case irrelevant because they should not have been at low level and high speed heading towards that coast in those weather conditions. That was the negligence, not the events that then followed - such as misreading the visual clues on the coast.
Meanwhile, read the book. Regards JP.
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Hi Mr Purdey,
Read the book and accept it for what it is. Another opinion based upon the few facts available. As I said, it may well be what happened, but we will never know with absolute certainty - the required level of proof.
I'm happy to agree that normal practice was for the pilots to see, and agree, the waypoint before effecting a navigation change. Like you, I don't want to go over old ground by disputing the issue surrounding speed and height, as neither readings prior to, or just after, the waypoint change are known. In fact, I wrote to the MoD to ask if they could specifically advise me of where the negligence occurred - asking for height, speed, heading and the Lat & Long and how many minutes into the flight the waypoint change was made. They wrote back stating that it was not possible to do so using the terms I had set, and quoted a statement made by Air Marshal Day to the HoL Select Committee. His reply wasn't convincing.
I would have thought that this information would have been crucial to satisfying an 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' requirement. How can you have absolutely no doubt whatsoever that negligence occurred, yet not know where or when it did?
However, as you say, there is no evidence from the cockpit to confirm anything. On that basis alone, the verdict of negligence is unsafe.
BOAC,
I'll check for the address you ask for and post it once found (sorry for not having it to hand). To contact your local MP, try using the
Fax Your MP Website
My best to all, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Read the book and accept it for what it is. Another opinion based upon the few facts available. As I said, it may well be what happened, but we will never know with absolute certainty - the required level of proof.
I'm happy to agree that normal practice was for the pilots to see, and agree, the waypoint before effecting a navigation change. Like you, I don't want to go over old ground by disputing the issue surrounding speed and height, as neither readings prior to, or just after, the waypoint change are known. In fact, I wrote to the MoD to ask if they could specifically advise me of where the negligence occurred - asking for height, speed, heading and the Lat & Long and how many minutes into the flight the waypoint change was made. They wrote back stating that it was not possible to do so using the terms I had set, and quoted a statement made by Air Marshal Day to the HoL Select Committee. His reply wasn't convincing.
I would have thought that this information would have been crucial to satisfying an 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' requirement. How can you have absolutely no doubt whatsoever that negligence occurred, yet not know where or when it did?
However, as you say, there is no evidence from the cockpit to confirm anything. On that basis alone, the verdict of negligence is unsafe.
BOAC,
I'll check for the address you ask for and post it once found (sorry for not having it to hand). To contact your local MP, try using the
Fax Your MP Website
My best to all, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just a numbered other
Hi, JP.
interesting post.
Agree 100%. So they probably could, unless one of them had suddenly developed suicidal tendancies.
Good question. Neither you nor I will ever know.
You are beginning to spoil an otherwise factual post. You have no way of knowing their intentions. I would think it most unlikely that they planned to do anything of the sort, as the pathetic icing clearance of this machine would not have allowed a climb to SALT.
Spot on, so the facts stop here and opinion starts.
Provided they were at an airspeed below 140kts and in sight of the surface, oh yes they could. You have no idea of the weather conditions they were flying in, and as you say it is inconceivable that they would blunder on in IMC, knowing that the coast was just ahead.
Not WAS, MIGHT HAVE BEEN. Certainly, it is possible that you are right, and that they just carried on, without a care, into the cliff. THere is, however, doubt. Enought doubt to be absolutely certain that the verdict of negligence is unsafe.
interesting post.
we are talking about a highly experienced and capable crew, and it is inconceivable that they would have pressed on at low level and high speed so close to that coast UNLESS they could see at least something ahead of them (agreed?).
So what went wrong at that stage?
So they thought that they could cruise climb above the hills behind the lighthouse, but unfortunately they actually faced the much higher high ground behind the fog signal complex.
Of course, there is no evidence from cockpit recorders to confirm this,
but the whole supposition is in any case irrelevant because they should not have been at low level and high speed heading towards that coast in those weather conditions
That was the negligence
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CHINOOK
ARK ROYAL.
As before, we should agree to disagree. Of course the book deals with a great deal of speculation, but I for one find very convincing the suggestion (yes, suggestion) that the crew misidentified their position at the coast. Readers will no doubt make up their own minds. Regards JP.
As before, we should agree to disagree. Of course the book deals with a great deal of speculation, but I for one find very convincing the suggestion (yes, suggestion) that the crew misidentified their position at the coast. Readers will no doubt make up their own minds. Regards JP.
Just a numbered other
JP,
It may be that we don't disagree that much, who knows.
I, however, refuse to condemn anyone on a 'suggestion' or even a probability, when the standsrd of proof is absolutely no doubt.
The book may well be right, although I doubt it. Can't you see the point? No matter what any of us choose to believe, the evidence simply does not exist to uphold the finding of Gross Negligence.
It may be that we don't disagree that much, who knows.
I, however, refuse to condemn anyone on a 'suggestion' or even a probability, when the standsrd of proof is absolutely no doubt.
The book may well be right, although I doubt it. Can't you see the point? No matter what any of us choose to believe, the evidence simply does not exist to uphold the finding of Gross Negligence.
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CHINOOK
ARK ROYAL
Thanks for the coment. On a matter of (important) detail, you said earlier (I paraphrase) that the crew could continue towards the coast provided that they were flying at less than 140 knots and could see the surface. I am intrigued by that. Would they have still been legitimate even if there was little or no forward visibility? It strikes me as pretty odd, and I would be interested in chapter and verse from the regs, if you could oblige. Regards JP
Thanks for the coment. On a matter of (important) detail, you said earlier (I paraphrase) that the crew could continue towards the coast provided that they were flying at less than 140 knots and could see the surface. I am intrigued by that. Would they have still been legitimate even if there was little or no forward visibility? It strikes me as pretty odd, and I would be interested in chapter and verse from the regs, if you could oblige. Regards JP
Just a numbered other
Sorry, I did omit vis. Been out a long time myself, and was never air force anyway, but I believe they required 1K, which isn't a lot.
The rules for helicopter VFR flight were (are?) simply clear of cloud and in sight of the surface.
The rules for helicopter VFR flight were (are?) simply clear of cloud and in sight of the surface.
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VFR
Even as little as ½ mile vis would have been OK – the idea being that helicopters can always slow down.
An eyewitness on the NI coast at the (actual) time of the accident said that the Mull could be seen although it was shrouded in mist – he thought he could see the base of the lighthouse wall. This suggests the all too common conditions there of clear visibility offshore at low level (below the cloud base) with the mist localized right on the Mull – this is important as had the aircraft turned at (the actual geographical position of) waypoint A it would not have entered the mist and would not have breached the VFR for helicopters in that situation.
They did not turn at waypoint A as according to the SuperTANS but continued on, indeed making a small (correctional?) turn to the right – at this time, they could not have been experiencing any control problems (or other emergency) as they would not have bothered to select their next waypoint for route navigation on the SuperTANS.
The actual geographical position of waypoint A was already very close in to the landmass and had they believed the SuperTANS they should have commenced their turn up the coast (remember, at that point of waypoint change it seems reasonable to assume that they had control).
It should not be surprising that this crew would not believe the position given by the SuperTANS to any degree of accuracy (they had said so, clearly, that they had doubts about this system’s accuracy previously). Thus, if they had some other reference to go on (visual or instrument) ignoring the SuperTANS waypoint was reasonable – a common practice for helicopters crossing from NI to this part of the coast was to directly approach a point near the lighthouse and commence a turn close in (but before the prevailing mist) so as to go along the shoreline – a neat maneuver if the turn was executed in a timely fashion.
One simple explanation for this accident is that the use of their other reference misled them; ZD576 did not have radar so all that remained to them in that position was a visual reference or a DME beacon. I have not read that book but I gather from the comments on this thread that they had a visual reference but confused it – this would rather suggest that conditions were not good enough for a visual reference. This HC2 was equipped to interrogate the (UHF) portable DME sets which could have given them very accurate range and approximate bearing (that corrective steer to the right at waypoint change?) to a portable set located, say, at the lighthouse helipad. DME is a favorite NavAid for helicopters being used for a variety of applications – it is regarded as accurate an reliable by pilots; from a navigation systems viewpoint, a DME set at the Mull lighthouse helipad would have been an obvious solution to what would have been a common situation for pilots on that leg. Yes, I know, you are not supposed to rely upon a radio NavAid for terrain avoidance in VFR but to have used it to aid a turn which should have kept them in the clear is little different to using a DME for, say, a turn on to an approach – in theory, not running into the mist (which, as they would have known, started just after the shoreline) relying for safety ultimately on their visual judgment of the range to that amorphous gray blob with no significant ground detail visible and no perspective going straight at it at low level.
The last moments of the flight suggest that they were surprised by entering the mist – at about the time that they entered the mist, the following would have happened:
Mist is suddenly flashing past them;
The shoreline is suddenly right beneath them;
The RADALT warning would have gone off.
And what happened about this time? The aircraft (thus apparently under control) started an entirely reasonable evasive turn.
If they were using such a beacon it could have been giving a false reading in which case the pilots could hardly be blamed – although ultimately they should have used visual only for terrain clearance, the effect of having a clear readout from a trusted system would have given them a strong bias to what they thought they were seeing distance wise..
Maybe this scenario is not what happened but I believe that it is sufficiently reasonable to have warranted being explored as a possibility. The thing is, it could have been verified or dismissed by a few pertinent questions in the right forum, questions like:
Was there a beacon there on that day for evaluation or had it been positioned there for some time?;
What was the squawk code before impact (as per radar recordings) and what was its meaning to the air traffic controllers? (The code found set in the wreck was 7760 which may indicate that they were referring to a ground transponder.);
If there was no beacon for the judgment of that regular turn in such common conditions, what was the accepted practice on this leg? (Don’t start, this was a regular route and I don’t believe that the problem of closing with the Mull would not have been discussed.)
Even as little as ½ mile vis would have been OK – the idea being that helicopters can always slow down.
An eyewitness on the NI coast at the (actual) time of the accident said that the Mull could be seen although it was shrouded in mist – he thought he could see the base of the lighthouse wall. This suggests the all too common conditions there of clear visibility offshore at low level (below the cloud base) with the mist localized right on the Mull – this is important as had the aircraft turned at (the actual geographical position of) waypoint A it would not have entered the mist and would not have breached the VFR for helicopters in that situation.
They did not turn at waypoint A as according to the SuperTANS but continued on, indeed making a small (correctional?) turn to the right – at this time, they could not have been experiencing any control problems (or other emergency) as they would not have bothered to select their next waypoint for route navigation on the SuperTANS.
The actual geographical position of waypoint A was already very close in to the landmass and had they believed the SuperTANS they should have commenced their turn up the coast (remember, at that point of waypoint change it seems reasonable to assume that they had control).
It should not be surprising that this crew would not believe the position given by the SuperTANS to any degree of accuracy (they had said so, clearly, that they had doubts about this system’s accuracy previously). Thus, if they had some other reference to go on (visual or instrument) ignoring the SuperTANS waypoint was reasonable – a common practice for helicopters crossing from NI to this part of the coast was to directly approach a point near the lighthouse and commence a turn close in (but before the prevailing mist) so as to go along the shoreline – a neat maneuver if the turn was executed in a timely fashion.
One simple explanation for this accident is that the use of their other reference misled them; ZD576 did not have radar so all that remained to them in that position was a visual reference or a DME beacon. I have not read that book but I gather from the comments on this thread that they had a visual reference but confused it – this would rather suggest that conditions were not good enough for a visual reference. This HC2 was equipped to interrogate the (UHF) portable DME sets which could have given them very accurate range and approximate bearing (that corrective steer to the right at waypoint change?) to a portable set located, say, at the lighthouse helipad. DME is a favorite NavAid for helicopters being used for a variety of applications – it is regarded as accurate an reliable by pilots; from a navigation systems viewpoint, a DME set at the Mull lighthouse helipad would have been an obvious solution to what would have been a common situation for pilots on that leg. Yes, I know, you are not supposed to rely upon a radio NavAid for terrain avoidance in VFR but to have used it to aid a turn which should have kept them in the clear is little different to using a DME for, say, a turn on to an approach – in theory, not running into the mist (which, as they would have known, started just after the shoreline) relying for safety ultimately on their visual judgment of the range to that amorphous gray blob with no significant ground detail visible and no perspective going straight at it at low level.
The last moments of the flight suggest that they were surprised by entering the mist – at about the time that they entered the mist, the following would have happened:
Mist is suddenly flashing past them;
The shoreline is suddenly right beneath them;
The RADALT warning would have gone off.
And what happened about this time? The aircraft (thus apparently under control) started an entirely reasonable evasive turn.
If they were using such a beacon it could have been giving a false reading in which case the pilots could hardly be blamed – although ultimately they should have used visual only for terrain clearance, the effect of having a clear readout from a trusted system would have given them a strong bias to what they thought they were seeing distance wise..
Maybe this scenario is not what happened but I believe that it is sufficiently reasonable to have warranted being explored as a possibility. The thing is, it could have been verified or dismissed by a few pertinent questions in the right forum, questions like:
Was there a beacon there on that day for evaluation or had it been positioned there for some time?;
What was the squawk code before impact (as per radar recordings) and what was its meaning to the air traffic controllers? (The code found set in the wreck was 7760 which may indicate that they were referring to a ground transponder.);
If there was no beacon for the judgment of that regular turn in such common conditions, what was the accepted practice on this leg? (Don’t start, this was a regular route and I don’t believe that the problem of closing with the Mull would not have been discussed.)
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CHINOOK
ArkRoyal.
Your reply about visibility seems to lack the precision on which you have always insisted. Did (do) the rules say 1 k or not? And where please did you get your figure of 140 kts? If you do not know (neither of us seems still to be in business), then perhaps a current operater could tell us what the rules are (were). Regards. JP.
Your reply about visibility seems to lack the precision on which you have always insisted. Did (do) the rules say 1 k or not? And where please did you get your figure of 140 kts? If you do not know (neither of us seems still to be in business), then perhaps a current operater could tell us what the rules are (were). Regards. JP.
Just a numbered other
JP,
It lacked precision, because I was relying on memory, without the time to look it up.
My notes on the accident:
NI Air Staff Orders in force at the time for operations based in the province required a cloudbase of 100' and visibility of 1Km.
The basic VFR rules for helicopters flying at or below 140KIAS required only that you be clear of cloud and in sight of the surface.
It lacked precision, because I was relying on memory, without the time to look it up.
My notes on the accident:
NI Air Staff Orders in force at the time for operations based in the province required a cloudbase of 100' and visibility of 1Km.
The basic VFR rules for helicopters flying at or below 140KIAS required only that you be clear of cloud and in sight of the surface.
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walter kennedy
I apologise if you have already covered this in your previous extensive postings on this subject:
Please direct us to the source document from where you are able to substantiate your claim that;
"This HC2 was equipped to interrogate the (UHF) portable DME sets"
And expand on your implication that the transponder on this aircraft was capable of displaying a range from another transponder.
Specifically, which model of airborne transponder allows this, and where was the associated range readout displayed in the cockpit of ZD576?
If you must persist with this line let us at least drag the discussion out of fantasy, and back to reality!
I am very suspicious of your motives, so let's put this to bed once and for all!
Thank you.
I apologise if you have already covered this in your previous extensive postings on this subject:
Please direct us to the source document from where you are able to substantiate your claim that;
"This HC2 was equipped to interrogate the (UHF) portable DME sets"
And expand on your implication that the transponder on this aircraft was capable of displaying a range from another transponder.
Specifically, which model of airborne transponder allows this, and where was the associated range readout displayed in the cockpit of ZD576?
If you must persist with this line let us at least drag the discussion out of fantasy, and back to reality!
I am very suspicious of your motives, so let's put this to bed once and for all!
Thank you.
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Tandemrotor
I probably have.
In brief, go ask your mates what the “towel rails” (antennas) are for on HC2s.
I think that it will do you more good to satisfy yourself from your own inquiries than to be presented with info that you snipe at from your existing/past experience.
You have been given the idea, if you can’t get anywhere then I’ll dig it out and post it again sometime in the future.
Fantasy/reality or knowledge/ignorance?
Motive? Believe it or not, I am sincere in saying that I understand your (all of yous’) negative attitudes to the idea of sabotage. There is denial, there is the pride that doesn’t want us to have been bushwhacked, there is the problem of having the ideological rocks we stand on melt away if such an act took place.
My motive is to get to the truth of what happened as a starting point for full justice – I have never believed the pilots to have been at fault and I do not think that they could be blamed for the technicality of their visual judgment being in error if such an instrument had been giving an incorrect reading by deliberate tampering groundside.
Remember (to the RAF blokes as a whole) there were more than the crew on board – those passengers were very special – and they were in your care. You owe it to the people of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to do everything you can to assist in establishing the full truth – not just clearing your colleagues, although I would like to say this:
I personally am probably more disgusted than any of you at the verdict of Gross Negligence because from my viewpoint the idea of blaming the pilots thus would have come from the same level that would have known they were being set up – if sabotage was the case, and I am certain it was.
I probably have.
In brief, go ask your mates what the “towel rails” (antennas) are for on HC2s.
I think that it will do you more good to satisfy yourself from your own inquiries than to be presented with info that you snipe at from your existing/past experience.
You have been given the idea, if you can’t get anywhere then I’ll dig it out and post it again sometime in the future.
Fantasy/reality or knowledge/ignorance?
Motive? Believe it or not, I am sincere in saying that I understand your (all of yous’) negative attitudes to the idea of sabotage. There is denial, there is the pride that doesn’t want us to have been bushwhacked, there is the problem of having the ideological rocks we stand on melt away if such an act took place.
My motive is to get to the truth of what happened as a starting point for full justice – I have never believed the pilots to have been at fault and I do not think that they could be blamed for the technicality of their visual judgment being in error if such an instrument had been giving an incorrect reading by deliberate tampering groundside.
Remember (to the RAF blokes as a whole) there were more than the crew on board – those passengers were very special – and they were in your care. You owe it to the people of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to do everything you can to assist in establishing the full truth – not just clearing your colleagues, although I would like to say this:
I personally am probably more disgusted than any of you at the verdict of Gross Negligence because from my viewpoint the idea of blaming the pilots thus would have come from the same level that would have known they were being set up – if sabotage was the case, and I am certain it was.
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NI Air Staff Orders in force at the time for operations based in the province required a cloudbase of 100' and visibility of 1Km.
What did ASO s say about weather limits while flying in the UK low flying system outside of an operational or exercise area?
Just wondering.
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Walter wrote:
You have previously presented some unsubstantiated theories, largely discredited by those with experience on type / in theatre. While I respect your commitment to finding the truth (one we all share), unless you have hard evidence of sabotage the use of words like "certain" can only detract from our cause. Please either produce some hard evidence (not theories please) or withdraw the statement.
Your point about all the deceased deserving justice is well made - it is precisely why a number of the relatives of the passengers on the flight - support the campaign to clear Jon & Rick.
if sabotage was the case, and I am certain it was
Your point about all the deceased deserving justice is well made - it is precisely why a number of the relatives of the passengers on the flight - support the campaign to clear Jon & Rick.
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I agree with Lt Hung. You cannot go round making statements that appear to be credible without finite proof.
I am also concerned that your profile does not reveal any aeronautical background, yet you write your posts giving the impression of a sound background in the rotary world.
I am unhappy with the implication of many of your posts without a clearer understanding of your background knowledge. Indeed, most of your surmise can be achieved by careful study of all the posts throughout the topic from the start, coupled with a few educated guesses.
The profile of the accident has been evaluated by many whom I know to be very experienced in the rotary world and on specific type. We do not need yet another round of theories based on nothing at all, or wild speculation.
I suggest you lend credibility to your theories by producing your background and evidence. Otherwise, stop wasting bandwidth.
FJJP
I am also concerned that your profile does not reveal any aeronautical background, yet you write your posts giving the impression of a sound background in the rotary world.
I am unhappy with the implication of many of your posts without a clearer understanding of your background knowledge. Indeed, most of your surmise can be achieved by careful study of all the posts throughout the topic from the start, coupled with a few educated guesses.
The profile of the accident has been evaluated by many whom I know to be very experienced in the rotary world and on specific type. We do not need yet another round of theories based on nothing at all, or wild speculation.
I suggest you lend credibility to your theories by producing your background and evidence. Otherwise, stop wasting bandwidth.
FJJP