Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone,
please find below the full, unedited, copy of an e-mail received from John Blakeley.


As the author of the so-called "Blakeley" report (C4's name, not mine) I have been very surprised that your many contributors have generally totally ignored the fact that when ZD 576 took off it was not only carrying a potentially misdiagnosed fault in the same systems that had been causing major technical problems since delivery from the conversion programme, but that by any standards of civilian passenger flight (which is what this was) the Chinook fleet was not, at that time, meeting the equivalent required airworthiness standards. When you look at the rest of the bias and shortfalls in the BoI's approach to investigating the engineering aspects it is quite clear that there are at least as many "real" facts supporting a technical cause for the accident as there are hypotheses, or worse hypotheses given the status of facts, supporting an aircrew error accident.

However, the only reaction I have had so far apart from a mis-spelling of my name (funny MOD did not spell it right either - is it the same person?) is a totally unjustified accusation that I misquoted ACM Wratten. In fact I did not quote Wratten at all - where I have quoted from the Board or other evidence I have used either quotation marks or italics, as anyone who read beyond page 1 would have realised. The comments on page 1 are, I believe, an accurate reflection of the comments made by Wratten as the Senior Reviewing Officer, but they are NOT a direct quote. For the pedantic amongst your contributors who worry about the accuracy of quotes and punctuation (and I must plead guilty to being a contributor to the Eats, Shoots and Leaves school of punctuation) I would suggest that their energy would be better served by pointing out the mis-quotes and non-sequiturs in the Board itself. For example witness 20 (Sqn Ldr Morgan - a QHI on the OCU) said :

“The unforeseen malfunctions on the Chinook HC2 of a flight critical nature [my bold] have mainly been associated with the engine system FADEC. They have resulted in undemanded engine shutdown, engine run-up, spurious engine failure captions and misleading and confusing cockpit indications.”

The Board, at paragraph 35d use this witness's evidence in their assessment of the problems of the Chinook HC2 in RAF Service – interestingly though they omit the words “flight critical” – one has to wonder why.

At paragraph the Board states:

“The HC2 has experienced a number of unforeseen technical occurrences since its introduction to service, and although the technical investigation provided no evidence of any technical malfunction, the possibility of the crew being distracted by a technical fault which had left no trace could not be dismissed The Board concluded that distraction by a technical malfunction could have been a contributory factor in the accident.”

Once again the Board despite being told by an expert witness that some malfunctions were of a "flight critical nature" downgrades such malfunctions to being merely a distraction - why?

In their opening remarks the Board decides to "eliminate [my bold] as possible causes: major technical malfunction or structural failure of the aircraft prior to impact; …… Therefore the Inquiry focused on the crew’s handling and operation of the aircraft.”

At paragraph 35d the Board states:

“Nevertheless an unforeseen technical malfunction of the type being experienced on the Chinook HC2, which would not necessarily have left any physical evidence, remained a possibility, and could not be discounted.”

Perhaps I am missing something obvious, but it seems to me that this statement is at total odds with the Board's opening remarks, and this major discrepancy should have easily been picked up by the Review Process.

The Board's findings and conclusions contain several other statements that are either not completely supported by the facts or that needed significantly more investigation - particularly on the engineering side - but read my paper and please comment on what I have said - I would be happy to have the discussion.

On the other hand one could argue that continuing detailed hypotheses on PPRuNe, new books purporting to know the cause of the accident (no I have not yet read it, but I hope to in the next few days,) and even engineering consultant's reports on the inadequacies of the Board's investigations on the engineering aspects are TOTALLY IRRELEVANT. The only thing that we all know about the accident itself was summed up by the House of Lords Select Committee with the words "We shall never know". This issue and the families' campaign is now not about the cause of the accident but about the unlawful and unjust nature of the Air Marshals' verdict, and the continuing refusal by MOD to either withdraw or overturn it.

When he appeared on Newsnight in 2000, and was accused by Jeremy Paxton of "breathtaking arrogance" ACM Wratten said that he could not accept the verdict of Sheriff Young's Scottish FAI and subsequent Committees of MPs verdicts , "because he had not been called as a witness ........ or had the opportunity to question then about how they reached their analysis" (no its not the complete quote but I have the tape, and I think that as a summary it's accurate). Well both he and Day had "their day" (no pun intended) in front of the House of Lords , and their Lordships (including a law lord who sitting in another place would have been sitting on the Court of Appeal) did not accept their position or the "legality" of their verdict.

Given that Air Force Law has to "mirror" the laws of England and Wales it is worth looking at what would happen in a civilian court. Gross negligence is a concept from criminal law. It is also used by various disciplinary tribunals. "Manslaughter by gross negligence" is a recognised offence. Where such a charge is brought the prosecution first has to prove negligence (ie that there was a duty of care between the defendant and the deceased and that it was breached) and secondly that the defendant's conduct was "so grossly negligent or reckless so as be properly branded criminal" (R v Devine[1999]. In each case this is a question for the jury on which they bring their common sense to bear. There is no general definition of what is and what is not capable of constituting gross negligence used in such cases.

Bear in mind that a mistake is not automatically a negligent one, which is why so many aircrew error (or even maintenance error) caused accidents did not automatically lead to charges of negligence or gross negligence - a few examples of the time that again cast doubt on the justice of the ZD 576 verdict even by the rules that applied then are given below:

1 June 1995 - Harrier - solo pilot killed (Full ADR and CVR fit)

Circumstances - the pilot, whilst testing new equipment , descended his aircraft until it impacted the sea.

Summary of findings - "The cause of the accident was the failure of the pilot to prevent the aircraft from impacting with the sea. The Board could not positively determine if the cause was due to distraction or incapacitation. Higher authority decided that pilot incapacitation in the form of a "partial epileptic seizure" was a possible contributory factor. This was despite the fact that, via the CVR and ADR, the pilot could be hard to be breathing normally and making control inputs, including a final flare as he realised he was about to hit the sea (shades of ZD 576?).

Cause: Human Factors - Not Positively Determined - no findings of negligence

1 September 1994 - Tornado - both crew killed (Full ADR and CVR fit)

Circumstances - pilot, flying at low level rolled the aircraft inverted and flew it into the ground

Summary of Findings - With a full "black box" fitted the Board could determine exactly what had occurred in the cockpit. The pilot appeared to have deliberately flown the aircraft into the ground. "The Board was satisfied that the final control inputs led directly to the loss of the aircraft." They found that the pilot had made an "error of judgement" though absolved him from blame. Higher Authority disputed this and decided that any "consideration of Human Failings" would serve no useful purpose.

Cause: Not positively determined - no findings of negligence

27 May 1993 - Hercules - all nine crew killed (no ADR or CVR)

Circumstances - the aircraft was exiting a drop zone after a para drop at low level; the aircraft became "trapped" in a valley and stalled, crashing, whilst trying to escape.

Summary of findings - The Board found that "the pilot had stalled the aircraft at a height from which recovery was impossible". With no CVR or ADR fitted the Board's findings remained conjecture. The AOC judged that findings of human failings would be "unsafe".

Cause: Not positively determined - no findings of negligence.

13 November 1990 - Jaguar - solo pilot killed (no ADR or CVR)

Circumstances - pilot hit sand bank during low level flying training

Summary of findings - The Board concluded that the cause of the accident was that the pilot inadvertently flew his aircraft into a ridge (largely due to visual illusion). The Board classed this as an "error of judgement", but this was overturned by Higher Authority.

Cause: Natural, Operating and Medical Risks (Operating Hazard) - no findings of negligence

26 August 1993 - Chipmunk - pilot killed, passenger survived (no ADR or CVR)

Circumstances - the pilot tried to turn the aircraft too tightly after take off and stalled, crashing

Summary of findings - The Board found that the [pilot .....mishandled the aircraft. The Board found that he had been negligent in attempting the manoeuvre but as they did not know if the aircraft had suffered a short term power loss could not be conclusive in its findings. Higher Authority rejected this idea as the Board could not establish with "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" the pilot's intentions.

Cause: Human factors (Aircrew) - no findings of negligence


Well, reverting to the gross negligence issue in this case, there was no jury at the time, but one might see the subsequent investigations by some of the top legal entities and MPs in the country as having exercised their equivalent judgement and common sense, and in all cases the Air Marshals' verdict has failed the test. Indeed, of course, the one thing that the RAF has learnt form the Mull of Kintyre is that their rules did not meet these tests and they have been changed such that today the Air Marshals could not make this judgement.

As Sir Menzies Campbell said, in giving his reaction to the PM's letter, on Newsnight Scotland last week the trouble is that MOD has developed a mind set. This is not a question of finding new evidence it is a question of MOD looking at the evidence that they have and recognising that it does not support a "Gross Negligence" verdict (something that I have been told was also said by the RAF's own professional flight safety organisation (the then IFS) to CAS at the time - long before external authorities became involved).

As a simple engineer could I suggest that the time of PPRuNers, who I assume are mostly professional aircrew, would be better spent fighting this continuing injustice against their fellow professionals rather than adding yet more hypotheses and speculation on the cause of the accident to the growing pile of what at the end of the day has to be categorised as fiction - interesting as some of the theories are! The cause of the accident will never be known - the injustice to the names of the dead aircrew is known to all, and MOD should be made to recognise that the judgements of the law apply to them as well as the rest of us. I would have hoped that PPRuNers could have made a major contribution to assisting that cause.

End

My thanks to Mr Blakeley for his support.

My best to all, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[slj]

Good letter in current edition of Private Eye (edition 1113, the one with Blunkett and his dog on front page).

Letter on page 13 top left corner is headed "Bad day at the office" and suggests that John Day's new job might have something to do with the Mull of Kintyre Chinook accident. letter suggests that Chinnook was unfit to fly.

[Argus]

slj

Any chance of a 'cut and paste' for those of us outside of the UK? The on line version of 'Private Eye' doesn't contain the letter you mention.

[slj]

Argus

Copied from Private Eye No 1113

Bad Day at the office

Sir,

Re: Biggles Fills His Pockets (1112). It doesn’t surprise me that Sir John Day is taking advantage of the revolving doors available to high-ranking military personnel. But it is interesting to speculate as to why he is so favoured.

May it be something to do with the Mull of Kintyre Chinook helicopter crash? It is ten years since the pilots of the Chinook were posthumously found guilty by the same day of “gross negligence” at the same time ignoring the findings of a board of inquiry that had not reached such a conclusion. Day went against established RAF protocol, which normally never blamed dead pilots. For the families and friends of flight lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Richard Crook, along with many service personnel, his pronouncement was a major injustice.

The reason Day said this was because he was not about to admit that the RAF’s biggest peacetime loss of life had been caused by using an aircraft that was unfit to fly.

I count myself privileged to have been an acquaintance of one of the pilot’s. I remember Rick’s pride in his job, something he took very seriously, and his profound sense of loyalty. In a world otherwise tainted with cynicism and bull****, the memory of his integrity still shines.

For John Day’s new civilian career, it doesn’t matter to me if he is appointed Pope; it will never wash away his guilt for that rotten pronouncement he gave 10 years ago.

Yours etc

TYRONE HOPES
Hook, Hants

[WOrkER]

A few comments/questions:

Tandemrotor: Your postings of 22/8, flying legally and flying negligently are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Do you really have to be given examples? Also, if at WP change the Chinook was not at low-level, high cruising speed and heading directly towards the Mull, then where was it and what was it doing, given that it was only some 20 seconds from impact? If you insist on saying we don't know, then presumably you also are unsure as to whether or not the sun will rise in the east tomorrow.

Mr Dixon, your posting of 21/8, If you really do believe there is no recorded time of WP change, then either you ignore the evidence or you have not read it.

Also, Mr Dixon, you may wish to ask Mr Blakeley if, given his records of RAF flying accidents, he can tell us if either Day or Wratten had any comment to make on the ones he quotes. It seems to me they may well have been in office at the time. If so, and if they did have comment as reviewing officers, what did they have to say and what does Blakeley conclude from such comments?

[Brian Dixon]

Hi WOrkER,
I have read the evidence. May I suggest you do too.

The AAIB's own report (in conjunction with the equipment manufacturer, RACAL) concluded that No time is recorded when the change to select waypoint B was made.

So, where else would you like me to look?
Check out the post I made on 12 Aug, if it helps you. If you have hard evidence of the time the change was made, please let me have it so that I can pass it on to the AAIB. I'm sure they would be most grateful.

If I may pick up on the point you make to Tandemrotor, and following on from what I have just said, your theory doesn't hold, due to the fact that no one knows what time the WP change was made.

With regards to your question to Mr Blakeley, I can tell you that I asked that very question to the MoD who advised me that it would be nigh on impossible for them to answer. They said that lists of RAF Boards of Inquiries showing, in each case, who the reviewing officers were, are not held. To specifically recall accidents against individual officers would require them to recall documents from the repository. That would be costly, and time consuming.
Personally, as it would have no bearing on the outcome of this particular accident, I didn't pursue the matter any further.

However, as your question is directed at Mr Blakeley, I shall leave it up to him whether or not he responds.

On a final point, my money is on the sun rising in the East

My best,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[jindabyne]

I was the President of a BoI which investigated a fatal Tornado accident in the mid-eighties. From the evidence available, we postulated that the crew had become disorientated whilst manoeuvring at lowish level, over the sea, at night. However, although the probability was high, there was insufficient evidence to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that this was the case. My reviewing officers agreed, and no blame was attached to the crew.

Having read through most of the detail of this case, and having regard for John Blakeley's references to previous accidents of a similar 'nature', I fail to grasp the mindset of the two Air Marshals; I'm not a conspiracy theorist, but am at a loss as to why they ignored 'convention'. It would also appear that the Air Rank Club has perhaps unsurprisingly gone to ground over the issue - given the findings of those previous accidents mentioned, there must be a few who are at odds with Day and Wratten?

Whither now Brian?

[Arkroyal]

WOrkER, your last post does you no favours.

So far, both sides here have argued as civil adults. Your petulant tone seems to show some annoyance at our disagreement with your theories.

On the contrary, we are able to accept that gross negligence is indeed one possible reason for this accident. It is a valid theory like any other.

As sure as the sun will rise in the east tomorrow, something caused this crash. If it can be determined beyond any doubt whatsoever, we'll all be happy. It can't. Therefore the finding is plain WRONG.

[walter kennedy]

jindabyne
I think your account of the Tornado accident inquiry is relevant here, the disorientation concept; let me paste part of the post by Brian Dixon on 23rd August 2004 on e-mail received from John Blakeley:
<<13 November 1990 - Jaguar
Circumstances - pilot hit sand bank during low level flying training.
Summary of findings - The Board concluded that the cause of the accident was that the pilot inadvertently flew his aircraft into a ridge (largely due to visual illusion).>>

I have had experience of the difficulty of judging range off a featureless sandbank, just like it is difficult to judge range off a headland whose ground detail is obscured by localized mist. That is why I have been perplexed by the lack of consideration (to any depth) of the problem that the crew would have had in judging their distance off the Mull in those conditions.
Bearing in mind how common the localized mist conditions are at the Mull, crews on many occasions on this leg would have had the same problem – but few commentators on this site seem willing to acknowledge this aspect, let alone discuss how crews would deal with it.
One well-placed witness gave me the impression that helicopters regularly turned in very close (along the shoreline) in identical weather conditions (as I witnessed myself on one such occasion) – this (late a turn in such conditions) would have made many such crews potentially negligent, according to some contributors BUT of course, they are looking at the flight of ZD576 as though it was a one off. If one considers it as one of many flights executing this close in turn in such conditions, then the question is was there an accepted practice or were the pilots left to their own devices? If the latter, then possible allegations of negligence should surely be directed to the superiors who did not envisage the regular encounter with this hazard.
I personally believe that there would have been an established practice – the obvious one being the use of DME in some form – and the IFF system in ZD576 was set so as to interrogate a “PRC” set in DME mode. Was there one for the use of such flights at the lighthouse pad?

[Tandemrotor]

WOrkER, welcome back, Perhaps I should begin by quoting from one of your earlier contributions:

"Whitehall staffs have no interest in the juvenile squabbling that often characterises this site. They have no interest in insults. In particular, anyone who proffers absurdities or inaccuracies is immediately condemned."

I shall choose to ignore the consistent tone of your postings, since it seems there are more important points to make.

For example, in a very recent exchange with Brian, you stated:

"Mr Dixon, your posting of 21/8, If you really do believe there is no recorded time of WP change, then either you ignore the evidence or you have not read it."

Come, come

Brian may be the least confrontational contributor to this discussion, but it seems you underestimate him, Allow me to explain why you should not repeat that mistake.

If you refer to your copy of "SUPERTANS INVESTIGATION REPORT", written by Racal Avionics Limited, and produced for the BOI, you will see that the ONLY recorded information at waypoint change, was a geographical position!

Defined by latitude and longitude, and known as the 'From' position.

NOTHING ELSE!

Para 2.12.5.3 States: "There is no time recorded when the pilot actually made the change to select waypoint 'B'."

So it is clear that Brian is correct, and you are, shall we say, out of step with the actualite?

This report is of course CRUCIAL, since it is the 'Source' document (and piece of equipment!) for the only RECORDED information pertaining to the approach of ZD576 to the Mull of Kintyre.

Indeed, I have heard John Day say that he was able to use the RNS252 Supertans as a 'rudimentary' flight data recorder!

Because, of course, ZD576 didn't have one did it?

So, shall we examine more closely, what was, and what was not, 'recorded'?

In so doing, it may prove instructive to keep in the back of our minds, an assertion of 'FACT' from you, and an assertion of 'FACT' from myself.

Your 'FACT': (p74)

"The pilots must have been in control until at least WP change. It is inconceivable that they would have made the three cockpit selections to change WP if out of control. We can also be in no doubt whatsoever that they were at low level and at high cruising speed, heading directly towards the Mull. This is not hypothesis. It is fact."

My 'FACT': (p77)

"I know as FACT that there is no SINGLE point (other than the point of impact) when we know with certainty, the aircraft's height, and speed, and attitude, and geographical position, or meteorological conditions."

I could of course have been less cautious, and stated that there is no 'recorded' information WHATSOEVER regarding aircraft speed, heading, or attitude. With the exception of the moment of impact, it simply does not exist!

But then perhaps I am being too scientific, or rigorous!

[Tandemrotor]

So, the Racal Avionics Limited document, named "SUPERTANS INVESTIGATION REPORT", dated 8 December 1994, begins with 8 paragraphs of 'Introduction', one of which states:

1.1.5 "The data extracted is that pertaining to the time of powerdown of the system.The equipment is not designed to provide 'historic' data, but attention has been paid to analysis of data items which may indicate the situation at a time earlier in the flight.

According to the manufacturer, who retrieved the data from SuperTANS, the equipment had been performing perfectly at the time of powerdown.

The next section is a summary of analysis:

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

1.2.1 All SuperTANS data are consistent with correct use of the navigation system.

1.2.2 The Super TANS was functioning throughout the flight until loss of power at 16:59.

1.2.3 The GPS position recorded at power down was N55 18.61', W005 47.80.

1.2.4 The Doppler position recorded at power down was N55 18.65', W005 47.49, approximately 330 metres east of the GPS position.

1.2.5 There were no alert conditions at the time of power down.

1.2.6 Positions and vectors held within the system at the time of loss of power, support correct operation of all sensors input to the SuperTANS.

1.2.7 A pressure setting (QNH) of 998 mbars had been entered. This parameter is used to calculate altitude above Mean Sea Level by the SuperTANS.

1.2.8 The altitude above Mean Sea Level was recorded at 665 feet (+-50ft) at powerdown.

1.2.9 The altitude above Mean Sea Level had been 468 feet (+-50ft) approximately 15 to 18 seconds earlier) There is no rate of climb information within SuperTANS.

1.2.10 The aircrew had used the system to select a new waypoint shortly before power down. The aircraft position at this time was over the sea, 0.95 nautical mile before the final position.

1.2.11 The calculated rate of change of heading was very close to zero, slightly turning right.

1.2.12 The attitude recorded at powerdown was pitch up 17.3*, roll left 10.1*

1.2.13 SuperTANS was commanding a steer left to turn towards the new waypoint.

This completes the summary of analysis, described in full to avoid any accusation of selective reporting!

So, I ask WOrkER once again, from where is your "FACTUAL" evidence regarding aircraft speed, altitude, and heading, at waypoint change recorded, or retrieved?

Or is it simply your HYPOTHESIS?

Any comments?

[meadowbank]

Some good material from Tandemrotor .

I have been in correspondence with the MoD with a hypothesis of my own for the cause of the accident. I don't wish to go into the hypothesis itself here, but part of the latest response that I have received is worth sharing for general discussion.

"It is acknowledged by all involved in this case that the aircraft was under the full control of the pilots at the time that the waypoint change was effected. By that time, the negligent act had already been committed. The pilots had already committed to a flight path which would take the helicopter too fast and too low, into cloud. In doing so, they failed in their duty of care, and it is this that is the basis of the finding of negligence."

This is the crux of the matter and, notwithstanding our individual preferred explanations for the crash, it is to show that no negligence can be proved up until this point that would unhinge the case for the prosecution and render a reversal of the finding compulsory. I shall therefore start the ball rolling again.

As Brian Dixon points out, we do not know the speed of the aircraft at the waypoint change. Mr Holbrook (the yachtsman) estimated that, when he saw the aircraft, it was travelling at 80-100 kts, but other estimates suggest that it must have been flying faster than that in order for it to achieve the impact speed estimated by the AAIB (whose estimate is, with all respect to the excellent work they do, an estimate). If Mr Holbrook's evidence could be verified (which it can't) this would already cast doubt on the negligence finding as the AMs contend that the aircraft should have been slowed down prior to the waypoint change. However, I suggest that this slowdown may not have been necessary. If the aircraft was flying at an indicated airspeed of 120-140 kts, resulting, with the tailwind component, in a higher groundspeed of the order of 140-160 kts. As the waypoint change was made some 0.81 nm from the lighthouse, it is reasonable to assume (all parties seem to be agreed on this) that the crew had identified the end of the Mull prior to this action. The Air Marshals’ view is that the crew should already have slowed down prior to this point, but what we cannot know is how much time elapsed between the crew identifying the Mull and the selection of the new waypoint. It is entirely possible that the crew had already had the Mull in sight for a considerable period of time, that they had been considering their options for a minute or more and therefore had no need to slow down as the Air Marshals suggest they should have done. At first sight it may seem unlikely that the crew had this much time to think, but all that would be needed, at a groundspeed of 150 kts, is an airborne visibility of 3.5nm (approximately 6.5 km) for this to have been possible. Given that Mr Holbrook had been able to discern breakers on the shoreline from his position at sea level, visibility away from the Mull, where the clouds were shrouding the hills, is likely to have been perfectly satisfactory for flying at a groundspeed of about 2.5 nm/minute (150-160 kts). A previous poster has even indicated that an eyewitness could see the Mull from the coast of Northern Ireland at the time. My own experience of low-flying around the West Coast of Scotland is that, generally speaking, when outside of any cloud one is flying in good visibility.

The fact that ZD576 must have been flying at about this speed at the time of impact and had therefore not slowed down prior to the waypoint change is a strong argument that the airborne visibility was perfectly adequate, rather than evidence that the crew had been negligent. It is certainly illogical to surmise that the crew had already "committed to a flightpath which would take the helicopter too fast and too low, into cloud."

Alternatively, the Air Marshals suggested the crew should already have decided to climb, but this would have been foolish, not only because of the icing conditions to be expected in the clouds in that position, but also because to turn early towards the next waypoint and to fly up the coast in VFR would have been so much easier.

The final alternative suggested by AM Day is that the crew should already have turned away from the Mull. I suggest that this is exactly what they attempted to do, but for some unknown reason (whether it be FADEC, UFCM, control jam or even meteorite strike, sudden appearance of another conflicting aircraft or whatever) they were prevented from doing so.

In all probability, the crew had no need to slow down because they were in visual contact with the coast of the Mull and only needed to make a 7 degree turn towards the next waypoint – a matter of certainly less than 5 seconds’ manoeuvring. I challenge the Air Marshals (or their 'supporters') to come up with an explanation as to why the crew would select the next waypoint if they had decided to fly "too fast and too low, into cloud", rather than make the small turn to the left.

To claim evidence that they were already negligent by the time they selected the waypoint change is nothing short of preposterous. There is simply no such evidence other than the circumstantial hypothesis that, having flown into the hill, they must have got there by simply carrying on, under full control, in a straight line! I accept that this remains a possibility, but that is all that it is - a possibility, and a fairly unlikely one at that! Certainly, it is not what happened "beyond any doubt whatsoever".

[WOrkER]

Tandemrotor: At the risk of irritating you even further, I should be most grateful for a clear answer to a straightforward question.

Are you saying that if the pilots were flying legally they could not have been flying negligently? (your posting of 16 Aug).

Your view here is fundamental to your approach to accident analysis, to your assessment of human failings, and to any point of continuing this exchange.

[Tandemrotor]

WOrkER

A clear answer to a straightforward question:

It is my firm belief that, this crew may well have been flying neither illegally, NOR negligently, AT waypoint change.

Can you (or the Air Marshalls) PROVE otherwise?

My view is indeed fundamental to my approach to accident analysis. To my view of human failings. I believe that any claims of 'FACT' should be supported by recorded evidence!

Not hypothesis

Not opinion

Not speculation

Isn't this the ONLY reasonable approach?

What say you?

I answered your question, now ,what about answering mine:

Tell us what PROVES negligence, before, or at waypoint change?

[Tandemrotor]

I genuinely hope you feel it worthwhile "continuing this exchange" since, if I have a truly open mind, you will be able to convince me of your case.

And if you have a truly open mind, I may be able to convince you of mine!

If this is not the case, I wish you all the very best, and I hope you accept, we both have genuinely held views, neither of which deserve, or require personal abuse.

Good luck to you, and rest assured, if the same situation befell you, I would defend you with equal vigour.

[WOrkER]

Tandemrotor: I hope you will accept that I mean no discourtesy to you or to anyone contributing to this site. I guess I just don't have a way with words.

You do, however. Your construction of your reply to my last posting avoids a direct answer to a simple question.

So I withdraw.

Bon chance

[Arkroyal]

At risk of being pedantic, worker, may I point out that your last but one post contained no questions, so it was not possible for TR to provide an answer!

I will say that it is quite possible to be flying legally and negligently at one and the same time.

Your problem is that with even the legality in doubt due to lack of evidence, then the negligence, needing proof beyond any doubt whatsoever, is even harder to pin down.

The extremely tight requirements of 'no doubt whatsoever' were required in this case because the pilots are dead. Since we'll never hear their side of the story, they must be given the benefit of the doubt (whether a large or tiny doubt).

[Tandemrotor]

meadowbank

Very many thanks for your posting. I think it would be interesting to chat, would you care to pm me?

So, here is the case as proposed by the MOD, communicated to meadowbank, and many others over a considerable period.

"It is acknowledged by all involved in this case that the aircraft was under the full control of the pilots at the time that the waypoint change was effected. By that time, the negligent act had already been committed. The pilots had already committed to a flight path which would take the helicopter too fast and too low, into cloud. In doing so, they failed in their duty of care, and it is this that is the basis of the finding of negligence."

This position is crystal clear, and UTTERLY crucial, and revealingly was a position, to my recollection, not adopted until after the FAI!

The attraction of this position for the MOD is that:

1) By implication, the very act of waypoint change, IS taken as PROOF that, the aircraft was under control at this moment! We have no RECORDING, what else can we go on!

2) If the aircraft was 'under the full control of the pilots' at waypoint change, and the negligence PRECEDED this moment, no consideration of any possible malfunction is required (Nothing occuring before, or subsequently could 'mitigate' their negligence in having reached THAT position!)

Case proven?

Let us see.

Consider how much FACTUAL information we have AT waypoint change:

a) GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION: 0.95nm from the accident location, 0.81nm from the lighthouse.

b) WEATHER: Impossible to accurately assess. Weather at ground level on the hillside, unquestionably poor, at least in patches, above 300ft. Weather out to sea, as described by a yachtsman, (the ONLY eye witness!)significantly better, very possibly good enough for VMC, and flight in accordance with VFR, with the coastline in view from some distance!

c) SPEED: Not known.

d) ALTITUDE: Not known.

e) HEADING: Not known.

f) ATTITUDE: Not known.

g) TIME: Not known.

h) RATE OF CLIMB: Not known.

i) INTENTIONS: Not known.

j) STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED:

ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER.

Guilty by waypoint change????

"too fast and too low into cloud"????

If only they had a data recorder - But they didn't did they!

[psyclic]

"It is acknowledged by all involved in this case that the aircraft was under the full control of the pilots at the time that the waypoint change was effected. By that time, the negligent act had already been committed. The pilots had already committed to a flight path which would take the helicopter too fast and too low, into cloud. In doing so, they failed in their duty of care, and it is this that is the basis of the finding of negligence."

Not "guilty by waypoint change" but guilty BEFORE waypoint change.

Ask the MOD to identify the geographical location of the aircraft, where they state the negligent act was committed.

[walter kennedy]

I posted some while ago that the actual waypoint they were plotting was probably the distinctive rock that the lighthouse keeper pointed out to me – where they turned “all the time” – presumably not the lighthouse itself because it was residential at the time and it would have been a bit rough turning heavy choppers right over it. This has been represented at the inquiries and in numerous PPRuNe postings as a minor error (sloppiness?) on the part of the crew in plotting the waypoint some several hundred metres out; interesting how no RAF men from such flights has had the decency to come forward and clear this little matter up.
AND this is the nub of the problem - input from men who actually flew such flights (SH on this leg) would have been crucial. That no one cleared up the above waypoint issue is a sad reflection of their integrity IF THEY ARE AT ALL AWARE OF IT – come on “Campaign”, you need to talk to them. I know that such flights in such conditions were regular so some should be around and available for comment.
After 10 years, there should be no doubt whatsoever about their intended flight plan – what should have been the starting point for inquiries and informal discussion.