Exercising the idea of SVFR was intended to break the mindset of strictly VFR or IMC which was used to stump any discussion about any special arrangements that could have been made to get around the problem of getting in close to the shoreline in those common weather conditions local to the Mull which otherwise spoiled a straightforward VFR flight at low level. SVFR is an example of just such a compromise/special arrangement.
FJJP says <<…The conditions reported by ground eye witnesses as to visibility are also meaningless…>> - I agree; I believe that the conditions were prevalent in that area – clear at sea up to the shoreline but the land covered in ground hugging mist that obscured ground detail making visual judgment of distance off difficult.
And <<None of your arguments detract from the contention that because we don't have crew statements or other definitive evidence, you cannot prove negligence beyond reasonable doubt.>> I have been trying to get to the truth by making the most use of available data as opposed to dismissing everything; an example is the reports of the radar track recording which not only have been omitted from consideration but have actually been denied having existed. I have never ever thought that this crew was negligent – betrayed, yes, but negligent, no.
And <<Looking at the map, logic dictates that the likely track from the intended Mull turning point (which would probably have been short of the coast) would have been northerly or slightly west of north. This would have had the aircraft flying more than 5nm west of the airfield, which would have put it outside the MATZ>> According to one of the lighthouse keepers and my own observation on one occasion (in identical weather conditions) helicopters on this leg turned so as to be right over the shoreline and followed the shoreline up some way – this may have resulted in crossing a bit closer in.
In the book “Phoenix…” by Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix page 367/8 we have the reported testimony of a Wing Commander <<It was his opinion that the crew had been attempting to fly around the Mull coast. Flight Lieutenant Tapper’s unanswered call to the Scottish Military at Prestwick about 5 minutes before the crash could have been the first contact to prepare for the WP change which would have necessitated the craft flying through a military air zone. Approach and tower frequencies at Macrihanish had been noted on the maps the pilots had prepared, showing they intend (sic) to fly through military airspace.>>.
I have also come across transcripts of radio traffic between ATC and low level US military helicopters making low level approaches to Macrihanish recorded by AMATEURS …
Beagle says <<… this is another red herring, as is the idea of little green men planting spoof beacons around the Mull...>> The little green men were US SEALs, equipped with communication sets that could be used as DME transponders; they were all over the crash site and said they were recovering their equipment – only one would have been used of course (perhaps they had trouble finding the hand held size device?). If the powers that be had decided to remove this team as an obstacle to the peace process (heaven forbid!) then these personnel would have been the logical choice. At the very least, they should have been formally questioned as to their activity – as should anyone with a possible motive found present at any possible crime scene.
Anyway, at this stage you are correct – we are a million miles from establishing whether a DME beacon was used or not, let alone how it could have been altered to give an incorrect reading. The trail is well cold for identifying the perpetrators.