Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Rudekid
I agree the Diana inquest is farcical (I’m not really interested in her story at all) – it’s just that little snippet that came out of it that I thought may get some of you thinking outside the box as the crash plot seems to have some credibility – and it does suggest some devious thinkers were around at the time, which was: << Counsel to the inquest Nicholas Hilliard said “A” had revealed there was a document, written in March 1993, about someone else in the Balkans, not Mr Milosevic, and that it was a “contingency plan”. (Telegraph, on line.)>>
.
As to your other digs, <<those more eloquent and qualified than I>> and << a powerful and informative thread >> have done little to answer those basic anomalies that I have listed previously.
Rather they have kept everyone running around in ever decreasing circles.
I have said this time and time again, one does not have to buy into the whole “conspiracy theory” – just do a thorough analysis and it should be apparent that the flight was doing something extra in the vicinity of the Mull – a by product is that the analysis refutes the arguments of “lost in IMC”, “overfly the Mull”, and “control jam”.
The “conspiracy theory” I have put forward is just to suggest possible motive and method for any willful interference – there are of course other possibilities but the first step is to do the analysis as far as is possible with the available data.
At the very least, the analysis I have done strongly suggests an extra tasking in the area of the Mull which has not been declared. Getting a consensus on what that task most probably was and pushing for its official disclosure is the most sure way of clearing the pilots’ names properly and perhaps getting real justice if the crash was someone else’s stuff up.
The only group of people (eg the Mull Group and other interested parties) that could have enough clout to do something use this forum – and there are plenty of experienced air crew and avionics techs and engineers who view it who could make sense of the data if it is presented in the right way – that’s why I am plugging away here, until the data’s meaning is understood and agreed upon and anomalies have been addressed.
I agree the Diana inquest is farcical (I’m not really interested in her story at all) – it’s just that little snippet that came out of it that I thought may get some of you thinking outside the box as the crash plot seems to have some credibility – and it does suggest some devious thinkers were around at the time, which was: << Counsel to the inquest Nicholas Hilliard said “A” had revealed there was a document, written in March 1993, about someone else in the Balkans, not Mr Milosevic, and that it was a “contingency plan”. (Telegraph, on line.)>>
.
As to your other digs, <<those more eloquent and qualified than I>> and << a powerful and informative thread >> have done little to answer those basic anomalies that I have listed previously.
Rather they have kept everyone running around in ever decreasing circles.
I have said this time and time again, one does not have to buy into the whole “conspiracy theory” – just do a thorough analysis and it should be apparent that the flight was doing something extra in the vicinity of the Mull – a by product is that the analysis refutes the arguments of “lost in IMC”, “overfly the Mull”, and “control jam”.
The “conspiracy theory” I have put forward is just to suggest possible motive and method for any willful interference – there are of course other possibilities but the first step is to do the analysis as far as is possible with the available data.
At the very least, the analysis I have done strongly suggests an extra tasking in the area of the Mull which has not been declared. Getting a consensus on what that task most probably was and pushing for its official disclosure is the most sure way of clearing the pilots’ names properly and perhaps getting real justice if the crash was someone else’s stuff up.
The only group of people (eg the Mull Group and other interested parties) that could have enough clout to do something use this forum – and there are plenty of experienced air crew and avionics techs and engineers who view it who could make sense of the data if it is presented in the right way – that’s why I am plugging away here, until the data’s meaning is understood and agreed upon and anomalies have been addressed.
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"and there are plenty of experienced air crew and avionics techs and engineers who view it who could make sense of the data if it is presented in the right way"
Did you ever wonder if they probably already had......? Add to that the fact that not one single solitary post in support of your conspiricy has ever been posted in here makes me wonder at what point you will actually see the blindingly obvious.
Did you ever wonder if they probably already had......? Add to that the fact that not one single solitary post in support of your conspiricy has ever been posted in here makes me wonder at what point you will actually see the blindingly obvious.
Firstly, I have said before I don’t believe Walter’s conspiracy theory involving AN/ARS-6(V) & AN/PRC112 (collectively termed AN/AYD-1 PLS). However, like all good conspiracy theories, there are elements which make it plausible. That is why it is so difficult to convincingly refute what he says. I would also say that Walter has been unfailingly polite in his posts and is entitled to his opinion.
The system is a well known one, and fully certified for use on the CH-47D. In the early 90s the PRC 112 was upgraded to include GPS, with DME retained for backward compatibility; a configuration that would require trialling. Trialling on an “opportunity basis” is very often the only methodology available when asset population is low/busy/in theatre, and especially when both Air and Land assets are required to interact. I say this to get it out of the way – it’s how things are done.
To refute Walter’s theory, it has been said it would be almost impossible to fit or carry such kit without a number of people knowing and records kept. (It can be “carry-on” equipment in the configuration which requires only aircraft power and single point intercomm access – not the only avionic kit with such an interface requirement, which on other RW platforms is facilitated through a single connector). There’s much that can be done on an ad hoc basis, but in this case I’d expect an extensive paper audit trail including a Service Deviation and Trials Directive.
Consider this. Not only can equipment be fitted with (what some would call reckless) disregard for the Airworthiness Requirements and Regulations laid down in Def Stan 00-970 and JSP 553, but at least three Boards of Inquiry into fatal accidents in the last 5 years have stated as much; in each case the installation / its use / its maintenance rendered the aircraft functionally unsafe. That is, not airworthy. The BoI reports are freely available – Tornado/Patriot, Nimrod MR2 and Sea King Mk7. And we know for certain that these requirements and regulations were routinely ignored (by some) in the subject Directorate General. (In fact, it was later ruled that refusing a directive NOT to implement them was a disciplinary offence).
Was there a conspiracy of silence in any of these cases? (“An agreement to say nothing about a matter”). What if I said that, post accident, an IPT denied the existence of a complete Data Pack (drawings, notes, correspondence, mod leaflets, etc)? That certain people had never worked in the IPT and no contracts existed to fit the offending installation. Claimed that one person had somehow fitted it to a whole aircraft fleet without their knowledge. In fact, denied the existence of an “extensive paper audit trail” (see above). This is indicative of how otherwise sensible people can take leave of these senses when acting together, and conspire to conceal the facts. How stupid is it to deny the existence of evidence that is available from numerous sources, and can even be viewed on any photograph of the aircraft? If people can do that, then some of what Walter suggests is entirely possible and an audit trail concealed.
It’s just that I don’t, in this case, believe it. I may be wrong. But, I have to admit that if you’d said to me in 1996 that 8 years later a group of people would deny knowledge of an aircraft installation that they themselves had attended meetings to discuss, approved, watched being fitted, signed off and had photographs of on their IPT office wall; and that that denial would taint the BoI report and perpetuate MoD’s ambivalence towards airworthiness and safety, I’d have said you were mad. I’d have been wrong. It’s why I am deeply suspicious of the MoD and its motives; and take everything they say with a pinch of salt.
The system is a well known one, and fully certified for use on the CH-47D. In the early 90s the PRC 112 was upgraded to include GPS, with DME retained for backward compatibility; a configuration that would require trialling. Trialling on an “opportunity basis” is very often the only methodology available when asset population is low/busy/in theatre, and especially when both Air and Land assets are required to interact. I say this to get it out of the way – it’s how things are done.
To refute Walter’s theory, it has been said it would be almost impossible to fit or carry such kit without a number of people knowing and records kept. (It can be “carry-on” equipment in the configuration which requires only aircraft power and single point intercomm access – not the only avionic kit with such an interface requirement, which on other RW platforms is facilitated through a single connector). There’s much that can be done on an ad hoc basis, but in this case I’d expect an extensive paper audit trail including a Service Deviation and Trials Directive.
Consider this. Not only can equipment be fitted with (what some would call reckless) disregard for the Airworthiness Requirements and Regulations laid down in Def Stan 00-970 and JSP 553, but at least three Boards of Inquiry into fatal accidents in the last 5 years have stated as much; in each case the installation / its use / its maintenance rendered the aircraft functionally unsafe. That is, not airworthy. The BoI reports are freely available – Tornado/Patriot, Nimrod MR2 and Sea King Mk7. And we know for certain that these requirements and regulations were routinely ignored (by some) in the subject Directorate General. (In fact, it was later ruled that refusing a directive NOT to implement them was a disciplinary offence).
Was there a conspiracy of silence in any of these cases? (“An agreement to say nothing about a matter”). What if I said that, post accident, an IPT denied the existence of a complete Data Pack (drawings, notes, correspondence, mod leaflets, etc)? That certain people had never worked in the IPT and no contracts existed to fit the offending installation. Claimed that one person had somehow fitted it to a whole aircraft fleet without their knowledge. In fact, denied the existence of an “extensive paper audit trail” (see above). This is indicative of how otherwise sensible people can take leave of these senses when acting together, and conspire to conceal the facts. How stupid is it to deny the existence of evidence that is available from numerous sources, and can even be viewed on any photograph of the aircraft? If people can do that, then some of what Walter suggests is entirely possible and an audit trail concealed.
It’s just that I don’t, in this case, believe it. I may be wrong. But, I have to admit that if you’d said to me in 1996 that 8 years later a group of people would deny knowledge of an aircraft installation that they themselves had attended meetings to discuss, approved, watched being fitted, signed off and had photographs of on their IPT office wall; and that that denial would taint the BoI report and perpetuate MoD’s ambivalence towards airworthiness and safety, I’d have said you were mad. I’d have been wrong. It’s why I am deeply suspicious of the MoD and its motives; and take everything they say with a pinch of salt.
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Tuc,
Like you I would not trust the MOD or most senior officers as far as I could throw them but in this case and with the length of time this campaign has been running it is utterly inconceivable that someone involved with what Walter suggests has not come forward by now.
The folk involved in what he is asking us to give credence to would all have moved on, many would have left the service and therefore have little to fear should they spill the beans but not a word has been said in support for him.
You are quite correct when you describe him as unfailingly polite in his posts and is entitled to his opinion however he has and continues to ask questions which he has had answers to from extremely knowledgeable folk who are as close to the heart of all this as you can get.
The thought that the rest of the Chinook force had no idea that what walter suggest was happening is plain daft and if it did happen the notion that out of some sense of loyalty to the MOD, who currently underfund, under pay and generally treat us in a shameful manner, people have kept quiet is barking mad.
I am sorry but I am of the opinion that he is now bordering on the edge of sanity as he is now seriously asking us to take something from the ludicrous "Diana" inquiry to help substantiate his claims. If there was even a hint of truth to what the mad arab says surely by now someone would have come forward, imagine what he would pay for the information to back up his claims..........
Like you I would not trust the MOD or most senior officers as far as I could throw them but in this case and with the length of time this campaign has been running it is utterly inconceivable that someone involved with what Walter suggests has not come forward by now.
The folk involved in what he is asking us to give credence to would all have moved on, many would have left the service and therefore have little to fear should they spill the beans but not a word has been said in support for him.
You are quite correct when you describe him as unfailingly polite in his posts and is entitled to his opinion however he has and continues to ask questions which he has had answers to from extremely knowledgeable folk who are as close to the heart of all this as you can get.
The thought that the rest of the Chinook force had no idea that what walter suggest was happening is plain daft and if it did happen the notion that out of some sense of loyalty to the MOD, who currently underfund, under pay and generally treat us in a shameful manner, people have kept quiet is barking mad.
I am sorry but I am of the opinion that he is now bordering on the edge of sanity as he is now seriously asking us to take something from the ludicrous "Diana" inquiry to help substantiate his claims. If there was even a hint of truth to what the mad arab says surely by now someone would have come forward, imagine what he would pay for the information to back up his claims..........
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PKPF
PKPF,
I can't answer your questions but out of interest, do happen to know if
1. The Machrihanish TAF was updated during the course of the afternoon outside the normal cycle.?
2. How it compared with the Islay (EGPI) for the same day.?
3. I seem to remember that Orsay was an automatic, are historical records kept?
can't find spidey in the dictionary either, praps he mean't spudey?
SMK
I can't answer your questions but out of interest, do happen to know if
1. The Machrihanish TAF was updated during the course of the afternoon outside the normal cycle.?
2. How it compared with the Islay (EGPI) for the same day.?
3. I seem to remember that Orsay was an automatic, are historical records kept?
can't find spidey in the dictionary either, praps he mean't spudey?
SMK
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PKPF
Ever watch a "Spider Man" movie - all would be revealed.
.
SFFP
I think I addressed that Diana thing in my recent post (#3259) – you must be desperate to spin it to this extent. – you rant like one of Orwell’s sheep.
.
RE your preceding post: <<"and there are plenty of experienced air crew and avionics techs and engineers who view it who could make sense of the data if it is presented in the right way"
Did you ever wonder if they probably already had......? >>
Well, I haven’t seen anything of it; they certainly haven’t made it available for members of the public with an interest in this case; the only decent analysis I have come across is By Mr. Mitchel of Boeing to which I have often referred.
What I have seen is misrepresentation of the weather and the a/c track from the inquiries – which I have described in a recent post with annotated maps.
Why didn’t any of you pick up that the actual position of waypoint change was bypassed to show a direct line to the crash site ignoring the steer to the right?
.
Again, the analysis of what the a/c had done from the available data is separate to the “conspiracy” theory as I have explained before – you (plural) seem to be using the “conspiracy theory” as a block to considering the conclusions of decent analysis. You can replicate the results yourselves using the Boeing analysis as a template – do the detailed chartwork. And while talking about doing the work for yourselves – why not go up to the Mull this summer and see for yourself those typical conditions in the evening with a southerly blowing (from a boat) – it’s not that far and a pleasant place to visit anyway. Take a GPS with you down to that landing area I have described previously and see just how close you can get to waypoint A without falling off the edge.
I think you would end up with them turning into the landmass from less than a mile away whilst still in clear conditions – with the power and instrument settings as found, the only rational explanation is that they were heading for that landing area for which waypoint A was an obvious inner marker.
Beyond this it is speculation (how they overshot, etc) – but the important point is that this landing area has never been mentioned at any of the inquiries.
My speculation is that helo pilots would only trust a point reference like a DME to approach that fast – but with no proof, it is indeed speculation. Others should have been addressing this starting with a good analysis.
.
<<… he has and continues to ask questions which he has had answers to from extremely knowledgeable folk …>>
But I have not had many answers at all (openly on the tread) and some of them have been obviously wrong – examples include:
The HSI course setting being irrelevant when they must have been on 027m for nearly 40 miles which got them directly to waypoint change, waypoint change to crash brg was 035m and this was found on handling pilot’s course selector;
The altimeter settings (BARO & RADALT alarm) were said to be irrelevant;
A call sign query was fobbed off with something about Tri-graphs;
Inquiring about the SSR Code (squawk) as seen on SSR earlier in the flight, no one recalled it and the existence of radar recordings were denied;
Etc, etc.
Oh, and of course the PLS – wouldn’t we all just love to know how the range and bearing gets displayed to the pilots in a/c fitted with ARS6 or equivalent?
Such an interesting system, that – wouldn’t mind betting it does get switched through to the HSIs somehow – otherwise, why the hell did they dump waypoint A when it was still ahead and the only reference they had (as far as we know) for judging their proximity to the landmass.
Come on you “extremely knowledgeable folk” – don’t tease.
Ever watch a "Spider Man" movie - all would be revealed.
.
SFFP
I think I addressed that Diana thing in my recent post (#3259) – you must be desperate to spin it to this extent. – you rant like one of Orwell’s sheep.
.
RE your preceding post: <<"and there are plenty of experienced air crew and avionics techs and engineers who view it who could make sense of the data if it is presented in the right way"
Did you ever wonder if they probably already had......? >>
Well, I haven’t seen anything of it; they certainly haven’t made it available for members of the public with an interest in this case; the only decent analysis I have come across is By Mr. Mitchel of Boeing to which I have often referred.
What I have seen is misrepresentation of the weather and the a/c track from the inquiries – which I have described in a recent post with annotated maps.
Why didn’t any of you pick up that the actual position of waypoint change was bypassed to show a direct line to the crash site ignoring the steer to the right?
.
Again, the analysis of what the a/c had done from the available data is separate to the “conspiracy” theory as I have explained before – you (plural) seem to be using the “conspiracy theory” as a block to considering the conclusions of decent analysis. You can replicate the results yourselves using the Boeing analysis as a template – do the detailed chartwork. And while talking about doing the work for yourselves – why not go up to the Mull this summer and see for yourself those typical conditions in the evening with a southerly blowing (from a boat) – it’s not that far and a pleasant place to visit anyway. Take a GPS with you down to that landing area I have described previously and see just how close you can get to waypoint A without falling off the edge.
I think you would end up with them turning into the landmass from less than a mile away whilst still in clear conditions – with the power and instrument settings as found, the only rational explanation is that they were heading for that landing area for which waypoint A was an obvious inner marker.
Beyond this it is speculation (how they overshot, etc) – but the important point is that this landing area has never been mentioned at any of the inquiries.
My speculation is that helo pilots would only trust a point reference like a DME to approach that fast – but with no proof, it is indeed speculation. Others should have been addressing this starting with a good analysis.
.
<<… he has and continues to ask questions which he has had answers to from extremely knowledgeable folk …>>
But I have not had many answers at all (openly on the tread) and some of them have been obviously wrong – examples include:
The HSI course setting being irrelevant when they must have been on 027m for nearly 40 miles which got them directly to waypoint change, waypoint change to crash brg was 035m and this was found on handling pilot’s course selector;
The altimeter settings (BARO & RADALT alarm) were said to be irrelevant;
A call sign query was fobbed off with something about Tri-graphs;
Inquiring about the SSR Code (squawk) as seen on SSR earlier in the flight, no one recalled it and the existence of radar recordings were denied;
Etc, etc.
Oh, and of course the PLS – wouldn’t we all just love to know how the range and bearing gets displayed to the pilots in a/c fitted with ARS6 or equivalent?
Such an interesting system, that – wouldn’t mind betting it does get switched through to the HSIs somehow – otherwise, why the hell did they dump waypoint A when it was still ahead and the only reference they had (as far as we know) for judging their proximity to the landmass.
Come on you “extremely knowledgeable folk” – don’t tease.
Walter,
At least one SH pilot has told you that the SHI bug is not normally used for VFR flight. I have recently confirmed this with a member of my family who is a military helicopter pilot. I understand that the normal practice is to have one bug set on wind direction. Is it possible that this bug was set to show the downwind direction, i.e direction of drift?
At least one SH pilot has told you that the SHI bug is not normally used for VFR flight. I have recently confirmed this with a member of my family who is a military helicopter pilot. I understand that the normal practice is to have one bug set on wind direction. Is it possible that this bug was set to show the downwind direction, i.e direction of drift?
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Pulse1
Try not to confuse the “Heading Bug” (HB) with the “Course Selector” (CS).
Both would be on the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) on a 47D Chinook (and therefore presumably on an HC2 Chinook).
The HB can be used in a couple of ways: say, your are flying VFR – you can turn the HB knob until it is on the heading that you desire and it will be a simple reminder – if you have an idea of how many degrees the wind is blowing you off track, you can add that to your heading, increment or decrement the HB’s position on the rose accordingly, and that will be a simple reminder for you of the direction to steer to keep you efficiently on a straight line for your desired track/route.
Further, when the autopilot is engaged it will keep the a/c heading on the heading that the HB is on.
.
The CS comprises an arrow and parallel bars (referred to commonly as “Track Bars”) and/or a centre line (the bars/centre line are the “Course Deviation Indicator” - CDI).
The CS arrow is moved around the compass rose by turning a knob on the HSI and the heading to which the arrow is pointing on the compass rose is repeated as a three digit number in a window in the instrument, a bit like the old mechanical odometers in cars (this number was preserved in ZD576 so we know what the CS was set to on the handling pilot’s HSI).
The CS is used for navigation tracking – that is, put simply, keeping you right on the line/route/track that you wish to follow over the ground as determined by whatever navigation system you are using – in 47Ds, the Mode Selector panel for the HSI gives a choice of the CS working off the GPS/Doppler nav computer (eg a SuperTANS) or a Radio Nav aid (VOR, TACAN, etc – whatever your nav radio is tuned to).
For example, if you are familiar with VOR operation you know that you can get a precise heading from/to a VOR beacon; if you were doing the old VOR navigation (in pre GPS days the most common method for aerodrome to aerodrome nav) you would have your nav radio tuned to the aerodrome of departure’s VOR, set the CS to the desired track away from that aerodrome, and the CDI will tell you if you are off track, and you steer towards the CDI to get back on track, etc..
The way a nav computer inputs the CS is more relevant to this case: if you want to go to a waypoint, the GPS/Doppler computer will calculate the required heading and also calculate continuously your adherence/deviation from that track.
Even if you are flying VFR, a navigation system prevents you getting lost and keeps you on an efficient course!
By the time ZD576 had reached the critical area it had already covered almost 40 miles (VFR); this included many miles over the Antrim hills where conditions were not very good and several miles over the sea while the nearest landmass ahead was shrouded in cloud and mist; yet they got to the position of waypoint change (about a mile from the coast) which was exactly on the 027 radial (magnetic bearing) from Aldergrove – the very radial that they had declared to ATC that they would be following.
Speed/distance/time calculations by Boeing’s Mr Mitchel deduced that they had to have been very much on track the whole way to that point – in a helicopter with a strong wind blowing.
It would seem obvious that, up until this position of waypoint change, the handling pilot would have had 027 on his CS.
(The non-handling pilot had 028 on his and he wasn’t the driver.)
After the waypoint was changed in the nav computer, the a/c turned right and made a track corresponding to a magnetic heading of 035 to the crash site – this was the setting found on the handling pilot’s CS.
The nature of the knob makes it unlikely that it could have been displaced by so much in the impact and besides the a/c had followed that track on its final leg.
This implies that the turn was intentional and, as I have tried to explain, there must have been a navigation system that could determine that track or surely the pilot would not have bothered turning the CS knob to that heading – remember, if you needed a simple reminder (unlikely in close manouevring) you could always use the heading bug.
Now there was no known suitable radio navaid in that direction, and no waypoint was stored in the SuperTANS that would have been of any use to the CS on that heading – a bit of an enigma?
.
Anyway, I hope you see my point as to the relevance of the CS setting.
I believe that the combination of their dumping the (still useful) waypoint A from the SuperTANS and the selection of a new course on the CS suggests that they had some other navaid to work off – the only one I can think of is a PRC112 but I am told that this was not possible.
If the system had been under trial/demonstration/exercise on this occasion, I would suggest that it looks like they were expecting it to have been at the landing area but it was actually up the hill.
Any other suggestions welcome.
Try not to confuse the “Heading Bug” (HB) with the “Course Selector” (CS).
Both would be on the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) on a 47D Chinook (and therefore presumably on an HC2 Chinook).
The HB can be used in a couple of ways: say, your are flying VFR – you can turn the HB knob until it is on the heading that you desire and it will be a simple reminder – if you have an idea of how many degrees the wind is blowing you off track, you can add that to your heading, increment or decrement the HB’s position on the rose accordingly, and that will be a simple reminder for you of the direction to steer to keep you efficiently on a straight line for your desired track/route.
Further, when the autopilot is engaged it will keep the a/c heading on the heading that the HB is on.
.
The CS comprises an arrow and parallel bars (referred to commonly as “Track Bars”) and/or a centre line (the bars/centre line are the “Course Deviation Indicator” - CDI).
The CS arrow is moved around the compass rose by turning a knob on the HSI and the heading to which the arrow is pointing on the compass rose is repeated as a three digit number in a window in the instrument, a bit like the old mechanical odometers in cars (this number was preserved in ZD576 so we know what the CS was set to on the handling pilot’s HSI).
The CS is used for navigation tracking – that is, put simply, keeping you right on the line/route/track that you wish to follow over the ground as determined by whatever navigation system you are using – in 47Ds, the Mode Selector panel for the HSI gives a choice of the CS working off the GPS/Doppler nav computer (eg a SuperTANS) or a Radio Nav aid (VOR, TACAN, etc – whatever your nav radio is tuned to).
For example, if you are familiar with VOR operation you know that you can get a precise heading from/to a VOR beacon; if you were doing the old VOR navigation (in pre GPS days the most common method for aerodrome to aerodrome nav) you would have your nav radio tuned to the aerodrome of departure’s VOR, set the CS to the desired track away from that aerodrome, and the CDI will tell you if you are off track, and you steer towards the CDI to get back on track, etc..
The way a nav computer inputs the CS is more relevant to this case: if you want to go to a waypoint, the GPS/Doppler computer will calculate the required heading and also calculate continuously your adherence/deviation from that track.
Even if you are flying VFR, a navigation system prevents you getting lost and keeps you on an efficient course!
By the time ZD576 had reached the critical area it had already covered almost 40 miles (VFR); this included many miles over the Antrim hills where conditions were not very good and several miles over the sea while the nearest landmass ahead was shrouded in cloud and mist; yet they got to the position of waypoint change (about a mile from the coast) which was exactly on the 027 radial (magnetic bearing) from Aldergrove – the very radial that they had declared to ATC that they would be following.
Speed/distance/time calculations by Boeing’s Mr Mitchel deduced that they had to have been very much on track the whole way to that point – in a helicopter with a strong wind blowing.
It would seem obvious that, up until this position of waypoint change, the handling pilot would have had 027 on his CS.
(The non-handling pilot had 028 on his and he wasn’t the driver.)
After the waypoint was changed in the nav computer, the a/c turned right and made a track corresponding to a magnetic heading of 035 to the crash site – this was the setting found on the handling pilot’s CS.
The nature of the knob makes it unlikely that it could have been displaced by so much in the impact and besides the a/c had followed that track on its final leg.
This implies that the turn was intentional and, as I have tried to explain, there must have been a navigation system that could determine that track or surely the pilot would not have bothered turning the CS knob to that heading – remember, if you needed a simple reminder (unlikely in close manouevring) you could always use the heading bug.
Now there was no known suitable radio navaid in that direction, and no waypoint was stored in the SuperTANS that would have been of any use to the CS on that heading – a bit of an enigma?
.
Anyway, I hope you see my point as to the relevance of the CS setting.
I believe that the combination of their dumping the (still useful) waypoint A from the SuperTANS and the selection of a new course on the CS suggests that they had some other navaid to work off – the only one I can think of is a PRC112 but I am told that this was not possible.
If the system had been under trial/demonstration/exercise on this occasion, I would suggest that it looks like they were expecting it to have been at the landing area but it was actually up the hill.
Any other suggestions welcome.
If you’re an engineer or suffer from another nervous complaint, look away now.
While considering a question PM’d to me, Walter’s posts came to mind. Essentially, he is talking about what would be a Service Engineered Modification which hadn’t been appraised or trialled properly and for which, perhaps, no proper instructions had been prepared. That is, almost every rule in the airworthiness book had been breached. A common enough occurrence, as pointed out by many fatal accident BoIs and the Public Accounts Committee.
It made me think of a SEM which had been fitted to a helo in the late 80s, and remained there until 2002. It HAD been through appraisal, industry had stated “Yes, it’s physically safe, but it doesn’t work, therefore the notional operating instructions are worthless” or words to that effect. This was ignored, the mod kits assembled (another breach, but move on….) and fitted. The crews soon discovered something. It seemed safe, didn’t work and the instructions were crap. What do you do now?????
Well, the usual reports were raised and, independently, the MoD(PE) aircraft project office (who of course have nothing to do with SEMs) offered to fix it. (Informed opinion, later proven correct, was that the design was “95% ok, but the 5% was a howler”). All were ignored and the squadron told to get on with it. What do you do now???
Answer. You, the aircrew, take tools onboard, cut the SEM wiring out, bag it and stuff it under your seat. When you return, you naturally report the SEM doesn’t work. The maintainers promptly reinstall it, test it as best they can (but of course it doesn’t work), you take the aircraft (and wire cutters) out again and………… For years on end until replaced by a proper Design Authority mod.
My points are these. Do not lightly dismiss things which seem impossible. In the above (very real) example one only had to go up one level to reach the common denominator with, in engineering management oversight terms, Chinook. Now go through 00-970 and 553 and tell me how many breaches I mention, which everyone at the air station accepted and put up with, because they were told to. Oh, and the PE project manager who offered to make the system and aircraft functionally safe was crucified by the same management team.
You can look now.
While considering a question PM’d to me, Walter’s posts came to mind. Essentially, he is talking about what would be a Service Engineered Modification which hadn’t been appraised or trialled properly and for which, perhaps, no proper instructions had been prepared. That is, almost every rule in the airworthiness book had been breached. A common enough occurrence, as pointed out by many fatal accident BoIs and the Public Accounts Committee.
It made me think of a SEM which had been fitted to a helo in the late 80s, and remained there until 2002. It HAD been through appraisal, industry had stated “Yes, it’s physically safe, but it doesn’t work, therefore the notional operating instructions are worthless” or words to that effect. This was ignored, the mod kits assembled (another breach, but move on….) and fitted. The crews soon discovered something. It seemed safe, didn’t work and the instructions were crap. What do you do now?????
Well, the usual reports were raised and, independently, the MoD(PE) aircraft project office (who of course have nothing to do with SEMs) offered to fix it. (Informed opinion, later proven correct, was that the design was “95% ok, but the 5% was a howler”). All were ignored and the squadron told to get on with it. What do you do now???
Answer. You, the aircrew, take tools onboard, cut the SEM wiring out, bag it and stuff it under your seat. When you return, you naturally report the SEM doesn’t work. The maintainers promptly reinstall it, test it as best they can (but of course it doesn’t work), you take the aircraft (and wire cutters) out again and………… For years on end until replaced by a proper Design Authority mod.
My points are these. Do not lightly dismiss things which seem impossible. In the above (very real) example one only had to go up one level to reach the common denominator with, in engineering management oversight terms, Chinook. Now go through 00-970 and 553 and tell me how many breaches I mention, which everyone at the air station accepted and put up with, because they were told to. Oh, and the PE project manager who offered to make the system and aircraft functionally safe was crucified by the same management team.
You can look now.
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John Purdey
I've been reviewing the last few pages of this thread and noticed that you have not commented on my post of 17th Feb (#3223 on Page 215). I'm sure this wasn't deliberate and would be interested in your response.
I've been reviewing the last few pages of this thread and noticed that you have not commented on my post of 17th Feb (#3223 on Page 215). I'm sure this wasn't deliberate and would be interested in your response.
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Meadow,
Just re read yours and as with my post at #3242 I am not sure the obvious answers are ones that JP would be prepared to give. He has told us about his inadvertent IMC experience and when I pointed out the similarities in this case it all went quiet. Perhaps your prompt will spur him into life.
Just re read yours and as with my post at #3242 I am not sure the obvious answers are ones that JP would be prepared to give. He has told us about his inadvertent IMC experience and when I pointed out the similarities in this case it all went quiet. Perhaps your prompt will spur him into life.
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Seldom
Let's hope so, as I'm intrigued.
An IMC Rate 1 turn at very low level, whether over land or sea, following an inadvertent entry into fog/cloud seems like a suicidal option to me. If JP did that repeatedly, as he states, it's hardly surprising that he is so convinced that ZD 576 was flown with similar disregard for safety!
What is surprising is that he's still here to express an opinion at all!
Let's hope so, as I'm intrigued.
An IMC Rate 1 turn at very low level, whether over land or sea, following an inadvertent entry into fog/cloud seems like a suicidal option to me. If JP did that repeatedly, as he states, it's hardly surprising that he is so convinced that ZD 576 was flown with similar disregard for safety!
What is surprising is that he's still here to express an opinion at all!
Last edited by meadowbank; 28th Feb 2008 at 10:48. Reason: To improve layout.
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Ancient Aviator,
Name calling between pots and kettles springs to mind - YOU have not responded to post 3245.
With regard to JP, a little simple mental arithmatic should give you the answer. If he was flying Hunters in Germany/ Sicily in the 60's then it is highly likely that he has now reached the Biblical "three score years and ten" and his health may not be what it once was. On the other hand he may have gone for a Caribbean Cruise to get away from the winter.
Navigation was very much a visual art in those days backed up by radio bearings and "Rebecca/Eureka" (if fitted). If you pulled up because of weather over Sicily you then had the problem of getting down again with the assistance of an Italian operator for whom Italian (let alone English) was not his normal language of communication. You only have to look at what happened at West Raynham when they launched in fog and the clearance never occurred. The approach and navigation aids you take for granted simply did not exist back then.
JP - If you read this - my apologies for pre-empting you.
Name calling between pots and kettles springs to mind - YOU have not responded to post 3245.
With regard to JP, a little simple mental arithmatic should give you the answer. If he was flying Hunters in Germany/ Sicily in the 60's then it is highly likely that he has now reached the Biblical "three score years and ten" and his health may not be what it once was. On the other hand he may have gone for a Caribbean Cruise to get away from the winter.
Navigation was very much a visual art in those days backed up by radio bearings and "Rebecca/Eureka" (if fitted). If you pulled up because of weather over Sicily you then had the problem of getting down again with the assistance of an Italian operator for whom Italian (let alone English) was not his normal language of communication. You only have to look at what happened at West Raynham when they launched in fog and the clearance never occurred. The approach and navigation aids you take for granted simply did not exist back then.
JP - If you read this - my apologies for pre-empting you.
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And of course all those language and weather problems you mention in JP's defence justify him simply pressing on and the inevitable inadvertent entry into IMC.........what a load of old cobblers 
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Caz,
What assessment is that then, trying to put words into my mouth? I have made my thoughts on what probably happened clear in here before now and I do think the crew probably did get it wrong. But MY OPINION of what PROBABLY happened, like the 2 AM's does not cut the mustard old chap as you and JP fine well know.
Now back to what I previously said are you seriously telling us that JP was JUSTIFIED in inadvertently entering IMC just because of historical weather conditions and a language barrier, simple enough question I think
What assessment is that then, trying to put words into my mouth? I have made my thoughts on what probably happened clear in here before now and I do think the crew probably did get it wrong. But MY OPINION of what PROBABLY happened, like the 2 AM's does not cut the mustard old chap as you and JP fine well know.
Now back to what I previously said are you seriously telling us that JP was JUSTIFIED in inadvertently entering IMC just because of historical weather conditions and a language barrier, simple enough question I think
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cazatou (K52)
The difference between 'JT' and 'JP', is that JP is around to confirm that is what he did.
Tragically there can be no such clarification from JT, nor indeed RC!
There's is simply an allegation which must be judged on the standard of proof required!
There is NO equivalence between the two.
The difference between 'JT' and 'JP', is that JP is around to confirm that is what he did.
Tragically there can be no such clarification from JT, nor indeed RC!
There's is simply an allegation which must be judged on the standard of proof required!
There is NO equivalence between the two.