I think that most of us are bemused as to why they chose to find these guys "grossly negligent" and equally bemused as to why the MoD can't now turn round and own up to a mistake having been made.
I know it seems unlikely that the AM's wanted to make an example of these guys, despite there being no evidence, but you might be interested to know that AM Wratten wrote to his Group Commanders early in 1995, saying (and I quote the letter in front of me verbatim)........
"DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
1. You will know that, since taking up my appointment as Air Officer Commanding in Chief, I have been particularly concerned about aircraft accidents brought about by carelessness or indiscipline. By definition, such accidents are avoidable and I have made my views known on a number of occasions. In particular, I addressed the subject in the foreword to the Stike Command Flight Safety Review, published last October, and I spoke about it at my first Group Commanders' Conference in November and again in the presence of Group, Station and Squadron Commanders at the Waddington Air Power Symposium. You will remember that I also touched on the subject during my address to the Air Rank Officers' Conference in December. Nobody involved in the conduct or supervision of flying operations in Strike Command should therefore be in any doubt as to my stance on this issue which is, simply, that I will not tolerate shortcomings of concentration or personal discipline in aircrew.
2. It follows that I wish to put this policy into practical effect by ensuring that formal disciplinary action is taken whenever, following Board of Inquiry or Unit Inquiry investigations, clear evidence emerges of unmitigated indiscipline or negligence. The increasing incidence of such cases suggests that past practice, which has been to shun the disciplinary approach (even in some quite serious cases) is no longer appropriate to the high standards the Royal Air Force is entitled to expect from its aircrew, although of course an interview with the AOC remains available in cases of minor negligence, or where there is judged to be considerable mitigation. Formal disciplinary action has always been an option open to us and we should not steer away from it when it is clearly appropriate.
3. To give effect to this policy and in order to ensure consistency throughout the Command, aircrew who are involved in a flying accident are not to be cleared to resume flying duties until sufficient evidence has emerged to indicate whether or not there are possible issues of serious negligence, indiscipline or incompetence to address. Once that position is reached, which in most cases should only be a week or two into the inquiry, I wish you to refer the decision on resumption of flying to me, with your recommendation. In this respect I do not anticipate that all aircrew who are warned under QR 1269 will necessarily be grounded. Equally, a decision to ground would not necessarily imply that disciplinary action will follow. But I would hope and expect that a grounding decision would capture all those aircrew against whom subsequent disciplinary action, or action under QR 1021, proved necessary for reasons of carelessness, indiscipline or incompetence. However, a decision to allow an individual to resume flying would not necessarily preclude disciplinary or administrative action being taken subsequently.
4. In such cases of serious human failing, when it comes to forming your recommendations for disposal, I would wish you to consult with AOA and with DLS(RAF) and, if they advise that there is a prima facie case to answer, to prepare either a formal charge for disposal by the Appropriate Superior Authority or, in the most serious cases, disposal by Court Martial. This will also ensure consistent treatment across the Command. No action should of course be taken on your recommendation until endorsed by me in the usual way.
5. In summary, aircrew and their supervisors should be in no doubt that honest professional endeavour will never bring censure - and will indeed attract my strong support - even when in trying circumstances mistakes are made, as they surely will be. On the other hand, I wish you also to convey, once again, the clear message through the command chain that unmitigated carelessness or indiscipline will not be tolerated and will be met with formal proceedings. This will of course in no way undermine the certainty for those affected of a fair and unbiased hearing with all the safeguards entailed in the legal process.
6. I am content for this letter to be copied verbatim to Station Commanders."
The letter is signed by W. J. Wratten, AOCINC, STC
This letter was written AFTER the Chinook accident, but BEFORE the AMs' decision to find Tapper & Cook grossly negligent was published. I feel sure that AM Day's stance will have been affected by his master's (Wratten's) words, indeed I'd be very surprised if the 2 of them didn't discuss the case before Day made his initial judgement or that he (Day) might find it beneficial (to himself) to adopt the same stance. The words in the letter speak volumes. He (Wratten) has ignored his own promise to support "honest professional endeavour" in favour of finding these fine young officers negligent, despite having no evidence for such a finding. My contempt knows no bounds.