Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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HOL Report
Chinook 240
I have a copy of part of Mr Cable's evidence. Not sure about posting large parts of an HOL report on the site so here is where I obtained my information:
Quote:
In laymans terms what the simulation demonstrated was that, in order to have created the conditions found by Mr Cable in the course of his examination of the wreckage of the aircraft and the site of its initial impact, the aircraft would have had to have been climbing at 150 knots airspeed and a rate of 1,000 feet per minute when control inputs postulated were made 2.9 seconds before the initial impact. And the result of these control inputs was to bring about a cyclic flare over a distance of 812 feet during which the aircraft's nose pitched up to the 31 degrees from the horizontal, its climb increased to 20 degrees above the horizontal, it gained 120 feet in height and its airspeed dropped from 150 to 135 knots.
That is where my 150 IAS comes from. I should have said "shortly before impact."
I have a copy of part of Mr Cable's evidence. Not sure about posting large parts of an HOL report on the site so here is where I obtained my information:
Quote:
In laymans terms what the simulation demonstrated was that, in order to have created the conditions found by Mr Cable in the course of his examination of the wreckage of the aircraft and the site of its initial impact, the aircraft would have had to have been climbing at 150 knots airspeed and a rate of 1,000 feet per minute when control inputs postulated were made 2.9 seconds before the initial impact. And the result of these control inputs was to bring about a cyclic flare over a distance of 812 feet during which the aircraft's nose pitched up to the 31 degrees from the horizontal, its climb increased to 20 degrees above the horizontal, it gained 120 feet in height and its airspeed dropped from 150 to 135 knots.
That is where my 150 IAS comes from. I should have said "shortly before impact."
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I posted a while ago the argument that they may not have climbed at all between waypoint change and impact - remember that just two points gave an indication of climb: last altitude update and point of impact; the encoding altimeter has a very coarse resolution and, all factors put in, from the highest level to the point of impact was easily within the height that the airmass would have carried them up the slope.
I have it that they were coasting in, letting their speed wash off a bit, and not intentionally climbing.
That the final control inputs were the result of a last moment realisation of their proximity to the ground is evidenced by the state of the engines - while (as Chinook 240 reminds us) actuators had responded meaningfully to the control inputs, the engines had not time to increase power - let me repeat briefly my previous detailed explanation of this because it offers such an important clue as to what happened:
the engine management system tries to hold rotor RPM to 100% +/- 0.5%;
the engines were found matched, something which may take a moment for either the FADEC or a pilot (with his beep trim) to achieve - this indicates that a steady state had preceded any last moment thrust demand;
the power level was intermediate, consistent with slowing down as to have maintained their cruising speed would have required a higher level;
as one slows down (as in coasting/letting the speed wash off whilst maintaining altitude and aircraft attitude) from a high speed the drag on the rotors reduces and there would be a tendency for them to speed up but the engine management system will reduce the fuel to keep the rotors within the +/- 0.5% - hence in this scenario one would expect the rotors to have been at 100.5% which what they were found to have been at at impact;
as already mentioned, controls had been moved which had meaningful results in the various servos/actuators consistent with a manoeuvre other than carrying on straight and level and it would have been consistent with a last moment evasive manoeuvre to have pulled up on the collective/thrust lever and this was very much the case (really was pulled up wasn't it) BUT
this would have been demanding full/emergency power as Sqn Ldr Burke so rightly commented saying that it would have been impossible to have maintained rotor RPM with that demand - I SAY THAT THE ROTORS HAD NOT HAD TIME TO SLOW DOWN SO LITTLE WAS THE TIME BETWEEN THIS DEMAND AND IMPACT.
So steady state intermediate power to an extreme demand which did not have time to manifest itself - they were surprised at their proximity to the ground.
I have it that they were coasting in, letting their speed wash off a bit, and not intentionally climbing.
That the final control inputs were the result of a last moment realisation of their proximity to the ground is evidenced by the state of the engines - while (as Chinook 240 reminds us) actuators had responded meaningfully to the control inputs, the engines had not time to increase power - let me repeat briefly my previous detailed explanation of this because it offers such an important clue as to what happened:
the engine management system tries to hold rotor RPM to 100% +/- 0.5%;
the engines were found matched, something which may take a moment for either the FADEC or a pilot (with his beep trim) to achieve - this indicates that a steady state had preceded any last moment thrust demand;
the power level was intermediate, consistent with slowing down as to have maintained their cruising speed would have required a higher level;
as one slows down (as in coasting/letting the speed wash off whilst maintaining altitude and aircraft attitude) from a high speed the drag on the rotors reduces and there would be a tendency for them to speed up but the engine management system will reduce the fuel to keep the rotors within the +/- 0.5% - hence in this scenario one would expect the rotors to have been at 100.5% which what they were found to have been at at impact;
as already mentioned, controls had been moved which had meaningful results in the various servos/actuators consistent with a manoeuvre other than carrying on straight and level and it would have been consistent with a last moment evasive manoeuvre to have pulled up on the collective/thrust lever and this was very much the case (really was pulled up wasn't it) BUT
this would have been demanding full/emergency power as Sqn Ldr Burke so rightly commented saying that it would have been impossible to have maintained rotor RPM with that demand - I SAY THAT THE ROTORS HAD NOT HAD TIME TO SLOW DOWN SO LITTLE WAS THE TIME BETWEEN THIS DEMAND AND IMPACT.
So steady state intermediate power to an extreme demand which did not have time to manifest itself - they were surprised at their proximity to the ground.
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This clip is just a little reminder of who were lost that day.
pprune posts :: May2011Vid4PPRUNE.mp4 video by grauniad - Photobucket
How happy would you be selling the airworthiness aspect to these guys if it had been colleagues rather than themselves who had perished?
pprune posts :: May2011Vid4PPRUNE.mp4 video by grauniad - Photobucket
How happy would you be selling the airworthiness aspect to these guys if it had been colleagues rather than themselves who had perished?
Last edited by walter kennedy; 27th May 2011 at 20:50. Reason: typo
How happy would you be selling the airworthiness aspect
Walter, may I suggest you put this question to Lord Philip, so that he may ask the RAF Chief Engineer; who had been duly informed of the systemic airworthiness failings by the Inspector of Flight Safety before the crash. And ask how many of the report's recommendations were implemented before the Mk2 RTS was issued by ACAS, who was also told by IFS. And how many remained outstanding when C130 XV179 and Nimrod XV230 crashed. And how many still remain.
You don't have to sell anyone the report. CE and ACAS had a duty to warn users, order corrective action and ensure it was implemented.
pprune posts :: May2011Vid4PPRUNE.mp4 video by grauniad - Photobucket :
And they didn't get it, and the RAF failed them in that responsibility. I have no problem with that Walter, for that is indeed the nub of the matter. So what are you saying now, that the "Airworthiness Waffle" is part of the cover up? Talk about not seeing the wood for the trees! In my opinion the occupants of ZD576 died that day because the RAF (not the pilots!) failed them, and have been party to the cover up ever since. It pains me to say that, as someone proud to have served in the Service. But that is the wrong conspiracy and the wrong cover up for you, isn't it?
You made a revealing correction to my saying that having determined PRC112 was fitted you developed your theory of what happened from that, stating the reverse was true, ie the theory came first, and PRC112 thus confirmed that you were right, via "QED". No, Walter it doesn't work like that, and Mr Spock would rightly declare your reasoning to be illogical.
You rightly remind us of the human cost of this tragedy. As the final episode of the "World at War" implores; "Remember the Dead!". That is something all who post here do, I believe. I take it ill therefore when you imply that those who consider that the known Gross Unairworthiness of the Chinook HC2 then to be a factor in this tragedy, do not. It is that human cost, together with that of all the other airworthiness related Military Air Accidents, and the urgent need to reform UK Military Airworthiness Provision to avoid future needless deaths, that motivates me. What motivates you, Walter?
All that they wanted from the RAF that day was a safe ride to Fort George from Aldergrove
You made a revealing correction to my saying that having determined PRC112 was fitted you developed your theory of what happened from that, stating the reverse was true, ie the theory came first, and PRC112 thus confirmed that you were right, via "QED". No, Walter it doesn't work like that, and Mr Spock would rightly declare your reasoning to be illogical.
You rightly remind us of the human cost of this tragedy. As the final episode of the "World at War" implores; "Remember the Dead!". That is something all who post here do, I believe. I take it ill therefore when you imply that those who consider that the known Gross Unairworthiness of the Chinook HC2 then to be a factor in this tragedy, do not. It is that human cost, together with that of all the other airworthiness related Military Air Accidents, and the urgent need to reform UK Military Airworthiness Provision to avoid future needless deaths, that motivates me. What motivates you, Walter?
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Chugalug
The clip wasn't just about the human cost of just those on board:
it was to emphasise the link to the cost to the population of a large chunk of Britain that then had accept major social change as part of the “peace” process (I do not want to discuss “the end justifies the means” here);
it was to hammer home the motive for a possibly contrived crash;
it was to let you look into the faces of the people that the service that you were so proud to serve in let down, both at a high level before the act and insidiously down through the ranks afterwards when people who knew of the equipment and its uses did not bring it to the attention of the inquiries.
The clip wasn't just about the human cost of just those on board:
it was to emphasise the link to the cost to the population of a large chunk of Britain that then had accept major social change as part of the “peace” process (I do not want to discuss “the end justifies the means” here);
it was to hammer home the motive for a possibly contrived crash;
it was to let you look into the faces of the people that the service that you were so proud to serve in let down, both at a high level before the act and insidiously down through the ranks afterwards when people who knew of the equipment and its uses did not bring it to the attention of the inquiries.
I'm perfectly aware of what you are hammering home Walter, I take exception that you are hammering the wrong people! The loss to the nation, communities, families and loved ones was, indeed is, unbearable. Ignore the Regulations, order subordinates to make false declarations, bury reports and expert urgent pleas to ground aircraft, then release those aircraft into squadron service lines up all the holes in the cheese slices and means an accident looking for a place to happen. I contend that place was the Mull of Kintyre on 2nd June 1994. The people who connived to subvert the regulations are the ones you should castigate, Walter. Why don't you?
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Isn't that what you all are doing?
Just get on with your paperchase - we don't all have to run with the pack.
If you you do not wish to be upset by disturbing conclusions, best put me on your ignore list - or is it your turn as one of Orwell's sheep?
Just get on with your paperchase - we don't all have to run with the pack.
If you you do not wish to be upset by disturbing conclusions, best put me on your ignore list - or is it your turn as one of Orwell's sheep?
Walter:
By which you mean that "you all" are hammering the wrong people? I don't think so Walter, because there is indeed a paper chase, as you say. Each piece of paper painfully and laboriously obtained under the FoI Act. Together with personal testimony posted in this very thread they lead to the same people, time and time again. The process is called gathering evidence Walter, a necessary prerequisite to "hammering". Where is your evidence? Oh yes, of course, you have shown that PRC112 could have been installed on that fatal flight, endex! That's it then though, isn't it Walter? That is why, to answer AA's question (as you probably won't), no-one listens to you now.
When this thread was concerned with forming possible scenarios as to what led to this terrible tragedy, yours was put forward together with others. Since then the unbelievable dereliction of duty, and worse, by very senior RAF Officers and others has been shown to have led directly to the premature and fatal rush into service of the grossly unairworthy Chinook HC2. That wasn't waffle, Walter. Waffle is what you do; propound theories that cannot be backed up with evidence. Go and get some, why don't you? Because there isn't any, is there? I answer for you again as I know that you will not. Your case is a busted flush Walter. Admit it!
Isn't that what you all are doing?
When this thread was concerned with forming possible scenarios as to what led to this terrible tragedy, yours was put forward together with others. Since then the unbelievable dereliction of duty, and worse, by very senior RAF Officers and others has been shown to have led directly to the premature and fatal rush into service of the grossly unairworthy Chinook HC2. That wasn't waffle, Walter. Waffle is what you do; propound theories that cannot be backed up with evidence. Go and get some, why don't you? Because there isn't any, is there? I answer for you again as I know that you will not. Your case is a busted flush Walter. Admit it!
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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As most of you will probably know, I no longer see WK's posts. I see from the thread that he is still active in his 'theory'. I would not be surprised if he was still endorsing the need for us to 'go walk on the Mull to see the cloud' 
Some time ago I did a ball-park statistical analysis of the chances of such a plan failing due to circumstances and the likelihood of a major political uproar resulting from 'discovery' of this 'plot'. I cannot recall the numbers, but the probability of an embarrassing failure was high. I now wish to add further degrading statistics -
1) The ?US NAVY seals? (was it?) would need to have been positioned in the area before the event
2) They would have to have known that a Chinook MkII with this kit was to be used for the flight
3) They would have to have known the pax details
4) They would have to have known the planned route
5) Someone would have had to 'arrange' a fly-by/stop at this 'landing-site'
6) They would have to have known TOT in order to get into position
If anyone wishes to add these factors to my other factors it is my firm opinion that the whole idea is farce. HOWEVER, if WK is SO convinced it is true, one might assume he must have detailed knowledge of it, and then according to his assurance a while back, would have presented the evidence to the enquiry (presumably 'in camera') and thus it will be in the considerations of the enquiry.
That should be enough. I again make a plea that posters do not feed this theory by responding. There is no point and it distracts from the aim of the campaign. IF, in the unlikely event it is found to be true, it should automatically over-turn the verdict - QED?
Some time ago I did a ball-park statistical analysis of the chances of such a plan failing due to circumstances and the likelihood of a major political uproar resulting from 'discovery' of this 'plot'. I cannot recall the numbers, but the probability of an embarrassing failure was high. I now wish to add further degrading statistics -
1) The ?US NAVY seals? (was it?) would need to have been positioned in the area before the event
2) They would have to have known that a Chinook MkII with this kit was to be used for the flight
3) They would have to have known the pax details
4) They would have to have known the planned route
5) Someone would have had to 'arrange' a fly-by/stop at this 'landing-site'
6) They would have to have known TOT in order to get into position
If anyone wishes to add these factors to my other factors it is my firm opinion that the whole idea is farce. HOWEVER, if WK is SO convinced it is true, one might assume he must have detailed knowledge of it, and then according to his assurance a while back, would have presented the evidence to the enquiry (presumably 'in camera') and thus it will be in the considerations of the enquiry.
That should be enough. I again make a plea that posters do not feed this theory by responding. There is no point and it distracts from the aim of the campaign. IF, in the unlikely event it is found to be true, it should automatically over-turn the verdict - QED?
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Like all conspiracy theorists Walter starts from the wrong end
IF someone wanted to kill these guys they could take them out, one at a time, by taking a bus ride top their houses and shooting them at the their front door (God knows it happened often enough) instead
Why wait until they were all on a helicopter and take them out that way? The complexities are mind boggling and neither MI6 nor the Provos ever showed a real ability to plan and carry out seriously complex operations
IF someone wanted to kill these guys they could take them out, one at a time, by taking a bus ride top their houses and shooting them at the their front door (God knows it happened often enough) instead
Why wait until they were all on a helicopter and take them out that way? The complexities are mind boggling and neither MI6 nor the Provos ever showed a real ability to plan and carry out seriously complex operations
BOAC:
Ironically you and Walter seem to share common ground! You will not know, as you say that he is on your "ignore" list, that he has suggested that I should place him on mine! With due respect to both of you, I must disagree. I well remember the resistance and hostility that "we all" received when first expounding our airworthiness ideas on this very thread. Of course some of that attitude still pertains amongst those like Walter who propose alternative theories and those MOD apologists (temporarily gone to ground?) who have a vested interest in muddying the waters. Others however have become more receptive to the contention that ZD576 was Grossly Unairworthy before killing its 29 occupants.
Opposing views are the lifeblood of this Forum and this thread. By working through them the truth may be arrived at, by rejecting and ignoring them it almost certainly will not. Walter himself has revealed the existence and possible use of the PRC112 (his wacky radio!) as well as illustrating the very typical orographic cloud that enshrouds the Mull with a southerly onshore wind.
May I in return suggest that those who are ignoring anyone presently "unignores" them and confront propositions that they oppose instead?
I again make a plea that posters do not feed this theory by responding.
Opposing views are the lifeblood of this Forum and this thread. By working through them the truth may be arrived at, by rejecting and ignoring them it almost certainly will not. Walter himself has revealed the existence and possible use of the PRC112 (his wacky radio!) as well as illustrating the very typical orographic cloud that enshrouds the Mull with a southerly onshore wind.
May I in return suggest that those who are ignoring anyone presently "unignores" them and confront propositions that they oppose instead?
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BOAC
7. You then have to persuade a very experienced crew to use a piece of equipment with which they have little or no experience to make a high speed approach in marginal conditions. They must not enter this into the authorisation sheets or tell anyone at their base they are going to do this.
Walter
John Stalker was also a pain to the government of the time. They treated him badly, but they didn't kill him. If the conspiritors had such access to the aircraft and crew, they could have devised a far better and more foolproof way of killing them than inducing a visual illusion.
7. You then have to persuade a very experienced crew to use a piece of equipment with which they have little or no experience to make a high speed approach in marginal conditions. They must not enter this into the authorisation sheets or tell anyone at their base they are going to do this.
Walter
John Stalker was also a pain to the government of the time. They treated him badly, but they didn't kill him. If the conspiritors had such access to the aircraft and crew, they could have devised a far better and more foolproof way of killing them than inducing a visual illusion.
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May I in return suggest that those who are ignoring anyone presently "unignores" them and confront propositions that they oppose instead?
It is a complete and utter waste of time engaging with WK. He's just not listening!
Nothing is more precious than life, Tandemrotor, I could not agree more. That is especially true when it is arbitrarily cut short by incompetence, malevolence and arrogance. That, as I told Walter, is what motivates me.
I agree that he does not appear to listen. No matter, others judge him accordingly and it weakens his case. Indeed anyone who does not listen will be similarly judged. As to an utter and complete waste of time, one is tempted to characterize the past 17 years thus, given that a likely major factor, if not the direct cause, of this accident was the utterly dysfunctional state of UK Military Airworthiness Provision then and now. Why now? Because this accident like many other UK Military Air Accidents was not properly investigated and thus the dysfunction continues and more fatal airworthiness related accidents result. Time that was stopped!
I say that life is too precious not to listen to all points of view. I am often tempted to characterise Walter as a troll, but he is not, for I believe he sincerely believes what he opines here. I may well think he is wrong, but who am I to say that he is, if I do not listen to what he has to say? His case may fail, but that does not mean that everything that he says is without value. Tolerance of others can lead to an opening up of one's own perceptions. I commend it!
I agree that he does not appear to listen. No matter, others judge him accordingly and it weakens his case. Indeed anyone who does not listen will be similarly judged. As to an utter and complete waste of time, one is tempted to characterize the past 17 years thus, given that a likely major factor, if not the direct cause, of this accident was the utterly dysfunctional state of UK Military Airworthiness Provision then and now. Why now? Because this accident like many other UK Military Air Accidents was not properly investigated and thus the dysfunction continues and more fatal airworthiness related accidents result. Time that was stopped!
I say that life is too precious not to listen to all points of view. I am often tempted to characterise Walter as a troll, but he is not, for I believe he sincerely believes what he opines here. I may well think he is wrong, but who am I to say that he is, if I do not listen to what he has to say? His case may fail, but that does not mean that everything that he says is without value. Tolerance of others can lead to an opening up of one's own perceptions. I commend it!
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given that a likely major factor, if not the direct cause, of this accident was the utterly dysfunctional state of the UK Military Airworthiness Provision then and now.
Is there any proof directly linking any 'airworthiness' issues with the cause of the accident on 2nd Jun 1994...
Or are you overstating a circumstantial link...
Edited to add:
Because this accident like many other UK Military Air Accidents was not properly investigated
It wasn't the 'investigators' or the 'investigation' that were inadequate here!
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 29th May 2011 at 12:13.
Tandemrotor
I, like everyone else here, have carefully avoided claiming lack of airworthiness caused this crash.
However, what I do not hesitate to say is that there can be no greater Organisational Fault than releasing an aircraft to Service knowing that it fails the MoD’s own test of airworthiness on almost every single count.
The BoI were obliged to consider this. (AP3207). They heard cast iron evidence of such fault. Why did they not mention it?
The coruscating report that is CHART (August 1992) is 373 pages of utterly damning evidence in support of what I say, sent by the RAF’s own Inspectorate of Flight Safety to the RAF Chief Engineer and ACAS. As you know, it starts by stating previous fatal Chinook crashes were caused solely by (systemic) airworthiness failings. What Organisation would place sole blame on two pilots given;
a. That report
b. Evidence of even greater failures on Chinook HC Mk2
Answer – An Organisation that would withhold both facts from every subsequent inquiry.
The key players in this charade should be lined up, handed CHART, told to read the very first paragraph and asked if they would change their opinions. (By all means let them offer an opinion that the pilots erred, but if a pilot had survived I suggest CHART would have been his first defence exhibit – once he found out about it).
Especially the likes of Sir Donald Spiers, the man responsible for signing the basic airworthiness statement (CAR). But he has already stated he has never seen it. Think about that one. The man with the signature (on both Mk1 and Mk2) was not shown a report such as this? That, I suggest, is criminal. What makes it worse is CHART was seen by the next man in the airworthiness chain, ACAS. When the CAR was sent to ACAS for incorporation, in toto, into his RTS as Part 1, he should have immediately replied to Sir Donald asking if he was mad, had he not read CHART? Unless of course ACAS was under pressure to sign from within his own Organisation?
This is not merely circumstantial evidence. It is relevant, fully documented fact. The questions I ask are so obvious it is gross negligence not to have asked them at every stage of this inquiry.
The RAF will say they are within their rights to issue an RTS in such circumstances. I disagree. At point of issue, they are obliged to comply with regulations. Which is why they are called regulations, not guidelines. What the regulations permit them to do is add a Part 2 to the RTS including Service Deviations. But Part 1, the CAR, must remain in its current form and be valid. ACAS did not add a Part 2 in November 1993. The RTS was the same as the CAR. That is, the aircraft was not safe for the intended operational use, with meaningful trials not due to commence until April 1994. And then they were delayed because Boscombe grounded the PE Fleet twice in 1994 before the crash. On airworthiness grounds.
Any fair and reasonable inquiry, given those facts, would slate them as a contributory.
You mention the AAIB. I merely point out that their nine recommendations fall into the “FFS, not again, when will you listen?” category. Every single one of them. That, too, is indicative of an airworthiness system in total meltdown.
I, like everyone else here, have carefully avoided claiming lack of airworthiness caused this crash.
However, what I do not hesitate to say is that there can be no greater Organisational Fault than releasing an aircraft to Service knowing that it fails the MoD’s own test of airworthiness on almost every single count.
The BoI were obliged to consider this. (AP3207). They heard cast iron evidence of such fault. Why did they not mention it?
The coruscating report that is CHART (August 1992) is 373 pages of utterly damning evidence in support of what I say, sent by the RAF’s own Inspectorate of Flight Safety to the RAF Chief Engineer and ACAS. As you know, it starts by stating previous fatal Chinook crashes were caused solely by (systemic) airworthiness failings. What Organisation would place sole blame on two pilots given;
a. That report
b. Evidence of even greater failures on Chinook HC Mk2
Answer – An Organisation that would withhold both facts from every subsequent inquiry.
The key players in this charade should be lined up, handed CHART, told to read the very first paragraph and asked if they would change their opinions. (By all means let them offer an opinion that the pilots erred, but if a pilot had survived I suggest CHART would have been his first defence exhibit – once he found out about it).
Especially the likes of Sir Donald Spiers, the man responsible for signing the basic airworthiness statement (CAR). But he has already stated he has never seen it. Think about that one. The man with the signature (on both Mk1 and Mk2) was not shown a report such as this? That, I suggest, is criminal. What makes it worse is CHART was seen by the next man in the airworthiness chain, ACAS. When the CAR was sent to ACAS for incorporation, in toto, into his RTS as Part 1, he should have immediately replied to Sir Donald asking if he was mad, had he not read CHART? Unless of course ACAS was under pressure to sign from within his own Organisation?
This is not merely circumstantial evidence. It is relevant, fully documented fact. The questions I ask are so obvious it is gross negligence not to have asked them at every stage of this inquiry.
The RAF will say they are within their rights to issue an RTS in such circumstances. I disagree. At point of issue, they are obliged to comply with regulations. Which is why they are called regulations, not guidelines. What the regulations permit them to do is add a Part 2 to the RTS including Service Deviations. But Part 1, the CAR, must remain in its current form and be valid. ACAS did not add a Part 2 in November 1993. The RTS was the same as the CAR. That is, the aircraft was not safe for the intended operational use, with meaningful trials not due to commence until April 1994. And then they were delayed because Boscombe grounded the PE Fleet twice in 1994 before the crash. On airworthiness grounds.
Any fair and reasonable inquiry, given those facts, would slate them as a contributory.
You mention the AAIB. I merely point out that their nine recommendations fall into the “FFS, not again, when will you listen?” category. Every single one of them. That, too, is indicative of an airworthiness system in total meltdown.