Tandemrotor
I, like everyone else here, have carefully avoided claiming lack of airworthiness caused this crash.
However, what I do not hesitate to say is that there can be no greater Organisational Fault than releasing an aircraft to Service knowing that it fails the MoD’s own test of airworthiness on almost every single count.
The BoI were obliged to consider this. (AP3207). They heard cast iron evidence of such fault. Why did they not mention it?
The coruscating report that is CHART (August 1992) is 373 pages of utterly damning evidence in support of what I say, sent by the RAF’s own Inspectorate of Flight Safety to the RAF Chief Engineer and ACAS. As you know, it starts by stating previous fatal Chinook crashes were caused solely by (systemic) airworthiness failings. What Organisation would place sole blame on two pilots given;
a. That report
b. Evidence of even greater failures on Chinook HC Mk2
Answer – An Organisation that would withhold both facts from every subsequent inquiry.
The key players in this charade should be lined up, handed CHART, told to read the very first paragraph and asked if they would change their opinions. (By all means let them offer an opinion that the pilots erred, but if a pilot had survived I suggest CHART would have been his first defence exhibit – once he found out about it).
Especially the likes of Sir Donald Spiers, the man responsible for signing the basic airworthiness statement (CAR). But he has already stated he has never seen it. Think about that one. The man with the signature (on both Mk1 and Mk2) was not shown a report such as this? That, I suggest, is criminal. What makes it worse is CHART was seen by the next man in the airworthiness chain, ACAS. When the CAR was sent to ACAS for incorporation, in toto, into his RTS as Part 1, he should have immediately replied to Sir Donald asking if he was mad, had he not read CHART? Unless of course ACAS was under pressure to sign from within his own Organisation?
This is not merely circumstantial evidence. It is relevant, fully documented fact. The questions I ask are so obvious it is gross negligence not to have asked them at every stage of this inquiry.
The RAF will say they are within their rights to issue an RTS in such circumstances. I disagree. At point of issue, they are obliged to comply with regulations. Which is why they are called regulations, not guidelines. What the regulations permit them to do is add a Part 2 to the RTS including Service Deviations. But Part 1, the CAR, must remain in its current form and be valid. ACAS did not add a Part 2 in November 1993. The RTS was the same as the CAR. That is, the aircraft was not safe for the intended operational use, with meaningful trials not due to commence until April 1994. And then they were delayed because Boscombe grounded the PE Fleet twice in 1994 before the crash. On airworthiness grounds.
Any fair and reasonable inquiry, given those facts, would slate them as a contributory.
You mention the AAIB. I merely point out that their nine recommendations fall into the “FFS, not again, when will you listen?” category. Every single one of them. That, too, is indicative of an airworthiness system in total meltdown.