Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Get your head out of the sand.
The quote could be a perfect example of a boomerang and it wouldn't be out of place.
Please see this thread, post #61, run video, at 1h10m;
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...on-cave-7.html
A perfect description of the Chinook HC Mk2 Release to Service. Can anyone here point me to a statement in the RTS (at 2.6.94) that gives the remotest indication the aircraft was sufficiently mature or its Nav/Comms systems were cleared for operational use?
Perfect description of the UFCMs, “positively dangerous” safety critical software issues and more, as of 2.6.94.
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...on-cave-7.html
“Mischaracterisation of the vehicle as a mature operational system”
A perfect description of the Chinook HC Mk2 Release to Service. Can anyone here point me to a statement in the RTS (at 2.6.94) that gives the remotest indication the aircraft was sufficiently mature or its Nav/Comms systems were cleared for operational use?
“Anomalies (in testing) should bring your organisation to a standstill. They are a violation of requirements. They are a clue something worse may happen”.
Perfect description of the UFCMs, “positively dangerous” safety critical software issues and more, as of 2.6.94.
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Walter
Why trust a newly fitted and unfamiliar piece of equipment in abysmal weather?
Why approach the coast at high speed in an aircraft that can hover?
Who switched on the ground beacon?
They didn't
FADEC
?
Why trust a newly fitted and unfamiliar piece of equipment in abysmal weather?
Why approach the coast at high speed in an aircraft that can hover?
Who switched on the ground beacon?
They didn't
FADEC
?
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In much the same way, one could argue, as those "in on the act" of falsifying an airworthiness trail etc could be seen to be culpable, and they have avoided spilling the beans for just as long...
TN
Walter:
Funny, I was going to say the same thing, but thought better of it. I was wrong not to do so. I see that now.
We have facts. Your only fact is that PRC112 was fitted. Out of that you have drawn up a theory. It remains just that. You believe your theory to be true and that everyone else is wrong. Your call, but the last bloke to do so looked rather silly the other day at 6PM, wouldn't you say?
Get your head out of the sand.
We have facts. Your only fact is that PRC112 was fitted. Out of that you have drawn up a theory. It remains just that. You believe your theory to be true and that everyone else is wrong. Your call, but the last bloke to do so looked rather silly the other day at 6PM, wouldn't you say?
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AA, at the risk of dragging this on, the only way the people "in on the act" would keep their mouths shut this long would be if they were all culpable for what happened. That would be a strong incentive for silence.
Thor
The beans were well and truly spilled long ago. What those responsible for the act have avoided is gaol.
In much the same way, one could argue, as those "in on the act" of falsifying an airworthiness trail etc could be seen to be culpable, and they have avoided spilling the beans for just as long...
The beans were well and truly spilled long ago. What those responsible for the act have avoided is gaol.
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True, but not (deliberately) by those who have a vested interest in keeping it quiet, which was my point.
With that scenario (airworthiness, RTS etc), there are a number of things that should exist, which don't. It has been proved that things were/weren't done negligently and/or maliciously. While the guilty parties 'fessing up would help, it isn't essential.
With the alternate (or should that be Walternate?) scenario, there is no paper trail to find, no reason to ask questions, and no reason to speak out you were involved.
Sadly. Is it too late, I wonder?
TN
With that scenario (airworthiness, RTS etc), there are a number of things that should exist, which don't. It has been proved that things were/weren't done negligently and/or maliciously. While the guilty parties 'fessing up would help, it isn't essential.
With the alternate (or should that be Walternate?) scenario, there is no paper trail to find, no reason to ask questions, and no reason to speak out you were involved.
Sadly. Is it too late, I wonder?
TN
TN:
Not sure of your reasoning there, TN. Are you saying that there is a Statute of Limitations for the offence of subverting the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations, or even of the military offence of issuing an illegal order? The limitation of the first is surely merely that relating to any alleged offence, ie the provision of proof. Not sure about the second I must confess. No doubt 2*'s and above are immune to Courts Martial, some certainly act as though they are. Perhaps someone could advise, together with the legal position of someone who has retired in such a rank. Can he/she be prosecuted for an offence committed whilst they were still serving? If so by whom?
Sadly. Is it too late, I wonder?
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Chug
<<Your only fact is that PRC112 was fitted. Out of that you have drawn up a theory. >>
It was the other way around which is a case of QED.
Dalek
<<Why trust a newly fitted and unfamiliar piece of equipment in abysmal weather?>>
There's not that much to the kit – ask those who have used it – and it is intrinsically accurate. And the weather again – why not run your eyes over the earlier posts on weather (I even put up some photos to explain).
<<Why approach the coast at high speed in an aircraft that can hover? >>
Ask those who fly them what is a fast approach and why, etc …..
Ah! the comfort zone that is the airworthiness waffle – if a car runs off a cliff because a deviation sign sent them down the wrong track, would it matter if the car had an MOT? Perhaps a parallel debate would run on whether it would have stopped in time if the brakes were checked but surely the big question should be why it took the wrong track in the first place.
<<Your only fact is that PRC112 was fitted. Out of that you have drawn up a theory. >>
It was the other way around which is a case of QED.
Dalek
<<Why trust a newly fitted and unfamiliar piece of equipment in abysmal weather?>>
There's not that much to the kit – ask those who have used it – and it is intrinsically accurate. And the weather again – why not run your eyes over the earlier posts on weather (I even put up some photos to explain).
<<Why approach the coast at high speed in an aircraft that can hover? >>
Ask those who fly them what is a fast approach and why, etc …..
Ah! the comfort zone that is the airworthiness waffle – if a car runs off a cliff because a deviation sign sent them down the wrong track, would it matter if the car had an MOT? Perhaps a parallel debate would run on whether it would have stopped in time if the brakes were checked but surely the big question should be why it took the wrong track in the first place.
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Walter
I'm sorry, I will not accept your thesis.
Were it true, the crew would have to have been briefed by somebody to do what they did. Therefore, they would have been deliberately approaching a coastline in poor weather.
That is something I have done at least dozens if not hundreds of times in my 34 years in the RAF. I have done it supported by a fully engaged crew of four, a surface search radar accurate to under 100 yards and an autopilot rated to zero visibility / zero height / zero speed. I refuse to believe that any competent RAF crew without those sophisticated toys (ie flying a Chinook 2 rather than a Sea King 3) would have continued such an approach deliberately in the conditions prevailing. Without deliberate action there is no Gross Negligence. Further, having been asked to perform such a manouevre deliberately, I am certain that a crew of the experience involved here would have aborted given the conditions. Thus, the combination of your hypothesis and the outcome is, in my opinion, untenable.
Of course, it is again my opinion. It does not meet the standard of proof required.
Iain
I'm sorry, I will not accept your thesis.
Were it true, the crew would have to have been briefed by somebody to do what they did. Therefore, they would have been deliberately approaching a coastline in poor weather.
That is something I have done at least dozens if not hundreds of times in my 34 years in the RAF. I have done it supported by a fully engaged crew of four, a surface search radar accurate to under 100 yards and an autopilot rated to zero visibility / zero height / zero speed. I refuse to believe that any competent RAF crew without those sophisticated toys (ie flying a Chinook 2 rather than a Sea King 3) would have continued such an approach deliberately in the conditions prevailing. Without deliberate action there is no Gross Negligence. Further, having been asked to perform such a manouevre deliberately, I am certain that a crew of the experience involved here would have aborted given the conditions. Thus, the combination of your hypothesis and the outcome is, in my opinion, untenable.
Of course, it is again my opinion. It does not meet the standard of proof required.
Iain
Walter
If, as you claim, CPLS was fitted to ZD576, then that would demonstrate a fundamental airworthiness failing, because the regulations require every piece of kit to be listed in the RTS, along with level of clearance and any limitations. If it is not listed, it is not cleared for use to any level - the risk being, in this case, of EMI.
Care to list the equipment mentioned in the RTS? No sign of CPLS? Then there is a conflict between your assertions that CPLS was fitted and airworthiness is "waffle". In fact, the (lack of) airworthiness fact is key to your theory. Your theory may turn out to be wrong, but the fact remains.
If, as you claim, CPLS was fitted to ZD576, then that would demonstrate a fundamental airworthiness failing, because the regulations require every piece of kit to be listed in the RTS, along with level of clearance and any limitations. If it is not listed, it is not cleared for use to any level - the risk being, in this case, of EMI.
Care to list the equipment mentioned in the RTS? No sign of CPLS? Then there is a conflict between your assertions that CPLS was fitted and airworthiness is "waffle". In fact, the (lack of) airworthiness fact is key to your theory. Your theory may turn out to be wrong, but the fact remains.
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Spot on Sven.
CPLS fitted. Yes
CPLS used. Probably not but maybe.
CPLS used for high speed approach to the Mull. Never.
They have no Radar, ILS or similar backup and they are distrustful of their TANS. What you suggest is suicidal.
Not even Wratten, Day or JP have ever suggested this crew had suicidal tendencies.
CPLS fitted. Yes
CPLS used. Probably not but maybe.
CPLS used for high speed approach to the Mull. Never.
They have no Radar, ILS or similar backup and they are distrustful of their TANS. What you suggest is suicidal.
Not even Wratten, Day or JP have ever suggested this crew had suicidal tendencies.
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As I have said for many years, understanding the local weather generated by the headland is germane to understanding why they could see it but judging distance to it would have been difficult.
By all accounts, it was typical with a southerly blowing - on the day, the orographic cloud started at about 800ft obscuring the higher topographic features;
the lower slopes, with the strong wind blowing off the sea and so late in the day, a thin layer of mist ran up the slopes close to the ground blurring ground textures on that already featureless slope (bugger all trees, etc) - imagine wet DPM steaming in front of a fire) - you could see it (as the yachtsman said) but it would be difficult to judge the range;
you could stay clear of it visually but if you wanted to approach (for whatever reason) a particular spot on the land, it would be very difficult to judge your closing range - and if something you should have been able to trust was giving you the wrong range, you would have a hard time detecting this,
The navigational analysis showed a deliberate turn to the right close in (see earlier posts) and the control positions and responses combined with the engine data indicated an awareness of their proximity to the ground at the last moment and that they had control - while they had knowingly approached the ground they were evidently surprised at just how close they had got.
Gentlemen, you have had 16 summers to go up there and see for yourself just what local weather is generated by a strong wind onto the Mull (it's common enough) - we are getting close to the anniversary of the crash - get yourselves together and hire a boat; stand 1/2 a mile or so off the coast at tea time when a moderate or strong southerly is forecast.
You could make an outing out of it - pass the time with a game judging how far off you were (get the skipper to move about a bit and check your answers with his radar) or chatting about whether the Mk2 was built like a Lada or a Rolls - and whether it would have made any difference to the crew heading towards the land at 150 kts if they had been being misled by some device as to their actual range to go.
By all accounts, it was typical with a southerly blowing - on the day, the orographic cloud started at about 800ft obscuring the higher topographic features;
the lower slopes, with the strong wind blowing off the sea and so late in the day, a thin layer of mist ran up the slopes close to the ground blurring ground textures on that already featureless slope (bugger all trees, etc) - imagine wet DPM steaming in front of a fire) - you could see it (as the yachtsman said) but it would be difficult to judge the range;
you could stay clear of it visually but if you wanted to approach (for whatever reason) a particular spot on the land, it would be very difficult to judge your closing range - and if something you should have been able to trust was giving you the wrong range, you would have a hard time detecting this,
The navigational analysis showed a deliberate turn to the right close in (see earlier posts) and the control positions and responses combined with the engine data indicated an awareness of their proximity to the ground at the last moment and that they had control - while they had knowingly approached the ground they were evidently surprised at just how close they had got.
Gentlemen, you have had 16 summers to go up there and see for yourself just what local weather is generated by a strong wind onto the Mull (it's common enough) - we are getting close to the anniversary of the crash - get yourselves together and hire a boat; stand 1/2 a mile or so off the coast at tea time when a moderate or strong southerly is forecast.
You could make an outing out of it - pass the time with a game judging how far off you were (get the skipper to move about a bit and check your answers with his radar) or chatting about whether the Mk2 was built like a Lada or a Rolls - and whether it would have made any difference to the crew heading towards the land at 150 kts if they had been being misled by some device as to their actual range to go.
Here's a selection of nav and comms equipments fitted to and cleared for use in Chinook HC Mk1.
Marconi AD120/3 VHF (am)
Plessey PTR 1751W UHF (am)
Marconi ARC 340 VHF (fm)
Marconi ARC 340 VHF (fm) Homing
Chelton 7 VHF (am) Homing
Collins 718 U4A HF
PTR1751 WWH HQ UHF
Improved UHF Secure SATCOM
Racal B6911 CCS
Decca Doppler 71
Marconi AD380 Radio Compass
AN/APN 198 Radar Altimeter
GM9 Compass
E2C Standby Compass
Decca 671 VOR/ILS
Cossor 1520 IFF/SSR
Marconi AD2770 TACAN
RNS252 Super TANS
Trimble 8000 GPS
Cossor 4760 Mk12 Mode 4 IFF
OMEGA Nav System
OMEGA Grid Mode Selector
Keystone/Cougarnet
Delco IVA Carousel INS
Care to hazard a guess at how many had full or even limited clearance for use in Mk2 as of November 1993 (CAR and RTS) and June 1994?
None.
I wonder what the safety case said about that, the positively dangerous software or the fact an essential safety modification (relating to DASH) had been outstanding for 5 years. If there was a safety case, one thing is certain. It cannot be reconciled with the RTS or the build standard of ZD576. Which is another way of saying what Haddon-Cave and the CHART report said of Nimrod and Chinook/Puma/Wessex respectively.
Marconi AD120/3 VHF (am)
Plessey PTR 1751W UHF (am)
Marconi ARC 340 VHF (fm)
Marconi ARC 340 VHF (fm) Homing
Chelton 7 VHF (am) Homing
Collins 718 U4A HF
PTR1751 WWH HQ UHF
Improved UHF Secure SATCOM
Racal B6911 CCS
Decca Doppler 71
Marconi AD380 Radio Compass
AN/APN 198 Radar Altimeter
GM9 Compass
E2C Standby Compass
Decca 671 VOR/ILS
Cossor 1520 IFF/SSR
Marconi AD2770 TACAN
RNS252 Super TANS
Trimble 8000 GPS
Cossor 4760 Mk12 Mode 4 IFF
OMEGA Nav System
OMEGA Grid Mode Selector
Keystone/Cougarnet
Delco IVA Carousel INS
Care to hazard a guess at how many had full or even limited clearance for use in Mk2 as of November 1993 (CAR and RTS) and June 1994?
None.
I wonder what the safety case said about that, the positively dangerous software or the fact an essential safety modification (relating to DASH) had been outstanding for 5 years. If there was a safety case, one thing is certain. It cannot be reconciled with the RTS or the build standard of ZD576. Which is another way of saying what Haddon-Cave and the CHART report said of Nimrod and Chinook/Puma/Wessex respectively.
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Speed again
Walter,
I have always said the many photographs you posted are excellent and show the conditions that (probably) pertained at the Mull that day.
I also agree with you that it would be very easy to become victim of visual illusion on a day like that. This would make the accident Aircrew Error, not Gross Negligence.
If the crew were given by CPLS an incorrect range to the coast, this danger would increase significantly.
The big problem with your theory and that of the AM's is speed.
The aircraft impacted at IAS 149 (Cable)
The aircraft was at lower speed a minute or so earlier ( RACAL or Holbrook)
If the LZ was visible on the edge of the cloudbank and an approach was just possible, every instinct of every crew I have ever flown with would be to configure early and slow down.
I have never met anyone who would choose to deliberately accelerate in those conditions.
Speed by itself cannot conclusively prove anything. Both RACAL (remember 1.15 "may" and "not") and Hobrook may be wrong. But if we choose to disragard them we have no evidence at all.
If we accept the speed evidence then FADEC or team suicide are the only explanations.
I have always said the many photographs you posted are excellent and show the conditions that (probably) pertained at the Mull that day.
I also agree with you that it would be very easy to become victim of visual illusion on a day like that. This would make the accident Aircrew Error, not Gross Negligence.
If the crew were given by CPLS an incorrect range to the coast, this danger would increase significantly.
The big problem with your theory and that of the AM's is speed.
The aircraft impacted at IAS 149 (Cable)
The aircraft was at lower speed a minute or so earlier ( RACAL or Holbrook)
If the LZ was visible on the edge of the cloudbank and an approach was just possible, every instinct of every crew I have ever flown with would be to configure early and slow down.
I have never met anyone who would choose to deliberately accelerate in those conditions.
Speed by itself cannot conclusively prove anything. Both RACAL (remember 1.15 "may" and "not") and Hobrook may be wrong. But if we choose to disragard them we have no evidence at all.
If we accept the speed evidence then FADEC or team suicide are the only explanations.
Last edited by dalek; 25th May 2011 at 12:18.
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dalek
<<The big problem with your theory and that of the AM's is speed.
The aircraft impacted at IAS 149 (Cable)
The aircraft was at lower speed a minute or so earlier ( RACAL or Holbrook)>>
A long time ago I recommended that anyone interested in this case download Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data” (Mitchel) – back in 2002 (as I recall) it was the first available decent go at old fashioned analysis – it was nothing to do with the simulation – if you disagreed with parts of it, it at least served as a framework and aide memoire for you to do your own sums and was an easy reference for some of the basic data.
In it, Mitchel had it from dist/time analysis and using the best available data for wind that the a/c most probably had held a constant airspeed for the sea crossing up to waypoint change, where it made a turn to the right and then slowed down – the increased wind as it approached and crossed the shoreline masked this slowing down in airspeed – the steady intermediate power level supported the scenario of letting the speed wash off as they approached the shoreline.
I posted some time ago annotated charts showing that, had they continued to waypoint A and commenced any reasonable turn (30 – 60 bank) as they crossed the shoreline, their approach heading of 035 mag (that was their track on that final leg from waypoint change to the area of the crash and as was found on the HP's HoSI course selector) was ideal for a graceful swing around the back of the light house with plenty of room for safety at their altitude even at high cruise speed.
They would have been below the orographic cloud (800ish ft) and above the layer of mist running up the slope – they should have been able to see the lighthouse intermittently from above when they swung around it – it would have been an impressive demo, perhaps.
Waypoint A just happened to be where the LZ with which they were familiar was.
Although most probably able to make out the ground, they would surely not even have gone in even as close as waypoint change on visual alone or TANS at speed as they would not have wanted to cross much to the right of that LZ (as they unfortunately did) – the manoeuvre was safe only if they got the landfall right – they were correctly on track to waypoint A up until waypoint change yet they turned right while evidently in control. The most logical explanation is that they had something that they were relying upon to mark that LZ and that this reference was for whatever reason out of position - ½ a mile or so up the hill explains the turn off the correct track and that they closed with the landmass sooner than expected, missing the shoreline crossing with MALM Forbes not yet at his window position.
If there was any fault at all by the captain, it was the disposition of his loadmasters – if MALM Forbes had been, say, checking the CPLS CDU then it would have been a good idea to have the other loadie up at the side window, so critical was it to keep an eye out for the moment of crossing the shoreline.
<<The big problem with your theory and that of the AM's is speed.
The aircraft impacted at IAS 149 (Cable)
The aircraft was at lower speed a minute or so earlier ( RACAL or Holbrook)>>
A long time ago I recommended that anyone interested in this case download Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data” (Mitchel) – back in 2002 (as I recall) it was the first available decent go at old fashioned analysis – it was nothing to do with the simulation – if you disagreed with parts of it, it at least served as a framework and aide memoire for you to do your own sums and was an easy reference for some of the basic data.
In it, Mitchel had it from dist/time analysis and using the best available data for wind that the a/c most probably had held a constant airspeed for the sea crossing up to waypoint change, where it made a turn to the right and then slowed down – the increased wind as it approached and crossed the shoreline masked this slowing down in airspeed – the steady intermediate power level supported the scenario of letting the speed wash off as they approached the shoreline.
I posted some time ago annotated charts showing that, had they continued to waypoint A and commenced any reasonable turn (30 – 60 bank) as they crossed the shoreline, their approach heading of 035 mag (that was their track on that final leg from waypoint change to the area of the crash and as was found on the HP's HoSI course selector) was ideal for a graceful swing around the back of the light house with plenty of room for safety at their altitude even at high cruise speed.
They would have been below the orographic cloud (800ish ft) and above the layer of mist running up the slope – they should have been able to see the lighthouse intermittently from above when they swung around it – it would have been an impressive demo, perhaps.
Waypoint A just happened to be where the LZ with which they were familiar was.
Although most probably able to make out the ground, they would surely not even have gone in even as close as waypoint change on visual alone or TANS at speed as they would not have wanted to cross much to the right of that LZ (as they unfortunately did) – the manoeuvre was safe only if they got the landfall right – they were correctly on track to waypoint A up until waypoint change yet they turned right while evidently in control. The most logical explanation is that they had something that they were relying upon to mark that LZ and that this reference was for whatever reason out of position - ½ a mile or so up the hill explains the turn off the correct track and that they closed with the landmass sooner than expected, missing the shoreline crossing with MALM Forbes not yet at his window position.
If there was any fault at all by the captain, it was the disposition of his loadmasters – if MALM Forbes had been, say, checking the CPLS CDU then it would have been a good idea to have the other loadie up at the side window, so critical was it to keep an eye out for the moment of crossing the shoreline.
then it would have been a good idea to have the other loadie up at the side window, so critical was it to keep an eye out for the moment of crossing the shoreline.
Interesting point.
Transmission debris screens had to be checked every 5 minutes, DECU connectors every 15 minutes. The crew were **** busy!
Periodicity of debris check implies that was more important. But I imagine a DECU connector coming loose would be of more immediate concern, although I'm happy to be corrected by any aircrew. It is an interesting question though.
Of course, the proper answer is the aircraft shouldn't have been flying with such a ludicrous Servicing (sic) Instruction on an LRU hosting safety critical software. ATP should be asked to explain themselves. On the other hand, they didn't amend the SI to make it applicable in-flight, contrary to regs. I wonder if it was they who issued it in the first place, as required by regs? (There's a trend here, honest!).
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Analysis of Available Data
Back to where we were two years ago Walter.
If you ignore the RACAL analysis, there is no data to analyse.
If you use RACAL, then your reconstruction, even if done expertly, shows what may have happened.
Mr Cable's figures show impact at around 150 IAS. He is an accredited expert witness dealing with real wreckage.
Ignoring RACAL entirely, Mr Holbrook did not describe an aircraft thundering along at just below VNE.
No significant deceleration was made in the final two miles. That is if you examine all the evidence, instead of cherry picking the bits you like. Speed either stayed the same or increased.
I, and I think many others on this site, are quite happy to accept that this accident may have been caused, at least in part, by visual illusion. For whatever reason, the crew misjudged their range to the coast and screwed up their escape.
Why can't you accept the equally valid explanation. The crew did not slow because they could not slow.
If you ignore the RACAL analysis, there is no data to analyse.
If you use RACAL, then your reconstruction, even if done expertly, shows what may have happened.
Mr Cable's figures show impact at around 150 IAS. He is an accredited expert witness dealing with real wreckage.
Ignoring RACAL entirely, Mr Holbrook did not describe an aircraft thundering along at just below VNE.
No significant deceleration was made in the final two miles. That is if you examine all the evidence, instead of cherry picking the bits you like. Speed either stayed the same or increased.
I, and I think many others on this site, are quite happy to accept that this accident may have been caused, at least in part, by visual illusion. For whatever reason, the crew misjudged their range to the coast and screwed up their escape.
Why can't you accept the equally valid explanation. The crew did not slow because they could not slow.
Mr Cable's figures show impact at around 150 IAS